5.15.212-rc1 review
Subsystems (6)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 253/843 cpufreq: conservative: Simplify frequency limit handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lifeng Zheng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3494dff89779b73a6c70481c982e0e96d336454a ]
cs_dbs_update() performs explicit checks against policy->min/max before updating the target frequency. These checks are redundant as __cpufreq_driver_target() already clamps the requested frequency to the valid policy limits.
Remove the unnecessary boundary checks and simplify the update logic.
This also fixes an issue introduced by commit 00bfe05889e9 ("cpufreq:
conservative: Decrease frequency faster for deferred updates"), where stale target comparisons could cause frequency updates to be skipped entirely after deferred adjustments.
--- drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq_conservative.c | 12 +----------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq_conservative.c +1 -11
@@ -103,10 +103,6 @@ static unsigned int cs_dbs_update(struct cpufreq_policy *policy)if (load > dbs_data->up_threshold) { dbs_info->down_skip =0 ; -/* if we are already at full speed then break out early */ -if (requested_freq == policy->max) - goto out; - requested_freq += freq_step;if (requested_freq > policy->max) requested_freq = policy->max;
@@ -123,13 +119,7 @@ static unsigned int cs_dbs_update(struct cpufreq_policy *policy)/* Check for frequency decrease */ if (load < cs_tuners->down_threshold) { -/* -* if we cannot reduce the frequency anymore, break out early -*/ -if (requested_freq == policy->min) - goto out; - -if (requested_freq > freq_step) +if (requested_freq > policy->min + freq_step) requested_freq -= freq_step;else requested_freq = policy->min;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 254/843 pwm: imx27: Fix variable truncation in .apply()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ronaldo Nunez <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dc9e08fdbcc3eb08a1d2b868b535081c44425e27 ]
Fix a variable truncation when calculating period in microseconds as part of the solution for the ERR051198 in .apply() callback.
Example scenario:
- Period of 3us (PWMPR = 196 and prescaler = 1)
- Expected value in tmp: 198000000000 (NSEC_PER_SEC * (196 + 2) * 1)
- Actual value is 431504384 (truncation to u32)
--- drivers/pwm/pwm-imx27.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pwm/pwm-imx27.c +7 -1
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ static void pwm_imx27_wait_fifo_slot(struct pwm_chip *chip,static int pwm_imx27_apply (struct pwm_chip *chip,struct pwm_device *pwm,const struct pwm_state *state) { -unsigned long period_cycles, duty_cycles, prescale, period_us, tmp; +unsigned long period_cycles, duty_cycles, prescale, period_us;struct pwm_imx27_chip *imx =to_pwm_imx27_chip (chip);struct pwm_state cstate;unsigned long long c;
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ static int pwm_imx27_apply(struct pwm_chip *chip, struct pwm_device *pwm,int val;int ret;u32 cr; +u64 tmp;pwm_get_state (pwm, &cstate);
@@ -268,6 +269,11 @@ static int pwm_imx27_apply(struct pwm_chip *chip, struct pwm_device *pwm, val =readl (imx->mmio_base +MX3_PWMPR ); val = val >=MX3_PWMPR_MAX ?MX3_PWMPR_MAX : val; cr =readl (imx->mmio_base +MX3_PWMCR ); + +/* +* tmp stores period in nanoseconds. Result fits in u64 since +* val <= 0xfffe and prescaler in [1, 0x1000]. +*/ tmp =NSEC_PER_SEC * (u64)(val +2 ) *MX3_PWMCR_PRESCALER_GET (cr); tmp =DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL (tmp, clkrate); period_us =DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL (tmp,1000 );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 255/843 bus: sunxi-rsb: Always check register address validity
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Samuel Holland <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 61192938a5870ac36edae81e4775b680dcf02c61 ]
The register address was already validated for read operations in regmap_sunxi_rsb_reg_read before being truncated to a u8. Write operations have the same set of possible addresses, and the address is being truncated from u32 to u8 here as well, so the same check is needed.
--- drivers/bus/sunxi-rsb.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/bus/sunxi-rsb.c +3 -0
@@ -446,6 +446,9 @@ static int regmap_sunxi_rsb_reg_write(void *context, unsigned int reg,struct sunxi_rsb_ctx *ctx = context;struct sunxi_rsb_device *rdev = ctx->rdev; +if (reg >0xff ) +return -EINVAL ; +return sunxi_rsb_write (rdev->rsb, rdev->rtaddr, reg, &val, ctx->size); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 256/843 RDMA/irdma: Fix out-of-bounds write in irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jacob Moroni <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5ebb3ed757be3e04cf803026004aa0beaeb13e9b ]
The irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs function loops through all of the umem DMA blocks to populate the PBLEs and will stop when either the last DMA block is reached or palloc->total_cnt is reached. The issue is that the logic for checking palloc->total_cnt would only work for non-zero values.
When irdma_setup_pbles is called with lvl==0, it
calls irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs with palloc->total_cnt==0, which means the only way to break out of the loop is to reach the last umem DMA block, which means it could end up going beyond the fixed size of 4 iwmr->pgaddrmem array that is used in the lvl==0 case.
In the case of QP/CQ/SRQ rings, the value of lvl is determined by a separate input (for example, req.cq_pages in the case of a CQ). So, we must perform explicit checking to ensure we don't overflow the pgaddrmem array if the user provides a umem that consists of more blocks than their provided req.cq_pages.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c +10 -4
@@ -2216,10 +2216,11 @@ static inline u64 *irdma_next_pbl_addr(u64 *pbl, struct irdma_pble_info **pinfo,* irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs - copy user page address to pble's os locally * @iwmr: iwmr for IB's user page addresses * @pbl: ple pointer to save 1 level or 0 level pble +* @pbl_len: Max number of PBL entries to populate * @level: indicated level 0, 1 or 2 */ static void irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs (struct irdma_mr *iwmr,u64 *pbl, -enum irdma_pble_level level) +u32 pbl_len,enum irdma_pble_level level) {struct ib_umem *region = iwmr->region;struct irdma_pbl *iwpbl = &iwmr->iwpbl;
@@ -2227,7 +2228,9 @@ static void irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs(struct irdma_mr *iwmr, u64 *pbl,struct irdma_pble_info *pinfo;struct ib_block_iter biter;u32 idx =0 ; -u32 pbl_cnt =0 ; + +if (!pbl_len) +return ; pinfo = (level ==PBLE_LEVEL_1 ) ?NULL : palloc->level2.leaf;
@@ -2236,7 +2239,7 @@ static void irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs(struct irdma_mr *iwmr, u64 *pbl,rdma_umem_for_each_dma_block (region, &biter, iwmr->page_size) { *pbl =rdma_block_iter_dma_address (&biter); -if (++pbl_cnt == palloc->total_cnt) +if (!--pbl_len)break ; pbl =irdma_next_pbl_addr (pbl, &pinfo, &idx); }
@@ -2313,6 +2316,7 @@ static int irdma_setup_pbles(struct irdma_pci_f *rf, struct irdma_mr *iwmr,u64 *pbl;enum irdma_status_code status;enum irdma_pble_level level =PBLE_LEVEL_1 ; +u32 pbl_len;if (use_pbles) { status = irdma_get_pble(rf->pble_rsrc, palloc, iwmr->page_cnt,
@@ -2320,16 +2324,18 @@ static int irdma_setup_pbles(struct irdma_pci_f *rf, struct irdma_mr *iwmr,if (status)return -ENOMEM ; + pbl_len = palloc->total_cnt; iwpbl->pbl_allocated = true; level = palloc->level; pinfo = (level ==PBLE_LEVEL_1 ) ? &palloc->level1 : palloc->level2.leaf; pbl = pinfo->addr; }else { + pbl_len =IRDMA_MAX_SAVED_PHY_PGADDR ; pbl = iwmr->pgaddrmem; } -irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs (iwmr, pbl, level); +irdma_copy_user_pgaddrs (iwmr, pbl, pbl_len, level);if (use_pbles) iwmr->pgaddrmem[0 ] = *pbl;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 257/843 IB/mlx4: Fix refcount leak in add_port() error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9a8826fdfbcd7ed2ccf745f5d54208358d939def ]
After kobject_init_and_add(), the lifetime of the embedded struct kobject is expected to be managed through the kobject core reference counting.
In add_port(), failure paths after kobject_init_and_add() must not free struct mlx4_port directly, because the embedded kobject is then managed by the kobject core. Freeing it directly leaves the kobject reference counting unbalanced and can lead to incorrect lifetime handling.
Allocate the pkey and gid attribute arrays before kobject_init_and_add(), so failures before kobject initialization can be handled by directly freeing the allocated memory. Once kobject_init_and_add() has been called, unwind later failures by removing any successfully created sysfs groups, calling kobject_del(), and then releasing the embedded kobject with kobject_put().
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/sysfs.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/sysfs.c +27 -18
@@ -638,12 +638,6 @@ static int add_port(struct mlx4_ib_dev *dev, int port_num, int slave) p->port_num = port_num; p->slave = slave; - ret =kobject_init_and_add (&p->kobj, &port_type, -kobject_get (dev->dev_ports_parent[slave]), -"%d" , port_num); -if (ret) - goto err_alloc; - p->pkey_group.name ="pkey_idx" ; p->pkey_group.attrs = alloc_group_attrs(show_port_pkey,
@@ -651,13 +645,9 @@ static int add_port(struct mlx4_ib_dev *dev, int port_num, int slave) dev->dev->caps.pkey_table_len[port_num]);if (!p->pkey_group.attrs) { ret = -ENOMEM ; - goto err_alloc; + goto err_free_port; } - ret =sysfs_create_group (&p->kobj, &p->pkey_group); -if (ret) - goto err_free_pkey; - p->gid_group.name ="gid_idx" ; p->gid_group.attrs =alloc_group_attrs (show_port_gid_idx,NULL ,1 );if (!p->gid_group.attrs) {
@@ -665,28 +655,47 @@ static int add_port(struct mlx4_ib_dev *dev, int port_num, int slave) goto err_free_pkey; } + ret =kobject_init_and_add (&p->kobj, &port_type, +kobject_get (dev->dev_ports_parent[slave]), +"%d" , port_num); +if (ret) + goto err_put; + + ret =sysfs_create_group (&p->kobj, &p->pkey_group); +if (ret) + goto err_del; + ret =sysfs_create_group (&p->kobj, &p->gid_group);if (ret) - goto err_free_gid; + goto err_remove_pkey; ret =add_vf_smi_entries (p);if (ret) - goto err_free_gid; + goto err_remove_gid;list_add_tail (&p->kobj.entry, &dev->pkeys.pkey_port_list[slave]);return 0 ; -err_free_gid: -kfree (p->gid_group.attrs[0 ]); -kfree (p->gid_group.attrs); +err_remove_gid: +sysfs_remove_group (&p->kobj, &p->gid_group); + +err_remove_pkey: +sysfs_remove_group (&p->kobj, &p->pkey_group); + +err_del: +kobject_del (&p->kobj); + +err_put: +kobject_put (dev->dev_ports_parent[slave]); +kobject_put (&p->kobj); +return ret; err_free_pkey:for (i =0 ; i < dev->dev->caps.pkey_table_len[port_num]; ++i)kfree (p->pkey_group.attrs[i]);kfree (p->pkey_group.attrs); -err_alloc: -kobject_put (dev->dev_ports_parent[slave]); +err_free_port:kfree (p);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 258/843 RDMA/hns: Fix warning in poll cq direct mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lianfa Weng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3f19c2a3852e6ba75f3e92dd5edc4e07f3d07f4a ]
CQs allocated by ib_alloc_cq() always have a comp_handler. Though in direct mode this handler is never expected to be called, it is still called when the driver is reset, triggering the following WARN_ONCE():
Call trace: ib_cq_completion_direct+0x38/0x60 hns_roce_cq_completion+0x54/0x90 (hns_roce_hw_v2] hns_roce_handle_device_err+Ox1c8/0x340 [hns_roce_hw_v2] hns_roce_hw_v2_uninit_instance.constprop.0+0x34/0x70 [hns_roce_hw_v2] hns_roce_hw_v2_reset_notify+0xc4/0xe0 [hns_roce_hw_v2] hclge_notify_roce_client+0x60/0xbc [hclge] hclge_reset_rebuild+0x48/0x34c [hclge] hclge_reset_subtask+0xcc/0xec [hclge] hclge_reset_service_task+0x80/0x160 [hclge] hclge_service_task+0x50/0x80 (hclge] process_one_work+0x1cc/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x154/0x414 kthread+0x104/0x144 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_main.c +1 -1
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ static void check_and_get_armed_cq(struct list_head *cq_list, struct ib_cq *cq)unsigned long flags;spin_lock_irqsave (&hr_cq->lock, flags); -if (cq->comp_handler) { +if (cq->comp_handler && hr_cq->ib_cq.poll_ctx !=IB_POLL_DIRECT ) {if (!hr_cq->is_armed) { hr_cq->is_armed =1 ;list_add_tail (&hr_cq->node, cq_list);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 259/843 PM: sleep: Use complete() in device_pm_sleep_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiakai Xu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3855941f1e4069182c895d5093c5fa589f5b38bd ]
Replace complete_all() with complete() in device_pm_sleep_init() to allow it to be called in atomic contexts without triggering a false-positive WARNING from lockdep_assert_RT_in_threaded_ctx() when CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled.
device_pm_sleep_init() may be called during device initialization while holding a raw_spinlock (e.g., from within device_initialize()), and complete_all() is unsafe in atomic contexts on PREEMPT_RT kernels. complete(), which is safe to call from any context, is sufficient here.
complete_all() sets the completion count to UINT_MAX/2 (permanently signaled), while complete() increments it by 1. Since no threads can be waiting during device initialization, both are functionally equivalent. The completion is always reinitialized via reinit_completion() in dpm_clear_async_state() before each suspend/resume cycle.
However, changing to complete() introduces a potential deadlock for devices with no PM support (dev->power.no_pm = true). Such devices are never added to the dpm_list and never go through dpm_clear_async_state(), so their completion is never reinitialized. A parent device waiting on a no_pm child across multiple suspend phases would consume the single-use token in the first phase and block forever in the second.
Fix this by adding an early return in dpm_wait() when dev->power.no_pm is set, since no_pm devices do not participate in system suspend/resume.
--- drivers/base/power/main.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/base/power/main.c +5 -1
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ void device_pm_sleep_init(struct device *dev) dev->power.is_noirq_suspended = false; dev->power.is_late_suspended = false;init_completion (&dev->power.completion); -complete_all (&dev->power.completion); +complete (&dev->power.completion); dev->power.wakeup =NULL ;INIT_LIST_HEAD (&dev->power.entry); }
@@ -239,6 +239,10 @@ static void dpm_wait(struct device *dev, bool async)if (!dev)return ; +/* Devices with no PM support don't use the completion. */ +if (dev->power.no_pm) +return ; +if (async || (pm_async_enabled && dev->power.async_suspend))wait_for_completion (&dev->power.completion); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 260/843 MIPS: Fix big-endian stack argument fetching in o32 wrapper
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8e0780d30b1b51248e42895b7acc7a20f147b40b ]
Fix an issue in call_o32() where the upper 32-bit half of incoming n64 stack arguments is fetched and used for outgoing o32 stack arguments on big-endian platforms.
This code was adapted from arch/mips/dec/prom/call_o32.S which was meant for a little-endian platform only and therefore using 32-bit loads from 64-bit stack slot locations holding incoming stack arguments resulted in correct values being retrieved for data that is expected to be 32-bit.
This works on little-endian platforms where the lower 32-bit half of the 64-bit value is located at every 64-bit stack slot location. However on big-endian platforms the lower 32-bit half is instead located at offset 4 from every 64-bit stack slot location.
So to fix the issue the offset of 4 would have to be used on big-endian platforms only, or alternatively a 64-bit load from the 64-bit stack slot location can be used across the board, as the subsequent 32-bit store to the corresponding outgoing stack argument slot will correctly truncate the value and cause no unpredictable result. We already take advantage of this architectural feature for the incoming arguments held in $a6 and $a7 registers, since the o32 wrapper does not know how many incoming arguments there are and consequently propagates incoming data which may not be 32-bit.
Since this code is generally supposed to be used with the stack located in cached memory there is no extra overhead expected for 64-bit loads as opposed to 32-bit ones, so pick this variant for code simplicity.
--- arch/mips/fw/lib/call_o32.S | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/mips/fw/lib/call_o32.S +1 -1
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ NESTED(call_o32, O32_FRAMESZ, ra) PTR_LA t1,6*O32_SZREG(fp) li t2,O32_ARGC-6 1: - lw t3,(t0) + ld t3,(t0) REG_ADDU t0,SZREG sw t3,(t1) REG_SUBU t2,1
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 261/843 MIPS: DEC: Remove do_IRQ() call indirection
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 35554eadc1b127bb5294504a4ac8f3a5dd9e299d ]
As from commit 8f99a1626535 ("MIPS: Tracing: Add IRQENTRY_EXIT section for MIPS") do_IRQ() is not a macro anymore and can be invoked directly from assembly code, as a tail call. Remove the dec_irq_dispatch() stub then and the indirection previously introduced with commit 187933f23679 ("[MIPS] do_IRQ cleanup"), improving performance by reducing the number of control flow changes and the overall instruction count, while fixing a compiler's complaint about a missing prototype for said stub:
arch/mips/dec/setup.c:780:25: warning: no previous prototype for 'dec_irq_dispatch' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
780 | asmlinkage unsigned int dec_irq_dispatch(unsigned int irq)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(which gets promoted to a compilation error with CONFIG_WERROR).
--- arch/mips/dec/int-handler.S | 2 +- arch/mips/dec/setup.c | 6 ------ 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/mips/dec/int-handler.S +1 -1
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ srlv t3,t1,t2 handle_it: - j dec_irq_dispatch + j do_IRQ nop #if defined(CONFIG_32BIT) && defined(CONFIG_MIPS_FP_SUPPORT)
arch/mips/dec/setup.c +0 -6
@@ -776,9 +776,3 @@ void __init arch_init_irq(void)pr_err ("Failed to register halt interrupt\n" ); } } - -asmlinkage unsigned int dec_irq_dispatch(unsigned int irq) -{ -do_IRQ (irq); -return 0 ; -}
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 262/843 mips: ralink: mt7621: add missing __iomem
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rosen Penev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4ddaf88aadd3bd09c2eb3734c53d2864af6b144e ]
raw_readl and writel calls expect pointers annotated with __iomem.
--- arch/mips/ralink/mt7621.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/mips/ralink/mt7621.c +1 -1
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ phys_addr_t mips_cpc_default_phys_base(void)static bool __init mt7621_addr_wraparound_test (phys_addr_t size) { -void *dm = (void *)KSEG1ADDR (&detect_magic); +void __iomem *dm = (void __iomem *)KSEG1ADDR (&detect_magic);if (CPHYSADDR (dm + size) >=MT7621_LOWMEM_MAX_SIZE )return true;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 263/843 mips: n64: add __iomem for writel call
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rosen Penev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 579f5329d5df2dbcf4bb5ef398701c2501d24892 ]
sparse: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) @@ expected void volatile [noderef] __iomem *mem @@
got unsigned int [usertype] *
--- arch/mips/n64/init.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/mips/n64/init.c +1 -1
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ void __init prom_init(void)#define W 320#define H 240 -#define REG_BASE ((u32 *) CKSEG1ADDR(0x4400000)) +#define REG_BASE ((u32 __iomem *) CKSEG1ADDR(0x4400000))static void __init n64rdp_write_reg (const u8 reg,const u32 value) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 264/843 mtd: spi-nor: Drop duplicate Kconfig dependency
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Miquel Raynal <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a6470e2162e9c3779a4bd6ff3bed1b81d796e46e ]
I do not think the MTD dependency is needed twice. This is likely a duplicate coming from a former rebase when the spi-nor core got cleaned up a while ago. Remove the extra line.
--- drivers/mtd/spi-nor/Kconfig | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mtd/spi-nor/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only menuconfig MTD_SPI_NOR tristate "SPI NOR device support" - depends on MTD depends on MTD && SPI_MASTER select SPI_MEM help
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 265/843 nvme-multipath: fix flex array size in struct nvme_ns_head
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 001e57554de81aa79c25c18fd53911d8a415c304 ]
struct nvme_ns_head contains a flexible array member, current_path[], which is indexed using the NUMA node ID:
head->current_path[numa_node_id()]
The structure is currently allocated as:
size = sizeof(struct nvme_ns_head) +
(num_possible_nodes() * sizeof(struct nvme_ns *));
head = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
This allocation assumes that NUMA node IDs are sequential and densely packed from 0 .. num_possible_nodes() - 1. While this assumption holds on many systems, it is not always true on some architectures such as powerpc.
On some powerpc systems, NUMA node IDs can be sparse. For example:
NUMA:
NUMA node(s): 6 NUMA node0 CPU(s): 80-159 NUMA node8 CPU(s): 0-79
NUMA node252 CPU(s):
NUMA node253 CPU(s):
NUMA node254 CPU(s):
NUMA node255 CPU(s):
That is, the possible/online NUMA node IDs are: 0, 8, 252, 253, 254, 255 In this case: num_possible_nodes() = 6
So memory is allocated for only 6 entries in current_path[]. However, the array is later indexed using the actual NUMA node ID. As a result, accesses such as:
head->current_path[8] or
head->current_path[252]
goes out of bounds, leading to the following KASAN splat:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths+0x22c/0x290 [nvme_core] Write of size 8 at addr c00020003bda35b8 by task kworker/u641:2/1997 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1997 Comm: kworker/u641:2 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-dirty #14 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: 8335-GTH POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:skiboot-v6.5.3-35-g1851b2a06 PowerNV Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn Call Trace: [c000200037fa7510] [c0000000021c23d4] dump_stack_lvl+0x88/0xdc (unreliable) [c000200037fa7540] [c0000000009fda90] print_report+0x22c/0x67c [c000200037fa7630] [c0000000009fd508] kasan_report+0x108/0x220 [c000200037fa7740] [c0000000009fff48] __asan_store8+0xe8/0x120 [c000200037fa7760] [c008000018e76474] nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths+0x22c/0x290 [nvme_core] [c000200037fa7800] [c008000018e6556c] nvme_update_ns_info+0x4a4/0x5e0 [nvme_core] [c000200037fa7a50] [c008000018e66270] nvme_alloc_ns+0x6d8/0x1a70 [nvme_core] [c000200037fa7c20] [c008000018e679fc] nvme_scan_ns+0x3f4/0x630 [nvme_core] [c000200037fa7d10] [c00000000031f22c] async_run_entry_fn+0x9c/0x3a0 [c000200037fa7db0] [c0000000002fa544] process_one_work+0x414/0xa10 [c000200037fa7ec0] [c0000000002fbf00] worker_thread+0x320/0x640 [c000200037fa7f80] [c00000000030d0f8] kthread+0x278/0x290 [c000200037fa7fe0] [c00000000000ded8] start_kernel_thread+0x14/0x18 Allocated by task 1997 on cpu 1 at 35.928317s: The buggy address belongs to the object at c00020003bda3000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-15-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 16 bytes to the right of
allocated 1448-byte region [c00020003bda3000, c00020003bda35a8)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
Memory state around the buggy address:
c00020003bda3480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
c00020003bda3500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>c00020003bda3580: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
c00020003bda3600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c00020003bda3680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================Fix this by allocating the flexible array using nr_node_ids instead of num_possible_nodes(). Since nr_node_ids represents the maximum possible NUMA node IDs, indexing current_path[] using numa_node_id() becomes safe even on systems with sparse node IDs.
--- drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvme/host/core.c +1 -1
@@ -3744,7 +3744,7 @@ static struct nvme_ns_head *nvme_alloc_ns_head(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,int ret = -ENOMEM ;#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_MULTIPATH - size +=num_possible_nodes () *sizeof (struct nvme_ns *); + size += nr_node_ids *sizeof (struct nvme_ns *);#endif head =kzalloc (size,GFP_KERNEL );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 266/843 workqueue: drop spurious * from print_worker_info() fn declaration
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 611583a76ea97991b0f65ec1ff099eac7fe0bae4 ]
print_worker_info() declares its local 'fn' as work_func_t * but worker->current_func has type work_func_t (a function pointer). The extra level of indirection is wrong and only happens to be harmless today because every supported Linux architecture has sizeof(work_func_t) == sizeof(work_func_t *):copy_from_kernel_nofault() reads the correct number of bytes by accident, and %ps still resolves the printed address because the stored value is the function address regardless of declared type.
On any future ABI where sizeof(void (*)()) differs from sizeof(void *), the nofault copy would transfer the wrong number of bytes and the subsequent %ps would print an incorrect address.
Match the field type so the intent is explicit and the code does not silently rely on equal pointer sizes.
--- kernel/workqueue.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/workqueue.c +1 -1
@@ -4688,7 +4688,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_worker_desc);*/ void print_worker_info (const char *log_lvl,struct task_struct *task) { -work_func_t *fn =NULL ; +work_func_t fn =NULL ;char name[WQ_NAME_LEN ] = { };char desc[WORKER_DESC_LEN ] = { };struct pool_workqueue *pwq =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 267/843 ipv6: guard against possible NULL deref in __in6_dev_stats_get()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 507541c2a8eeb76c02bd2511958f73a8cfa3e1bc ]
dev_get_by_index_rcu() could return NULL if the original physical device is unregistered.
Found by Sashiko.
--- include/net/addrconf.h | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/net/addrconf.h +4 -1
@@ -332,8 +332,11 @@ static inline struct inet6_dev *__in6_dev_get(const struct net_device *dev)static inline struct inet6_dev *__in6_dev_stats_get (const struct net_device *dev,const struct sk_buff *skb) { -if (netif_is_l3_master (dev)) +if (netif_is_l3_master (dev)) { dev =dev_get_by_index_rcu (dev_net (dev),inet6_iif (skb)); +if (!dev) +return NULL ; + }return __in6_dev_get (dev); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 268/843 net/sched: cls_bpf: prevent unbounded recursion in offload rollback
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 27db54b90bcc7c37867fe664107fa25ea6a116e4 ]
Quan Sun reported [1] a stack overflow in cls_bpf_offload_cmd().
Reproducer on netdevsim: add a skip_sw cls_bpf filter, set the bpf_tc_accept debugfs knob to 0, then tc filter replace. The replace calls tc_setup_cb_replace() which fails. cls_bpf_offload_cmd() then swaps prog/oldprog and recursively calls itself to roll back. But bpf_tc_accept=0 makes the rollback fail too, which triggers yet another rollback frame with the same arguments, and so on until the stack is exhausted.
bpf_tc_accept is just a convenient knob for the reproducer. Any driver whose tc_setup_cb_replace() fails twice in a row can hit the same loop, so this is not a netdevsim-only issue.
Two ways to fix it:
1) Have the rollback call tc_setup_cb_add() on oldprog instead of re-entering cls_bpf_offload_cmd().
2) Mark the rollback frame with a flag and skip a second-level rollback from inside it.
Go with (2). It is the smaller change and keeps the original behaviour:
the rollback still goes through tc_setup_cb_replace(), so the driver gets one real chance to restore its state. If that attempt also fails, we just return the original error instead of recursing.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/T/#u
--- net/sched/cls_bpf.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/sched/cls_bpf.c +6 -4
@@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ static bool cls_bpf_is_ebpf(const struct cls_bpf_prog *prog)static int cls_bpf_offload_cmd (struct tcf_proto *tp,struct cls_bpf_prog *prog,struct cls_bpf_prog *oldprog, -struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) +struct netlink_ext_ack *extack, +bool is_rollback) {struct tcf_block *block = tp->chain->block;struct tc_cls_bpf_offload cls_bpf = {};
@@ -173,7 +174,8 @@ static int cls_bpf_offload_cmd(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct cls_bpf_prog *prog, &oldprog->in_hw_count, true);if (prog && err) { -cls_bpf_offload_cmd (tp, oldprog, prog, extack); +if (!is_rollback) +cls_bpf_offload_cmd (tp, oldprog, prog, extack, true);return err; }
@@ -204,7 +206,7 @@ static int cls_bpf_offload(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct cls_bpf_prog *prog,if (!prog && !oldprog)return 0 ; -return cls_bpf_offload_cmd (tp, prog, oldprog, extack); +return cls_bpf_offload_cmd (tp, prog, oldprog, extack, false); } static void cls_bpf_stop_offload(struct tcf_proto *tp,
@@ -213,7 +215,7 @@ static void cls_bpf_stop_offload(struct tcf_proto *tp, {int err; - err =cls_bpf_offload_cmd (tp,NULL , prog, extack); + err =cls_bpf_offload_cmd (tp,NULL , prog, extack, false);if (err)pr_err ("Stopping hardware offload failed: %d\n" , err); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 269/843 drm/tegra: dc: Fix device node reference leak in tegra_dc_has_output()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 63a3998d792ab5c45304bf879e385a31fa923b61 ]
The of_for_each_phandle() macro increments the reference count of the device node it iterates over. If the loop exits early, the reference must be released manually.
In tegra_dc_has_output(), the function returns true immediately when a match is found, failing to release the current node's reference.
Fix this by adding a call to of_node_put() before returning from the loop.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/tegra/dc.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/tegra/dc.c +3 -1
@@ -94,8 +94,10 @@ bool tegra_dc_has_output(struct tegra_dc *dc, struct device *dev)int err;of_for_each_phandle (&it, err, np,"nvidia,outputs" ,NULL ,0 ) -if (it.node == dev->of_node) +if (it.node == dev->of_node) { +of_node_put (it.node);return true; + }return false; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 270/843 drm/tegra: Fix iommu_map_sgtable() return value check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mikko Perttunen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b3f349517de8f4469c385ebb7bfdfcc148790c0f ]
Commit "iommu: return full error code from iommu_map_sg[_atomic]()" changed iommu_map_sgtable() to return an ssize_t and negative values in error cases, rather than a size_t and a zero.
