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staging: rtl8723bs: fix missing shared-key auth challenge length check

PATCH Superseded Panagiotis Petrakopoulos 2 participants 2 messages Jul 8 – Jul 17

Subsystems (2)

v2 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 staging: rtl8723bs: fix missing shared-key auth challenge length check

The WEP shared-key authentication handlers use the challenge-text element's length. This text and its length are attacker-controlled. The handlers do not check the length against the fixed 128-byte chg_txt buffer.

In OnAuthClient() the length from rtw_get_ie() can be up to 255 bytes. It is used to perform memcpy() into the 128-byte pmlmeinfo->chg_txt. A malicious AP sending a malformed WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE element can overflow/underfill chg_txt by up to 127 bytes. This is reachable over the air, before association, during shared-key authentication. In the case of an overflow, the driver can write out of bounds. In the case of an underfill, the driver can echo stale buffer memory. In OnAuth() a similar issue is observed. The driver compares a full 128 bytes regardless of the element's length, reading past a shorter element.

The challenge text is defined to be exactly 128 octets, which is already provided as the WLAN_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN define; require the element to be exactly that length in both handlers.

Fixes 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")

---
v2:
improved patch description for clarity. no code changes.

testing:
Compile-tested only; I do not have RTL8723BS hardware to test the shared-key authentication path at runtime. The change only rejects challenge elements whose length differs from the spec-mandated 128 bytes, so conforming peers are unaffected.

 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c +2 -2
index a86d6f97cf02..13634d4e83d1 100644
@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ unsigned int OnAuth(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame)
 			p = rtw_get_ie(pframe + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + 4 + _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_, WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE, (int *)&ie_len,
 					len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_ - 4);
 
-			if (!p || ie_len <= 0) {
+			if (!p || ie_len != WLAN_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN) {
 				status = WLAN_STATUS_CHALLENGE_FAIL;
 				goto auth_fail;
 			}
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ unsigned int OnAuthClient(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_fram
 			p = rtw_get_ie(pframe + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_, WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE, (int *)&len,
 				pkt_len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_);
 
-			if (!p)
+			if (!p || len != WLAN_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN)
 				goto authclnt_fail;
 
 			memcpy(pmlmeinfo->chg_txt, p + 2, len);
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 61 lines · Panagiotis Petrakopoulos

The WEP shared-key authentication handlers use the challenge-text element's length. This text and its length are attacker-controlled. The handlers do not check the length against the fixed 128-byte chg_txt buffer.

In OnAuthClient() the length from rtw_get_ie() can be up to 255 bytes. It is used to perform memcpy() into the 128-byte pmlmeinfo->chg_txt. A malicious AP sending a malformed WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE element can overflow/underfill chg_txt by up to 127 bytes. This is reachable over the air, before association, during shared-key authentication. In the case of an overflow, the driver can write out of bounds. In the case of an underfill, the driver can echo stale buffer memory. In OnAuth() a similar issue is observed. The driver compares a full 128 bytes regardless of the element's length, reading past a shorter element.

The challenge text is defined to be exactly 128 octets, which is already provided as the WLAN_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN define; require the element to be exactly that length in both handlers.

Fixes 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")

---
v2:
improved patch description for clarity. no code changes.

testing:
Compile-tested only; I do not have RTL8723BS hardware to test the shared-key authentication path at runtime. The change only rejects challenge elements whose length differs from the spec-mandated 128 bytes, so conforming peers are unaffected.

 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c +2 -2
index a86d6f97cf02..13634d4e83d1 100644
@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ unsigned int OnAuth(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame)
 			p = rtw_get_ie(pframe + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + 4 + _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_, WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE, (int *)&ie_len,
 					len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_ - 4);
 
-			if (!p || ie_len <= 0) {
+			if (!p || ie_len != WLAN_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN) {
 				status = WLAN_STATUS_CHALLENGE_FAIL;
 				goto auth_fail;
 			}
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ unsigned int OnAuthClient(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_fram
 			p = rtw_get_ie(pframe + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_, WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE, (int *)&len,
 				pkt_len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_);
 
-			if (!p)
+			if (!p || len != WLAN_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN)
 				goto authclnt_fail;
 
 			memcpy(pmlmeinfo->chg_txt, p + 2, len);
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0

This does not apply against my staging-linus branch. Can you rebase and resend?

thanks,

greg k-h