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wifi: ar5523: fix integer underflow in ar5523_data_rx_cb()

PATCH In review pip-izony 2 participants 3 messages Nov 3, 2025 – Jul 17 USB AR5523 wireless driver

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PATCH 1/1 wifi: ar5523: fix integer underflow in ar5523_data_rx_cb()

From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>

In ar5523_data_rx_cb(), the rxlen variable is derived from desc->len, which is provided by the USB device.

The function checks for an upper bound (rxlen > ar->rxbufsz) and for a zero value (!rxlen), but it fails to check for a proper lower bound against the size of the descriptor.

If a malicious device provides an rxlen value that is positive but smaller than sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc), the subtraction in the call to skb_put() will result in an integer underflow.

This passes a very large unsigned value to skb_put(), which then triggers a kernel panic upon detecting the potential buffer overflow.

Fix this by adding a check to ensure rxlen is at least sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc) before performing the substraction.

Fixes b7d572e1871df ("ar5523: Add new driver")
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c +6 -0
index 1230e6278f23..dfaccf241560 100644
@@ -589,6 +589,12 @@ static void ar5523_data_rx_cb(struct urb *urb)
 		goto skip;
 	}
 
+	if (rxlen < sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc)) {
+		ar5523_dbg(ar, "RX: Bad descriptor (len=%d is too small)\n",
+			   rxlen);
+		goto skip;
+	}
+
 	skb_reserve(data->skb, sizeof(*chunk));
 	skb_put(data->skb, rxlen - sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc));
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 32 lines · pip-izony

From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>

In ar5523_data_rx_cb(), the rxlen variable is derived from desc->len, which is provided by the USB device.

The function checks for an upper bound (rxlen > ar->rxbufsz) and for a zero value (!rxlen), but it fails to check for a proper lower bound against the size of the descriptor.

If a malicious device provides an rxlen value that is positive but smaller than sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc), the subtraction in the call to skb_put() will result in an integer underflow.

This passes a very large unsigned value to skb_put(), which then triggers a kernel panic upon detecting the potential buffer overflow.

Fix this by adding a check to ensure rxlen is at least sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc) before performing the substraction.

Fixes b7d572e1871df ("ar5523: Add new driver")
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c +0 -0
index 1230e6278f23..dfaccf241560 100644
@@ -589,6 +589,12 @@ static void ar5523_data_rx_cb(struct urb *urb)
 		goto skip;
 	}

drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c static void ar5523_data_rx_cb(struct urb *urb) · line 600

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c +6 -0
 
+	if (rxlen < sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc)) {
+		ar5523_dbg(ar, "RX: Bad descriptor (len=%d is too small)\n",
+			   rxlen);
+		goto skip;
+	}
+
 	skb_reserve(data->skb, sizeof(*chunk));
 	skb_put(data->skb, rxlen - sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc));
 

Since this is an orphaned driver, this patch has been sitting in my patchwork queue for a very long time. Today I decided to take a look.

The patch does address the issue mentioned, but really doesn't completely address the crux of the issue. I believe there should be a fixed correlation between the rxlen and the usblen. I posed the following question to my review agent:

given that the usblen should account for the ar5523_chunk header, the payload, and the ar5523_rx_desc, shouldn't the rxlen always be the same as the usblen - sizeof(ar5523_chunk)?

And my agent agreed:

Yes, that's exactly right. Looking at the struct comment "msg length including header" for desc->len and the frame layout:

[ar5523_chunk (4B)] [802.11 payload] [ar5523_rx_desc]
←──────────────────── usblen ──────────────────────→

The invariant should be:

rxlen == usblen - sizeof(ar5523_chunk)

Because rxlen covers [802.11 payload] + [ar5523_rx_desc], and usblen covers
everything including the chunk header.

The code never cross-validates them. It independently bounds-checks usblen
(via AR5523_MIN_RXBUFSZ) and rxlen (upper bound vs rxbufsz, lower bound added by the patch), but if a malicious device provides rxlen > usblen - sizeof(ar5523_chunk), then:

  skb_put(data->skb, rxlen - sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc));

...would expose bytes beyond the actual 802.11 payload — potentially biting
into the ar5523_rx_desc trailer bytes, or uninitialized skb tail space up to rxbufsz, and pass that garbage to ieee80211_rx_irqsafe().

The existing upper bound check rxlen > ar->rxbufsz prevents a skb_put
overflow (since the skb is allocated with rxbufsz), but it's far too loose. The right check would be:

if (rxlen != usblen - sizeof(struct ar5523_chunk))

      goto skip;

Or at minimum a strict upper bound:

if (rxlen > usblen - sizeof(struct ar5523_chunk))

      goto skip;

So the patch fixes the underflow but misses this inconsistency between rxlen
and usblen that could allow overreading valid-but-wrong data within the skb buffer.

So please consider this analysis and propose a v2

/jeff

author
#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 wifi: ar5523: validate rxlen against descriptor size and usblen in ar5523_data_rx_cb()

From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>

In ar5523_data_rx_cb(), the rxlen variable is derived from desc->len, which is provided by the USB device.

The function checks for an upper bound (rxlen > ar->rxbufsz) and for a zero value (!rxlen), but it fails to check for a proper lower bound against the size of the descriptor.

If a malicious device provides an rxlen value that is positive but smaller than sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc), the subtraction in the call to skb_put() will result in an integer underflow.

This passes a very large unsigned value to skb_put(), which then triggers a kernel panic upon detecting the potential buffer overflow.

Fix this by adding a check to ensure rxlen is at least sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc) before performing the subtraction.

Additionally, rxlen is not cross-checked against usblen (the number of bytes actually received). Since the frame layout is [ar5523_chunk][802.11 payload][ar5523_rx_desc] and usblen covers the whole buffer, a valid rxlen cannot exceed usblen - sizeof(chunk). A device reporting a larger rxlen would cause skb_put() to expose descriptor trailer bytes or uninitialized skb tail data as 802.11 payload to ieee80211_rx_irqsafe().

Add a check to reject such frames.

Fixes b7d572e1871df ("ar5523: Add new driver")

---
v1 -> v2: cross-check rxlen against usblen to prevent overreading past the received payload

 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c +12 -0
index 66ac396858a5..3ee4b020f416 100644
@@ -589,6 +589,18 @@ static void ar5523_data_rx_cb(struct urb *urb)
 		goto skip;
 	}
 
+	if (rxlen < sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc)) {
+		ar5523_dbg(ar, "RX: Bad descriptor (len=%u is too small)\n",
+			   rxlen);
+		goto skip;
+	}
+
+	if (rxlen > usblen - sizeof(struct ar5523_chunk)) {
+		ar5523_dbg(ar, "RX: rxlen too large (rxlen=%u usblen=%d)\n",
+			   rxlen, usblen);
+		goto skip;
+	}
+
 	skb_reserve(data->skb, sizeof(*chunk));
 	skb_put(data->skb, rxlen - sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc));
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0