Update tegra_bo_iommu_map() to correctly check for errors from iommu_map_sgtable.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/tegra/gem.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/tegra/gem.c +6 -3
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ static const struct host1x_bo_ops tegra_bo_ops = {static int tegra_bo_iommu_map (struct tegra_drm *tegra,struct tegra_bo *bo) {int prot =IOMMU_READ |IOMMU_WRITE ; +ssize_t size;int err;if (bo->mm)
@@ -201,13 +202,15 @@ static int tegra_bo_iommu_map(struct tegra_drm *tegra, struct tegra_bo *bo) bo->iova = bo->mm->start; - bo->size =iommu_map_sgtable (tegra->domain, bo->iova, bo->sgt, prot); -if (!bo->size) { + size =iommu_map_sgtable (tegra->domain, bo->iova, bo->sgt, prot); +if (size <0 ) {dev_err (tegra->drm->dev,"failed to map buffer\n" ); - err = -ENOMEM ; + err = size; goto remove; } + bo->size = size; +mutex_unlock (&tegra->mm_lock);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 271/843 drm/nouveau/bios: specify correct display fuse register for Ampere and Ada
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timur Tabi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c1cf2d5db80ce91a85855bbaf4da85ff603e089a ]
The NV_FUSE_STATUS_OPT_DISPLAY register is used to determine whether the GPU has display hardware. The current code that normally reads this register is instead hard-coded to check for GA100 vs later GPUs. Since this function is called only on pre-Hopper GPUs, and this if-statement applies only to GA100 and later, the check works because GA100 is the only non-display Ampere and Ada GPU.
However, there actually is a register that can be read, so we should use it.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/bios/shadowramin.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/bios/shadowramin.c +2 -1
@@ -65,13 +65,14 @@ pramin_init(struct nvkm_bios *bios, const char *name)/* we can't get the bios image pointer without PDISP */ if (device->card_type >=GA100 ) - addr = device->chipset ==0x170 ;/*XXX: find the fuse reg for this */ + addr =nvkm_rd32 (device,0x820c04 );else if (device->card_type >=GM100 ) addr =nvkm_rd32 (device,0x021c04 );else if (device->card_type >=NV_C0 ) addr =nvkm_rd32 (device,0x022500 ); +if (addr &0x00000001 ) {nvkm_debug (subdev,"... display disabled\n" );return ERR_PTR (-ENODEV );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 272/843 libbpf: Fix UAF in strset__add_str()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b23705e6afb6ac4ae6d220dcb35975698667dd76 ]
strset_add_str_mem() might reallocate the strset data buffer in order to accommodate the provided string 's'. However, if 's' points to a string already present in the buffer, it becomes dangling after the realloc. This leads to a use-after-free when attempting to memcpy() the string into the new buffer.
One scenario that triggers this problematic path is when resolve_btfids attempts to patch kfunc prototypes using existing BTF parameter names:
| resolve_btfids: function bpf_list_push_back_impl already exists in BTF | Segmentation fault (core dumped)
Compiling resolve_btfids with fsanitize=address generates a detailed report of the UAF:
| ================================================================= | ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7f4c4a500bd4 | ==1507892==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7f4c4a500bd4 at pc 0x55d25155a2a8 bp 0x7ffcef879060 sp 0x7ffcef878818 | READ of size 5 at 0x7f4c4a500bd4 thread T0 | #0 0x55d25155a2a7 in memcpy (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xcf2a7) | #1 0x55d2515d708e in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:162:2 | #2 0x55d2515c730b in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2109:8 | #3 0x55d2515c9020 in btf__add_func_param tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:3108:14 | #4 0x55d25159f0b5 in process_kfunc_with_implicit_args tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1196:9 | #5 0x55d25159e004 in btf2btf tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1229:9 | #6 0x55d25159cee7 in main tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1535:6 | #7 0x7f4c78e29f76 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16 | #8 0x7f4c78e2a026 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3 | #9 0x55d2514bb860 in _start (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0x30860) | | 0x7f4c4a500bd4 is located 13268 bytes inside of 2829000-byte region [0x7f4c4a4fd800,0x7f4c4a7b02c8) | freed by thread T0 here: | #0 0x55d25155b700 in realloc (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xd0700) | #1 0x55d2515c426c in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/./libbpf_internal.h:220:9 | #2 0x55d2515c426c in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:224:13 | | previously allocated by thread T0 here: | #0 0x55d25155b2e3 in malloc (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xd02e3) | #1 0x55d2515d6e7d in strset__new tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:58:20
While resolve_btfids could be refactored to avoid this call path, let's instead fix this issue at the source in strset__add_str() and avoid similar scenarios.
Let's check if set->strs_data was reallocated and whether 's' points to an internal string within the old strset buffer. In such case, 's' is reconstructed to point to the new buffer.
While already here, also fix strset__find_str() which suffers from the same problem by factoring out the common operations into a new helper function strset_str_append().
--- tools/lib/bpf/strset.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
tools/lib/bpf/strset.c +41 -21
@@ -107,6 +107,41 @@ static void *strset_add_str_mem(struct strset *set, size_t add_sz) set->strs_data_len, set->strs_data_max_len, add_sz); } +static long strset_str_append (struct strset *set,const char *s) +{ +uintptr_t old_data = (uintptr_t )set->strs_data; +size_t old_data_len = set->strs_data_len; +uintptr_t old_s = (uintptr_t )s; +long len =strlen (s) +1 ; +void *p; + +/* +* Hashmap keys are always offsets within set->strs_data, so to even +* look up some string from the "outside", we need to first append it +* at the end, so that it can be addressed with an offset. Luckily, +* until set->strs_data_len is incremented, that string is just a piece +* of garbage for the rest of the code, so no harm, no foul. On the +* other hand, if the string is unique, it's already appended and +* ready to be used, only a simple set->strs_data_len increment away. +*/ + p =strset_add_str_mem (set, len); +if (!p) +return -ENOMEM ; + +/* +* The set->strs_data might have reallocated and if 's' pointed +* to an internal string within the old buffer, then it became +* dangling and needs to be reconstructed before the copy. +*/ +if (old_data && old_data != (uintptr_t )set->strs_data && + old_s >= old_data && old_s < old_data + old_data_len) + s = set->strs_data + (old_s - old_data); + +memcpy (p, s, len); + +return len; +} +/* Find string offset that corresponds to a given string *s*. * Returns: * - >0 offset into string data, if string is found;
@@ -116,16 +151,12 @@ static void *strset_add_str_mem(struct strset *set, size_t add_sz)int strset__find_str (struct strset *set,const char *s) {long old_off, new_off, len; -void *p; -/* see strset__add_str() for why we do this */ - len =strlen (s) +1 ; - p =strset_add_str_mem (set, len); -if (!p) -return -ENOMEM ; + len =strset_str_append (set, s); +if (len <0 ) +return len; new_off = set->strs_data_len; -memcpy (p, s, len);if (hashmap__find (set->strs_hash, (void *)new_off, (void **)&old_off))return old_off;
@@ -142,24 +173,13 @@ int strset__find_str(struct strset *set, const char *s)int strset__add_str (struct strset *set,const char *s) {long old_off, new_off, len; -void *p;int err; -/* Hashmap keys are always offsets within set->strs_data, so to even -* look up some string from the "outside", we need to first append it -* at the end, so that it can be addressed with an offset. Luckily, -* until set->strs_data_len is incremented, that string is just a piece -* of garbage for the rest of the code, so no harm, no foul. On the -* other hand, if the string is unique, it's already appended and -* ready to be used, only a simple set->strs_data_len increment away. -*/ - len =strlen (s) +1 ; - p =strset_add_str_mem (set, len); -if (!p) -return -ENOMEM ; + len =strset_str_append (set, s); +if (len <0 ) +return len; new_off = set->strs_data_len; -memcpy (p, s, len);/* Now attempt to add the string, but only if the string with the same * contents doesn't exist already (HASHMAP_ADD strategy). If such
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 273/843 dax/kmem: account for partial discontiguous resource upon removal
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8aa442cfce79e2d69e72fc8e0c0864ac2971149d ]
When dev_dax_kmem_probe() partially succeeds (at least one range is mapped) but a subsequent range fails request_mem_region() or add_memory_driver_managed(), the probe silently continues, ultimately returning success, but with the corresponding range resource NULL'ed out.
dev_dax_kmem_remove() iterates over all dax_device ranges regardless of if the underlying resource exists. When remove_memory() is called later, it returns 0 because the memory was never added which causes dev_dax_kmem_remove() to incorrectly assume the (nonexistent) resource can be removed and attempts cleanup on a NULL pointer.
Fix this by skipping these ranges altogether, noting that these cases are considered success, such that the cleanup is still reached when all actually-added ranges are successfully removed.
--- drivers/dax/kmem.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/dax/kmem.c +6 -0
@@ -179,6 +179,12 @@ static void dev_dax_kmem_remove(struct dev_dax *dev_dax)if (rc)continue ; +/* range was never added during probe */ +if (!data->res[i]) { + success++; +continue ; + } + rc =remove_memory (range.start,range_len (&range));if (rc ==0 ) {remove_resource (data->res[i]);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 274/843 rapidio/tsi721: prevent a bad dereference in tsi721_db_dpc()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fc15e3a30ddd950f009c76765331783b9af94a87 ]
With a list_for_each() loop, if we don't find the item we are looking for in the list, then the loop exits with the iterator, which is "dbell" in this loop, pointing to invalid memory.
This code uses the "found" variable to determine if we have found the doorbell we are looking for or not. However, the problem that the "found" variable needs to be set to false at the start of each iteration, otherwise after the first correct doorbell, then everything is marked as found.
Reset the "found" to false at the start of the iteration and move the variable inside the loop.
--- drivers/rapidio/devices/tsi721.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rapidio/devices/tsi721.c +2 -1
@@ -384,7 +384,6 @@ static void tsi721_db_dpc(struct work_struct *work) idb_work);struct rio_mport *mport;struct rio_dbell *dbell; -int found =0 ;u32 wr_ptr, rd_ptr;u64 *idb_entry;u32 regval;
@@ -402,6 +401,8 @@ static void tsi721_db_dpc(struct work_struct *work) rd_ptr =ioread32 (priv->regs +TSI721_IDQ_RP (IDB_QUEUE )) %IDB_QSIZE ;while (wr_ptr != rd_ptr) { +int found =0 ; + idb_entry = (u64 *)(priv->idb_base + (TSI721_IDB_ENTRY_SIZE * rd_ptr)); rd_ptr++;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 275/843 ocfs2: dont BUG_ON an invalid journal dinode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: ZhengYuan Huang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c0438198c28b1d22c272751af5e717c11d9fa8dd ]
[BUG]
A fuzzed OCFS2 image can corrupt the current slot journal dinode while mount is still in progress. The mount path first reports the invalid journal block and then crashes in shutdown:
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1034!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:ocfs2_journal_toggle_dirty+0x2d6/0x340 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1034 Call Trace: ocfs2_journal_shutdown+0x414/0xc30 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1116 ocfs2_mount_volume fs/ocfs2/super.c:1785 [inline] ocfs2_fill_super+0x30a9/0x3cd0 fs/ocfs2/super.c:1083 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x38b/0x640 fs/super.c:1698 get_tree_bdev+0x24/0x40 fs/super.c:1721 ocfs2_get_tree+0x21/0x30 fs/ocfs2/super.c:1184 vfs_get_tree+0x9a/0x370 fs/super.c:1758 fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1199 [inline] do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3642 [inline] do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3718 [inline] path_mount+0x5b8/0x1ea0 fs/namespace.c:4028 do_mount fs/namespace.c:4041 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4229 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4206 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x320 fs/namespace.c:4206 ...
[CAUSE]ocfs2_journal_toggle_dirty() used to return -EIO when journal->j_bh no longer contained a valid dinode, because the startup and shutdown paths already handled that failure. Commit 10995aa2451a
("ocfs2: Morph the haphazard OCFS2_IS_VALID_DINODE() checks.") changed the check to a BUG_ON() under the assumption that the journal dinode had already been validated. That turns an unexpected invalid journal dinode during mount teardown into a kernel crash instead of a normal mount failure.
[FIX]
Replace the BUG_ON() with WARN_ON() and return -EIO. This keeps the invariant warning for debugging, but restores the original behavior of failing startup or shutdown cleanly instead of panicking the kernel.
--- fs/ocfs2/journal.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/journal.c +2 -5
@@ -966,11 +966,8 @@ static int ocfs2_journal_toggle_dirty(struct ocfs2_super *osb,struct ocfs2_dinode *fe; fe = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)bh->b_data; - -/* The journal bh on the osb always comes from ocfs2_journal_init() -* and was validated there inside ocfs2_inode_lock_full(). It's a -* code bug if we mess it up. */ -BUG_ON (!OCFS2_IS_VALID_DINODE (fe)); +if (WARN_ON (!OCFS2_IS_VALID_DINODE (fe))) +return -EIO ; flags =le32_to_cpu (fe->id1.journal1.ij_flags);if (dirty)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 276/843 ocfs2: kill osb->system_file_mutex lock
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f5b1910e23f1233c8d4185268b2e659df2bc5dbf ]
Commit 43b10a20372d ("ocfs2: avoid system inode ref confusion by adding mutex lock") tried to avoid a refcount leak caused by allowing multiple threads to call igrab(inode). But addition of osb->system_file_mutex made locking dependency complicated and is causing lockdep to warn about possibility of AB-BA deadlock.
Since _ocfs2_get_system_file_inode() returns the same inode for the same input arguments, we don't need to serialize _ocfs2_get_system_file_inode(). What we need to make sure is that igrab(inode) is called for only once(). Therefore, replace osb->system_file_mutex with cmpxchg()-based locking.
--- fs/ocfs2/ocfs2.h | 2 -- fs/ocfs2/super.c | 2 -- fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c | 9 +++------ 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/ocfs2.h +0 -2
@@ -467,8 +467,6 @@ struct ocfs2_superstruct rb_root osb_rf_lock_tree;struct ocfs2_refcount_tree *osb_ref_tree_lru; -struct mutex system_file_mutex; -/* * OCFS2 needs to schedule several different types of work which * require cluster locking, disk I/O, recovery waits, etc. Since these
fs/ocfs2/super.c +0 -2
@@ -2058,8 +2058,6 @@ static int ocfs2_initialize_super(struct super_block *sb,spin_lock_init (&osb->osb_xattr_lock);ocfs2_init_steal_slots (osb); -mutex_init (&osb->system_file_mutex); -atomic_set (&osb->alloc_stats.moves,0 );atomic_set (&osb->alloc_stats.local_data,0 );atomic_set (&osb->alloc_stats.bitmap_data,0 );
fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c +3 -6
@@ -98,11 +98,9 @@ struct inode *ocfs2_get_system_file_inode(struct ocfs2_super *osb, }else arr =get_local_system_inode (osb, type, slot); -mutex_lock (&osb->system_file_mutex);if (arr && ((inode = *arr) !=NULL )) {/* get a ref in addition to the array ref */ inode =igrab (inode); -mutex_unlock (&osb->system_file_mutex);BUG_ON (!inode);return inode;
@@ -112,11 +110,10 @@ struct inode *ocfs2_get_system_file_inode(struct ocfs2_super *osb, inode =_ocfs2_get_system_file_inode (osb, type, slot);/* add one more if putting into array for first time */ -if (arr && inode) { - *arr =igrab (inode); -BUG_ON (!*arr); +if (inode && arr && !*arr && !cmpxchg (&(*arr),NULL , inode)) { + inode =igrab (inode); +BUG_ON (!inode); } -mutex_unlock (&osb->system_file_mutex);return inode; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 277/843 crypto: hisilicon/qm - disable error report before flr
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weili Qian <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e71dc5602b9a29027f6aedd5990d3e8c4f638c8c ]
Before function level reset, driver first disable device error report and then waits for the device reset to complete. However, when the error is recovered, the error bits will be enabled again, resulting in invalid disable. It is modified to detect that there is no error before disable error report, and then do FLR.
--- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/qm.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/hisilicon/qm.c +2 -2
@@ -5113,8 +5113,6 @@ void hisi_qm_reset_prepare(struct pci_dev *pdev)u32 delay =0 ;int ret; -hisi_qm_dev_err_uninit (pf_qm); -/* * Check whether there is an ECC mbit error, If it occurs, need to * wait for soft reset to fix it.
@@ -5131,6 +5129,8 @@ void hisi_qm_reset_prepare(struct pci_dev *pdev)return ; } +hisi_qm_dev_err_uninit (pf_qm); +/* PF obtains the information of VF by querying the register. */ if (qm->fun_type ==QM_HW_PF )qm_cmd_uninit (qm);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 278/843 drm/msm/dp: fix HPD state status bit shift value
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jessica Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2e6c2e81d81251623c458a60e2a57447dcbc988e ]
The HPD state status is the 3 most significant bits, not 4 bits of the HPD_INT_STATUS register.
Fix the bit shift macro so that the correct bits are returned in msm_dp_aux_is_link_connected().
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/727611/
--- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dp/dp_reg.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dp/dp_reg.h +2 -2
@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@#define DP_DP_IRQ_HPD_INT_ACK (0x00000002)#define DP_DP_HPD_REPLUG_INT_ACK (0x00000004)#define DP_DP_HPD_UNPLUG_INT_ACK (0x00000008) -#define DP_DP_HPD_STATE_STATUS_BITS_MASK (0x0000000F) -#define DP_DP_HPD_STATE_STATUS_BITS_SHIFT (0x1C) +#define DP_DP_HPD_STATE_STATUS_BITS_MASK (0x00000007) +#define DP_DP_HPD_STATE_STATUS_BITS_SHIFT (0x1D)#define REG_DP_DP_HPD_INT_MASK (0x0000000C)#define DP_DP_HPD_PLUG_INT_MASK (0x00000001)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 279/843 drm/msm/dp: Fix the ISR_* enum values
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jessica Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3fbfdc3b1d48cc115a86953e5df0c76cd2efc42b ]
The ISR_HPD_* enum should represent values that can be read from the REG_DP_DP_HPD_INT_STATUS register. Swap ISR_HPD_IO_GLITCH_COUNT and ISR_HPD_REPLUG_COUNT to map them correctly to register values.
While we are at it, correct the spelling for ISR_HPD_REPLUG_COUNT.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/727602/
--- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dp/dp_display.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dp/dp_display.c +2 -2
@@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ enum {ISR_DISCONNECTED ,ISR_CONNECT_PENDING ,ISR_CONNECTED , -ISR_HPD_REPLUG_COUNT , +ISR_HPD_IO_GLITCH_COUNT ,ISR_IRQ_HPD_PULSE_COUNT , - ISR_HPD_LO_GLITH_COUNT, + ISR_HPD_REPLUG_COUNT, };/* event thread connection state */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 280/843 EDAC/{skx_common,skx}: Fix UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds in skx_get_dimm_info
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: zhoumin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c63ed6e1f5fe648a4a099b6717f679999be482ef ]
When the skx_get_dimm_attr() helper returns -EINVAL, skx_get_dimm_info() does not validate these return values before using them in a shift operation:
size = ((1ull << (rows + cols + ranks)) * banks) >> (20 - 3);
If all three values are -22, the shift exponent becomes -66, triggering a UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds error:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/edac/skx_common.c
shift exponent -66 is negative--- drivers/edac/skx_common.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/edac/skx_common.c +3 -0
@@ -354,6 +354,9 @@ int skx_get_dimm_info(u32 mtr, u32 mcmtr, u32 amap, struct dimm_info *dimm, rows =numrow (mtr); cols = imc->hbm_mc ?6 :numcol (mtr); +if (ranks <0 || rows <0 || cols <0 ) +return 0 ; +if (imc->hbm_mc) { banks =32 ; mtype =MEM_HBM2 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 281/843 media: qcom: venus: drop extra padding in NV12 raw size calculation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Renjiang Han <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e1c9adabb268cc5d56723b7df1da49e59070f309 ]
get_framesize_raw_nv12() currently adds SZ_4K to the UV plane size and an additional SZ_8K to the total buffer size. This inflates the calculated sizeimage and leads userspace to over-allocate buffers without a clear requirement.
Remove the extra SZ_4K/SZ_8K padding and compute the NV12 size as the sum of Y and UV planes, keeping the final ALIGN(size, SZ_4K) intact.
--- drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/helpers.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/helpers.c +2 -2
@@ -928,8 +928,8 @@ static u32 get_framesize_raw_nv12(u32 width, u32 height) uv_sclines =ALIGN (((height +1 ) >>1 ),16 ); y_plane = y_stride * y_sclines; - uv_plane = uv_stride * uv_sclines +SZ_4K ; - size = y_plane + uv_plane +SZ_8K ; + uv_plane = uv_stride * uv_sclines; + size = y_plane + uv_plane;return ALIGN (size,SZ_4K ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 282/843 media: qcom: venus: relax encoder frame/blur dimension steps on v4
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Renjiang Han <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 35428ae3a6a40912f1f7b47bb6c65f1a63d0b8f8 ]
Encoder HFI capabilities on v4 advertise a 16-pixel step for frame and blur dimensions. This is overly restrictive and can cause userspace caps negotiation to fail even for valid resolutions.
Relax the advertised step size to 1 and keep alignment enforcement in buffer layout and size calculations.
--- .../platform/qcom/venus/hfi_platform_v4.c | 20 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_platform_v4.c +10 -10
@@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ static const struct hfi_plat_caps caps[] = { .codec = HFI_VIDEO_CODEC_H264, .domain = VIDC_SESSION_TYPE_ENC, .cap_bufs_mode_dynamic = true, - .caps[0] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 16}, - .caps[1] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 16}, + .caps[0] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 1}, + .caps[1] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 1}, .caps[2] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_MBS_PER_FRAME, 1, 36864, 1}, .caps[3] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BITRATE, 1, 120000000, 1}, .caps[4] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_SCALE_X, 8192, 65536, 1},
@@ -172,8 +172,8 @@ static const struct hfi_plat_caps caps[] = { .codec = HFI_VIDEO_CODEC_HEVC, .domain = VIDC_SESSION_TYPE_ENC, .cap_bufs_mode_dynamic = true, - .caps[0] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 16}, - .caps[1] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 16}, + .caps[0] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 1}, + .caps[1] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 1}, .caps[2] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_MBS_PER_FRAME, 1, 36864, 1}, .caps[3] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BITRATE, 1, 120000000, 1}, .caps[4] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_SCALE_X, 8192, 65536, 1},
@@ -194,8 +194,8 @@ static const struct hfi_plat_caps caps[] = { .caps[19] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_RATE_CONTROL_MODES, 0x1000001, 0x1000005, 1}, .caps[20] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_COLOR_SPACE_CONVERSION, 0, 2, 1}, .caps[21] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_ROTATION, 1, 4, 90}, - .caps[22] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 16}, - .caps[23] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 16}, + .caps[22] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 1}, + .caps[23] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 1}, .num_caps = 24, .pl[0] = {HFI_HEVC_PROFILE_MAIN, HFI_HEVC_LEVEL_6 | HFI_HEVC_TIER_HIGH0}, .pl[1] = {HFI_HEVC_PROFILE_MAIN10, HFI_HEVC_LEVEL_6 | HFI_HEVC_TIER_HIGH0},
@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ static const struct hfi_plat_caps caps[] = { .codec = HFI_VIDEO_CODEC_VP8, .domain = VIDC_SESSION_TYPE_ENC, .cap_bufs_mode_dynamic = true, - .caps[0] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 16}, - .caps[1] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 16}, + .caps[0] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 1}, + .caps[1] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 1}, .caps[2] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_MBS_PER_FRAME, 1, 36864, 1}, .caps[3] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BITRATE, 1, 120000000, 1}, .caps[4] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_SCALE_X, 8192, 65536, 1},
@@ -228,8 +228,8 @@ static const struct hfi_plat_caps caps[] = { .caps[16] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_P_FRAME_QP, 0, 127, 1}, .caps[17] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_MAX_WORKMODES, 1, 2, 1}, .caps[18] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_RATE_CONTROL_MODES, 0x1000001, 0x1000005, 1}, - .caps[19] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 16}, - .caps[20] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 16}, + .caps[19] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 1}, + .caps[20] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 1}, .caps[21] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_COLOR_SPACE_CONVERSION, 0, 2, 1}, .caps[22] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_ROTATION, 1, 4, 90}, .num_caps = 23,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 283/843 media: qcom: venus: relax encoder frame/blur step size on v6
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Renjiang Han <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c53e0550288b2e08b984b24035c471941b7820c7 ]
Encoder HFI capabilities on v6 enforce a 16-pixel step for frame and blur dimensions, which does not reflect actual hardware requirements and can reject valid userspace configurations.
Relax the step size to 1 while leaving min/max limits unchanged.
--- .../media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_platform_v6.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_platform_v6.c +8 -8
@@ -172,8 +172,8 @@ static const struct hfi_plat_caps caps[] = { .codec = HFI_VIDEO_CODEC_HEVC, .domain = VIDC_SESSION_TYPE_ENC, .cap_bufs_mode_dynamic = true, - .caps[0] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_WIDTH, 128, 8192, 16}, - .caps[1] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_HEIGHT, 128, 8192, 16}, + .caps[0] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_WIDTH, 128, 8192, 1}, + .caps[1] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_HEIGHT, 128, 8192, 1}, .caps[2] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_MBS_PER_FRAME, 64, 138240, 1}, .caps[3] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BITRATE, 1, 160000000, 1}, .caps[4] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_SCALE_X, 8192, 65536, 1},
@@ -194,8 +194,8 @@ static const struct hfi_plat_caps caps[] = { .caps[19] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_RATE_CONTROL_MODES, 0x1000001, 0x1000005, 1}, .caps[20] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_COLOR_SPACE_CONVERSION, 0, 2, 1}, .caps[21] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_ROTATION, 1, 4, 90}, - .caps[22] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 16}, - .caps[23] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 16}, + .caps[22] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 1}, + .caps[23] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 1}, .num_caps = 24, .pl[0] = {HFI_HEVC_PROFILE_MAIN, HFI_HEVC_LEVEL_6 | HFI_HEVC_TIER_HIGH0}, .pl[1] = {HFI_HEVC_PROFILE_MAIN10, HFI_HEVC_LEVEL_6 | HFI_HEVC_TIER_HIGH0},
@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ static const struct hfi_plat_caps caps[] = { .codec = HFI_VIDEO_CODEC_VP8, .domain = VIDC_SESSION_TYPE_ENC, .cap_bufs_mode_dynamic = true, - .caps[0] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_WIDTH, 128, 4096, 16}, - .caps[1] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_HEIGHT, 128, 4096, 16}, + .caps[0] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_WIDTH, 128, 4096, 1}, + .caps[1] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_FRAME_HEIGHT, 128, 4096, 1}, .caps[2] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_MBS_PER_FRAME, 64, 36864, 1}, .caps[3] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BITRATE, 1, 74000000, 1}, .caps[4] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_SCALE_X, 8192, 65536, 1},
@@ -228,8 +228,8 @@ static const struct hfi_plat_caps caps[] = { .caps[16] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_P_FRAME_QP, 0, 127, 1}, .caps[17] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_MAX_WORKMODES, 1, 2, 1}, .caps[18] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_RATE_CONTROL_MODES, 0x1000001, 0x1000005, 1}, - .caps[19] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 16}, - .caps[20] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 16}, + .caps[19] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_WIDTH, 96, 4096, 1}, + .caps[20] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_BLUR_HEIGHT, 96, 4096, 1}, .caps[21] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_COLOR_SPACE_CONVERSION, 0, 2, 1}, .caps[22] = {HFI_CAPABILITY_ROTATION, 1, 4, 90}, .num_caps = 23,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 284/843 md/raid10: reset read_slot when reusing r10bio for discard
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chen Cheng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6b8a26af065ddc93de2aa5c9f0df98dce9723442 ]
put_all_bios() always drops devs[i].bio, but it only drops devs[i].repl_bio when r10_bio->read_slot < 0. If discard reuses an r10bio that was previously used for a read, read_slot can still be non-negative, and discard cleanup can skip bio_put() on repl_bio.
Reset read_slot to -1 when preparing an r10bio for discard so the replacement bio is always released correctly.
--- drivers/md/raid10.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/md/raid10.c +1 -0
@@ -1766,6 +1766,7 @@ static int raid10_handle_discard(struct mddev *mddev, struct bio *bio) r10_bio->mddev = mddev; r10_bio->state =0 ; r10_bio->sectors =0 ; + r10_bio->read_slot =-1 ;memset (r10_bio->devs,0 ,sizeof (r10_bio->devs[0 ]) * geo->raid_disks);wait_blocked_dev (mddev, r10_bio);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 285/843 ext4: fix LOGFLUSH shutdown ordering to allow ordered-mode data writeback
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Yi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d99748ef1695ce17eaf51c64b7a06952fa7cddab ]
In EXT4_GOING_FLAGS_LOGFLUSH mode, the EXT4_FLAGS_SHUTDOWN flag was set before calling ext4_force_commit(). This caused ordered-mode data writeback (triggered by journal commit) to fail with -EIO, since ext4_do_writepages() checks for the shutdown flag. The journal would then be aborted prematurely before the commit could succeed.
