wifi: ar5523: fix integer underflow in ar5523_data_rx_cb()
PATCH 1/1 wifi: ar5523: fix integer underflow in ar5523_data_rx_cb()
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
In ar5523_data_rx_cb(), the rxlen variable is derived from desc->len, which is provided by the USB device.
The function checks for an upper bound (rxlen > ar->rxbufsz) and for a zero value (!rxlen), but it fails to check for a proper lower bound against the size of the descriptor.
If a malicious device provides an rxlen value that is positive but smaller than sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc), the subtraction in the call to skb_put() will result in an integer underflow.
This passes a very large unsigned value to skb_put(), which then triggers a kernel panic upon detecting the potential buffer overflow.
Fix this by adding a check to ensure rxlen is at least sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc) before performing the substraction.
--- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c +6 -0
@@ -589,6 +589,12 @@ static void ar5523_data_rx_cb(struct urb *urb) goto skip; } +if (rxlen <sizeof (struct ar5523_rx_desc )) { +ar5523_dbg (ar,"RX: Bad descriptor (len=%d is too small)\n" , + rxlen); + goto skip; + } +skb_reserve (data->skb,sizeof (*chunk));skb_put (data->skb, rxlen -sizeof (struct ar5523_rx_desc ));
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 32 lines · pip-izony
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
In
ar5523_data_rx_cb(), therxlenvariable is derived fromdesc->len, which is provided by the USB device.The function checks for an upper bound (rxlen >
ar->rxbufsz) and for a zero value (!rxlen), but it fails to check for a proper lower bound against the size of the descriptor.If a malicious device provides an
rxlenvalue that is positive but smaller thansizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc), the subtraction in the call toskb_put()will result in an integer underflow.This passes a very large unsigned value to
skb_put(), which then triggers a kernel panic upon detecting the potential buffer overflow.Fix this by adding a check to ensure
rxlenis at leastsizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc)before performing the substraction.Fixes b7d572e1871df ("ar5523: Add new driver")Signed-off-by Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c +0
-0@@ -589,6 +589,12 @@ static void ar5523_data_rx_cb(struct urb *urb) goto skip; }
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c static void ar5523_data_rx_cb(struct urb *urb) · line 600
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c +6
-0+if (rxlen <sizeof (struct ar5523_rx_desc )) { +ar5523_dbg (ar,"RX: Bad descriptor (len=%d is too small)\n" , + rxlen); + goto skip; + } +skb_reserve (data->skb,sizeof (*chunk));skb_put (data->skb, rxlen -sizeof (struct ar5523_rx_desc ));
Since this is an orphaned driver, this patch has been sitting in my patchwork queue for a very long time. Today I decided to take a look.
The patch does address the issue mentioned, but really doesn't completely address the crux of the issue. I believe there should be a fixed correlation between the rxlen and the usblen. I posed the following question to my review agent:
given that the usblen should account for the ar5523_chunk header, the payload, and the ar5523_rx_desc, shouldn't the rxlen always be the same as the usblen - sizeof(ar5523_chunk)?
And my agent agreed:
Yes, that's exactly right. Looking at the struct comment "msg length including header" for desc->len and the frame layout:
[ar5523_chunk (4B)] [802.11 payload] [ar5523_rx_desc]
←──────────────────── usblen ──────────────────────→
The invariant should be:
rxlen == usblen - sizeof(ar5523_chunk)
Because rxlen covers [802.11 payload] + [ar5523_rx_desc], and usblen covers
everything including the chunk header.
The code never cross-validates them. It independently bounds-checks usblen
(via AR5523_MIN_RXBUFSZ) and rxlen (upper bound vs rxbufsz, lower bound added by the patch), but if a malicious device provides rxlen > usblen - sizeof(ar5523_chunk), then:
skb_put(data->skb, rxlen - sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc));
...would expose bytes beyond the actual 802.11 payload — potentially biting
into the ar5523_rx_desc trailer bytes, or uninitialized skb tail space up to rxbufsz, and pass that garbage to ieee80211_rx_irqsafe().
The existing upper bound check rxlen > ar->rxbufsz prevents a skb_put
overflow (since the skb is allocated with rxbufsz), but it's far too loose. The right check would be:
if (rxlen != usblen - sizeof(struct ar5523_chunk))
goto skip;
Or at minimum a strict upper bound:
if (rxlen > usblen - sizeof(struct ar5523_chunk))
goto skip;
So the patch fixes the underflow but misses this inconsistency between rxlen
and usblen that could allow overreading valid-but-wrong data within the skb buffer.
So please consider this analysis and propose a v2
/jeff
PATCH v2 1/1 wifi: ar5523: validate rxlen against descriptor size and usblen in ar5523_data_rx_cb()
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
In ar5523_data_rx_cb(), the rxlen variable is derived from desc->len, which is provided by the USB device.
The function checks for an upper bound (rxlen > ar->rxbufsz) and for a zero value (!rxlen), but it fails to check for a proper lower bound against the size of the descriptor.
If a malicious device provides an rxlen value that is positive but smaller than sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc), the subtraction in the call to skb_put() will result in an integer underflow.
This passes a very large unsigned value to skb_put(), which then triggers a kernel panic upon detecting the potential buffer overflow.
Fix this by adding a check to ensure rxlen is at least sizeof(struct ar5523_rx_desc) before performing the subtraction.
Additionally, rxlen is not cross-checked against usblen (the number of bytes actually received). Since the frame layout is [ar5523_chunk][802.11 payload][ar5523_rx_desc] and usblen covers the whole buffer, a valid rxlen cannot exceed usblen - sizeof(chunk). A device reporting a larger rxlen would cause skb_put() to expose descriptor trailer bytes or uninitialized skb tail data as 802.11 payload to ieee80211_rx_irqsafe().
Add a check to reject such frames.
---
v1 -> v2: cross-check rxlen against usblen to prevent overreading past the received payload
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c +12 -0
@@ -589,6 +589,18 @@ static void ar5523_data_rx_cb(struct urb *urb) goto skip; } +if (rxlen <sizeof (struct ar5523_rx_desc )) { +ar5523_dbg (ar,"RX: Bad descriptor (len=%u is too small)\n" , + rxlen); + goto skip; + } + +if (rxlen > usblen -sizeof (struct ar5523_chunk )) { +ar5523_dbg (ar,"RX: rxlen too large (rxlen=%u usblen=%d)\n" , + rxlen, usblen); + goto skip; + } +skb_reserve (data->skb,sizeof (*chunk));skb_put (data->skb, rxlen -sizeof (struct ar5523_rx_desc ));
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0