ARM: imx: Fix suspend/resume crash with Clang CFI
PATCH v2 1/1 ARM: imx: Fix suspend/resume crash with Clang CFI
Relocated suspend code in OCRAM lacks compiler-generated CFI type signatures. When CONFIG_CFI=y is active, the indirect call to imx6_suspend_in_ocram_fn triggers a strict CFI violation panic.
Annotate imx6q_suspend_finish with __nocfi to bypass CFI checking for this specific indirect call.
Additionally, protect the imx6_suspend_in_ocram_fn pointer by marking it __ro_after_init to prevent it from being used as a CFI bypass exploit vector.
---
Tested on a Kobo Clara HD (i.MX6SLL SoC) running postmarketOS edge. Before this patch, suspending the device caused an immediate silent hang requiring a hard-reboot. With this patch applied, suspend and resume work successfully.
Differences from v1:
- Added __ro_after_init to imx6_suspend_in_ocram_fn to prevent it from being exploited as a CFI bypass gadget.
arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c +2 -2
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@static void __iomem *ccm_base;static void __iomem *suspend_ocram_base; -static void (*imx6_suspend_in_ocram_fn)(void __iomem *ocram_vbase); +static void (*imx6_suspend_in_ocram_fn)(void __iomem *ocram_vbase)__ro_after_init ;/* * suspend ocram space layout:
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ int imx6_set_lpm(enum mxc_cpu_pwr_mode mode)return 0 ; } -static int imx6q_suspend_finish (unsigned long val) +static int __nocfi imx6q_suspend_finish(unsigned long val) {if (!imx6_suspend_in_ocram_fn) {cpu_do_idle ();
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider:
New issues:
- [High] Applying __nocfi to imx6q_suspend_finish unintentionally disables KCFI checks for other indirect branches.
- [High] The CFI bypass mitigation is incomplete: suspend_ocram_base remains writable, enabling a Write-What-Where (Data-Oriented Programming) exploit.
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The kCFI panic with fncpy relocated code affects multiple platforms, but is only fixed for i.MX6.
- [High] The ccm_base global variable is written only during initialization but lacks __ro_after_init protection, exposing it to manipulation for Read-Modify-Write (RMW) gadgets. --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH v2] ARM: imx: Fix suspend/resume crash with Clang CFI --- commit 66327a9e81a0b45dd7493d089dd60f3a912e1240
Author: Yo'av Moshe <[email protected]>
ARM: imx: Fix suspend/resume crash with Clang CFI
Relocated suspend code in OCRAM lacks compiler-generated CFI type signatures. This patch annotates imx6q_suspend_finish with __nocfi to bypass CFI checking for the indirect call, and marks the function pointer as __ro_after_init.
arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c line 64
Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c +0
-0@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@static void __iomem *ccm_base;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does ccm_base also need __ro_after_init protection?
Since ccm_base is assigned once in imx6_pm_common_init() and then repeatedly dereferenced in power management functions like imx6_set_lpm(), could an attacker overwrite it to misdirect read/write operations?
For example, readl_relaxed(ccm_base + CLPCR) could be redirected to arbitrary kernel addresses. Adding __ro_after_init here might prevent trivial data-oriented programming exploitation of power management paths.
arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c line 65
Quoted 1 line
arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c +0
-0static void __iomem *suspend_ocram_base;
[Severity: High]
Since suspend_ocram_base is passed as the first argument to the __nocfi function imx6_suspend_in_ocram_fn, does leaving it mutable in the .bss section defeat the intent of the __ro_after_init protection?
The target assembly routine imx6_suspend trusts this pointer (passed in r0), using it to derive target addresses for memory writes:
arch/arm/mach-imx/suspend-imx6.S:imx6_suspend()
ldr r11, [r0, #PM_INFO_MX6Q_SRC_V_OFFSET]
/* store physical resume addr and pm_info address. */
str r9, [r11, #MX6Q_SRC_GPR1]Could an attacker with arbitrary memory write capabilities overwrite suspend_ocram_base to point to a crafted payload, yielding a write-what-where primitive during suspend that completely bypasses CFI?
Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c +1
-1-static void (*imx6_suspend_in_ocram_fn)(void __iomem *ocram_vbase); +static void (*imx6_suspend_in_ocram_fn)(void __iomem *ocram_vbase)__ro_after_init ;/* * suspend ocram space layout:
[ ... ]
arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c int imx6_set_lpm(enum mxc_cpu_pwr_mode mode) · line 363
Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c +1
-1@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ int imx6_set_lpm(enum mxc_cpu_pwr_mode mode)return 0 ; } -static int imx6q_suspend_finish (unsigned long val) +static int __nocfi imx6q_suspend_finish(unsigned long val)
[Severity: High]
By applying __nocfi to the entire imx6q_suspend_finish() function, are we unintentionally disabling CFI checks for other indirect branches?
Within this function, cpu_do_idle() and flush_cache_all() expand to indirect calls (cpu_vtable[smp_processor_id()]->_do_idle() and cpu_cache.flush_kern_all()).
Could an attacker with arbitrary memory write capabilities overwrite these architecture-level function pointers and bypass kCFI entirely when a suspend is triggered?
Would it be safer to restrict the __nocfi annotation to a minimal inline or noinline wrapper function that only executes the single unverified indirect call to imx6_suspend_in_ocram_fn?
Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c +0
-0{if (!imx6_suspend_in_ocram_fn) {cpu_do_idle ();arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c +0
-0}else {
arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c +0
-0/* * call low level suspend function in ocram, * as we need to float DDR IO. */ local_flush_tlb_all ();/* check if need to flush internal L2 cache */ if (!((struct imx6_cpu_pm_info *) suspend_ocram_base)->l2_base.vbase)flush_cache_all ();imx6_suspend_in_ocram_fn (suspend_ocram_base);
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does fixing this kCFI panic only for i.MX6 leave other 32-bit ARM platforms broken?
The kCFI panic with fncpy() relocated code appears to affect multiple platforms since fncpy() copies only the instruction body and omits the compiler-generated SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START header.
For example, mx5_suspend_enter() in arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx5.c invokes imx5_suspend_in_ocram_fn(suspend_ocram_base), and at91_suspend_finish() in arch/arm/mach-at91/pm.c invokes at91_suspend_sram_fn(&soc_pm.data).
Since neither seem to have a __nocfi bypass, would they suffer deterministic kernel panics on suspend when CONFIG_CFI_CLANG is active?
Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm/mach-imx/pm-imx6.c +0
-0}return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1