Fix this by calling ext4_force_commit() first, then setting the shutdown flag, so that pending data can be written back correctly.
Note that moving ext4_force_commit() before setting the shutdown flag creates a small window in which new writes may occur and generate new journal transactions. When the journal is subsequently aborted, the new transactions will not be able to write to disk. This is intentional because LOGFLUSH's semantics are to flush pre-existing journal entries before shutdown, not to guarantee atomicity for writes that race with the ioctl.
--- fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +9 -3
@@ -585,11 +585,17 @@ static int ext4_shutdown(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long arg)thaw_bdev (sb->s_bdev);break ;case EXT4_GOING_FLAGS_LOGFLUSH : +/* +* Call ext4_force_commit() before setting EXT4_FLAGS_SHUTDOWN. +* This is because in data=ordered mode, journal commit +* triggers data writeback which fails if shutdown is already +* set, causing the journal to be aborted prematurely before +* the commit succeeds. +*/ + (void )ext4_force_commit (sb);set_bit (EXT4_FLAGS_SHUTDOWN , &sbi->s_ext4_flags); -if (sbi->s_journal && !is_journal_aborted (sbi->s_journal)) { - (void )ext4_force_commit (sb); +if (sbi->s_journal && !is_journal_aborted (sbi->s_journal))jbd2_journal_abort (sbi->s_journal, -ESHUTDOWN ); - }break ;case EXT4_GOING_FLAGS_NOLOGFLUSH :set_bit (EXT4_FLAGS_SHUTDOWN , &sbi->s_ext4_flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 286/843 ARM: imx3: Fix CCM node reference leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yuho Choi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 36d46348eb5fc4bc505cd2290ddd70c25fbe6bb3 ]
of_find_compatible_node() returns a referenced device node. The i.MX31 and i.MX35 early init paths use the node to map the CCM registers with of_iomap(), but never drop the node reference.
Release the node after the mapping is created.
--- arch/arm/mach-imx/mm-imx3.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/arm/mach-imx/mm-imx3.c +2 -0
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ void __init imx31_init_early(void) arm_pm_idle = imx31_idle; np =of_find_compatible_node (NULL ,NULL ,"fsl,imx31-ccm" ); mx3_ccm_base =of_iomap (np,0 ); +of_node_put (np); BUG_ON(!mx3_ccm_base); }#endif /* ifdef CONFIG_SOC_IMX31 */
@@ -144,6 +145,7 @@ void __init imx35_init_early(void) arch_ioremap_caller = imx3_ioremap_caller; np =of_find_compatible_node (NULL ,NULL ,"fsl,imx35-ccm" ); mx3_ccm_base =of_iomap (np,0 ); +of_node_put (np); BUG_ON(!mx3_ccm_base); }#endif /* ifdef CONFIG_SOC_IMX35 */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 287/843 ARM: imx31: Fix IIM mapping leak in revision check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yuho Choi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ccb4b54b8ecf1ebafef96d538cd6c5c8455bb390 ]
mx31_read_cpu_rev() maps the IIM registers with of_iomap() to read the silicon revision, but returns without unmapping the MMIO mapping.
Keep the normalized revision value in a local variable and route the return path through iounmap() after the revision register has been read.
--- arch/arm/mach-imx/cpu-imx31.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm/mach-imx/cpu-imx31.c +7 -2
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ static int mx31_read_cpu_rev(void)void __iomem *iim_base;struct device_node *np;u32 i, srev; +int rev =IMX_CHIP_REVISION_UNKNOWN ; np =of_find_compatible_node (NULL ,NULL ,"fsl,imx31-iim" ); iim_base =of_iomap (np,0 );
@@ -48,13 +49,17 @@ static int mx31_read_cpu_rev(void)for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (mx31_cpu_type); i++)if (srev == mx31_cpu_type[i].srev) { + rev = mx31_cpu_type[i].rev;imx_print_silicon_rev (mx31_cpu_type[i].name, mx31_cpu_type[i].rev); -return mx31_cpu_type[i].rev; + goto out; }imx_print_silicon_rev ("i.MX31" ,IMX_CHIP_REVISION_UNKNOWN ); -return IMX_CHIP_REVISION_UNKNOWN ; + +out: +iounmap (iim_base); +return rev; }int mx31_revision (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 288/843 scsi: Revert "scsi: Fix sas_user_scan() to handle wildcard and multi-channel scans"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Martin Wilck <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8c292e89bd831c8a13e92f3429ef66bbe0b83677 ]
This reverts commit 37c4e72b0651e7697eb338cd1fb09feef472cc1a.
Said commit causes excessive resource usage and even system freeze with some controllers, e.g. smartpqi and hisi_sas. The justification provided by the patch authors [1] was supporting a special mode of the mpi3mr and mpt3sas, so-called "Tri-mode", in which NVMe drives are exposed as SCSI devices on a separate channel. While that's useful for these drivers, it seems wrong to cause major breakage for other drivers for the sake of this feature.
--- drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c | 2 +- drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_sas.c | 60 +++++++------------------------ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c +1 -1
@@ -1763,7 +1763,7 @@ int scsi_scan_host_selected(struct Scsi_Host *shost, unsigned int channel,return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (scsi_scan_host_selected); +static void scsi_sysfs_add_devices (struct Scsi_Host *shost) {struct scsi_device *sdev;
drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_sas.c +12 -48
83 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 289/843 scsi: pm8001: Fix error code in non_fatal_log_show()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1b6f03b7ae9ee27054c55bb55a69d05555a78516 ]
The non_fatal_log_show() function is supposed to return negative error codes on failure. But because the error codes are saved in a u32 and then cast to signed long, they end up being high positive values instead of negative. Remove the intermediary u32 variable to fix this bug.
--- drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm8001_ctl.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm8001_ctl.c +1 -4
@@ -590,10 +590,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(fatal_log, S_IRUGO, pm8001_ctl_fatal_log_show, NULL);static ssize_t non_fatal_log_show (struct device *cdev,struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) { -u32 count; - - count =pm80xx_get_non_fatal_dump (cdev, attr, buf); -return count; +return pm80xx_get_non_fatal_dump (cdev, attr, buf); }static DEVICE_ATTR_RO (non_fatal_log);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 290/843 bpf: fix UAF by restoring RCU-delayed inode freeing in bpffs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Deepanshu Kartikey <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b93c55b4932dd7e32dca8cf34a3443cc87a02906 ]
commit 4f375ade6aa9 ("bpf: Avoid RCU context warning when unpinning htab with internal structs") moved inode cleanup from ->free_inode() into ->destroy_inode() to avoid sleeping in RCU context when calling bpf_any_put(). However this removed the RCU delay on freeing the inode itself and the cached symlink body (i_link), both of which can be accessed by RCU pathwalk (pick_link, may_lookup etc.).
This causes a use-after-free when a concurrent unlinkat() drops the last inode reference and destroy_inode() frees the inode immediately, while another task is still walking the path in RCU mode and reads inode->i_opflags (offset +2) inside current_time() -> is_mgtime().
KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in is_mgtime include/linux/fs.h:2313 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880407e4282 (offset +2 = i_opflags)
The rules (per Al Viro):
->destroy_inode() called immediately, can sleep, use for blocking
cleanup e.g. bpf_any_put()
->free_inode() called after RCU grace period, use for freeing
inode and anything RCU-accessible e.g. i_link
Fix: split the two concerns properly:
- keep bpf_any_put() in bpf_destroy_inode() since it is blocking and needs to run promptly
- introduce bpf_free_inode() to handle kfree(i_link) and free_inode_nonrcu() with proper RCU delay, preventing the UAF
--- kernel/bpf/inode.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/inode.c +11 -2
@@ -614,10 +614,18 @@ static void bpf_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode) {enum bpf_type type; -if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) -kfree (inode->i_link);if (!bpf_inode_type (inode, &type))bpf_any_put (inode->i_private, type); +} + +/* +* Called after RCU grace period - safe to free inode and anything +* that might be accessed by RCU pathwalk (inode fields, i_link). +*/ +static void bpf_free_inode (struct inode *inode) +{ +if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) +kfree (inode->i_link);free_inode_nonrcu (inode); }
@@ -626,6 +634,7 @@ static const struct super_operations bpf_super_ops = { .drop_inode = generic_delete_inode, .show_options = bpf_show_options, .destroy_inode = bpf_destroy_inode, + .free_inode = bpf_free_inode, };enum {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 291/843 mm/fake-numa: fix under-allocation detection in uniform split
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sang-Heon Jeon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3a3fc1dfd6a958615ebaab8fb251e89fc2b3f2f2 ]
When splitting NUMA node uniformly, split_nodes_size_interleave_uniform() returns the next absolute node ID, not the number of nodes created.
The existing under-allocation detection logic compares next absolute node ID (ret) and request count (n), which only works when nid starts at 0.
For example, on a system with 2 physical NUMA nodes (node 0: 2GB, node 1: 128MB) and numa=fake=8U, 8 fake nodes are successfully created from node 0 and split_nodes_size_interleave_uniform() returns 8. For node 1, fake node nid starts at 8, but only 4 fake nodes are created due to current FAKE_NODE_MIN_SIZE being 32MB, and split_nodes_size_interleave_uniform() returns 12. By existing under-allocation detection logic, "ret < n" (12 < 8) is false, so the under-allocation will not be detected.
Fix under-allocation detection logic to compare the number of actually created nodes (ret - nid) against the request count (n). Also skip under-allocation detection logic for memoryless physical nodes where no fake nodes are created.
Also, fix the outdated comment describing split_nodes_size_interleave_uniform() to match the actual return value.
--- arch/x86/mm/numa_emulation.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/numa_emulation.c +13 -4
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static u64 uniform_size(u64 max_addr, u64 base, u64 hole, int nr_nodes)* Sets up fake nodes of `size' interleaved over physical nodes ranging from * `addr' to `max_addr'. * -* Returns zero on success or negative on error. +* Returns node ID of the next node on success or negative error code. */ static int __init split_nodes_size_interleave_uniform(struct numa_meminfo *ei, struct numa_meminfo *pi,
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ void __init numa_emulation(struct numa_meminfo *numa_meminfo, int numa_dist_cnt)if (strchr (emu_cmdline,'U' )) {nodemask_t physnode_mask = numa_nodes_parsed;unsigned long n; -int nid =0 ; +int nid =0 , nr_created; n =simple_strtoul (emu_cmdline, &emu_cmdline,0 ); ret =-1 ;
@@ -413,9 +413,18 @@ void __init numa_emulation(struct numa_meminfo *numa_meminfo, int numa_dist_cnt) n, &pi.blk[0], nid);if (ret <0 )break ; -if (ret < n) { + +/* +* If no memory was found for this physical node, +* skip the under-allocation check. +*/ +if (ret == nid) +continue ; + + nr_created = ret - nid; +if (nr_created < n) {pr_info ("%s: phys: %d only got %d of %ld nodes, failing\n" , - __func__, i, ret, n); + __func__, i, nr_created, n); ret =-1 ;break ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 292/843 lib/test_meminit: use && for bools
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8e0c2085c978ed6d9764d79fc785920360096f21 ]
As pointed out by Dan Carpenter, test_kmemcache() was using a bitwise AND on two bools instead of a boolean AND. Fix this for the sake of code cleanliness.
--- lib/test_meminit.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/test_meminit.c +1 -1
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static int __init test_kmemcache(int *total_failures) ctor = flags &1 ; rcu = flags &2 ; zero = flags &4 ; -if (ctor & zero) +if (ctor && zero)continue ; num_tests +=do_kmem_cache_size (size, ctor, rcu, zero, &failures);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 293/843 configfs_lookup(): dont leave ->s_dentry dangling on failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 10da12d352b7b2bb330a8609fdda9a58bf0e9856 ]
Normally ->s_dentry is cleared when dentry it's pointing to becomes negative (on eviction, realistically). However, that only happens if dentry gets to be positive in the first place; in case of inode allocation failure dentry never becomes positive, so ->d_iput() is not called at all.
We do part of what normally would've been done by configfs_d_iput() (dropping the reference to configfs_dirent) manually, but we do not clear ->s_dentry there. Sloppy as it is, it does not matter in case of configfs_create_{dir,link}() - there configfs_dirent does not survive dropping the sole reference to it.
However, for configfs_lookup() it *does* survive, with a dangling pointer to soon to be freed dentry sitting it its ->s_dentry.
Subsequent getdents(2) in that directory will end up dereferencing that pointer in order to pick the inode number. Use after free...
This is the minimal fix; the right approach is to set the linkage between dentry and configfs_dirent only after we know that we have an inode, but that takes more surgery and the bug had been there since 2006, so...
--- fs/configfs/dir.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/configfs/dir.c +3 -0
@@ -462,6 +462,9 @@ static struct dentry * configfs_lookup(struct inode *dir, inode =configfs_create (dentry, mode);if (IS_ERR (inode)) { +spin_lock (&configfs_dirent_lock); + sd->s_dentry =NULL ; +spin_unlock (&configfs_dirent_lock);configfs_put (sd);return ERR_CAST (inode); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 294/843 bpftool: Use libbpf error code for flow dissector query
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Woojin Ji <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8a7f2bff2165e53595d1e91c160b340f978c0ab7 ]
bpf_prog_query() returns a negative errno on failure. query_flow_dissector() currently closes the namespace fd and then reads errno to decide whether -EINVAL means that the running kernel does not support flow dissector queries.
That errno check controls behavior, not just diagnostics: -EINVAL is handled as a non-fatal old-kernel case, while any other error makes bpftool net fail.
The namespace fd is opened read-only, so close() is not expected to commonly fail in normal use. Still, the BPF_PROG_QUERY error is already available in err, and reading errno after an intervening close() is fragile. If close() does change errno, the compatibility branch may be based on close()'s error instead of the BPF_PROG_QUERY result.
This was reproduced with an LD_PRELOAD fault injector that forced BPF_PROG_QUERY for BPF_FLOW_DISSECTOR to fail with EINVAL and then forced close() on the netns fd to fail with EIO. The unpatched bpftool reported "can't query prog: Input/output error". With this change, the same injected failure is handled as the intended non-fatal EINVAL compatibility case.
Use the libbpf-returned error code instead. Keep the existing errno reset in the non-fatal path to preserve batch mode behavior. The success path is unchanged.
--- tools/bpf/bpftool/net.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/bpf/bpftool/net.c +2 -2
@@ -506,14 +506,14 @@ static int query_flow_dissector(struct bpf_attach_info *attach_info) &attach_flags, prog_ids, &prog_cnt);close (fd);if (err) { -if (errno ==EINVAL ) { +if (err == -EINVAL ) {/* Older kernel's don't support querying * flow dissector programs. */ errno =0 ;return 0 ; } -p_err ("can't query prog: %s" ,strerror (errno)); +p_err ("can't query prog: %s" ,strerror (-err));return -1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 295/843 perf/x86/amd/core: Always use the NMI latency mitigation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sandipan Das <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 73a4c02f94a98d94480c3e5c81450215a4da05ba ]
Commit df4d29732fda ("perf/x86/amd: Change/fix NMI latency mitigation to use a timestamp") fixed handling of late-arriving NMIs but limited the mitigation to processors having X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE. However, it is unclear if processors without this feature are also affected. When Mediated vPMU is enabled on affected hardware, it is also possible to bypass the fix inside KVM guests if X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE is removed from the guest CPUID (e.g. using "-cpu host,-perfctr-core" with QEMU). Hence, use the mitigation at all times.
--- arch/x86/events/amd/core.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/events/amd/core.c +3 -3
@@ -943,12 +943,12 @@ static int __init amd_core_pmu_init(void)u64 even_ctr_mask =0ULL ;int i; -if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE )) -return 0 ; -/* Avoid calculating the value each time in the NMI handler */ perf_nmi_window =msecs_to_jiffies (100 ); +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE )) +return 0 ; +/* * If core performance counter extensions exists, we must use * MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL/MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR msrs. See also
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 296/843 ocfs2: rebase copied fsdlm LVB pointers in locking_state
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 93612d48fa42b3d1a637eb9279e15281c611c000 ]
The locking_state debugfs iterator snapshots struct ocfs2_lock_res by value under ocfs2_dlm_tracking_lock and later formats that copy in ocfs2_dlm_seq_show(). That is fine for the inline fields, but the userspace fsdlm stack stores the LVB through lksb_fsdlm.sb_lvbptr. Once the iterator drops the tracking lock, a copied non-NULL sb_lvbptr still points into the original lockres owner, so teardown can free that container before the debugfs dump walks the raw LVB bytes.
Rebase the copied sb_lvbptr to the copied l_lksb before dumping the raw LVB. The seq snapshot already carries the inline LVB storage reserved in struct ocfs2_dlm_lksb, so the debugfs reader can dump the copied bytes without borrowing the original lockres lifetime.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path:
locking_state reader: lockres teardown:
1. ocfs2_dlm_seq_start()/next() 1. file release or another owner
copies struct ocfs2_lock_res teardown reaches
2. ocfs2_dlm_seq_show() formats ocfs2_lock_res_free()
the copied row 2. the lockres is removed from the
3. ocfs2_dlm_lvb() follows the tracking list
copied sb_lvbptr 3. the owner frees the original
lockres container
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_dlm_seq_show+0x1bd/0x430
RIP: 0033:0x7f8ec4b1e29d The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810a1e0800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 368 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region [ffff88810a1e0800, ffff88810a1e0c00) Read of size 1 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x630 ocfs2_dlm_seq_show+0x1bd/0x430 (fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.c:3137) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 seq_read_iter+0x29d/0x790 seq_read+0x20a/0x280 find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 rcu_read_unlock+0x18/0x70 full_proxy_read+0x9e/0xd0 vfs_read+0x12c/0x590 ksys_read+0xd2/0x170 do_user_addr_fault+0x65a/0x890 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Allocated by task stack: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 ocfs2_file_open+0x13e/0x300 do_dentry_open+0x233/0x7f0 vfs_open+0x5a/0x1b0 path_openat+0x66d/0x1540 do_file_open+0x186/0x2b0 do_sys_openat2+0xce/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0xd0/0x140 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task stack: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 kfree+0x313/0x590 ocfs2_file_release+0x138/0x260 __fput+0x1df/0x4b0 fput_close_sync+0xd2/0x170 __x64_sys_close+0x55/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
--- fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.c +17 -0
@@ -3133,6 +3133,22 @@ static void *ocfs2_dlm_seq_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)* - Add last pr/ex unlock times and first lock wait time in usecs */ #define OCFS2_DLM_DEBUG_STR_VERSION 4 + +/* +* The debug iterator snapshots lockres by value, so a userspace-stack LVB +* pointer copied from the original lockres must be rebased to the copied +* lksb before the dump walks the raw bytes. +*/ +static void ocfs2_dlm_seq_rebase_lvb (struct ocfs2_lock_res *lockres) +{ +if (!ocfs2_stack_supports_plocks ()) +return ; + +if (lockres->l_lksb.lksb_fsdlm.sb_lvbptr) + lockres->l_lksb.lksb_fsdlm.sb_lvbptr = + (char *)&lockres->l_lksb +sizeof (struct dlm_lksb ); +} +static int ocfs2_dlm_seq_show (struct seq_file *m,void *v) {int i;
@@ -3193,6 +3209,7 @@ static int ocfs2_dlm_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) lockres->l_blocking);/* Dump the raw LVB */ +ocfs2_dlm_seq_rebase_lvb (lockres); lvb =ocfs2_dlm_lvb (&lockres->l_lksb);for (i =0 ; i <DLM_LVB_LEN ; i++)seq_printf (m,"0x%x\t" , lvb[i]);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 297/843 ocfs2: fix buffer head management in ocfs2_read_blocks()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Antipov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6371a07148ee979af22a9d6f4c277462953a9a4a ]
In ocfs2_read_blocks(), caller should't assume that buffer head returned by 'sb_getblk()' is exclusively owned and so 'put_bh()' always drops b_count from 1 to 0. If it is not so, buffer head remains on hold and likely to be returned by the next call to 'sb_getblk()' unchanged - that is, with BH_Uptodate bit set even if it has failed validation previously, thus allowing to insert that buffer head into OCFS2 metadata cache and submit it to upper layers. To avoid such a scenario, BH_Uptodate should be cleared immediately after 'validate()' callback has detected some data inconsistency.
--- fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c +4 -3
@@ -350,8 +350,6 @@ int ocfs2_read_blocks(struct ocfs2_caching_info *ci, u64 block, int nr,wait_on_buffer (bh);put_bh (bh); bhs[i] =NULL ; - }else if (bh &&buffer_uptodate (bh)) { -clear_buffer_uptodate (bh); }continue ; }
@@ -380,8 +378,11 @@ int ocfs2_read_blocks(struct ocfs2_caching_info *ci, u64 block, int nr,BUG_ON (buffer_jbd (bh));clear_buffer_needs_validate (bh); status =validate (sb, bh); -if (status) +if (status) { +if (buffer_uptodate (bh)) +clear_buffer_uptodate (bh); goto read_failure; + } } }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 298/843 ocfs2: reject FITRIM ranges shorter than a cluster
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ca1afd88f5eaaff9168e1466e5401385edf59543 ]
ocfs2_trim_mainbm() trims the global bitmap in cluster units, but its too-short range validation only checks sb->s_blocksize.
On filesystems with a cluster size larger than the block size, a FITRIM range that is at least one block but shorter than one cluster is accepted and shifted down to len == 0. The later start + len - 1 and len -= ... arithmetic then underflows and can drive trimming past the requested range.
Reject ranges shorter than s_clustersize instead. That preserves the existing -EINVAL behavior for requests that cannot discard even one allocation unit and keeps zero-cluster trims out of the group walk.
--- fs/ocfs2/alloc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ocfs2/alloc.c +1 -1
@@ -7539,7 +7539,7 @@ int ocfs2_trim_mainbm(struct super_block *sb, struct fstrim_range *range) len = range->len >> osb->s_clustersize_bits; minlen = range->minlen >> osb->s_clustersize_bits; -if (minlen >= osb->bitmap_cpg || range->len < sb->s_blocksize) +if (minlen >= osb->bitmap_cpg || range->len < osb->s_clustersize)return -EINVAL ;trace_ocfs2_trim_mainbm (start, len, minlen);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 299/843 ocfs2/dlm: require a ref for locking_state debugfs open
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 03ad858ce8064861ea580021976dc19b7aabb549 ]
debug_lockres_open() copies inode->i_private into struct debug_lockres and debug_lockres_release() later drops that pointer with dlm_put(). That only works if open successfully pins the struct dlm_ctxt.
Today open calls dlm_grab(dlm) but ignores its return value. Once the last domain unregister has removed the context from dlm_domains, dlm_grab() returns NULL, yet open still stores the raw pointer and returns success. The later release path is outside the debugfs removal barrier, so it can call dlm_put() after dlm_free_ctxt_mem() has freed the context. KASAN reports this as a slab-use-after-free in dlm_put() called from debug_lockres_release().
Fail the open when dlm_grab() cannot acquire the reference and unwind the seq_file private state before returning. That keeps locking_state from handing out a file descriptor whose release path does not own the dlm_ctxt.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path:
locking_state debugfs open: last domain unregister:
1. debug_lockres_open() reads 1. dlm_unregister_domain() calls
inode->i_private. dlm_complete_dlm_shutdown().
2. debug_lockres_open() calls 2. shutdown removes the dlm_ctxt from
dlm_grab(dlm) and gets NULL. dlm_domains.
3. open still stores the raw dlm 3. final teardown reaches
pointer in dl->dl_ctxt and dlm_free_ctxt_mem() and frees it.
returns success.
4. debug_lockres_release() later
calls dlm_put(dl->dl_ctxt).
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-use-after-free in dlm_put+0x82/0x200
RIP: 0033:0x7f4d349bc9e0 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888103a3c000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 816 bytes inside of freed 2048-byte region [ffff888103a3c000, ffff888103a3c800) Write of size 4 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?) dlm_put+0x82/0x200 (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?) kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 (?:?) debug_lockres_release+0x53/0x80 (fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c:587) dlm_put+0x9/0x200 (?:?) debug_lockres_release+0x5c/0x80 (fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c:587) full_proxy_release+0x67/0x90 (?:?) __fput+0x1df/0x4b0 (?:?) do_raw_spin_lock+0x10f/0x1b0 (?:?) fput_close_sync+0xd2/0x170 (?:?) __x64_sys_close+0x55/0x90 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x10c/0x640 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) irqentry_exit+0xac/0x6e0 (?:?) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) Freed by task stack: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 (?:?) kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 (?:?) kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 (?:?) __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 (?:?) kfree+0x30f/0x580 (?:?) dlm_put+0x1ce/0x200 (?:?) dlm_unregister_domain+0xf6/0xb30 (?:?) o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0x6b/0x90 (?:?) ocfs2_cluster_disconnect+0x41/0x70 (?:?) ocfs2_dlm_shutdown+0x1c4/0x220 (?:?) ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x38a/0x550 (?:?) generic_shutdown_super+0xc3/0x220 (?:?) kill_block_super+0x29/0x60 (?:?) deactivate_locked_super+0x66/0xe0 (?:?) cleanup_mnt+0x13d/0x210 (?:?) task_work_run+0xfa/0x170 (?:?) exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xd6/0x430 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x3cb/0x640 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)
--- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c +12 -4
@@ -612,6 +612,7 @@ static int debug_lockres_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)struct dlm_ctxt *dlm = inode->i_private;struct debug_lockres *dl;void *buf; +int status = -ENOMEM ; buf =kmalloc (PAGE_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!buf)
@@ -624,16 +625,23 @@ static int debug_lockres_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) dl->dl_len =PAGE_SIZE ; dl->dl_buf = buf; -dlm_grab (dlm); - dl->dl_ctxt = dlm; +/* ->release uses dl_ctxt after open, so it needs a real pin. */ + dl->dl_ctxt =dlm_grab (dlm); +if (!dl->dl_ctxt) { + status = -ENOENT ; + goto bailseq; + }return 0 ; +bailseq: +seq_release_private (inode, file); bailfree:kfree (buf); bail: -mlog_errno (-ENOMEM ); -return -ENOMEM ; +if (status != -ENOENT ) +mlog_errno (status); +return status; }static int debug_lockres_release (struct inode *inode,struct file *file)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 300/843 ocfs2: fix race between ocfs2_control_install_private() and ocfs2_control_release()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 57dcfd9049d497c31151787a0696d59f0a98f8e6 ]
Move atomic_inc(&ocfs2_control_opened) and the handshake state update inside ocfs2_control_lock to close a race window where ocfs2_control_release() can observe ocfs2_control_opened dropping to zero (resetting ocfs2_control_this_node and running_proto) while ocfs2_control_install_private() is about to bump the counter and mark the connection valid.
--- fs/ocfs2/stack_user.c | 10 +++------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/stack_user.c +3 -7
@@ -326,18 +326,14 @@ static int ocfs2_control_install_private(struct file *file) ocfs2_control_this_node = p->op_this_node; running_proto.pv_major = p->op_proto.pv_major; running_proto.pv_minor = p->op_proto.pv_minor; - } - -out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (&ocfs2_control_lock); - -if (!rc && set_p) { -/* We set the global values successfully */ atomic_inc (&ocfs2_control_opened);ocfs2_control_set_handshake_state (file,OCFS2_CONTROL_HANDSHAKE_VALID ); } +out_unlock: +mutex_unlock (&ocfs2_control_lock); +return rc; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 301/843 netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: fix mss parsing on big-endian architectures
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a625c94144c9b66d32e1f374f909f38db46161c1 ]
The MSS calculation in nf_osf_match_one() manually shifts bytes to construct a 16-bit value before passing it to ntohs().
This works on little-endian hosts but it does not work on big-endian as the bytes are being always shifted and set in the same way for all architectures.
Use get_unaligned_be16() to fix this on big-endian systems. It also simplifies the code.
--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c +1 -5
@@ -95,11 +95,7 @@ static bool nf_osf_match_one(const struct sk_buff *skb,switch (*optp) {case OSFOPT_MSS : - mss = optp[3 ]; - mss <<=8 ; - mss |= optp[2 ]; - - mss =ntohs ((__force __be16 )mss); + mss =get_unaligned_be16 (&optp[2 ]);break ;case OSFOPT_TS :break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 302/843 netfilter: synproxy: protect nf_ct_seqadj_init() with conntrack lock
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9e37388b8070afe73d4ab2d973b28593ed65f3ad ]
nf_ct_seqadj_init() is called without holding the ct lock. This can race with nf_ct_seq_adjust() when a connection is in CLOSE state due to an RST or connection reopening. In addition for SYN_RECV state, concurrent processing of packets can trigger nf_ct_seq_adjust() too. These situations create a read/write data race.
As synproxy is the only user of nf_ct_seqadj_init() at the moment, fix this by holding ct->lock inside nf_ct_seqadj_init() until all is done.
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_seqadj.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_seqadj.c +2 -0
@@ -17,12 +17,14 @@ int nf_ct_seqadj_init(struct nf_conn *ct, enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo,if (off ==0 )return 0 ; +spin_lock_bh (&ct->lock);set_bit (IPS_SEQ_ADJUST_BIT , &ct->status); seqadj =nfct_seqadj (ct); this_way = &seqadj->seq[dir]; this_way->offset_before = off; this_way->offset_after = off; +spin_unlock_bh (&ct->lock);return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (nf_ct_seqadj_init);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 303/843 netfilter: conntrack: call nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy() if master helper is pptp
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b0f02608fbcd607b5131cceb91fc0a035264e61c ]
For GRE flows, validate that the ct master helper (if any) is pptp before calling nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy(), so the helper data area can be accessed safely. Note that only the pptp helper provides a .destroy callback.
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +16 -2
@@ -622,9 +622,23 @@ static void destroy_gre_conntrack(struct nf_conn *ct) {#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_GRE struct nf_conn *master = ct->master; +struct nf_conn_help *help; + +if (!master) +return ; + + help =nfct_help (master); +if (help) { +struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper; -if (master) -nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy (master); +rcu_read_lock (); + helper =rcu_dereference (help->helper); +/* Only pptp helper has a destroy callback. */ +if (helper && helper->destroy) +nf_ct_gre_keymap_destroy (master); + +rcu_read_unlock (); + }#endif }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 304/843 IB/cm: Fix av cm device leak on an error path in cm_init_av_by_path()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9b2207bc5cdb955bdae34b3eec80f04979e17081 ]
Codex pointed out that cm_init_av_by_path() can call cm_set_av_port() which takes a reference on the cm device, but then can immediately return error if ib_init_ah_attr_from_path() fails.
Since callers like ib_send_cm_req() put the av on the stack this leaks that cm device reference.
Re-order cm_init_av_by_path() so it doesn't touch the av until it has done all its failable work, and then update the av in one shot so it is either left alone or fully init'd.
Sashiko also pointed out that the cm_destroy_av() prior to cm_init_av_by_path() is harmful as it leaves the AV broken in the error case and thus the REJ won't send. Since cm_init_av_by_path() is now atomic it is safe to delete the cm_destroy_av(). On succees the av from cm_init_av_for_response() is cleaned up by cm_init_av_by_path(), on failure the 'goto rejected' guarentees the av is destroyed during ib_destroy_cm_id().
--- drivers/infiniband/core/cm.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/core/cm.c +8 -5
@@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ static int cm_init_av_by_path(struct sa_path_rec *path,struct rdma_ah_attr new_ah_attr;struct cm_device *cm_dev;struct cm_port *port; +u16 pkey_index;int ret; port =get_cm_port_from_path (path, sgid_attr);
@@ -521,12 +522,10 @@ static int cm_init_av_by_path(struct sa_path_rec *path, cm_dev = port->cm_dev; ret =ib_find_cached_pkey (cm_dev->ib_device, port->port_num, -be16_to_cpu (path->pkey), &av->pkey_index); +be16_to_cpu (path->pkey), &pkey_index);if (ret)return ret; -cm_set_av_port (av, port); -/* * av->ah_attr might be initialized based on wc or during * request processing time which might have reference to sgid_attr.
@@ -541,6 +540,8 @@ static int cm_init_av_by_path(struct sa_path_rec *path,if (ret)return ret; + av->pkey_index = pkey_index; +cm_set_av_port (av, port); av->timeout = path->packet_life_time +1 ;rdma_move_ah_attr (&av->ah_attr, &new_ah_attr);return 0 ;
@@ -2175,8 +2176,10 @@ static int cm_req_handler(struct cm_work *work) cm_id_priv->av.ah_attr.roce.dmac); work->path[0 ].hop_limit = grh->hop_limit; -/* This destroy call is needed to pair with cm_init_av_for_response */ -cm_destroy_av (&cm_id_priv->av); +/* +* cm_init_av_by_path() will internally pair with the above +* cm_init_av_for_response() if it succeeds. +*/ ret =cm_init_av_by_path (&work->path[0 ], gid_attr, &cm_id_priv->av);if (ret) {int err;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 305/843 RDMA/irdma: Fix OOB read during CQ MR registration
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jacob Moroni <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4385ddd654d90245eeb83b3cb539670ab5c85ba4 ]
Sashiko pointed out an unrelated bug during a previous patch:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260512183852.614045-1-jmoroni%40google.com
This change fixes the bug by eliminating the cqmr->split field which was not being set properly and instead just checks the CQ resize feature flag directly.
The cqmr->split field essentially tracks whether IRDMA_FEATURE_CQ_RESIZE is set, but it was not being set until CQ creation time, which is _after_ CQ memory registration (the only other place where it is referenced).
As a result, it would always be false during MR registration and would therefore cause irdma_handle_q_mem to populate cqmr->shadow even for GEN_2 HW and beyond:
cqmr->shadow = (dma_addr_t)arr[req->cq_pages];
The issue is that for GEN_2 and beyond, req->cq_pages may be exactly equal to iwmr->page_cnt and therefore equal to the size of arr, which would cause an OOB read by one.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c | 4 ++-- drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c +2 -2
@@ -2024,7 +2024,6 @@ static int irdma_create_cq(struct ib_cq *ibcq, } cqmr_shadow = &iwpbl_shadow->cq_mr; info.shadow_area_pa = cqmr_shadow->cq_pbl.addr; - cqmr->split = true; }else { info.shadow_area_pa = cqmr->shadow; }
@@ -2400,7 +2399,8 @@ static int irdma_handle_q_mem(struct irdma_device *iwdev,case IRDMA_MEMREG_TYPE_CQ : hmc_p = &cqmr->cq_pbl; -if (!cqmr->split) +if (!(iwdev->rf->sc_dev.hw_attrs.uk_attrs.feature_flags & +IRDMA_FEATURE_CQ_RESIZE )) cqmr->shadow = (dma_addr_t )arr[req->cq_pages];if (use_pbles)
drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.h +0 -1
@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ struct irdma_hmc_pble {struct irdma_cq_mr {struct irdma_hmc_pble cq_pbl;dma_addr_t shadow; -bool split; };struct irdma_qp_mr {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 306/843 bpf: Update transport_header when encapsulating UDP tunnel in lwt
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Leon Hwang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 82d7d0adbc678064543e9d254864f6b4ea4a388c ]
Currently, bpf_lwt_push_ip_encap() does not update skb->transport_header. When a driver, e.g. ice, reuses the stale skb->transport_header to offload checksum computation to NIC hardware, VxLAN packets encapsulated by bpf_lwt_push_encap() helper may be dropped due to incorrect checksum.
Update skb->transport_header in bpf_lwt_push_ip_encap() whenever the encapsulated packet uses UDP, so checksum offload works correctly.
--- net/core/lwt_bpf.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
net/core/lwt_bpf.c +12 -0
@@ -589,6 +589,7 @@ static int handle_gso_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, bool ipv4, int encap_len)int bpf_lwt_push_ip_encap (struct sk_buff *skb,void *hdr,u32 len,bool ingress) { +bool is_udp_tunnel;struct iphdr *iph;bool ipv4;int err;
@@ -602,10 +603,16 @@ int bpf_lwt_push_ip_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, void *hdr, u32 len, bool ingress) ipv4 = true;if (unlikely (len < iph->ihl *4 ))return -EINVAL ; + is_udp_tunnel = iph->protocol ==IPPROTO_UDP ; +if (unlikely (is_udp_tunnel && len < iph->ihl *4 +sizeof (struct udphdr ))) +return -EINVAL ; }else if (iph->version ==6 ) { ipv4 = false;if (unlikely (len <sizeof (struct ipv6hdr )))return -EINVAL ; + is_udp_tunnel = ((struct ipv6hdr *)iph)->nexthdr ==NEXTHDR_UDP ; +if (unlikely (is_udp_tunnel && len <sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ) +sizeof (struct udphdr ))) +return -EINVAL ; }else {return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -627,6 +634,11 @@ int bpf_lwt_push_ip_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, void *hdr, u32 len, bool ingress)if (ingress)skb_postpush_rcsum (skb, iph, len);skb_reset_network_header (skb); +if (is_udp_tunnel) { +size_t iph_sz = ipv4 ? iph->ihl *4 :sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ); + +skb_set_transport_header (skb,skb_network_offset (skb) + iph_sz); + }memcpy (skb_network_header (skb), hdr, len);bpf_compute_data_pointers (skb);skb_clear_hash (skb);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 307/843 wifi: wcn36xx: fix OOB read from firmware count in PRINT_REG_INFO indication
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tristan Madani <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit df2187acfca6c6cca372c5d35f42394d9c270b09 ]
The firmware-controlled rsp->count field is used as the loop bound for indexing into the flexible rsp->regs[] array without validation against the message length. A count exceeding the actual data causes out-of- bounds reads from the heap-allocated message buffer.
Add a check that count fits within the received message.
--- drivers/net/wireless/ath/wcn36xx/smd.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/wcn36xx/smd.c +6 -0
@@ -2769,6 +2769,12 @@ static int wcn36xx_smd_print_reg_info_ind(struct wcn36xx *wcn,return -EIO ; } +if (rsp->count > (len -sizeof (*rsp)) /sizeof (rsp->regs[0 ])) { +wcn36xx_warn ("Truncated print reg info indication: count %u, len %zu\n" , + rsp->count, len); +return -EIO ; + } +wcn36xx_dbg (WCN36XX_DBG_HAL ,"reginfo indication, scenario: 0x%x reason: 0x%x\n" , rsp->scenario, rsp->reason);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 308/843 riscv: stacktrace: Remove bogus -0x4 offset in non-FP walk_stackframe
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rui Qi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8ac35bac70e7e581d673b76878f7691cdadc33b8 ]
In the non-frame-pointer version of walk_stackframe, each value read from the stack is treated as a potential return address and has 0x4 subtracted before being used as the program counter. This was intended to convert the return address (the instruction after a call) back to the call site, but it is incorrect:
1. RISC-V has variable-length instructions due to the RVC (compressed instruction) extension. A call instruction can be either 4 bytes (regular) or 2 bytes (compressed, e.g. c.jal). Subtracting a fixed 0x4 assumes all call instructions are 4 bytes, which is wrong for compressed instructions.
2. Stack traces conventionally report return addresses, not call sites. Other architectures (ARM64, x86, ARM) do not subtract instruction size from return addresses in their stack unwinding code.
3. The frame-pointer version of walk_stackframe already dropped the -0x4 offset. Commit b785ec129bd9 ("riscv/ftrace: Add HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_RET_ADDR_PTR support") replaced "pc = frame->ra - 0x4" with ftrace_graph_ret_addr(), and the commit message explicitly noted that "the original calculation, pc = frame->ra - 4, is buggy when the instruction at the return address happened to be a compressed inst." The non-FP version was simply overlooked.
Remove the bogus -0x4 offset to match the FP version and the conventions used by other architectures.
--- arch/riscv/kernel/stacktrace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/riscv/kernel/stacktrace.c +1 -1
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ void notrace walk_stackframe(struct task_struct *task,while (!kstack_end (ksp)) {if (__kernel_text_address (pc) &&unlikely (!fn (arg, pc)))break ; - pc =READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (*ksp++) -0x4 ; + pc =READ_ONCE_NOCHECK (*ksp++); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 309/843 ALSA: seq: Introduce SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_USER_PVERSION ioctl
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit afb72505e4614a2ccefe3440d37dec3a2273c330 ]
For the future extension of ALSA sequencer ABI, introduce a new ioctl SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_USER_PVERSION. This is similar like the ioctls used in PCM and other interfaces, for an application to specify its supporting ABI version.
The use of this ioctl will be mandatory for the upcoming UMP support.
Stable-dep-of: 705dd6dcbc0e ("ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read")
--- include/uapi/sound/asequencer.h | 1 + sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 8 ++++++++ sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.h | 1 + sound/core/seq/seq_compat.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
include/uapi/sound/asequencer.h +1 -0
@@ -577,6 +577,7 @@ struct snd_seq_query_subs {#define SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_CLIENT_ID _IOR ('S', 0x01, int)#define SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SYSTEM_INFO _IOWR('S', 0x02, struct snd_seq_system_info)#define SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_RUNNING_MODE _IOWR('S', 0x03, struct snd_seq_running_info) +#define SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_USER_PVERSION _IOW('S', 0x04, int)#define SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_GET_CLIENT_INFO _IOWR('S', 0x10, struct snd_seq_client_info)#define SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SET_CLIENT_INFO _IOW ('S', 0x11, struct snd_seq_client_info)
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c +8 -0
@@ -1159,6 +1159,12 @@ static int snd_seq_ioctl_pversion(struct snd_seq_client *client, void *arg)return 0 ; } +static int snd_seq_ioctl_user_pversion (struct snd_seq_client *client,void *arg) +{ + client->user_pversion = *(unsigned int *)arg; +return 0 ; +} +static int snd_seq_ioctl_client_id (struct snd_seq_client *client,void *arg) {int *client_id = arg;
@@ -2086,6 +2092,7 @@ static const struct ioctl_handler {int (*func)(struct snd_seq_client *client,void *arg); } ioctl_handlers[] = { { SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_PVERSION, snd_seq_ioctl_pversion }, + { SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_USER_PVERSION, snd_seq_ioctl_user_pversion }, { SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_CLIENT_ID, snd_seq_ioctl_client_id }, { SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SYSTEM_INFO, snd_seq_ioctl_system_info }, { SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_RUNNING_MODE, snd_seq_ioctl_running_mode },
@@ -2226,6 +2233,7 @@ int snd_seq_create_kernel_client(struct snd_card *card, int client_index, client->accept_input =1 ; client->accept_output =1 ; client->data.kernel.card = card; + client->user_pversion =SNDRV_SEQ_VERSION ;va_start (args, name_fmt);vsnprintf (client->name,sizeof (client->name), name_fmt, args);
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.h +1 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct snd_seq_client {snd_seq_client_type_t type; unsigned int accept_input: 1, accept_output: 1; +unsigned int user_pversion;char name[64 ];/* client name */ int number;/* client number */ unsigned int filter;/* filter flags */
sound/core/seq/seq_compat.c +1 -0
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ static long snd_seq_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned lswitch (cmd) {case SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_PVERSION : +case SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_USER_PVERSION :case SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_CLIENT_ID :case SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_SYSTEM_INFO :case SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_GET_CLIENT_INFO :
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 310/843 ALSA: seq: Add UMP support
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 46397622a3fa8372b8fda0f04b33d16923b03b1b ]
Starting from this commit, we add the basic support of UMP (Universal MIDI Packet) events on ALSA sequencer infrastructure. The biggest change here is that, for transferring UMP packets that are up to 128 bits, we extend the data payload of ALSA sequencer event record when the client is declared to support for the new UMP events.
A new event flag bit, SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_UMP, is defined and it shall be set for the UMP packet events that have the larger payload of 128 bits, defined as struct snd_seq_ump_event.
For controlling the UMP feature enablement in kernel, a new Kconfig, CONFIG_SND_SEQ_UMP is introduced. The extended event for UMP is available only when this Kconfig item is set. Similarly, the size of the internal snd_seq_event_cell also increases (in 4 bytes) when the Kconfig item is set. (But the size increase is effective only for 32bit architectures; 64bit archs already have padding there.) Overall, when CONFIG_SND_SEQ_UMP isn't set, there is no change in the event and cell, keeping the old sizes.
For applications that want to access the UMP packets, first of all, a sequencer client has to declare the user-protocol to match with the latest one via the new SNDRV_SEQ_IOCTL_USER_PVERSION; otherwise it's treated as if a legacy client without UMP support.
Then the client can switch to the new UMP mode (MIDI 1.0 or MIDI 2.0) with a new field, midi_version, in snd_seq_client_info. When switched to UMP mode (midi_version = 1 or 2), the client can write the UMP events with SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_UMP flag. For reads, the alignment size is changed from snd_seq_event (28 bytes) to snd_seq_ump_event (32 bytes). When a UMP sequencer event is delivered to a legacy sequencer client, it's ignored or handled as an error.
Conceptually, ALSA sequencer client and port correspond to the UMP Endpoint and Group, respectively; each client may have multiple ports and each port has the fixed number (16) of channels, total up to 256 channels.
As of this commit, ALSA sequencer core just sends and receives the UMP events as-is from/to clients. The automatic conversions between the legacy events and the new UMP events will be implemented in a later patch.
Along with this commit, bump the sequencer protocol version to 1.0.3.
Stable-dep-of: 705dd6dcbc0e ("ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read")
--- include/sound/asequencer.h | 4 + include/sound/seq_kernel.h | 8 ++ include/uapi/sound/asequencer.h | 53 +++++++---- sound/core/seq/Kconfig | 7 ++ sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 154 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------- sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.h | 1 + sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c | 10 ++- sound/core/seq/seq_memory.h | 19 +++- 8 files changed, 193 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
include/sound/asequencer.h +4 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@#define snd_seq_ev_is_abstime (ev) (snd_seq_ev_timemode_type(ev) == SNDRV_SEQ_TIME_MODE_ABS)#define snd_seq_ev_is_reltime (ev) (snd_seq_ev_timemode_type(ev) == SNDRV_SEQ_TIME_MODE_REL) +/* check whether the given event is a UMP event */ +#define snd_seq_ev_is_ump (ev) \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SND_SEQ_UMP) && ((ev)->flags & SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_UMP)) +/* queue sync port */ #define snd_seq_queue_sync_port (q) ((q) + 16)
include/sound/seq_kernel.h +8 -0
@@ -73,6 +73,14 @@ int snd_seq_expand_var_event(const struct snd_seq_event *event, int count, charint snd_seq_dump_var_event (const struct snd_seq_event *event,snd_seq_dump_func_t func,void *private_data); +/* size of the event packet; it can be greater than snd_seq_event size */ +static inline size_t snd_seq_event_packet_size (struct snd_seq_event *ev) +{ +if (snd_seq_ev_is_ump (ev)) +return sizeof (struct snd_seq_ump_event ); +return sizeof (struct snd_seq_event ); +} +/* interface for OSS emulation */ int snd_seq_set_queue_tempo (int client,struct snd_seq_queue_tempo *tempo);
include/uapi/sound/asequencer.h +37 -16
90 lines not on this page · raw message
sound/core/seq/Kconfig +7 -0
@@ -60,4 +60,11 @@ config SND_SEQ_MIDI_EMUL config SND_SEQ_VIRMIDI tristate +config SND_SEQ_UMP + bool "Support for UMP events" + help + Say Y here to enable the support for handling UMP (Universal MIDI + Packet) events via ALSA sequencer infrastructure, which is an + essential feature for enabling MIDI 2.0 support. + endif # SND_SEQUENCER
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c +110 -44
314 lines not on this page · raw message
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.h +1 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct snd_seq_client {snd_seq_client_type_t type; unsigned int accept_input: 1, accept_output: 1; +unsigned int midi_version;unsigned int user_pversion;char name[64 ];/* client name */ int number;/* client number */
sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c +8 -2
@@ -288,6 +288,7 @@ int snd_seq_event_dup(struct snd_seq_pool *pool, struct snd_seq_event *event,int ncells, err;unsigned int extlen;struct snd_seq_event_cell *cell; +int size; *cellp =NULL ;
@@ -305,7 +306,12 @@ int snd_seq_event_dup(struct snd_seq_pool *pool, struct snd_seq_event *event,return err;/* copy the event */ - cell->event = *event; + size =snd_seq_event_packet_size (event); +memcpy (&cell->ump, event, size); +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SND_SEQ_UMP ) +if (size <sizeof (cell->event)) + cell->ump.raw.extra =0 ; +#endif /* decompose */ if (snd_seq_ev_is_variable (event)) {
@@ -323,7 +329,7 @@ int snd_seq_event_dup(struct snd_seq_pool *pool, struct snd_seq_event *event, tail =NULL ;while (ncells-- >0 ) { -int size =sizeof (struct snd_seq_event ); + size =sizeof (struct snd_seq_event );if (len < size) size = len; err = snd_seq_cell_alloc(pool, &tmp, nonblock, file,
sound/core/seq/seq_memory.h +18 -1
@@ -11,9 +11,26 @@struct snd_info_buffer ; +/* aliasing for legacy and UMP event packet handling */ +union __snd_seq_event { +struct snd_seq_event legacy; +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SND_SEQ_UMP ) +struct snd_seq_ump_event ump; +#endif +struct { +struct snd_seq_event event; +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SND_SEQ_UMP ) +u32 extra; +#endif + } __packed raw; +}; +/* container for sequencer event (internal use) */ struct snd_seq_event_cell { -struct snd_seq_event event; +union { +struct snd_seq_event event; +union __snd_seq_event ump; + };struct snd_seq_pool *pool;/* used pool */ struct snd_seq_event_cell *next;/* next cell */ };
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 311/843 ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kyle Zeng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 705dd6dcbc0ea87351c660c1a6443f85f1001c76 ]
snd_seq_read() copies a queued variable-length event header to userspace before expanding the payload. Queued variable-length events use SNDRV_SEQ_EXT_CHAINED internally, and data.ext.ptr points at the first extension cell.
The read side strips SNDRV_SEQ_EXT_* bits from data.ext.len before the copy, but it leaves data.ext.ptr untouched. A userspace sequencer client can therefore write a direct variable event to itself and read back the extension-cell kernel address from the returned header.
Clear the temporary header pointer before copy_to_user(). The original queued event remains unchanged and is still passed to snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so payload expansion keeps using the internal chain.
--- sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c +1 -0
@@ -464,6 +464,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_seq_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,memcpy (&tmpev, &cell->event, aligned_size); tmpev.data.ext.len &= ~SNDRV_SEQ_EXT_MASK ; + tmpev.data.ext.ptr =NULL ;if (copy_to_user (buf, &tmpev, aligned_size)) { err = -EFAULT ;break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 312/843 ACPI: IPMI: Fix message kref handling on dead device
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yuho Choi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 63320db6a5d84ec3fed8b3d36ba5244d07ddd108 ]
acpi_ipmi_space_handler() takes an extra reference on tx_msg before checking whether the selected IPMI device is dead. The reference belongs to the tx_msg_list entry and is normally dropped by ipmi_cancel_tx_msg() or ipmi_flush_tx_msg() after the message is removed from the list.
On the dead-device path, the message has not been queued yet, but the error path still calls ipmi_msg_release() directly. That bypasses kref_put() and frees tx_msg while the queued-message reference is still recorded in the kref count.
Take the queued-message reference only after the dead-device check succeeds, immediately before adding tx_msg to the list.
--- drivers/acpi/acpi_ipmi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/acpi/acpi_ipmi.c +1 -1
@@ -548,7 +548,6 @@ acpi_ipmi_space_handler(u32 function, acpi_physical_address address,return AE_TYPE ; } -acpi_ipmi_msg_get (tx_msg);mutex_lock (&driver_data.ipmi_lock);/* Do not add a tx_msg that can not be flushed. */ if (ipmi_device->dead) {
@@ -556,6 +555,7 @@ acpi_ipmi_space_handler(u32 function, acpi_physical_address address,ipmi_msg_release (tx_msg);return AE_NOT_EXIST ; } +acpi_ipmi_msg_get (tx_msg);spin_lock_irqsave (&ipmi_device->tx_msg_lock, flags);list_add_tail (&tx_msg->head, &ipmi_device->tx_msg_list);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&ipmi_device->tx_msg_lock, flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 313/843 cpufreq: Documentation: fix conservative governor freq_step description
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pengjie Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 03120e1425262c7d11f93362a88e579a1720390b ]
The conservative governor documentation incorrectly states that setting freq_step to 0 will use the default 5% frequency step. In reality, since at least commit 8e677ce83bf4 ("[CPUFREQ] conservative: fixup governor to function more like ondemand logic"), freq_step=0 has always caused the governor to skip frequency updates entirely.
Correct the documentation to reflect the actual behavior: freq_step=0 disables frequency changes by the governor entirely.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/pm/cpufreq.rst | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/pm/cpufreq.rst +2 -2
@@ -569,8 +569,8 @@ This governor exposes the following tunables: 100 (5 by default). This is how much the frequency is allowed to change in one go. Setting - it to 0 will cause the default frequency step (5 percent) to be used - and setting it to 100 effectively causes the governor to periodically + it to 0 disables frequency changes by the governor entirely and setting + it to 100 effectively causes the governor to periodically switch the frequency between the ``scaling_min_freq`` and ``scaling_max_freq`` policy limits.
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 314/843 IB/mlx5: Dont take the rereg_mr fallback without a new translation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 55d339d200c908de83a408d023cfb7be779b0dd7 ]
Jumping to mlx5_ib_reg_user_mr() without IB_MR_REREG_TRANS set will use garbage values for start, length, and iova. Recovering the original mr parameters for ODP and DMABUF to properly recreate it is too hard in this flow, so just fail it.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c +1 -1
@@ -1828,7 +1828,7 @@ struct ib_mr *mlx5_ib_rereg_user_mr(struct ib_mr *ib_mr, int flags, u64 start, }/* DM or ODP MR's don't have a normal umem so we can't re-use it */ if (!mr->umem ||is_odp_mr (mr) ||is_dmabuf_mr (mr)) - goto recreate; +return ERR_PTR (-EOPNOTSUPP );/* * Only one active MR can refer to a umem at one time, revoke
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 315/843 IB/mlx5: Properly support implicit ODP rereg_mr
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ee7a8335069150c3f1893a697ab30bbeca00d796 ]
Due to all the child mkeys in the implicit ODP configuration we cannot change anything in place for the parent mkey. Instead the whole thing needs to be rebuilt if any change is requested. If the user does not specify a translation then force the implicit values which will then fall through the logic into mlx5_ib_reg_user_mr() to allocate a completely new MR.
Since implicit children were also touching the mr->pd, this removes another case where the access was racy.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c +15 -0
@@ -1815,6 +1815,21 @@ struct ib_mr *mlx5_ib_rereg_user_mr(struct ib_mr *ib_mr, int flags, u64 start,if (!(flags &IB_MR_REREG_PD )) new_pd = ib_mr->pd; +if (mr->is_odp_implicit && !(flags &IB_MR_REREG_TRANS )) { +if (!(new_access_flags &IB_ACCESS_ON_DEMAND )) +return ERR_PTR (-EOPNOTSUPP ); + +/* +* Due to all the child mkeys we cannot actually change an +* implicit MR in place. If the user did not specify a new +* translation then force the fixed implicit MR values. +*/ + start =0 ; + iova =0 ; + length =U64_MAX ; + flags |=IB_MR_REREG_TRANS ; + } +if (!(flags &IB_MR_REREG_TRANS )) {struct ib_umem *umem;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 316/843 spi: ep93xx: fix double-free of zeropage on DMA setup failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7886054b06f762f62054957a8f6de0f14e6b7541 ]
If DMA setup fails after allocating the zeropage, the error path frees the page but leaves espi->zeropage dangling. A subsequent call to ep93xx_spi_release_dma() sees the non-NULL pointer and frees the page again.
Clear the pointer after freeing in the error path of ep93xx_spi_setup_dma().
--- drivers/spi/spi-ep93xx.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/spi/spi-ep93xx.c +1 -0
@@ -625,6 +625,7 @@ static int ep93xx_spi_setup_dma(struct ep93xx_spi *espi) espi->dma_rx =NULL ; fail_free_page:free_page ((unsigned long )espi->zeropage); + espi->zeropage =NULL ;return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 317/843 firmware_loader: Fix recursive lock in device_cache_fw_images()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d3ec78f8f8d48a04a9fac38d47275c34645e5103 ]
A recursive locking deadlock can occur in the firmware loader's power management notification handler.
During system suspend or hibernation preparation, fw_pm_notify() calls device_cache_fw_images(). This function acquires fw_lock to set the firmware cache state to FW_LOADER_START_CACHE and then iterates over all devices using dpm_for_each_dev() while still holding the lock.
For each device, dev_cache_fw_image() schedules asynchronous work to cache the firmware. If memory allocation for the async work entry fails (e.g., in out-of-memory conditions), async_schedule_node_domain() falls back to executing the work function synchronously in the current thread.
The synchronous execution path (__async_dev_cache_fw_image() -> cache_firmware() -> request_firmware() -> assign_fw()) attempts to acquire fw_lock again. Since the current thread already holds fw_lock, this results in a recursive locking deadlock.
Fix this by releasing fw_lock immediately after updating the cache state and before calling dpm_for_each_dev(). The lock is only needed to protect the state update. Concurrent firmware requests will correctly see the FW_LOADER_START_CACHE state and use the piggyback mechanism, which is independently protected by its own fwc->name_lock.
--- drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c +2 -1
@@ -1444,9 +1444,10 @@ static void device_cache_fw_images(void)mutex_lock (&fw_lock); fwc->state =FW_LOADER_START_CACHE ; -dpm_for_each_dev (NULL , dev_cache_fw_image);mutex_unlock (&fw_lock); +dpm_for_each_dev (NULL , dev_cache_fw_image); +/* wait for completion of caching firmware for all devices */ async_synchronize_full_domain (&fw_cache_domain);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 318/843 configfs: fix lockless traversals of ->s_children
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9b9e8bb81c41fd27e7b57a1c936fde140548535f ]
Having the parent directory locked protects entries from removal by another thread, but it does *not* protect cursors from being moved around by lseek() - or freed, for that matter.
--- fs/configfs/dir.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/configfs/dir.c +41 -13
@@ -225,15 +225,16 @@ static int configfs_dirent_exists(struct configfs_dirent *parent_sd, {struct configfs_dirent * sd; +spin_lock (&configfs_dirent_lock);list_for_each_entry (sd, &parent_sd->s_children, s_sibling) {if (sd->s_element) { -const unsigned char *existing =configfs_get_name (sd); -if (strcmp (existing, new)) -continue ; -else +if (strcmp (configfs_get_name (sd), new) ==0 ) { +spin_unlock (&configfs_dirent_lock);return -EEXIST ; + } } } +spin_unlock (&configfs_dirent_lock);return 0 ; }
@@ -551,11 +552,28 @@ static void configfs_detach_rollback(struct dentry *dentry)configfs_detach_rollback (sd->s_dentry); } +/* +* Find the next non-cursor. configfs_dirent_lock held by caller. +*/ +static struct configfs_dirent *next_dirent (struct configfs_dirent *parent, +struct configfs_dirent *last) +{ +struct configfs_dirent *s; + + s =list_prepare_entry (last, &parent->s_children, s_sibling); + +list_for_each_entry_continue (s, &parent->s_children, s_sibling) { +if (s->s_element) +return s; + } +return NULL ; +} +static void detach_attrs (struct config_item * item) {struct dentry * dentry =dget (item->ci_dentry); -struct configfs_dirent * parent_sd; -struct configfs_dirent * sd, * tmp; +struct configfs_dirent *parent_sd; +struct configfs_dirent *sd, *next;if (!dentry)return ;
@@ -564,15 +582,19 @@ static void detach_attrs(struct config_item * item) dentry->d_name.name); parent_sd = dentry->d_fsdata; -list_for_each_entry_safe (sd, tmp, &parent_sd->s_children, s_sibling) { -if (!sd->s_element || !(sd->s_type &CONFIGFS_NOT_PINNED )) + +spin_lock (&configfs_dirent_lock); +for (sd =next_dirent (parent_sd,NULL ); sd; sd = next) { + next =next_dirent (parent_sd, sd); +if (!(sd->s_type &CONFIGFS_NOT_PINNED ))continue ; -spin_lock (&configfs_dirent_lock);list_del_init (&sd->s_sibling);spin_unlock (&configfs_dirent_lock);configfs_drop_dentry (sd, dentry);configfs_put (sd); +spin_lock (&configfs_dirent_lock); } +spin_unlock (&configfs_dirent_lock);/** * Drop reference from dget() on entrance.
@@ -621,18 +643,20 @@ static void detach_groups(struct config_group *group)struct dentry * dentry =dget (group->cg_item.ci_dentry);struct dentry *child;struct configfs_dirent *parent_sd; -struct configfs_dirent *sd, *tmp; +struct configfs_dirent *sd, *next;if (!dentry)return ; parent_sd = dentry->d_fsdata; -list_for_each_entry_safe (sd, tmp, &parent_sd->s_children, s_sibling) { -if (!sd->s_element || - !(sd->s_type &CONFIGFS_USET_DEFAULT )) +spin_lock (&configfs_dirent_lock); +for (sd =next_dirent (parent_sd,NULL ); sd; sd = next) { + next =next_dirent (parent_sd, sd); +if (!(sd->s_type &CONFIGFS_USET_DEFAULT ))continue ; child = sd->s_dentry; +spin_unlock (&configfs_dirent_lock);inode_lock (d_inode (child));
@@ -644,7 +668,9 @@ static void detach_groups(struct config_group *group)d_delete (child);dput (child); +spin_lock (&configfs_dirent_lock); } +spin_unlock (&configfs_dirent_lock);/** * Drop reference from dget() on entrance.
@@ -1096,6 +1122,7 @@ configfs_find_subsys_dentry(struct configfs_dirent *root_sd,struct configfs_dirent *p;struct configfs_dirent *ret =NULL ; +spin_lock (&configfs_dirent_lock);list_for_each_entry (p, &root_sd->s_children, s_sibling) {if (p->s_type &CONFIGFS_DIR && p->s_element == subsys_item) {
@@ -1103,6 +1130,7 @@ configfs_find_subsys_dentry(struct configfs_dirent *root_sd,break ; } } +spin_unlock (&configfs_dirent_lock);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 319/843 watchdog: unregister PM notifier on watchdog unregister
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yuho Choi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a298c7302ee9584a7a1ac1e8acbede8d98ab51a4 ]
watchdog_register_device() registers wdd->pm_nb when WDOG_NO_PING_ON_SUSPEND is set, but watchdog_unregister_device() does not remove it. This leaves an embedded notifier block on the PM notifier chain after the watchdog device has been unregistered.
A later suspend/resume notification can then call watchdog_pm_notifier() with a stale watchdog_device pointer, or at minimum after wdd->wd_data has been cleared by watchdog_dev_unregister().
Unregister the PM notifier before tearing down the watchdog device.
--- drivers/watchdog/watchdog_core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/watchdog/watchdog_core.c +3 -0
@@ -377,6 +377,9 @@ static void __watchdog_unregister_device(struct watchdog_device *wdd)if (test_bit (WDOG_STOP_ON_REBOOT , &wdd->status))unregister_reboot_notifier (&wdd->reboot_nb); +if (test_bit (WDOG_NO_PING_ON_SUSPEND , &wdd->status)) +unregister_pm_notifier (&wdd->pm_nb); +watchdog_dev_unregister (wdd);ida_simple_remove (&watchdog_ida, wdd->id); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 320/843 pinctrl: mediatek: mt8516: Fix Schmitt trigger register offset of pins 34-39
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luca Leonardo Scorcia <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1c3044cab23a056ea28da47da1cdd667a39df0b8 ]
The correct Schmitt trigger register offset for pins 34-39 is 0xA00.
--- drivers/pinctrl/mediatek/pinctrl-mt8516.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pinctrl/mediatek/pinctrl-mt8516.c +1 -1
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static const struct mtk_pin_ies_smt_set mt8516_smt_set[] = {MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (24 ,25 ,0xA00 ,12 ),MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (26 ,30 ,0xA00 ,0 ),MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (31 ,33 ,0xA00 ,1 ), -MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (34 ,39 ,0xA900 ,2 ), +MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (34 ,39 ,0xA00 ,2 ),MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (40 ,40 ,0xA10 ,11 ),MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (41 ,43 ,0xA00 ,10 ), MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC(44, 47, 0xA00, 11),
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 321/843 pinctrl: mediatek: mt8167: Fix Schmitt trigger register offset of pins 34-39
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luca Leonardo Scorcia <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 439bc91d20188901dac698bed4921caac76d9074 ]
The correct Schmitt trigger register offset for pins 34-39 is 0xA00. Value was verified with SoC data sheet.
--- drivers/pinctrl/mediatek/pinctrl-mt8167.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pinctrl/mediatek/pinctrl-mt8167.c +1 -1
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static const struct mtk_pin_ies_smt_set mt8167_smt_set[] = {MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (24 ,25 ,0xA00 ,12 ),MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (26 ,30 ,0xA00 ,0 ),MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (31 ,33 ,0xA00 ,1 ), -MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (34 ,39 ,0xA900 ,2 ), +MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (34 ,39 ,0xA00 ,2 ),MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (40 ,40 ,0xA10 ,11 ),MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC (41 ,43 ,0xA00 ,10 ), MTK_PIN_IES_SMT_SPEC(44, 47, 0xA00, 11),
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 322/843 vmalloc: fix NULL pointer dereference in is_vm_area_hugepages()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hui Zhu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c55dd3b46c1208d6d2ea737a8aefef4aa4c70cb8 ]
find_vm_area() can return NULL if the given address is not a valid vmalloc area. Check the return value before dereferencing it to avoid a kernel crash.
--- include/linux/vmalloc.h | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/vmalloc.h +3 -1
@@ -214,7 +214,9 @@ static inline bool is_vm_area_hugepages(const void *addr)* allocated in the vmalloc layer. */ #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMALLOC -return find_vm_area (addr)->page_order >0 ; +struct vm_struct *area =find_vm_area (addr); + +return area && area->page_order >0 ;#else return false;#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 323/843 hwspinlock: qcom: avoid uninitialized struct members
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8752c396ce3b2136b3d4c906fe103f6efb6782d9 ]
The reg_field is allocated on stack, so using the REG_FIELD macro will ensure that unused members do not have uninitialized values.
--- drivers/hwspinlock/qcom_hwspinlock.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/hwspinlock/qcom_hwspinlock.c +1 -4
@@ -129,7 +129,6 @@ static struct regmap *qcom_hwspinlock_probe_mmio(struct platform_device *pdev,static int qcom_hwspinlock_probe (struct platform_device *pdev) {struct hwspinlock_device *bank; -struct reg_field field;struct regmap *regmap;size_t array_size;u32 stride;
@@ -151,9 +150,7 @@ static int qcom_hwspinlock_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)platform_set_drvdata (pdev, bank);for (i =0 ; i <QCOM_MUTEX_NUM_LOCKS ; i++) { - field.reg = base + i * stride; - field.lsb =0 ; - field.msb =31 ; +struct reg_field field =REG_FIELD (base + i * stride,0 ,31 ); bank->lock[i].priv =devm_regmap_field_alloc (&pdev->dev, regmap, field);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 324/843 btrfs: fix invalid pointer dereference in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 486f8298b6188ff11ef1f4be7f1d5d2e4d1b1fae ]
In the beginning of the loop, we try to obtain a locked delayed ref head, if 'locked_ref' is currently NULL, by calling btrfs_select_ref_head(), which can return an error pointer. If the error pointer is -EAGAIN we do a continue and go back to the beginning of the loop, which will not try again to call btrfs_select_ref_head() since 'locked_ref' is no longer NULL but it's ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN), and then we do:
spin_lock(&locked_ref->lock);
against a ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN) value, generating an invalid pointer dereference.
Fix this by ensuring that 'locked_ref' is set to NULL when btrfs_select_ref_head() returns ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN) and incrementing 'count' as well, to prevent infinite looping. We do this by doing a goto to the bottom of the loop that already sets 'locked_ref' to NULL and does a cond_resched(), with an increment to 'count' right before the goto. These measures were in place before the refactoring in commit 0110a4c43451 ("btrfs: refactor __btrfs_run_delayed_refs loop") but were unintentionally lost afterwards.
--- fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +3 -2
@@ -2015,7 +2015,8 @@ static noinline int __btrfs_run_delayed_refs(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, locked_ref =btrfs_obtain_ref_head (trans);if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (locked_ref)) {if (PTR_ERR (locked_ref) == -EAGAIN ) { -continue ; + count++; + goto again; }else {break ; }
@@ -2064,7 +2065,7 @@ static noinline int __btrfs_run_delayed_refs(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,* Either success case or btrfs_run_delayed_refs_for_head * returned -EAGAIN, meaning we need to select another head */ - +again: locked_ref =NULL ;cond_resched (); }while ((nr !=-1 && count < nr) || locked_ref);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 325/843 fbdev: sm501fb: Fix buffer errors in OF binding code
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Laight <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d8421e09382cfe0bd2a044c8b0a822f64855dd4e ]
The code that gets the frame buffer mode from OF has 'use after free', 'buffer overrun' and memory leaks.
info->edid_data isn't free if the probe functions fail or if pd->def_mode is set.
If both the CRT and PANEL are enabled info->edid_data is used after being freed and is freed twice.
The string returned by of_get_property(np, "mode", &len) is just written over either the static "640x480-16@60" or the module parameter string without any regard for the length (which is most likely longer).
Use kstrump() for the OF mode and free everything before freeing 'info.
--- drivers/video/fbdev/sm501fb.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/sm501fb.c +12 -4
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct sm501fb_info {void __iomem *fbmem;/* remapped framebuffer */ size_t fbmem_len;/* length of remapped region */ u8 *edid_data; +char *fb_mode; };/* per-framebuffer private data */
@@ -1788,12 +1789,11 @@ static int sm501fb_init_fb(struct fb_info *fb, enum sm501_controller head, fb->var.yres_virtual = fb->var.yres; }else {if (info->edid_data) { - ret =fb_find_mode (&fb->var, fb, fb_mode, + ret =fb_find_mode (&fb->var, fb, + info->fb_mode ?: fb_mode, fb->monspecs.modedb, fb->monspecs.modedb_len, &sm501_default_mode, default_bpp); -/* edid_data is no longer needed, free it */ -kfree (info->edid_data); }else { ret =fb_find_mode (&fb->var, fb,NULL ,NULL ,0 ,NULL ,8 );
@@ -1969,7 +1969,7 @@ static int sm501fb_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)/* Get EDID */ cp =of_get_property (np,"mode" , &len);if (cp) -strcpy (fb_mode, cp); + info->fb_mode =kstrdup (cp,GFP_KERNEL ); prop =of_get_property (np,"edid" , &len);if (prop && len ==EDID_LENGTH ) { info->edid_data = kmemdup(prop, EDID_LENGTH,
@@ -2026,6 +2026,12 @@ static int sm501fb_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) goto err_started_crt; } +/* These aren't needed any more */ +kfree (info->edid_data); +kfree (info->fb_mode); + info->edid_data =NULL ; + info->fb_mode =NULL ; +/* we registered, return ok */ return 0 ;
@@ -2043,6 +2049,8 @@ static int sm501fb_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)framebuffer_release (info->fb[HEAD_CRT ]); err_alloc: +kfree (info->edid_data); +kfree (info->fb_mode);kfree (info);return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 326/843 IB/mlx4: Fill in the access_flags if IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS is not specified
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bade9a3150d44ed20b8c6484c4c8a943b7289abb ]
Sashiko noticed mlx4 was using whatever random access flags were provided when IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS is not used. Since IB_MR_REREG_TRANS needs access_flags it used the random ones which means it doesn't work sensibly if userspace provides only IB_MR_REREG_TRANS.
Keep track of the current access_flag of the MR and use it if the user does not specify one.
Also fixup a little confusion around mmr.access, it is the HW access flags so the convert_access() was missing. But nothing reads this by the time rereg_mr can happen.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mlx4_ib.h | 1 + drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c | 9 +++++++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mlx4_ib.h +1 -0
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ struct mlx4_ib_mr {dma_addr_t page_map;u32 npages;u32 max_pages; +int access_flags;struct mlx4_mr mmr;struct ib_umem *umem;size_t page_map_size;
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c +7 -2
@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ struct ib_mr *mlx4_ib_reg_user_mr(struct ib_pd *pd, u64 start, u64 length,if (err) goto err_mr; + mr->access_flags = access_flags; mr->ibmr.rkey = mr->ibmr.lkey = mr->mmr.key; mr->ibmr.page_size =1U << shift;
@@ -495,6 +496,8 @@ struct ib_mr *mlx4_ib_rereg_user_mr(struct ib_mr *mr, int flags, u64 start,if (err) goto release_mpt_entry; + }else { + mr_access_flags = mmr->access_flags; }if (flags &IB_MR_REREG_TRANS ) {
@@ -536,8 +539,10 @@ struct ib_mr *mlx4_ib_rereg_user_mr(struct ib_mr *mr, int flags, u64 start,* return a failure. But dereg_mr will free the resources. */ err =mlx4_mr_hw_write_mpt (dev->dev, &mmr->mmr, pmpt_entry); -if (!err && flags &IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS ) - mmr->mmr.access = mr_access_flags; +if (!err && flags &IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS ) { + mmr->access_flags = mr_access_flags; + mmr->mmr.access =convert_access (mr_access_flags); + } release_mpt_entry:mlx4_mr_hw_put_mpt (dev->dev, pmpt_entry);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 327/843 vduse: hold vduse_lock across IDR lookup in open path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qihang Tang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e440e077748939839d9f76e24383b76b785f80ce ]
vduse_dev_open() looks up struct vduse_dev through the IDR and then acquires dev->lock only after vduse_lock has been dropped.
This leaves a window where a concurrent VDUSE_DESTROY_DEV can remove the same object from the IDR and free it before the open path locks the device, leading to a use-after-free.
Close this race by keeping vduse_lock held until dev->lock has been acquired in the open path, matching the lock ordering already used by the destroy path.
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/vduse_dev.c | 21 +++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/vduse_dev.c +7 -14
@@ -1108,26 +1108,18 @@ static int vduse_dev_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)return 0 ; } -static struct vduse_dev *vduse_dev_get_from_minor (int minor) +static int vduse_dev_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *file) { +int ret = -EBUSY ;struct vduse_dev *dev;mutex_lock (&vduse_lock); - dev =idr_find (&vduse_idr, minor); -mutex_unlock (&vduse_lock); - -return dev; -} - -static int vduse_dev_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *file) -{ -int ret; -struct vduse_dev *dev =vduse_dev_get_from_minor (iminor (inode)); - -if (!dev) + dev =idr_find (&vduse_idr,iminor (inode)); +if (!dev) { +mutex_unlock (&vduse_lock);return -ENODEV ; + } - ret = -EBUSY ;mutex_lock (&dev->lock);if (dev->connected) goto unlock;
@@ -1137,6 +1129,7 @@ static int vduse_dev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) file->private_data = dev; unlock:mutex_unlock (&dev->lock); +mutex_unlock (&vduse_lock);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 328/843 vhost/vdpa: validate virtqueue index in mmap and fault paths
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qihang Tang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 929e4f044621c8cc30b612fb74e1410bef09e41b ]
vhost_vdpa_mmap() and vhost_vdpa_fault() use vma->vm_pgoff as a virtqueue index for get_vq_notification(), but they do not validate that the index is smaller than v->nvqs.
The ioctl path already performs both a bounds check and array_index_nospec(), but the mmap/fault path only checks that the index fits in u16. This allows an out-of-range queue index to reach driver-specific get_vq_notification() callbacks.
Fix this by extracting a unified vhost_vdpa_get_vq_notification() helper that validates the queue index against v->nvqs and applies array_index_nospec() before calling the driver callback. Both the mmap and fault paths use this helper, and the bounds checking is consolidated into a single location.
Quoted 1 line
From source inspection, the most defensible impact is out-of-bounds
access in the callback path, potentially leading to invalid PFN remaps and crash/DoS.
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/vhost/vdpa.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/vhost/vdpa.c +22 -7
@@ -1058,16 +1058,32 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filep) }#ifdef CONFIG_MMU -static vm_fault_t vhost_vdpa_fault (struct vm_fault *vmf) +static int +vhost_vdpa_get_vq_notification (struct vhost_vdpa *v,unsigned long index, +struct vdpa_notification_area *notify) { -struct vhost_vdpa *v = vmf->vma->vm_file->private_data;struct vdpa_device *vdpa = v->vdpa;const struct vdpa_config_ops *ops = vdpa->config; + +if (index >65535 || index >= v->nvqs) +return -EINVAL ; + + index =array_index_nospec (index, v->nvqs); + + *notify = ops->get_vq_notification (vdpa, index); + +return 0 ; +} + +static vm_fault_t vhost_vdpa_fault (struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ +struct vhost_vdpa *v = vmf->vma->vm_file->private_data;struct vdpa_notification_area notify;struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma; -u16 index = vma->vm_pgoff; +unsigned long index = vma->vm_pgoff; - notify = ops->get_vq_notification (vdpa, index); +if (vhost_vdpa_get_vq_notification (v, index, ¬ify)) +return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ;return vmf_insert_pfn (vma, vmf->address &PAGE_MASK ,PFN_DOWN (notify.addr)); }
@@ -1090,8 +1106,6 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)return -EINVAL ;if (vma->vm_flags &VM_READ )return -EINVAL ; -if (index >65535 ) -return -EINVAL ;if (!ops->get_vq_notification)return -ENOTSUPP ;
@@ -1099,7 +1113,8 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)* support the doorbell which sits on the page boundary and * does not share the page with other registers. */ - notify = ops->get_vq_notification (vdpa, index); +if (vhost_vdpa_get_vq_notification (v, index, ¬ify)) +return -EINVAL ;if (notify.addr & (PAGE_SIZE -1 ))return -EINVAL ;if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != notify.size)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 329/843 vduse: Requeue failed read to send_list head
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Tianci <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 373ec43ded742b2f3aecf14731ffe1a57f438f38 ]
When copy_to_iter() fails in vduse_dev_read_iter(), put the message back at the head of send_list to preserve FIFO ordering and retry the oldest pending request first.
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/vduse_dev.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/vduse_dev.c +7 -1
@@ -171,6 +171,12 @@ static void vduse_enqueue_msg(struct list_head *head,list_add_tail (&msg->list, head); } +static void vduse_enqueue_msg_head (struct list_head *head, +struct vduse_dev_msg *msg) +{ +list_add (&msg->list, head); +} +static void vduse_dev_broken (struct vduse_dev *dev) {struct vduse_dev_msg *msg, *tmp;
@@ -331,7 +337,7 @@ static ssize_t vduse_dev_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)spin_lock (&dev->msg_lock);if (ret != size) { ret = -EFAULT ; -vduse_enqueue_msg (&dev->send_list, msg); +vduse_enqueue_msg_head (&dev->send_list, msg); goto unlock; }vduse_enqueue_msg (&dev->recv_list, msg);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 330/843 tools/virtio: check mmap return value in vringh_test
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: longlong yan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ec6177dfe98b9be1c3ede6c0dfe4394ea2a76959 ]
In parallel_test(), the return values of mmap() for both host_map and guest_map are not checked against MAP_FAILED. If mmap() fails, the subsequent code will dereference the invalid pointer, leading to a segmentation fault.
Add MAP_FAILED checks after both mmap() calls, using err() to report the error and exit, consistent with the existing error handling style in this file (e.g., the open() call on line 149).
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
--- tools/virtio/vringh_test.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
tools/virtio/vringh_test.c +5 -0
@@ -159,7 +159,12 @@ static int parallel_test(u64 features,/* Parent and child use separate addresses, to check our mapping logic! */ host_map =mmap (NULL , mapsize,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 ); +if (host_map ==MAP_FAILED ) +err (1 ,"mmap host_map" ); + guest_map =mmap (NULL , mapsize,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 ); +if (guest_map ==MAP_FAILED ) +err (1 ,"mmap guest_map" );pipe (to_guest);pipe (to_host);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 331/843 bonding: 3ad: fix mux port state on oper down
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Louis Scalbert <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 807afc7544b865d4d09068a415fd5b71bf5665cc ]
When the bonding interface has carrier down due to the absence of usable slaves and a slave transitions from down to up, the bonding interface briefly goes carrier up, then down again, and finally up once LACP negotiates collecting and distributing on the port.
When lacp_strict mode is on, the interface should not transition to carrier up until LACP negotiation is complete.
This happens because the actor and partner port states remain in Collecting_Distributing when the port goes down. When the port comes back up, it temporarily remains in this state until LACP renegotiation occurs.
Previously this was mostly cosmetic, but since the bonding carrier state may depend on the LACP negotiation state, it causes the interface to flap.
According to IEEE 802.3ad-2000 and IEEE 802.1ax-2014, Collecting and Distributing should be reset when a port goes down:
- In the Receive state machine, port_enabled == FALSE causes a transition to the PORT_DISABLED state, which is expected to clear Partner_Oper_Port_State.Synchronization.
- In the Mux state machine, Partner_Oper_Port_State.Synchronization == FALSE causes a transition to the ATTACHED state, which disables Collecting and Distributing.
However, Partner_Oper_Port_State.Synchronization is not cleared in the PORT_DISABLED state.
Clear Partner_Oper_Port_State.Synchronization in the Receive PORT_DISABLED state.
--- drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c +1 -0
@@ -1171,6 +1171,7 @@ static void ad_rx_machine(struct lacpdu *lacpdu, struct port *port) fallthrough;case AD_RX_PORT_DISABLED : port->sm_vars &= ~AD_PORT_MATCHED ; + port->partner_oper.port_state &= ~LACP_STATE_SYNCHRONIZATION ;break ;case AD_RX_LACP_DISABLED : port->sm_vars &= ~AD_PORT_SELECTED ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 332/843 selftests/bpf: Fix bpf_iter/task_vma test
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2e8ad1ff712d2a397e407c9fde60901f68d077dc ]
For selftest bpf_iter/task_vma, I got a failure like below on my qemu run:
test_task_vma_common:FAIL:compare_output unexpected compare_output:
actual
'561593546000-561593585000r--p0000000000:241256579534/root/devshare/bpf-next/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs'
!= expected
'561593546000-561593585000r--p0000000000:245551546830/root/devshare/bpf-next/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs'Further debugging found out file->f_inode->i_ino value may exceed 32bit, e.g., i_ino = 0x14c2eae35, but the format string is '%u'. This caused inode mismatch between bpf iter and proc result.
Fix the issue by using format string '%llu' to accommodate 64bit i_ino.
--- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_task_vma.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_task_vma.c +1 -1
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ SEC("iter/task_vma") int proc_maps(struct bpf_iter__task_vma *ctx)bpf_d_path (&file->f_path, d_path_buf,D_PATH_BUF_SIZE );BPF_SEQ_PRINTF (seq,"%08llx " , vma->vm_pgoff <<12 ); -BPF_SEQ_PRINTF (seq,"%02x:%02x %u" ,MAJOR (dev),MINOR (dev), +BPF_SEQ_PRINTF (seq,"%02x:%02x %llu" ,MAJOR (dev),MINOR (dev), file->f_inode->i_ino);BPF_SEQ_PRINTF (seq,"\t%s\n" , d_path_buf); }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 333/843 bpf: Tighten cgroup storage cookie checks for prog arrays
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 10627ddc0167aab5c1c390a10ef461e9937aba08 ]
The fix in commit abad3d0bad72 ("bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage") is still incomplete. The prog-array compatibility check treats a program with no cgroup storage as compatible with any stored storage cookie. This allows a storage-less program to bridge a tail call chain between an entry program and a storage-using callee even though cgroup local storage at runtime still follows the caller's context, that is, A -> B(no storage) -> C(storage) path.
Requiring exact cookie equality would break the legitimate case of a storage-less leaf program being tail called from a storage-using one. Instead, only accept a zero storage cookie if the program cannot perform tail calls itself. This keeps A -> B(no storage) working while rejecting the A -> B(no storage) -> C(storage) bridge.
--- kernel/bpf/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/core.c +1 -1
@@ -1872,7 +1872,7 @@ static bool __bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map, cookie = aux->cgroup_storage[i] ? aux->cgroup_storage[i]->cookie :0 ; ret = map->owner->storage_cookie[i] == cookie || - !cookie; + (!cookie && !aux->tail_call_reachable); }if (ret && map->owner->attach_func_proto != aux->attach_func_proto) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 334/843 s390/process: Fix kernel thread function pointer type
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d0478f5d3cba1095bfdeb43a9b063c10cdebef14 ]
In case of a kernel thread __ret_from_fork() calls the specified function indirectly. Fix the kernel thread function pointer, since kernel threads return an int instead of void.
--- arch/s390/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/s390/kernel/process.c +1 -1
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ void ret_from_fork(void) asm("ret_from_fork");void __ret_from_fork (struct task_struct *prev,struct pt_regs *regs) { -void (*func)(void *arg); +int (*func)(void *arg);schedule_tail (prev);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 335/843 fs: efs: remove unneeded debug prints
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maxwell Doose <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 89009392c80da5da00876c8334ff20028e6e3eb6 ]
The current code uses debug prints conditionally compiled with #ifdef DEBUG. However, that code, when compiled, causes compiler errors due to incompatible formatters and undefined variables, notably:
fs/efs/file.c: In function `efs_get_block':fs/efs/file.c:26:35: error: block' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean iblock'?
26 | __func__, block, inode->i_blocks, inode->i_size);
| ^~~~~
and:
fs/efs/file.c: In function `efs_bmap':./include/linux/kern_levels.h:5:25: error: format %ld' expects argument of type long int', but argument 4 has type blkcnt_t' {aka long long unsigned int'} [-Werror=format=]
5 | #define KERN_SOH "\001" /* ASCII Start Of Header */
| ^~~~~~which also extends to the other formatters. As this part of the code has been dead for just about 14 years now, it has not been modernized to stay compatible with the most recent gcc compilers. Fix these issues by removing the debug prints.
--- fs/efs/file.c | 21 +++------------------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/efs/file.c +3 -18
@@ -18,16 +18,9 @@ int efs_get_block(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,if (create)return error; -if (iblock >= inode->i_blocks) { -#ifdef DEBUG -/* -* i have no idea why this happens as often as it does -*/ -pr_warn ("%s(): block %d >= %ld (filesize %ld)\n" , - __func__, block, inode->i_blocks, inode->i_size); -#endif +if (iblock >= inode->i_blocks)return 0 ; - } + phys =efs_map_block (inode, iblock);if (phys)map_bh (bh_result, inode->i_sb, phys);
@@ -42,16 +35,8 @@ int efs_bmap(struct inode *inode, efs_block_t block) { }/* are we about to read past the end of a file ? */ -if (!(block < inode->i_blocks)) { -#ifdef DEBUG -/* -* i have no idea why this happens as often as it does -*/ -pr_warn ("%s(): block %d >= %ld (filesize %ld)\n" , - __func__, block, inode->i_blocks, inode->i_size); -#endif +if (!(block < inode->i_blocks))return 0 ; - }return efs_map_block (inode, block); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 336/843 RDMA/mlx5: Remove raw RSS QP restrack tracking
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Patrisious Haddad <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 666031fed8f0fdfc29b20d125a628c1b0a04cdaf ]
Raw RSS QP restrack tracking wasn't working to begin with as it was only tracking the first raw RSS QP which was added, since at creation the raw RSS QP number is reserved so the QP number for this qp type was always zero.
The following raw RSS QP additions were always failing silently.
Since the fix isn't trivial and there were no users that required or complained about this issue we are dropping this for now instead of fixing.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c +1 -0
@@ -3000,6 +3000,7 @@ static int create_qp(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct ib_pd *pd,int err;if (params->is_rss_raw) { +rdma_restrack_no_track (&qp->ibqp.res); err =create_rss_raw_qp_tir (dev, pd, qp, params); goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 337/843 RDMA/mlx5: Fix undefined shift of user RQ WQE size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maher Sanalla <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d881d60223aac8fdc12b227d89c76e131e92a9cd ]
set_rq_size() computes the RQ WQE size as "1 << rq_wqe_shift" based on the user-provided rq_wqe_shift, which is only checked to be greater than 32, so shifts of 32 are still accepted. A shift of 31 also overflows a signed integer, leading to undefined behavior.
Use check_shl_overflow() to compute the RQ WQE size and reject any invalid values.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c | 11 ++++------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c +4 -7
@@ -369,16 +369,13 @@ static int set_rq_size(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct ib_qp_cap *cap,if (ucmd) { qp->rq.wqe_cnt = ucmd->rq_wqe_count; -if (ucmd->rq_wqe_shift >BITS_PER_BYTE *sizeof (ucmd->rq_wqe_shift)) -return -EINVAL ; qp->rq.wqe_shift = ucmd->rq_wqe_shift; -if ((1 << qp->rq.wqe_shift) / -sizeof (struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg ) < - wq_sig) +if (check_shl_overflow (1 , qp->rq.wqe_shift, &wqe_size)) +return -EINVAL ; +if (wqe_size /sizeof (struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg ) < wq_sig)return -EINVAL ; qp->rq.max_gs = - (1 << qp->rq.wqe_shift) / -sizeof (struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg ) - + wqe_size /sizeof (struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg ) - wq_sig; qp->rq.max_post = qp->rq.wqe_cnt; }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 338/843 ASoC: codecs: hdac_hdmi: Validate written enum value
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: HyeongJun An <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0b08baeccdcf52fad328ad645f5b4fbee04eea34 ]
hdac_hdmi_set_pin_port_mux() uses the written enum value to index the texts array before calling snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double(), which validates that the value is within the enum item range.
An out-of-range value can therefore make the driver read past the texts array before the helper rejects the write. Move the lookup after the helper has accepted the value.
--- sound/soc/codecs/hdac_hdmi.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/codecs/hdac_hdmi.c +3 -1
@@ -906,12 +906,14 @@ static int hdac_hdmi_set_pin_port_mux(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,struct hdac_device *hdev =dev_to_hdac_dev (dapm->dev);struct hdac_hdmi_priv *hdmi =hdev_to_hdmi_priv (hdev);struct hdac_hdmi_pcm *pcm; -const char *cvt_name = e->texts[ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0 ]]; +const char *cvt_name; ret =snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double (kcontrol, ucontrol);if (ret <0 )return ret; + cvt_name = e->texts[ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0 ]]; +if (port ==NULL )return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 339/843 ASoC: fsl: fsl_audmix: Validate written enum values
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: HyeongJun An <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3cd17e4e2871114d5579fa7bc8da66faf7fc1930 ]
fsl_audmix_put_mix_clk_src() and fsl_audmix_put_out_src() convert the user-provided enum item with snd_soc_enum_item_to_val() before checking whether the item is within the enum's item count.
The generic snd_soc_put_enum_double() helper performs that validation, but these callbacks use the converted value first: the clock-source path tests it with BIT(), and the output-source path indexes the prms transition table with it.
Reject out-of-range enum items before converting them.
--- sound/soc/fsl/fsl_audmix.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
sound/soc/fsl/fsl_audmix.c +6 -0
@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ static int fsl_audmix_put_mix_clk_src(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,unsigned int *item = ucontrol->value.enumerated.item;unsigned int reg_val, val, mix_clk; +if (item[0 ] >= e->items) +return -EINVAL ; +/* Get current state */ reg_val =snd_soc_component_read (comp,FSL_AUDMIX_CTR ); mix_clk = ((reg_val & FSL_AUDMIX_CTR_MIXCLK_MASK)
@@ -157,6 +160,9 @@ static int fsl_audmix_put_out_src(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,unsigned int reg_val, val, mask =0 , ctr =0 ;int ret; +if (item[0 ] >= e->items) +return -EINVAL ; +/* Get current state */ reg_val =snd_soc_component_read (comp,FSL_AUDMIX_CTR );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 340/843 ASoC: tegra: tegra210_ahub: Validate written enum value
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: HyeongJun An <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1d8aabb413b5638670dfd1162169edc0ba276a2e ]
tegra_ahub_put_value_enum() reads e->values[item[0]] before checking whether item[0] is within the enum item range. The existing check therefore happens too late to prevent an out-of-range read of the values array.
Move the check before the array access.
--- sound/soc/tegra/tegra210_ahub.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/tegra/tegra210_ahub.c +3 -1
@@ -60,13 +60,15 @@ static int tegra_ahub_put_value_enum(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl,struct soc_enum *e = (struct soc_enum *)kctl->private_value;struct snd_soc_dapm_update update[TEGRA_XBAR_UPDATE_MAX_REG ] = { };unsigned int *item = uctl->value.enumerated.item; -unsigned int value = e->values[item[0 ]]; +unsigned int value;unsigned int i, bit_pos, reg_idx =0 , reg_val =0 ;int change =0 ;if (item[0 ] >= e->items)return -EINVAL ; + value = e->values[item[0 ]]; +if (value) {/* Get the register index and value to set */ reg_idx = (value -1 ) / (8 * cmpnt->val_bytes);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 341/843 net: fib_rules: Dont dump dying fib_rule in fib_rules_dump().
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2821e85c058f81c9948a2fb1a634f7b47457d51c ]
rocker_router_fib_event() calls fib_rule_get() during RCU dump.
If the fib_rule is dying, refcount_inc() will complain about it.
Let's call refcount_inc_not_zero() in fib_rules_dump().
--- include/net/fib_rules.h | 5 +++++ net/core/fib_rules.c | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/net/fib_rules.h +5 -0
@@ -128,6 +128,11 @@ static inline void fib_rule_get(struct fib_rule *rule)refcount_inc (&rule->refcnt); } +static inline bool fib_rule_get_safe (struct fib_rule *rule) +{ +return refcount_inc_not_zero (&rule->refcnt); +} +static inline void fib_rule_put (struct fib_rule *rule) {if (refcount_dec_and_test (&rule->refcnt))
net/core/fib_rules.c +5 -1
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ int fib_rules_lookup(struct fib_rules_ops *ops, struct flowi *fl,if (err != -EAGAIN ) {if ((arg->flags &FIB_LOOKUP_NOREF ) || -likely (refcount_inc_not_zero (&rule->refcnt))) { +likely (fib_rule_get_safe (rule))) { arg->rule = rule; goto out; }
@@ -386,8 +386,12 @@ int fib_rules_dump(struct net *net, struct notifier_block *nb, int family,if (!ops)return -EAFNOSUPPORT ;list_for_each_entry_rcu (rule, &ops->rules_list, list) { +if (!fib_rule_get_safe (rule)) +continue ; + err =call_fib_rule_notifier (nb,FIB_EVENT_RULE_ADD , rule, family, extack); +fib_rule_put (rule);if (err)break ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 342/843 bridge: cfm: reject invalid CCM interval at configuration time
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xiang Mei <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f3e02edd8322b31b8e6517faa6ba053bf29d1e26 ]
ccm_tx_work_expired() re-arms itself via queue_delayed_work() using the configured exp_interval converted by interval_to_us(). When exp_interval is BR_CFM_CCM_INTERVAL_NONE or out of range, interval_to_us() returns 0, causing the worker to fire immediately in a tight loop that allocates skbs until OOM.
Fix this by validating exp_interval at configuration time:
- Constrain IFLA_BRIDGE_CFM_CC_CONFIG_EXP_INTERVAL to the valid range [BR_CFM_CCM_INTERVAL_3_3_MS, BR_CFM_CCM_INTERVAL_10_MIN] in the netlink policy so userspace cannot set an invalid value.
- Reject starting CCM TX in br_cfm_cc_ccm_tx() when exp_interval has not yet been configured (defaults to 0 from kzalloc).
--- net/bridge/br_cfm.c | 6 ++++++ net/bridge/br_cfm_netlink.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bridge/br_cfm.c +6 -0
@@ -805,6 +805,12 @@ int br_cfm_cc_ccm_tx(struct net_bridge *br, const u32 instance, goto save; } +if (!interval_to_us (mep->cc_config.exp_interval)) { +NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD (extack, +"Invalid CCM interval" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } +/* Start delayed work to transmit CCM frames. It is done with zero delay * to send first frame immediately */
net/bridge/br_cfm_netlink.c +3 -1
@@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ br_cfm_cc_config_policy[IFLA_BRIDGE_CFM_CC_CONFIG_MAX + 1] = { [IFLA_BRIDGE_CFM_CC_CONFIG_UNSPEC] = { .type = NLA_REJECT }, [IFLA_BRIDGE_CFM_CC_CONFIG_INSTANCE] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [IFLA_BRIDGE_CFM_CC_CONFIG_ENABLE] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, - [IFLA_BRIDGE_CFM_CC_CONFIG_EXP_INTERVAL] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [IFLA_BRIDGE_CFM_CC_CONFIG_EXP_INTERVAL ] = +NLA_POLICY_RANGE (NLA_U32 ,BR_CFM_CCM_INTERVAL_3_3_MS , + BR_CFM_CCM_INTERVAL_10_MIN), [IFLA_BRIDGE_CFM_CC_CONFIG_EXP_MAID ] = { .type = NLA_BINARY, .len = CFM_MAID_LENGTH }, };
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 343/843 sctp: validate embedded address parameter length
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xin Long <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e9361d0ca55c4af12aac09e2572852fa91046229 ]
sctp_verify_asconf() and sctp_verify_param() only validate ADD_IP, DEL_IP, and SET_PRIMARY parameters against a fixed minimum size of sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr). This ensures the outer parameter is large enough to contain an embedded address parameter header, but does not verify that the embedded address parameter's declared length fits within the bounds of the outer parameter.
Later, sctp_process_param() and sctp_process_asconf_param() extract the embedded address parameter and pass it to af->from_addr_param(), which uses the address parameter length to parse the variable-length address payload. A malformed peer can therefore advertise an embedded address parameter length that exceeds the remaining bytes in the enclosing parameter.
Validate that addr_param->p.length does not exceed the space available after the sctp_addip_param header before processing the embedded address parameter. Reject malformed parameters when the embedded address length extends beyond the enclosing parameter bounds.
This prevents out-of-bounds reads when parsing malformed parameters carried in INIT or ASCONF processing paths.
--- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +8 -2
@@ -2670,6 +2670,9 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, goto fall_through; addr_param = param.v +sizeof (struct sctp_addip_param ); +if (ntohs (addr_param->p.length) > +ntohs (param.p->length) -sizeof (struct sctp_addip_param )) +break ; af =sctp_get_af_specific (param_type2af (addr_param->p.type));if (!af)
@@ -3068,13 +3071,16 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,union sctp_addr addr;struct sctp_af *af; - addr_param = (void *)asconf_param +sizeof (*asconf_param); -if (asconf_param->param_hdr.type !=SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP && asconf_param->param_hdr.type !=SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP && asconf_param->param_hdr.type !=SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY )return SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM ; + addr_param = (void *)asconf_param +sizeof (*asconf_param); +if (ntohs (addr_param->p.length) > +ntohs (asconf_param->param_hdr.length) -sizeof (*asconf_param)) +return SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION ; +switch (addr_param->p.type) {case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS :if (!asoc->peer.ipv6_address)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 344/843 net/sched: sch_hfsc: Dont make class passive twice
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Victor Nogueira <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 90b662ea25f5e83bb3b8ccec5b93ced810b92fb8 ]
update_vf() is called from two places for the same class during a single dequeue when the class's child qdisc (e.g. codel/fq_codel) drops its last packets while dequeuing:
1. The child calls qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog(), which, now that the child is empty, invokes hfsc_qlen_notify() -> update_vf(cl, 0, 0) and turns the class passive (cl_nactive is decremented up the hierarchy).
2. hfsc_dequeue() then calls update_vf(cl, qdisc_pkt_len(skb), cur_time) to charge the dequeued bytes.
On the second call the class is already passive, but its child qdisc is still empty, so update_vf() arms go_passive again:
if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen == 0 && cl->cl_flags & HFSC_FSC)
go_passive = 1;The leaf is then skipped by the cl_nactive == 0 check inside the loop, which does not clear go_passive, so the stale go_passive propagates to the parent and decrements its cl_nactive a second time. A parent that still has other active children is driven to cl_nactive == 0 and removed from the vttree, even though those siblings are still backlogged. They are never dequeued again and the qdisc stalls.
Fix this by only arming go_passive when the class is actually active, so an already-passive class no longer triggers a second passive transition. The byte accounting (cl->cl_total += len) still runs for every ancestor, so dequeued bytes continue to be counted exactly once.
--- net/sched/sch_hfsc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sched/sch_hfsc.c +1 -1
@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ update_vf(struct hfsc_class *cl, unsigned int len, u64 cur_time)u64 f;/* , myf_bound, delta; */ int go_passive =0 ; -if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen ==0 && cl->cl_flags &HFSC_FSC ) +if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen ==0 && cl->cl_flags &HFSC_FSC && cl->cl_nactive) go_passive =1 ;for (; cl->cl_parent !=NULL ; cl = cl->cl_parent) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 345/843 tipc: require net admin for TIPCv2 netlink mutators
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 86b0c540e2ea397cde021eecd24145f7c16a3d4e ]
TIPCv2 registers mutating generic-netlink operations without admin permission flags. Generic netlink only checks CAP_NET_ADMIN when an operation sets GENL_ADMIN_PERM or GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, so a local unprivileged process can currently change TIPC state through commands such as TIPC_NL_NET_SET, TIPC_NL_KEY_SET, TIPC_NL_KEY_FLUSH, and bearer enable/disable.
The legacy TIPC netlink API already checks netlink_net_capable(..., CAP_NET_ADMIN) for administrative commands. Give the TIPCv2 mutators the equivalent generic-netlink gate. Use GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, which maps to the same namespace-aware CAP_NET_ADMIN check that netlink_net_capable() performs, so the behaviour matches the legacy path and keeps working for CAP_NET_ADMIN holders in a non-initial user namespace (containers).
A QEMU/KASAN repro run as uid/gid 65534 with zero effective capabilities previously succeeded in changing the network id and node identity, setting and flushing key material, and enabling/disabling a UDP bearer. With this patch applied the same operations fail with -EPERM.
--- net/tipc/netlink.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
net/tipc/netlink.c +12 -0
@@ -152,11 +152,13 @@ static const struct genl_ops tipc_genl_v2_ops[] = { { .cmd = TIPC_NL_BEARER_DISABLE, .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP, + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, .doit = tipc_nl_bearer_disable, }, { .cmd = TIPC_NL_BEARER_ENABLE, .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP, + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, .doit = tipc_nl_bearer_enable, }, {
@@ -168,11 +170,13 @@ static const struct genl_ops tipc_genl_v2_ops[] = { { .cmd = TIPC_NL_BEARER_ADD, .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP, + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, .doit = tipc_nl_bearer_add, }, { .cmd = TIPC_NL_BEARER_SET, .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP, + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, .doit = tipc_nl_bearer_set, }, {
@@ -197,11 +201,13 @@ static const struct genl_ops tipc_genl_v2_ops[] = { { .cmd = TIPC_NL_LINK_SET, .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP, + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, .doit = tipc_nl_node_set_link, }, { .cmd = TIPC_NL_LINK_RESET_STATS, .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP, + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, .doit = tipc_nl_node_reset_link_stats, }, {
@@ -213,6 +219,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops tipc_genl_v2_ops[] = { { .cmd = TIPC_NL_MEDIA_SET, .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP, + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, .doit = tipc_nl_media_set, }, {
@@ -228,6 +235,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops tipc_genl_v2_ops[] = { { .cmd = TIPC_NL_NET_SET, .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP, + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, .doit = tipc_nl_net_set, }, {
@@ -238,6 +246,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops tipc_genl_v2_ops[] = { { .cmd = TIPC_NL_MON_SET, .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP, + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, .doit = tipc_nl_node_set_monitor, }, {
@@ -255,6 +264,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops tipc_genl_v2_ops[] = { { .cmd = TIPC_NL_PEER_REMOVE, .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP, + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, .doit = tipc_nl_peer_rm, },#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_MEDIA_UDP
@@ -269,11 +279,13 @@ static const struct genl_ops tipc_genl_v2_ops[] = { { .cmd = TIPC_NL_KEY_SET, .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP, + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, .doit = tipc_nl_node_set_key, }, { .cmd = TIPC_NL_KEY_FLUSH, .validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP, + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, .doit = tipc_nl_node_flush_key, }, #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 346/843 tipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ab3e10b44ba5411779aac7afd2477917dd77750f ]
tipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv() subtracts the peer-supplied connection ack count from the unsigned 16-bit send counter snt_unacked without checking that it does not exceed the number of messages actually outstanding:
tsk->snt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);
msg_conn_ack() is read straight from a received CONN_MANAGER/CONN_ACK message. If the ack count is larger than snt_unacked, the subtraction wraps to a near-maximum value, leaving tsk_conn_cong() permanently true and starving the connection of further transmits.
Validate the ACK count at the start of the CONN_ACK block and drop the message if it acknowledges more messages than are outstanding. A peer (or, for a local connection, the connected peer socket) can otherwise wedge a TIPC connection's send side by sending an oversized connection ack.
--- net/tipc/socket.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/tipc/socket.c +3 -0
@@ -1366,6 +1366,9 @@ static void tipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv(struct tipc_sock *tsk, struct sk_buff *skb,__skb_queue_tail (xmitq, skb);return ; }else if (mtyp ==CONN_ACK ) { +if (tsk->snt_unacked <msg_conn_ack (hdr)) + goto exit; + was_cong =tsk_conn_cong (tsk);tipc_sk_push_backlog (tsk,msg_nagle_ack (hdr)); tsk->snt_unacked -=msg_conn_ack (hdr);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 347/843 tipc: reject inverted service ranges from peer bindings
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2afb648f7b99216c687db1f89739c995e1144153 ]
tipc_update_nametbl() inserts a binding advertised by a peer node using the lower and upper service-range bounds taken directly from the wire, without checking that lower <= upper. The local bind path validates the ordering (tipc_uaddr_valid()), but the name-distribution path does not.
A binding with lower > upper is inserted at the far end of the service-range rbtree (keyed on lower) where no lookup or withdrawal can ever match it (service_range_foreach_match() requires sr->lower <= end). The publication, its service_range node and the augmented rbtree entry are then leaked for the lifetime of the namespace, and there is no per-peer cap equivalent to TIPC_MAX_PUBL on locally created bindings.
Reject inverted ranges in the network path as well. A peer node can otherwise leak unbounded binding-table memory by sending PUBLICATION items with lower > upper.
--- net/tipc/name_distr.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/tipc/name_distr.c +11 -2
@@ -288,12 +288,21 @@ static bool tipc_update_nametbl(struct net *net, struct distr_item *i, u32 node, u32 dtype) {struct publication *p =NULL ; +u32 lower =ntohl (i->lower); +u32 upper =ntohl (i->upper);struct tipc_socket_addr sk; -struct tipc_uaddr ua;u32 key =ntohl (i->key); +struct tipc_uaddr ua; + +/* A peer-advertised binding with lower > upper can never be matched +* or withdrawn and would leak the publication; the local bind path +* rejects such ranges, so reject ranges learned from the network too. +*/ +if (lower > upper) +return false;tipc_uaddr (&ua,TIPC_SERVICE_RANGE ,TIPC_CLUSTER_SCOPE , -ntohl (i->type),ntohl (i->lower),ntohl (i->upper)); +ntohl (i->type), lower, upper); sk.ref =ntohl (i->port); sk.node = node;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 348/843 crypto: marvell/octeontx - fix DMA cleanup using wrong loop index
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7891c64c0520519782470ba29bac8a5761e295d8 ]
The sg_cleanup path used list[i] instead of list[j] when unmapping DMA buffers, leaking successfully mapped entries and repeatedly unmapping the failed one.
--- drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.c +2 -2
@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ static inline int setup_sgio_components(struct pci_dev *pdev, sg_cleanup:for (j =0 ; j < i; j++) {if (list[j].dma_addr) { -dma_unmap_single (&pdev->dev, list[i].dma_addr, - list[i].size,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ); +dma_unmap_single (&pdev->dev, list[j].dma_addr, + list[j].size,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ); } list[j].dma_addr =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 349/843 crypto: cavium/cpt - fix DMA cleanup using wrong loop index
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9dbf173bd32d5f81b005008b682bfb50aa093455 ]
The sg_cleanup error path used list[i] instead of list[j] when unmapping DMA buffers, leaking successfully mapped entries and repeatedly unmapping the failed one.
--- drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c +2 -2
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ static int setup_sgio_components(struct cpt_vf *cptvf, struct buf_ptr *list, sg_cleanup:for (j =0 ; j < i; j++) {if (list[j].dma_addr) { -dma_unmap_single (&pdev->dev, list[i].dma_addr, - list[i].size,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ); +dma_unmap_single (&pdev->dev, list[j].dma_addr, + list[j].size,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ); } list[j].dma_addr =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 350/843 crypto: rng - Free default RNG on module exit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 606ba888b98e0d26a2c4e5c8dc0542e3ad8f0f3a ]
When the rng module is removed the default RNG will be leaked. Call crypto_del_default_rng to free it if possible.
--- crypto/rng.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
crypto/rng.c +11 -0
@@ -232,5 +232,16 @@ void crypto_unregister_rngs(struct rng_alg *algs, int count) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (crypto_unregister_rngs); +static void __exit rng_exit(void) +{ +int err; + + err =crypto_del_default_rng (); +if (err) +pr_err ("Failed delete default RNG: %d\n" , err); +} + +module_exit (rng_exit); +MODULE_LICENSE ("GPL" );MODULE_DESCRIPTION ("Random Number Generator" );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 351/843 spi: xilinx: use FIFO occupancy register to determine buffer size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lars Pöschel <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 47f3b5365536e8c38f264824ab15fdb74454e066 ]
The method the driver uses to determine the size of the FIFO has a problem. What it currently does is this:
It stops the SPI hardware and writes to the TX FIFO register until TX FIFO FULL asserts in the status register. But the hardware does not only have the FIFO, it also has a shift register which can hold a byte. This can be seen, when writing a byte to the FIFO (while the SPI hardware is stopped,) the TX FIFO EMPTY is still empty. So, if we have a FIFO size of 16 for example, the current method returns a 17.
This is a problem, at least when using the driver in irq mode. The same size determined for the TX FIFO is also assumed for the RX FIFO. When a SPI transaction wants to write the amount of the FIFO size or more bytes, the following happens, for example with 16 bytes FIFO size:
The driver stops the SPI hardware and writes 17 bytes to the TX FIFO and starts the SPI hardware and goes sleep.
The hardware then shifts out 17 bytes (FIFO + shift register) and simultaneously reads bytes into the RX FIFO, but it only has 16 places, so it looses one byte. Then TX FIFO empty asserts, wakes the driver again, which has a fast path and reads 16 bytes from the RX FIFO, but before reading the last 17th byte (which is lost) it does this:
sr = xspi->read_fn(xspi->regs + XSPI_SR_OFFSET);
if (!(sr & XSPI_SR_RX_EMPTY_MASK)) {
xilinx_spi_rx(xspi);
rx_words--;
}It reads the status register and checks if the RX FIFO is not empty. But it is empty in our case. So this check spins in a while loop forever locking the driver.
This patch fixes the logic to determine the FIFO size.
--- drivers/spi/spi-xilinx.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi-xilinx.c +9 -2
@@ -369,11 +369,18 @@ static int xilinx_spi_find_buffer_size(struct xilinx_spi *xspi) xspi->regs + XIPIF_V123B_RESETR_OFFSET);/* Fill the Tx FIFO with as many words as possible */ -do { +while (1 ) { xspi->write_fn (0 , xspi->regs +XSPI_TXD_OFFSET ); sr = xspi->read_fn (xspi->regs +XSPI_SR_OFFSET ); +if (sr &XSPI_SR_TX_FULL_MASK ) +break ; + n_words++; - }while (!(sr &XSPI_SR_TX_FULL_MASK )); + } + +/* Handle the NO FIFO case separately */ +if (!n_words) +return 1 ;return n_words; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 352/843 ASoC: adau1372: Clear PLL_EN on failed PLL lock without reset GPIO
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 69b4141b428bcf2cf7a863950c0d6e5c5ae89ac1 ]
The PLL lock failure path in adau1372_set_power() unwinds by putting the regmap back in cache-only mode, asserting the optional power-down GPIO and disabling mclk.
adau1372_enable_pll() enables CLK_CTRL.PLL_EN before polling the PLL lock bit. If the lock fails on a board without a power-down GPIO, the error path disables mclk and returns an error, but leaves PLL_EN set in the hardware register. The normal power-off path already handles the no-GPIO case by explicitly clearing PLL_EN.
Mirror that cleanup in the PLL lock failure path and clear PLL_EN while the regmap is still live, before switching it back to cache-only mode.
--- sound/soc/codecs/adau1372.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
sound/soc/codecs/adau1372.c +5 -0
@@ -812,6 +812,11 @@ static int adau1372_set_power(struct adau1372 *adau1372, bool enable)if (adau1372->use_pll) { ret =adau1372_enable_pll (adau1372);if (ret) { +if (!adau1372->pd_gpio) +regmap_update_bits (adau1372->regmap, +ADAU1372_REG_CLK_CTRL , +ADAU1372_CLK_CTRL_PLL_EN , +0 );regcache_cache_only (adau1372->regmap, true);if (adau1372->pd_gpio)gpiod_set_value (adau1372->pd_gpio,1 );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 353/843 net/sched: sch_fq_codel: Do not call qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog during peek before restoring qlen
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Victor Nogueira <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 097f6fc7b1ae362dd7a9444b2572162fda73b284 ]
Whenever fq_codel drops packets during peek, it calls qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog. An issue arises because it calls qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog before it reincrements the qlen. If qlen drops to zero, but peek returns an skb, the parent's qlen_notify callback will be executed even though fq_codel still has 1 packet on the queue and, thus, will mistakenly deactivate the parent's class causing issues like a recent report [1] and a wild memory access in qfq:
[ 29.371146][ T360] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xfbd59c0000000024: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 29.371666][ T360] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000120-0xdead000000000127] [ 29.371987][ T360] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 360 Comm: tc Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-00285-gc530e5b2dbc6-dirty #82 PREEMPT(full) [ 29.372384][ T360] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 29.372620][ T360] RIP: 0010:qfq_deactivate_agg (include/linux/list.h:1029 (discriminator 2) include/linux/list.h:1043 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1369 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1395 (discriminator 2)) sch_qfq [ 29.373544][ T360] RSP: 0018:ffff888102417370 EFLAGS: 00010216 [ 29.373800][ T360] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811224d568 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [ 29.374079][ T360] RDX: 1ffff11021fe1543 RSI: ffff88810ff0aa00 RDI: dffffc0000000000 [ 29.374368][ T360] RBP: ffff88811224c280 R08: dead000000000122 R09: 1bd5a00000000024 [ 29.374649][ T360] R10: fffffbfff7940329 R11: fffffbfff7940329 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 29.374926][ T360] R13: dead000000000100 R14: ffff88811224d580 R15: ffff88811224d578 [ 29.375207][ T360] FS: 00007f5b794e5780(0000) GS:ffff88815d1e9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 29.375545][ T360] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 29.375823][ T360] CR2: 000055ffb091f000 CR3: 000000010a305000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 29.376103][ T360] PKRU: 55555554 [ 29.376258][ T360] Call Trace: [ 29.376401][ T360] <TASK> ... [ 29.376885][ T360] qfq_reset_qdisc (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:357 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1487) sch_qfq [ 29.377074][ T360] qdisc_reset (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1057) [ 29.377414][ T360] __qdisc_destroy (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1096) [ 29.377600][ T360] qdisc_graft (net/sched/sch_api.c:1062 net/sched/sch_api.c:1053 net/sched/sch_api.c:1159) [ 29.378593][ T360] tc_get_qdisc (net/sched/sch_api.c:1528 net/sched/sch_api.c:1556)
Fix this by only calling qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog in peek after the qlen is restored.
[1] http://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAN2cbVe79oj0O9==m4+4x3v+O+qzRagA=2=wkrp9i9=CqYvyZA@mail.gmail.com/
--- net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c +39 -2
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static void drop_func(struct sk_buff *skb, void *ctx)qdisc_qstats_drop (sch); } -static struct sk_buff *fq_codel_dequeue (struct Qdisc *sch) +static struct sk_buff *__fq_codel_dequeue (struct Qdisc *sch) {struct fq_codel_sched_data *q =qdisc_priv (sch);struct sk_buff *skb;
@@ -315,12 +315,49 @@ static struct sk_buff *fq_codel_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch)qdisc_bstats_update (sch, skb); flow->deficit -=qdisc_pkt_len (skb); +return skb; +} + +static void fq_codel_dequeue_drop (struct Qdisc *sch) +{ +struct fq_codel_sched_data *q =qdisc_priv (sch); +if (q->cstats.drop_count) {qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog (sch, q->cstats.drop_count, q->cstats.drop_len); q->cstats.drop_count =0 ; q->cstats.drop_len =0 ; } +} + +static struct sk_buff *fq_codel_dequeue (struct Qdisc *sch) +{ +struct sk_buff *skb; + + skb =__fq_codel_dequeue (sch); + +fq_codel_dequeue_drop (sch); + +return skb; +} + +static struct sk_buff *fq_codel_peek (struct Qdisc *sch) +{ +struct sk_buff *skb =skb_peek (&sch->gso_skb); + +if (!skb) { + skb =__fq_codel_dequeue (sch); + +if (skb) { +__skb_queue_head (&sch->gso_skb, skb); +/* it's still part of the queue */ +qdisc_qstats_backlog_inc (sch, skb); + sch->q.qlen++; + } + +fq_codel_dequeue_drop (sch); + } +return skb; }
@@ -702,7 +739,7 @@ static struct Qdisc_ops fq_codel_qdisc_ops __read_mostly = { .priv_size = sizeof(struct fq_codel_sched_data), .enqueue = fq_codel_enqueue, .dequeue = fq_codel_dequeue, - .peek = qdisc_peek_dequeued, + .peek = fq_codel_peek, .init = fq_codel_init, .reset = fq_codel_reset, .destroy = fq_codel_destroy,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 354/843 net/sched: sch_codel: Do not call qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog during peek before restoring qlen
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Victor Nogueira <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 52f1da34c9f4d5bdc1e8b44242da5c7ba8db85f3 ]
Whenever codel drops packets during peek, it calls qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog. An issue arises because it calls qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog before it reincrements the qlen. If qlen drops to zero, but peek returns an skb, the parent's qlen_notify callback will be executed even though codel still has 1 packet on the queue and, thus, will mistakenly deactivate the parent's class causing issues like a wild memory access when qfq has codel as a child:
[ 36.339843][ T370] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xfbd59c0000000024: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 36.340408][ T370] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000120-0xdead000000000127] [ 36.340737][ T370] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 370 Comm: tc Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-00287-g66e13b626592 #87 PREEMPT(full) [ 36.341113][ T370] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 36.341357][ T370] RIP: 0010:qfq_deactivate_agg (include/linux/list.h:1029 (discriminator 2) include/linux/list.h:1043 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1369 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1395 (discriminator 2)) sch_qfq [ 36.342221][ T370] RSP: 0018:ffff8881100ef370 EFLAGS: 00010216 [ 36.342422][ T370] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881058a9568 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [ 36.342664][ T370] RDX: 1ffff11021064dc3 RSI: ffff888108326e00 RDI: dffffc0000000000 [ 36.342905][ T370] RBP: ffff8881058a8280 R08: dead000000000122 R09: 1bd5a00000000024 [ 36.343140][ T370] R10: fffffbfff2940329 R11: fffffbfff2940329 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 36.343383][ T370] R13: dead000000000100 R14: ffff8881058a9580 R15: ffff8881058a9578 [ 36.343631][ T370] FS: 00007fc04b0ca780(0000) GS:ffff888184fef000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 36.343911][ T370] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 36.344116][ T370] CR2: 0000557c02c02000 CR3: 000000010e0ba000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 36.344359][ T370] PKRU: 55555554 [ 36.344481][ T370] Call Trace: ... [ 36.345054][ T370] qfq_reset_qdisc (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:357 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1487) sch_qfq [ 36.345222][ T370] qdisc_reset (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1057) [ 36.345503][ T370] __qdisc_destroy (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1096) [ 36.345677][ T370] qdisc_graft (net/sched/sch_api.c:1062 net/sched/sch_api.c:1053 net/sched/sch_api.c:1159) [ 36.346335][ T370] tc_get_qdisc (net/sched/sch_api.c:1528 net/sched/sch_api.c:1556)
Fix this by only calling qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog in peek after the qlen is restored.
--- net/sched/sch_codel.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_codel.c +43 -5
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static void drop_func(struct sk_buff *skb, void *ctx)qdisc_qstats_drop (sch); } -static struct sk_buff *codel_qdisc_dequeue (struct Qdisc *sch) +static struct sk_buff *__codel_qdisc_dequeue (struct Qdisc *sch) {struct codel_sched_data *q =qdisc_priv (sch);struct sk_buff *skb;
@@ -95,13 +95,51 @@ static struct sk_buff *codel_qdisc_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) &q->stats, qdisc_pkt_len, codel_get_enqueue_time, drop_func, dequeue_func); +if (skb) +qdisc_bstats_update (sch, skb); +return skb; +} + +static void codel_dequeue_drop (struct Qdisc *sch) +{ +struct codel_sched_data *q =qdisc_priv (sch); +if (q->stats.drop_count) { -qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog (sch, q->stats.drop_count, q->stats.drop_len); +qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog (sch, q->stats.drop_count, + q->stats.drop_len); q->stats.drop_count =0 ; q->stats.drop_len =0 ; } -if (skb) -qdisc_bstats_update (sch, skb); +} + +static struct sk_buff *codel_qdisc_dequeue (struct Qdisc *sch) +{ +struct sk_buff *skb; + + skb =__codel_qdisc_dequeue (sch); + +codel_dequeue_drop (sch); + +return skb; +} + +static struct sk_buff *codel_peek (struct Qdisc *sch) +{ +struct sk_buff *skb =skb_peek (&sch->gso_skb); + +if (!skb) { + skb =__codel_qdisc_dequeue (sch); + +if (skb) { +__skb_queue_head (&sch->gso_skb, skb); +/* it's still part of the queue */ +qdisc_qstats_backlog_inc (sch, skb); + sch->q.qlen++; + } + +codel_dequeue_drop (sch); + } +return skb; }
@@ -279,7 +317,7 @@ static struct Qdisc_ops codel_qdisc_ops __read_mostly = { .enqueue = codel_qdisc_enqueue, .dequeue = codel_qdisc_dequeue, - .peek = qdisc_peek_dequeued, + .peek = codel_peek, .init = codel_init, .reset = codel_reset, .change = codel_change,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 355/843 net: mana: initialize gdma queue id to INVALID_QUEUE_ID
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aditya Garg <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5985474e1cb4034680fac2145497a94b0860be50 ]
mana_gd_create_mana_wq_cq() leaves queue->id as 0 (from kzalloc_obj()) until mana_create_wq_obj() assigns the firmware-returned id. If creation fails before that, cleanup calls mana_gd_destroy_cq() with id 0, NULLing gc->cq_table[0] and silently breaking whichever real CQ owns that slot.
Initialize queue->id to INVALID_QUEUE_ID right after allocation, matching mana_gd_create_eq(). The existing (id >= max_num_cqs) guard then short-circuits cleanly.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/gdma_main.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/gdma_main.c +2 -0
@@ -776,6 +776,8 @@ int mana_gd_create_mana_wq_cq(struct gdma_dev *gd,if (!queue)return -ENOMEM ; + queue->id =INVALID_QUEUE_ID ; + gmi = &queue->mem_info; err =mana_gd_alloc_memory (gc, spec->queue_size, gmi);if (err)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 356/843 net: mana: guard TX wq object destroy with INVALID_MANA_HANDLE check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aditya Garg <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f8fd56977eeea3d6939b1a9cd8bd36f1779b3ad0 ]
mana_create_txq() has several error paths (after mana_alloc_queues() or mana_create_wq_obj() failure) where tx_qp[i].tx_object stays as the INVALID_MANA_HANDLE sentinel set at allocation. mana_destroy_txq() then unconditionally calls mana_destroy_wq_obj() with (u64)-1, which firmware rejects and logs an error.
Mirror the RX-side pattern in mana_destroy_rxq() and skip the destroy when the handle is still INVALID_MANA_HANDLE.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c +2 -1
@@ -1173,7 +1173,8 @@ static void mana_destroy_txq(struct mana_port_context *apc)netif_napi_del (napi); apc->tx_qp[i].txq.napi_initialized = false; } -mana_destroy_wq_obj (apc,GDMA_SQ , apc->tx_qp[i].tx_object); +if (apc->tx_qp[i].tx_object !=INVALID_MANA_HANDLE ) +mana_destroy_wq_obj (apc,GDMA_SQ , apc->tx_qp[i].tx_object);mana_deinit_cq (apc, &apc->tx_qp[i].tx_cq);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 357/843 bpf: Run generic devmap egress prog on private skb
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sun Jian <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6001896f00984d317fb75160ba05c4a885fbe2a0 ]
Generic XDP devmap multi redirect uses skb_clone() for intermediate destinations and sends the last destination with the original skb. This can leave multiple destinations sharing the same packet data.
This becomes visible after generic devmap egress-program support was
added: a devmap egress program may mutate packet data, and another destination sharing the same data can observe that mutation.
Native XDP broadcast redirect does not have this issue because xdpf_clone() copies the frame data for each destination. Generic XDP should provide the same per-destination isolation before running a devmap egress program.
Fix this by making cloned skbs private before running the generic devmap egress program. Use skb_copy() instead of skb_unshare() so allocation failure does not consume the skb and the existing caller error paths keep their ownership semantics.
--- kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/devmap.c +12 -0
@@ -676,6 +676,18 @@ int dev_map_generic_redirect(struct bpf_dtab_netdev *dst, struct sk_buff *skb,if (unlikely (err))return err; +if (dst->xdp_prog &&skb_cloned (skb)) { +struct sk_buff *nskb; + + nskb =skb_copy (skb,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!nskb) +return -ENOMEM ; + + nskb->mac_len = skb->mac_len; +consume_skb (skb); + skb = nskb; + } +/* Redirect has already succeeded semantically at this point, so we just * return 0 even if packet is dropped. Helper below takes care of * freeing skb.
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 358/843 kcm: use WRITE_ONCE() when changing lower socket callbacks
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Runyu Xiao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 47186409c092cd7dd70350999186c700233e854d ]
kcm_attach() replaces a live lower TCP socket's sk_data_ready and sk_write_space callbacks with KCM handlers, and kcm_unattach() restores them later. Those callback-pointer updates are still plain stores even though the same fields can be read and invoked concurrently on other CPUs.
If another CPU observes an older callback snapshot after the live field has already been restored, callback execution can run with a mismatched target and sk_user_data state, leading to stale or misdirected wakeups.
Use WRITE_ONCE() for the callback replacement and restore operations so these shared callback fields follow the same visibility contract already established by the earlier 4022 fixes.
--- net/kcm/kcmsock.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/kcm/kcmsock.c +4 -4
@@ -1404,8 +1404,8 @@ static int kcm_attach(struct socket *sock, struct socket *csock, psock->save_write_space = csk->sk_write_space; psock->save_state_change = csk->sk_state_change; csk->sk_user_data = psock; - csk->sk_data_ready = psock_data_ready; - csk->sk_write_space = psock_write_space; +WRITE_ONCE (csk->sk_data_ready, psock_data_ready); +WRITE_ONCE (csk->sk_write_space, psock_write_space); csk->sk_state_change = psock_state_change;write_unlock_bh (&csk->sk_callback_lock);
@@ -1481,8 +1481,8 @@ static void kcm_unattach(struct kcm_psock *psock)*/ write_lock_bh (&csk->sk_callback_lock); csk->sk_user_data =NULL ; - csk->sk_data_ready = psock->save_data_ready; - csk->sk_write_space = psock->save_write_space; +WRITE_ONCE (csk->sk_data_ready, psock->save_data_ready); +WRITE_ONCE (csk->sk_write_space, psock->save_write_space); csk->sk_state_change = psock->save_state_change;strp_stop (&psock->strp);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 359/843 netfilter: nf_conncount: callers must hold rcu read lock
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 64d7d5abe2160bba369b4a8f06bdf5630573bab0 ]
rcu_derefence_raw() should not have been used here, it concealed this bug. Its used because struct rb_node lacks __rcu annotated pointers, so plain rcu_derefence causes sparse warnings.
The major tradeoff is that rcu_derefence_raw() doesn't warn when the caller isn't in a rcu read section.
Extend the rcu read lock scope accordingly and cause sparse warnings, those warnings are the lesser evil.
--- net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c | 6 +++--- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c +3 -3
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ count_tree(struct net *net, hash =jhash2 (key, data->keylen, conncount_rnd) %CONNCOUNT_SLOTS ; root = &data->root[hash]; - parent =rcu_dereference_raw (root->rb_node); + parent =rcu_dereference (root->rb_node);while (parent) {int diff;
@@ -507,9 +507,9 @@ count_tree(struct net *net, diff =key_diff (key, rbconn->key, data->keylen);if (diff <0 ) { - parent =rcu_dereference_raw (parent->rb_left); + parent =rcu_dereference (parent->rb_left); }else if (diff >0 ) { - parent =rcu_dereference_raw (parent->rb_right); + parent =rcu_dereference (parent->rb_right); }else {int ret;
net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +1 -1
@@ -2088,10 +2088,10 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit(struct net *net, }else {rcu_read_lock (); limit =ct_limit_get (info, zone); -rcu_read_unlock (); err =__ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit ( net, info->data, zone, limit, reply); +rcu_read_unlock ();if (err)return err; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 360/843 smb/client: always return a value for FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Huiwen He <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7acbaa16b99edaf8ef432229d4b7a6f3b666767d ]
Currently, repeated lsattr calls on a regular CIFS file without the compressed attribute may show random flags:
$ touch test.bin $ lsattr test.bin s-S-ia-A-EjI---------m test.bin $ lsattr test.bin ------d-cEjI---------m test.bin
The lsattr reproducer depends on the previous contents of its userspace buffer, so it may not reproduce on every setup. A deterministic reproducer is to initialize the ioctl argument before FS_IOC_GETFLAGS on a file without the compressed attribute:
int flags = 0x7fffffff;
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_GETFLAGS, &flags);On an affected kernel, flags remains 0x7fffffff. With the fix, it is set to 0.
This happens because when the cached inode does not have the compressed bit set, the CIFS fallback path in FS_IOC_GETFLAGS returns success without calling put_user() to write the zero flags value into the user buffer. As a result, the caller observes stale contents from its own buffer.
Fix this by always writing the visible flags value back to the user buffer before returning success, even when the value is zero.
--- fs/cifs/ioctl.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/ioctl.c +5 -7
@@ -347,13 +347,11 @@ long cifs_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int command, unsigned long arg) break; }#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX */ - rc =0 ; -if (CIFS_I (inode)->cifsAttrs &ATTR_COMPRESSED ) { -/* add in the compressed bit */ - ExtAttrBits =FS_COMPR_FL ; - rc =put_user (ExtAttrBits &FS_FL_USER_VISIBLE , - (int __user *)arg); - } +if (CIFS_I (inode)->cifsAttrs &FILE_ATTRIBUTE_COMPRESSED ) + ExtAttrBits |=FS_COMPR_FL ; + + rc =put_user (ExtAttrBits &FS_FL_USER_VISIBLE , + (int __user *)arg);break ;case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS :if (pSMBFile ==NULL )
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 361/843 bpf, sockmap: reject overflowing copy + len in bpf_msg_push_data()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weiming Shi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0c0a8ed85349dae298712d79cb276acfeb794d82 ]
When the scatterlist ring is full or nearly full, bpf_msg_push_data() enters a copy fallback path and computes copy + len for the page allocation size. Since len comes from BPF with arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING and both are u32, a crafted len can wrap the sum to a small value, causing an undersized allocation followed by an out-of-bounds memcpy.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed104089a402 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI Call Trace: __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105) bpf_msg_push_data (net/core/filter.c:2852 net/core/filter.c:2788) bpf_prog_9ed8b5711920a7d7+0x2e/0x36 sk_psock_msg_verdict (net/core/skmsg.c:934) tcp_bpf_sendmsg (net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:421 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:584) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2206) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
Add an overflow check before the allocation.
--- net/core/filter.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/core/filter.c +3 -0
@@ -2802,6 +2802,9 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start,if (!space || (space ==1 && start != offset)) copy = msg->sg.data[i].length; +if (unlikely (copy + len < copy)) +return -EINVAL ; + page =alloc_pages (__GFP_NOWARN |GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_COMP,get_order (copy + len));if (unlikely (!page))
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 362/843 bpf, sockmap: fix integer overflow in bpf_msg_pop_data() bounds check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sechang Lim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a48802fb2cd2d1e23651989f8ff4d15e9d5dad54 ]
start and len are u32, so
u64 last = start + len;
evaluates start + len in 32-bit and wraps before storing it in last. The bounds check
if (start >= offset + l || last > msg->sg.size) return -EINVAL;
can then be passed with an out-of-range start/len, after which the pop loop runs off the end of the scatterlist and sk_msg_shift_left() calls put_page() on the empty msg->sg.end slot:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] RIP: 0010:sk_msg_shift_left net/core/filter.c:2957 [inline] RIP: 0010:____bpf_msg_pop_data net/core/filter.c:3103 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_msg_pop_data+0x753/0x1a10 net/core/filter.c:2984 Call Trace: <TASK> bpf_prog_4cc92c278f4d5d56+0x1b1/0x1e8 bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu+0x107/0x320 include/linux/filter.h:746 sk_psock_msg_verdict+0x357/0x7f0 net/core/skmsg.c:934 tcp_bpf_send_verdict net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:420 [inline] tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x766/0x1ae0 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:583 __sock_sendmsg+0x153/0x1c0 net/socket.c:802 __sys_sendto+0x326/0x430 net/socket.c:2265 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100 net/socket.c:2268 do_syscall_64+0x14c/0x480 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK>
Widen the addition with a (u64) cast so the bound is evaluated in 64-bit and a len near U32_MAX no longer wraps below msg->sg.size.
While here, change pop from int to u32. It counts bytes against the unsigned scatterlist lengths and can never be negative, so the signed type only invites sign-confusion in the pop loop.
--- net/core/filter.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/core/filter.c +2 -2
@@ -2968,8 +2968,8 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pop_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, u32, len, u64, flags) {u32 i =0 , l =0 , space, offset =0 ; -u64 last = start + len; -int pop; +u64 last = (u64 )start + len; +u32 pop;if (unlikely (flags))return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 363/843 MIPS: mm: Fix out-of-bounds write in maar_res_walk()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yadan Fan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1b001b16bc88f3f7817e228acfd91ee01bdcfcce ]
maar_res_walk() uses wi->num_cfg as the index into the fixed-size wi->cfg array, but checks whether the array is full only after it has filled the selected entry. If walk_system_ram_range() reports more than 16 memory ranges, the overflow call writes one struct maar_config past the end of the array before WARN_ON() prevents num_cfg from advancing.
Move the full-array check before taking the array slot and return non-zero when the scratch array is full, so walk_system_ram_range() terminates the walk instead of invoking the callback for further ranges.
--- arch/mips/mm/init.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/mips/mm/init.c +8 -4
@@ -276,9 +276,15 @@ static int maar_res_walk(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages, void *data) {struct maar_walk_info *wi = data; -struct maar_config *cfg = &wi->cfg[wi->num_cfg]; +struct maar_config *cfg;unsigned int maar_align; +/* Ensure we don't overflow the cfg array */ +if (WARN_ON (wi->num_cfg >=ARRAY_SIZE (wi->cfg))) +return -1 ; + + cfg = &wi->cfg[wi->num_cfg]; +/* MAAR registers hold physical addresses right shifted by 4 bits */ maar_align =BIT (MIPS_MAAR_ADDR_SHIFT +4 );
@@ -287,9 +293,7 @@ static int maar_res_walk(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages, cfg->upper =ALIGN_DOWN (PFN_PHYS (start_pfn + nr_pages), maar_align) -1 ; cfg->attrs =MIPS_MAAR_S ; -/* Ensure we don't overflow the cfg array */ -if (!WARN_ON (wi->num_cfg >=ARRAY_SIZE (wi->cfg))) - wi->num_cfg++; + wi->num_cfg++;return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 364/843 powerpc/perf: fix preempt count underflow in fsl_emb_pmu_del
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aboorva Devarajan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 81e3a86030462824a67d697739cf3f387f4ba350 ]
fsl_emb_pmu_del() unconditionally calls put_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events) at the 'out:' label, but only calls the matching get_cpu_var() after the 'i < 0' early-return check. When event->hw.idx is negative the function jumps to 'out:' without having taken get_cpu_var(), and the trailing put_cpu_var() then issues an unmatched preempt_enable(), underflowing preempt_count.
On a CONFIG_PREEMPT=y kernel preempt_count would underflow and eventually present as a 'scheduling while atomic' BUG.
Move put_cpu_var() to pair with get_cpu_var() so the percpu access is correctly bracketed and the 'out:' label only handles perf_pmu_enable.
--- arch/powerpc/perf/core-fsl-emb.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/perf/core-fsl-emb.c +2 -1
@@ -366,9 +366,10 @@ static void fsl_emb_pmu_del(struct perf_event *event, int flags) cpuhw->n_events--; +put_cpu_var (cpu_hw_events); + out:perf_pmu_enable (event->pmu); -put_cpu_var (cpu_hw_events); }static void fsl_emb_pmu_start (struct perf_event *event,int ef_flags)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 365/843 powerpc/powernv: fix preempt count leak in pnv_kexec_wait_secondaries_down
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aboorva Devarajan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0ecd26e93e698c8327521910fc6296f5b84a4b92 ]
pnv_kexec_wait_secondaries_down() calls get_cpu() to obtain the current CPU id but never calls the matching put_cpu(), leaking one preempt_disable() nesting level on every invocation.
In practice the imbalance does not trigger a visible splat because the kexec teardown path is a one-way trip: IRQs are already disabled, no schedule() occurs after the leak, and default_machine_kexec() overwrites preempt_count with HARDIRQ_OFFSET before jumping into kexec_sequence() which never returns. However the bookkeeping is still wrong.
The function only needs the current CPU id, and this path runs with interrupts disabled and the CPU pinned, so the preempt_disable() side-effect of get_cpu() is unnecessary. Replace it with raw_smp_processor_id().
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c +2 -1
@@ -359,7 +359,8 @@ static void pnv_kexec_wait_secondaries_down(void) {int my_cpu, i, notified =-1 ; - my_cpu =get_cpu (); +/* Called with interrupts disabled, so the CPU is pinned. */ + my_cpu =raw_smp_processor_id ();for_each_online_cpu (i) {uint8_t status;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 366/843 powerpc/kexec: fix double get_cpu() imbalance in kexec_prepare_cpus
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aboorva Devarajan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5c86f1c1f972761a04bf22f4c0618d1aa714185b ]
kexec_prepare_cpus_wait() calls get_cpu() internally to obtain the current CPU id. kexec_prepare_cpus() calls kexec_prepare_cpus_wait() twice -- once for KEXEC_STATE_IRQS_OFF and once for KEXEC_STATE_REAL_MODE -- but only issues a single put_cpu() at the end, leaving preempt_count elevated by one extra nesting level.
In practice the imbalance does not trigger a 'scheduling while atomic' splat because the kexec path is a one-way trip: IRQs are already disabled, no schedule() occurs after the leak, and default_machine_kexec() overwrites preempt_count with HARDIRQ_OFFSET before jumping into kexec_sequence() which never returns. However the bookkeeping is still wrong.
kexec_prepare_cpus() calls local_irq_disable()/hard_irq_disable() before invoking kexec_prepare_cpus_wait(), so the CPU is already pinned and the get_cpu()/put_cpu() preempt_disable() bracketing is unnecessary. Only the current CPU id is needed, so replace get_cpu() with raw_smp_processor_id() and drop the now-unneeded put_cpu().
--- arch/powerpc/kexec/core_64.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kexec/core_64.c +1 -3
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static void kexec_prepare_cpus_wait(int wait_state)int my_cpu, i, notified=-1 ;hw_breakpoint_disable (); - my_cpu =get_cpu (); + my_cpu =raw_smp_processor_id ();/* Make sure each CPU has at least made it to the state we need. * * FIXME: There is a (slim) chance of a problem if not all of the CPUs
@@ -246,8 +246,6 @@ static void kexec_prepare_cpus(void)/* after we tell the others to go down */ if (ppc_md.kexec_cpu_down) ppc_md.kexec_cpu_down(0, 0); - - put_cpu(); }#else /* ! SMP */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 367/843 KEYS: Use acquire when reading state in keyring search
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gui-Dong Han <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c1201b37f666f6466ab1fd3a381c2b7a4b7e9fee ]
The negative-key race fix added release/acquire ordering for key use.
Publish payload before state; read state before payload.
keyring_search_iterator() still uses READ_ONCE() before match callbacks. An asymmetric match callback calls asymmetric_key_ids(), which reads key->payload.data[asym_key_ids].
Use key_read_state() there to complete that ordering.
--- security/keys/keyring.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/keys/keyring.c +1 -1
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data;const struct key *key =keyring_ptr_to_key (object);unsigned long kflags =READ_ONCE (key->flags); -short state =READ_ONCE (key->state); +short state =key_read_state (key);kenter ("{%d}" , key->serial);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 368/843 tipc: fix UAF in tipc_l2_send_msg()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f4c3d89fc986b0da196ddfc6cfe0ea5d5d08bec6 ]
Syzbot reported a slab-use-after-free in ipvlan_hard_header() when called from tipc_l2_send_msg().
The root cause is that tipc_disable_l2_media() calls synchronize_net() while b->media_ptr is still valid. This allows concurrent RCU readers to obtain the device pointer after synchronize_net() has finished. The pointer is cleared later in bearer_disable(), but without any subsequent synchronization, allowing the device to be freed while still in use by readers.
Fix this by clearing b->media_ptr in tipc_disable_l2_media() before calling synchronize_net().
This is safe to do now because the call order in bearer_disable() was reversed in 0d051bf93c06 ("tipc: make bearer packet filtering generic") to call tipc_node_delete_links() (which needs the pointer) before disable_media().
https: //lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/T/#u
--- net/tipc/bearer.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/tipc/bearer.c +1 -0
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ void tipc_disable_l2_media(struct tipc_bearer *b) dev = (struct net_device *)rtnl_dereference (b->media_ptr);dev_remove_pack (&b->pt);RCU_INIT_POINTER (dev->tipc_ptr,NULL ); +RCU_INIT_POINTER (b->media_ptr,NULL );synchronize_net ();dev_put (dev); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 369/843 tcp: ipv6: clamp default adverting MSS to avoid GSO_BY_FRAGS (0xFFFF)
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2bf43d0e2e6a27d52a7d624e2d6b9116972e8a22 ]
When MTU is large, ip6_default_advmss() can return IPV6_MAXPLEN (65535). This is interpreted by TCP as mss_clamp, allowing the MSS to reach 65535.
However, 0xFFFF is also used as a magic value GSO_BY_FRAGS in the kernel. If a TCP packet with gso_size=0xFFFF is passed to skb_segment(), it will be mistakenly treated as GSO_BY_FRAGS, leading to a NULL pointer dereference because local TCP packets do not use frag_list.
Fix this by returning min(IPV6_MAXPLEN, GSO_BY_FRAGS - 1) (65534) from ip6_default_advmss() when MTU is large.
Also update the stale comment in ip6_default_advmss() which suggested that IPV6_MAXPLEN is returned to mean "any MSS".
--- net/ipv6/route.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/route.c +3 -3
@@ -3200,11 +3200,11 @@ static unsigned int ip6_default_advmss(const struct dst_entry *dst)/* * Maximal non-jumbo IPv6 payload is IPV6_MAXPLEN and * corresponding MSS is IPV6_MAXPLEN - tcp_header_size. -* IPV6_MAXPLEN is also valid and means: "any MSS, -* rely only on pmtu discovery" +* Limit the default MSS to GSO_BY_FRAGS - 1 to avoid +* collision with the GSO_BY_FRAGS magic value (0xFFFF). */ if (mtu >IPV6_MAXPLEN -sizeof (struct tcphdr )) - mtu =IPV6_MAXPLEN ; + mtu = min_t(unsigned int, IPV6_MAXPLEN, GSO_BY_FRAGS - 1);return mtu; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 370/843 ksmbd: fix use-after-free in same_client_has_lease()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 65b655f65c3ca1ab5d598d3832bb0ff531725858 ]
same_client_has_lease() returns an opinfo pointer from ci->m_op_list after dropping ci->m_lock without taking a reference.
smb_grant_oplock() then dereferences that pointer in copy_lease() and when checking breaking_cnt. A concurrent close can remove the old lease from ci->m_op_list and drop the last reference before the caller uses the returned pointer, leading to a use-after-free.
Take a reference when same_client_has_lease() selects an existing lease, drop any previous match while scanning, and release the returned reference in smb_grant_oplock() after copying the lease state.
--- fs/ksmbd/oplock.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/ksmbd/oplock.c +6 -0
@@ -534,7 +534,12 @@ static struct oplock_info *same_client_has_lease(struct ksmbd_inode *ci, ret =compare_guid_key (opinfo, client_guid, lctx->lease_key);if (ret) { +if (!atomic_inc_not_zero (&opinfo->refcount)) +continue ; +if (m_opinfo) +opinfo_put (m_opinfo); m_opinfo = opinfo; +/* skip upgrading lease about breaking lease */ if (atomic_read (&opinfo->breaking_cnt)) {read_lock (&ci->m_lock);
@@ -1237,6 +1242,7 @@ int smb_grant_oplock(struct ksmbd_work *work, int req_op_level, u64 pid,if (atomic_read (&m_opinfo->breaking_cnt)) opinfo->o_lease->flags =SMB2_LEASE_FLAG_BREAK_IN_PROGRESS_LE ; +opinfo_put (m_opinfo); goto out; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 371/843 ocfs2: fix circular locking dependency in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aleksandr Nogikh <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ff6f26c58421614b02694ac9d219ac61d924bc68 ]
A circular locking dependency involves INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE, EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE, and ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE.
1. ocfs2_mknod() acquires INODE_ALLOC then EXTENT_ALLOC.
2. ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() acquires EXTENT_ALLOC for unwritten extents, then ORPHAN_DIR via ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan() while still holding EXTENT_ALLOC.
3. ocfs2_wipe_inode() acquires ORPHAN_DIR then INODE_ALLOC via ocfs2_remove_inode.
Break the cycle in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() by freeing the allocation contexts (releasing EXTENT_ALLOC) before acquiring ORPHAN_DIR.
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
------------------------------------------------------
is trying to acquire lock:ffff8881e78b33a0 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:ocfs2_evict_inode+0x1539/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299
but task is already holding lock:ffff8881e78b4fa0 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:ocfs2_evict_inode+0xe97/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}:
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline]
ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan+0x12e/0x7a0 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:2728
ocfs2_dio_end_io+0xf9c/0x1370 fs/ocfs2/aops.c:2418
dio_complete+0x25b/0x790 fs/direct-io.c:281-> #1 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}:
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline]
ocfs2_reserve_suballoc_bits+0x16d/0x4840 fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:882
ocfs2_reserve_new_metadata_blocks+0x415/0x9a0
fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1078
ocfs2_mknod+0x10f3/0x2260 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:351-> #0 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__lock_acquire+0x15a5/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
down_write+0x96/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline]
ocfs2_remove_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:733 [inline]
ocfs2_wipe_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:896 [inline]
ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1157 [inline]
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x1539/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299
Chain exists of:
&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE] -->
&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE] -->
&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]
Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]);
lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]);
lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]); lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]);
*** DEADLOCK ***
--- fs/ocfs2/aops.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/aops.c +9 -4
@@ -2400,6 +2400,15 @@ static int ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(struct inode *inode, unlock:up_write (&oi->ip_alloc_sem); +if (data_ac) { +ocfs2_free_alloc_context (data_ac); + data_ac =NULL ; + } +if (meta_ac) { +ocfs2_free_alloc_context (meta_ac); + meta_ac =NULL ; + } +/* everything looks good, let's start the cleanup */ if (!ret && dwc->dw_orphaned) {BUG_ON (dwc->dw_writer_pid !=task_pid_nr (current));
@@ -2411,10 +2420,6 @@ static int ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(struct inode *inode,ocfs2_inode_unlock (inode,1 );brelse (di_bh); out: -if (data_ac) -ocfs2_free_alloc_context (data_ac); -if (meta_ac) -ocfs2_free_alloc_context (meta_ac);ocfs2_run_deallocs (osb, &dealloc);ocfs2_dio_free_write_ctx (inode, dwc);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 372/843 net/9p: fix race condition on rdma->state in trans_rdma.c
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yizhou Zhao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7d54894a1ee265a72d70f7cae1da6cc774cccc71 ]
The rdma->state field is modified without holding req_lock in both recv_done() and p9_cm_event_handler(), while rdma_request() accesses the same field under the req_lock spinlock. This inconsistent locking creates a race condition:
- recv_done() running in softirq completion context sets rdma->state = P9_RDMA_FLUSHING without acquiring req_lock
- p9_cm_event_handler() modifies rdma->state at multiple points (ADDR_RESOLVED, ROUTE_RESOLVED, ESTABLISHED, CLOSED) without req_lock
- rdma_request() uses spin_lock_irqsave(&rdma->req_lock, flags) to protect the read-modify-write of rdma->state
The race can cause lost state transitions: recv_done() or the CM event handler could set state to FLUSHING/CLOSED while rdma_request() is concurrently checking or modifying state under the lock, leading to the FLUSHING transition being silently overwritten by CLOSING. This corrupts the connection state machine and can cause use-after-free on RDMA request objects during teardown.
Fix by adding req_lock protection to all rdma->state modifications in recv_done() and p9_cm_event_handler(), matching the pattern already used in rdma_request(). Use spin_lock_irqsave/spin_unlock_irqrestore in the CM event handler since it can race with recv_done() which runs in softirq context.
Tested with a kernel module that races two threads (simulating rdma_request and recv_done/CM handler) on rdma->state with proper
locking: 5.5M+ FLUSHING writes over 27M iterations with 0 lost transitions.
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
--- net/9p/trans_rdma.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/9p/trans_rdma.c +17 -2
@@ -243,25 +243,36 @@ p9_cm_event_handler(struct rdma_cm_id *id, struct rdma_cm_event *event) {struct p9_client *c = id->context;struct p9_trans_rdma *rdma = c->trans; +unsigned long flags; +switch (event->event) {case RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_RESOLVED : +spin_lock_irqsave (&rdma->req_lock, flags);BUG_ON (rdma->state !=P9_RDMA_INIT ); rdma->state =P9_RDMA_ADDR_RESOLVED ; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&rdma->req_lock, flags);break ;case RDMA_CM_EVENT_ROUTE_RESOLVED : +spin_lock_irqsave (&rdma->req_lock, flags);BUG_ON (rdma->state !=P9_RDMA_ADDR_RESOLVED ); rdma->state =P9_RDMA_ROUTE_RESOLVED ; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&rdma->req_lock, flags);break ;case RDMA_CM_EVENT_ESTABLISHED : +spin_lock_irqsave (&rdma->req_lock, flags);BUG_ON (rdma->state !=P9_RDMA_ROUTE_RESOLVED ); rdma->state =P9_RDMA_CONNECTED ; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&rdma->req_lock, flags);break ;case RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED : -if (rdma) +if (rdma) { +spin_lock_irqsave (&rdma->req_lock, flags); rdma->state =P9_RDMA_CLOSED ; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&rdma->req_lock, flags); + } c->status = Disconnected;break ;
@@ -299,6 +310,7 @@ recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)struct p9_req_t *req;int err =0 ;int16_t tag; +unsigned long flags; req =NULL ; ib_dma_unmap_single(rdma->cm_id->device, c->busa, client->msize,
@@ -335,7 +347,10 @@ recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) err_out:p9_debug (P9_DEBUG_ERROR ,"req %p err %d status %d\n" , req, err, wc->status); - rdma->state =P9_RDMA_FLUSHING ; +spin_lock_irqsave (&rdma->req_lock, flags); +if (rdma->state <P9_RDMA_FLUSHING ) + rdma->state =P9_RDMA_FLUSHING ; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&rdma->req_lock, flags); client->status = Disconnected; goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 373/843 staging: nvec: fix use-after-free in nvec_rx_completed()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexandru Hossu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 26813881181deb3a32fbb59eadb2599cbe8423f6 ]
In nvec_rx_completed(), when an incomplete RX transfer is detected, nvec_msg_free() is called to return the message back to the pool by clearing its 'used' atomic flag. Immediately after this, the code accesses nvec->rx->data[0] to check the message type.
Since nvec_msg_free() marks the pool slot as available via atomic_set(), any concurrent or subsequent call to nvec_msg_alloc() could claim that same slot and overwrite its data[] array. Reading nvec->rx->data[0] after freeing the message is therefore a use-after-free.
Fix this by saving the message type byte before calling nvec_msg_free(), then using the saved value for the battery quirk check.
--- drivers/staging/nvec/nvec.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/staging/nvec/nvec.c +3 -1
@@ -489,6 +489,8 @@ static void nvec_tx_completed(struct nvec_chip *nvec)static void nvec_rx_completed (struct nvec_chip *nvec) {if (nvec->rx->pos !=nvec_msg_size (nvec->rx)) { +unsigned char msg_type = nvec->rx->data[0 ]; +dev_err (nvec->dev,"RX incomplete: Expected %u bytes, got %u\n" , (uint )nvec_msg_size (nvec->rx), (uint )nvec->rx->pos);
@@ -497,7 +499,7 @@ static void nvec_rx_completed(struct nvec_chip *nvec) nvec->state =0 ;/* Battery quirk - Often incomplete, and likes to crash */ -if (nvec->rx->data[0 ] ==NVEC_BAT ) +if (msg_type ==NVEC_BAT )complete (&nvec->ec_transfer);return ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 374/843 coresight: cti: Fix DT filter signals silently ignored
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yingchao Deng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 551bb2fd5e4ed63d33aa11f07102cce5179b7595 ]
In cti_plat_process_filter_sigs(), after allocating a temporary cti_trig_grp struct via kzalloc_obj(), the code never assigns tg->nr_sigs = nr_filter_sigs. Since kzalloc zero-initialises the struct, tg->nr_sigs remains 0. cti_plat_read_trig_group() guards with:
if (!tgrp->nr_sigs)
return 0;so it returns immediately without reading any signal indices from DT.
Fix by assigning tg->nr_sigs before calling cti_plat_read_trig_group().
--- drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-cti-platform.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-cti-platform.c +1 -0
@@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ static int cti_plat_process_filter_sigs(struct cti_drvdata *drvdata,if (!tg)return -ENOMEM ; + tg->nr_sigs = nr_filter_sigs; err =cti_plat_read_trig_group (tg, fwnode,CTI_DT_FILTER_OUT_SIGS );if (!err) drvdata->config.trig_out_filter |= tg->used_mask;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 375/843 coresight: etm4x: Correct TRCVMIDCCTLR1 save and restore
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Leo Yan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0ec0a8785d21f63db520bd9d2a67c55e855d36a8 ]
It is a typo to use trcvmidcctlr0 to save and restore TRCVMIDCCTLR1. Use trcvmidcctlr1 instead.
--- drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c +2 -2
@@ -1753,7 +1753,7 @@ static int __etm4_cpu_save(struct etmv4_drvdata *drvdata) state->trcvmidcctlr0 =etm4x_read32 (csa,TRCVMIDCCTLR0 );if (drvdata->numvmidc >4 ) - state->trcvmidcctlr0 =etm4x_read32 (csa,TRCVMIDCCTLR1 ); + state->trcvmidcctlr1 =etm4x_read32 (csa,TRCVMIDCCTLR1 ); state->trcclaimset =etm4x_read32 (csa,TRCCLAIMCLR );
@@ -1878,7 +1878,7 @@ static void __etm4_cpu_restore(struct etmv4_drvdata *drvdata)etm4x_relaxed_write32 (csa, state->trcvmidcctlr0,TRCVMIDCCTLR0 );if (drvdata->numvmidc >4 ) -etm4x_relaxed_write32 (csa, state->trcvmidcctlr0,TRCVMIDCCTLR1 ); +etm4x_relaxed_write32 (csa, state->trcvmidcctlr1,TRCVMIDCCTLR1 );etm4x_relaxed_write32 (csa, state->trcclaimset,TRCCLAIMSET );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 376/843 x86/platform/olpc: xo15: Drop wakeup source on driver removal
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cc966553e6ff0849978b5754531b768b0ff54985 ]
Prevent leaking a wakeup source object after removing the driver by adding appropriate cleanup code to its remove callback function.
--- arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo15-sci.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo15-sci.c +1 -0
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ static int xo15_sci_add(struct acpi_device *device)static int xo15_sci_remove (struct acpi_device *device) { +device_init_wakeup (&device->dev, false);acpi_disable_gpe (NULL , xo15_sci_gpe);acpi_remove_gpe_handler (NULL , xo15_sci_gpe, xo15_sci_gpe_handler);cancel_work_sync (&sci_work);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 377/843 platform/x86: xo15-ebook: Fix wakeup source and GPE handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b2fc2c6ebbd2d49935c8960755d8170faead2159 ]
The device_set_wakeup_enable() call in ebook_switch_add() doesn't actually do anything because power.can_wakeup is not set for ACPI device objects. Moreover, had it done anything, it would have registered a wakeup source object that wouldn't have been used going forward and that wakeup source would have been leaked after driver removal because ebook_switch_remove() doesn't clean it up. Accordingly, remove that call from ebook_switch_add().
Also prevent leaking an enabled ACPI GPE after removing the driver by adding appropriate cleanup code to ebook_switch_remove().
--- drivers/platform/x86/xo15-ebook.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/platform/x86/xo15-ebook.c +6 -1
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, ebook_device_ids);struct ebook_switch {struct input_dev *input;char phys[32 ];/* for input device */ +bool gpe_enabled; };static int ebook_send_state (struct acpi_device *device)
@@ -131,7 +132,7 @@ static int ebook_switch_add(struct acpi_device *device)/* Button's GPE is run-wake GPE */ acpi_enable_gpe (device->wakeup.gpe_device, device->wakeup.gpe_number); -device_set_wakeup_enable (&device->dev, true); + button->gpe_enabled = true; }return 0 ;
@@ -147,6 +148,10 @@ static int ebook_switch_remove(struct acpi_device *device) {struct ebook_switch *button =acpi_driver_data (device); +if (button->gpe_enabled) +acpi_disable_gpe (device->wakeup.gpe_device, + device->wakeup.gpe_number); +input_unregister_device (button->input);kfree (button);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 378/843 perf sched: Add missing mmap2 handler in timehist
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 91182741369b261c441e63e6678893032a6d7e4c ]
perf_sched__timehist() registers event handlers for options using the sched->tool struct. It registers handlers for MMAP, COMM, EXIT, FORK, etc. but completely omits registering a handler for MMAP2 events.
Failing to register both MMAP and MMAP2 handlers causes modern systems (which primarily output MMAP2 records) to silently drop VMA map mappings. This results in uninitialized machine/thread mapping structures, making it impossible to resolve shared library instruction pointers (IPs) to dynamic symbols/DSOs during timehist callchain analysis.
Fix this by correctly registering perf_event__process_mmap2 in sched->tool inside perf_sched__timehist().
--- tools/perf/builtin-sched.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +1 -0
@@ -3011,6 +3011,7 @@ static int perf_sched__timehist(struct perf_sched *sched)*/ sched->tool.sample = perf_timehist__process_sample; sched->tool.mmap = perf_event__process_mmap; + sched->tool.mmap2 = perf_event__process_mmap2; sched->tool.comm = perf_event__process_comm; sched->tool.exit = perf_event__process_exit; sched->tool.fork = perf_event__process_fork;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 379/843 phy: phy-can-transceiver: Check driver match and driver data against NULL
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ebee9004cc0200b2b708ebf7ac625d35c71c049f ]
Every platform driver can be forced to match a device that doesn't match its list of device IDs because of device_match_driver_override() so platform drivers that rely on the existence of a device's driver data need to verify its presence.
Accordingly, add requisite match and driver data checks against NULL to the driver where they are missing.
--- drivers/phy/phy-can-transceiver.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/phy/phy-can-transceiver.c +3 -0
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ static int can_transceiver_phy_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)return -ENOMEM ; match =of_match_node (can_transceiver_phy_ids, pdev->dev.of_node); +if (!match || !match->data) +return -ENODEV ; + drvdata = match->data; phy = devm_phy_create(dev, dev->of_node,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 380/843 staging: most: video: avoid double free on video register failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7cb1c5b32a2bfde961fff8d5204526b609bcb30a ]
comp_register_videodev() allocates a video_device with video_device_alloc() and releases it if video_register_device() fails.
This can double free the video_device when __video_register_device() reaches device_register() and that call fails:
video_register_device()
-> __video_register_device()
-> device_register() fails
-> put_device(&vdev->dev)
-> v4l2_device_release()
-> vdev->release(vdev)
-> video_device_release(vdev) comp_register_videodev()
-> video_device_release(mdev->vdev)
Use video_device_release_empty() while registering the device so that registration failure paths do not free mdev->vdev through vdev->release(). comp_register_videodev() then releases mdev->vdev exactly once on failure. Restore video_device_release() after successful registration so the registered device keeps its normal lifetime handling.
This issue was found by a static analysis tool I am developing.
--- drivers/staging/most/video/video.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/staging/most/video/video.c +6 -1
@@ -416,6 +416,7 @@ static int comp_register_videodev(struct most_video_dev *mdev)/* Fill the video capture device struct */ *mdev->vdev = comp_videodev_template; + mdev->vdev->release = video_device_release_empty; mdev->vdev->v4l2_dev = &mdev->v4l2_dev; mdev->vdev->lock = &mdev->lock; snprintf(mdev->vdev->name, sizeof(mdev->vdev->name), "MOST: %s",
@@ -428,9 +429,13 @@ static int comp_register_videodev(struct most_video_dev *mdev)v4l2_err (&mdev->v4l2_dev,"video_register_device failed (%d)\n" , ret);video_device_release (mdev->vdev); +return ret; } -return ret; + mdev->vdev->release = video_device_release; + +return 0 ; + }static void comp_unregister_videodev (struct most_video_dev *mdev)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 381/843 usb: host: max3421: Fix shift-out-of-bounds in max3421_hub_control()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cff06b03b530ae1fe8a13e93a7848f2130e00fb4 ]
The max3421_hub_control() function handles USB hub class requests to the virtual root hub. In the default branches of both the ClearPortFeature and SetPortFeature switch statements, it modifies max3421_hcd->port_status by left shifting 1 by the request's value parameter. However, it does not validate whether this shift will exceed the width of port_status.
So if a malicious userspace task with access to the root hub via /dev/bus/usb/.../001 issues a USBDEVFS_CONTROL ioctl with wValue greater than or equal to 32, the left shift operation invokes shift-out-of-bounds undefined behavior. This results in arbitrary bit corruption of port_status, including the normally-immutable change bits, which can bypass internal state checks and confuse the hub status.
Fix this by rejecting requests whose value exceeds the shift width before performing the shift.
This issue was found using a KLEE-based symbolic execution tool for kernel drivers that I'm currently developing.
--- drivers/usb/host/max3421-hcd.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/host/max3421-hcd.c +4 -0
@@ -1703,6 +1703,8 @@ max3421_hub_control(struct usb_hcd *hcd, u16 type_req, u16 value, u16 index, !pdata->vbus_active_level); fallthrough;default : +if (value >=32 ) + goto error; max3421_hcd->port_status &= ~(1 << value); }break ;
@@ -1756,6 +1758,8 @@ max3421_hub_control(struct usb_hcd *hcd, u16 type_req, u16 value, u16 index,max3421_reset_port (hcd); fallthrough;default : +if (value >=32 ) + goto error;if ((max3421_hcd->port_status &USB_PORT_STAT_POWER ) !=0 ) max3421_hcd->port_status |= (1 << value);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 382/843 usb: host: max3421: Reject hub port requests for non-existent ports
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 11b5c101e2fd206104b05bc92554d356989423a8 ]
The max3421_hub_control() function handles USB hub class requests to the virtual root hub. The GetPortStatus case correctly rejects requests with index != 1, since the virtual root hub has only a single port. However, the ClearPortFeature and SetPortFeature cases lack the same check.
Fix this by extending the index != 1 rejection to both cases, matching the existing behavior of GetPortStatus.
--- drivers/usb/host/max3421-hcd.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/host/max3421-hcd.c +4 -0
@@ -1694,6 +1694,8 @@ max3421_hub_control(struct usb_hcd *hcd, u16 type_req, u16 value, u16 index,case ClearHubFeature:break ;case ClearPortFeature: +if (index !=1 ) + goto error;switch (value) {case USB_PORT_FEAT_SUSPEND :break ;
@@ -1737,6 +1739,8 @@ max3421_hub_control(struct usb_hcd *hcd, u16 type_req, u16 value, u16 index,break ;case SetPortFeature: +if (index !=1 ) + goto error;switch (value) {case USB_PORT_FEAT_LINK_STATE :case USB_PORT_FEAT_U1_TIMEOUT :
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 383/843 char: tlclk: fix use-after-free in tlclk_cleanup()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: James Kim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bbf003b7794d6ad6f939fdd29f1f1bde8ac554c1 ]
This patch improves the module cleanup process in the tlclk driver to prevent potential use-after-free and race conditions.
Currently, the file_operations structure does not specify the .owner field, which could allow the module to be unloaded while user-space processes are still interacting with the device. Additionally, the tlclk_cleanup() function frees the alarm_events memory before ensuring that blocked processes in the waitqueue are fully awakened and that the switchover_timer has completed.
To address these cases, this patch:
- Sets '.owner = THIS_MODULE' in tlclk_fops to safely defer module unloading while the device is in use.
- Updates tlclk_cleanup() to explicitly wake up all blocked readers (wake_up_all), properly release hardware I/O regions, and safely delete the timer (timer_delete_sync) prior to freeing memory.
--- drivers/char/tlclk.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/char/tlclk.c +4 -0
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ static ssize_t tlclk_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, }static const struct file_operations tlclk_fops = { + .owner =THIS_MODULE , .read = tlclk_read, .open = tlclk_open, .release = tlclk_release,
@@ -852,6 +853,9 @@ static void __exit tlclk_cleanup(void)misc_deregister (&tlclk_miscdev);unregister_chrdev (tlclk_major,"telco_clock" ); + got_event =1 ; +wake_up_all (&wq); +release_region (TLCLK_BASE ,8 );del_timer_sync (&switchover_timer);kfree (alarm_events);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 384/843 perf header: Sanity check HEADER_EVENT_DESC attr.size before swap
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 944f65c8b8231d26d4db6be67bcb641142603cb4 ]
read_event_desc() reads nre (event count), sz (attr size), and nr (IDs per event) from the file and uses them to control allocations and loops without validating them against the section size.
A crafted perf.data could trigger large allocations or many loop iterations before __do_read() eventually rejects the reads.
Add bounds checks in read_event_desc():
- Reject sz smaller than PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0.
- Require at least one event (nre > 0).
- Check that nre events fit in the remaining section, using the minimum per-event footprint of sz + sizeof(u32).
- Pre-swap attr->size to native byte order, then reject values below PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0 or above sz before calling perf_event__attr_swap() to prevent heap out-of-bounds access.
- Handle ABI0 (attr.size == 0): substitute PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0, and on native-endian files write the value back so free_event_desc() does not treat the zero as its end-of-array sentinel (it iterates while attr.size != 0). The swap path skips the write-back — perf_event__attr_swap() has its own ABI0 fallback that sets VER0 after swapping.
- Check that nr IDs fit in the remaining section before allocating.
--- tools/perf/util/header.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/header.c +54 -0
@@ -1826,9 +1826,28 @@ static struct evsel *read_event_desc(struct feat_fd *ff)if (do_read_u32 (ff, &nre)) goto error; +/* Size of each of the nre attributes. */ if (do_read_u32 (ff, &sz)) goto error; +/* +* Require at least one event with an attr no smaller than the +* first published struct, and reject sz values where +* sz + sizeof(u32) would overflow size_t (possible on 32-bit) +* or nre == UINT32_MAX where nre + 1 wraps to 0 in the calloc. +* +* The minimum section footprint per event is sz bytes for the +* attr plus a u32 for the id count, check that nre events fit. +*/ +if (!nre || sz <PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0 || + sz > ff->size || (size_t )sz >SIZE_MAX -sizeof (u32) || + nre ==UINT32_MAX || + nre > (ff->size - ff->offset) / (sz +sizeof (u32))) { +pr_err ("Invalid HEADER_EVENT_DESC: nre=%u sz=%u (min %d)\n" , + nre, sz,PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0 ); + goto error; + } +/* buffer to hold on file attr struct */ buf =malloc (sz);if (!buf)
@@ -1844,6 +1863,9 @@ static struct evsel *read_event_desc(struct feat_fd *ff) msz = sz;for (i =0 , evsel = events; i < nre; evsel++, i++) { +struct perf_event_attr *attr = buf; +u32 attr_size; + evsel->core.idx = i;/*
@@ -1853,6 +1875,32 @@ static struct evsel *read_event_desc(struct feat_fd *ff)if (__do_read (ff, buf, sz)) goto error; +/* Reject before attr_swap to prevent OOB via bswap_safe() */ + attr_size = ff->ph->needs_swap ?bswap_32 (attr->size) : attr->size; +/* ABI0: size == 0 means the producer didn't set it */ +if (!attr_size) { + attr_size =PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0 ; +/* +* Write back so free_event_desc() doesn't +* treat this event as the end-of-array sentinel +* (it iterates while attr.size != 0). +* +* Only for native — the swap path must NOT +* write native-endian VER0 here because +* perf_event__attr_swap() would re-swap it +* to 0x40000000, defeating bswap_safe() bounds. +* perf_event__attr_swap() has its own ABI0 +* fallback that sets VER0 after swapping. +*/ +if (!ff->ph->needs_swap) + attr->size = attr_size; + } +if (attr_size <PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0 || attr_size > sz) { +pr_err ("Event %d attr.size (%u) invalid (min: %d, max: %u)\n" , + i, attr_size,PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0 , sz); + goto error; + } +if (ff->ph->needs_swap)perf_event__attr_swap (buf);
@@ -1874,6 +1922,12 @@ static struct evsel *read_event_desc(struct feat_fd *ff)if (!nr)continue ; +/* Prevent oversized allocation from crafted nr */ +if (nr > (ff->size - ff->offset) /sizeof (*id)) { +pr_err ("Event %d: id count %u exceeds remaining section\n" , i, nr); + goto error; + } + id =calloc (nr,sizeof (*id));if (!id) goto error;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 385/843 iio: light: si1133: reset counter to prevent race condition
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joshua Crofts <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0a5f45ed2342aabae1e32c72558d15be28940a95 ]
Sashiko reported a potential race condition happening when the driver returns an errno after a timeout in the si1133_command() function. The premature exit causes the hardware and software counters to become out of sync by not updating data->rsp_seq, therefore the internal hardware counter keeps incrementing.
Fix this by adding a call to si1133_cmd_reset_counter() before returning from timeout.
--- drivers/iio/light/si1133.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/iio/light/si1133.c +5 -0
@@ -427,6 +427,11 @@ static int si1133_command(struct si1133_data *data, u8 cmd)dev_warn (dev,"Failed to read command 0x%02x, ret=%d\n" , cmd, err); +/* +* Reset counter on err to prevent software and hardware +* counters being out of sync. +*/ +si1133_cmd_reset_counter (data); goto out; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 386/843 iio: light: si1133: prevent race condition on timeout
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joshua Crofts <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8c50a95ceb230d17801758a9e41ffbbbe46f8b4d ]
Sashiko reported a bug where the si1133_command exits on timeout without halting the sensor or masking the interrupt. If the sensor completes the command later, any subsequent command to the sensor will cause the IRQ handler to complete immediately, returning stale data to the driver all while the command hasn't finished yet, shifting all potential reads in the future.
Fix this by masking the IRQ if wait_for_completion_timeout() fails. When initiating a new command, do a dummy read of the IRQ_STATUS register and turn the IRQ back on.
--- drivers/iio/light/si1133.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/light/si1133.c +8 -1
@@ -395,8 +395,14 @@ static int si1133_command(struct si1133_data *data, u8 cmd) expected_seq = (data->rsp_seq +1 ) &SI1133_MAX_CMD_CTR ; -if (cmd ==SI1133_CMD_FORCE ) +if (cmd ==SI1133_CMD_FORCE ) { +/* Flush pending IRQs from a previous timeout. */ +regmap_read (data->regmap,SI1133_REG_IRQ_STATUS , &resp); +regmap_write (data->regmap,SI1133_REG_IRQ_ENABLE , +SI1133_IRQ_CHANNEL_ENABLE ); +reinit_completion (&data->completion); + } err =regmap_write (data->regmap,SI1133_REG_COMMAND , cmd);if (err) {
@@ -409,6 +415,7 @@ static int si1133_command(struct si1133_data *data, u8 cmd)/* wait for irq */ if (!wait_for_completion_timeout (&data->completion,msecs_to_jiffies (SI1133_COMPLETION_TIMEOUT_MS ))) { +regmap_write (data->regmap,SI1133_REG_IRQ_ENABLE ,0 ); err = -ETIMEDOUT ; goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 387/843 iio: magnetometer: ak8975: fix potential kernel stack memory leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joshua Crofts <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a9a00d727b7bbc5e913a919530a9dd468935bf95 ]
Currently in the AK8975 driver there are four instances where potential uninitialized kernel stack memory leaks can occur. If i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data_or_emulated() returns a value less than the size of the buffer, uninitialized bytes are retained in the buffer and later the buffer is passed on to IIO buffers, potentially leaking memory to userspace.
Fix this by adding checks whether the return value of the function is equal to the size of the buffer and subsequently if the value is lesser than zero to distinguish from a returned error code.
--- drivers/iio/magnetometer/ak8975.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
drivers/iio/magnetometer/ak8975.c +14 -0
@@ -437,6 +437,10 @@ static int ak8975_who_i_am(struct i2c_client *client,dev_err (&client->dev,"Error reading WIA\n" );return ret; } +if (ret !=sizeof (wia_val)) { +dev_err (&client->dev,"Error reading WIA\n" ); +return -EIO ; + }if (wia_val[0 ] !=AK8975_DEVICE_ID )return -ENODEV ;
@@ -549,6 +553,10 @@ static int ak8975_setup(struct i2c_client *client)dev_err (&client->dev,"Not able to read asa data\n" );return ret; } +if (ret !=sizeof (data->asa)) { +dev_err (&client->dev,"Error reading asa data\n" ); +return -EIO ; + }/* After reading fuse ROM data set power-down mode */ ret =ak8975_set_mode (data,POWER_DOWN );
@@ -688,6 +696,10 @@ static int ak8975_read_axis(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, int index, int *val) sizeof(rval), (u8*)&rval);if (ret <0 ) goto exit; +if (ret !=sizeof (rval)) { + ret = -EIO ; + goto exit; + }/* Read out ST2 for release lock on measurment data. */ ret =i2c_smbus_read_byte_data (client, data->def->ctrl_regs[ST2 ]);
@@ -817,6 +829,8 @@ static void ak8975_fill_buffer(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) (u8 *)fval);if (ret <0 ) goto unlock; +if (ret !=sizeof (fval)) + goto unlock;mutex_unlock (&data->lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 388/843 iio: accel: mma8452: handle I2C read error(s) in mma8452_read()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sanjay Chitroda <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5bdff291d20c31b365d9ddfe9c426fbfb41da5bb ]
Currently, If i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data() fails but mma8452_set_runtime_pm_state() succeeds, mma8452_read() returns 0.
As a result, the caller mma8452_read_raw() assumes the read was successful and proceeds to use a buffer containing uninitialized stack memory.
Add proper checking of the I2C read return value and propagate errors to the caller.
--- drivers/iio/accel/mma8452.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/iio/accel/mma8452.c +2 -0
@@ -252,6 +252,8 @@ static int mma8452_read(struct mma8452_data *data, __be16 buf[3]) ret =i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data (data->client,MMA8452_OUT_X ,3 *sizeof (__be16), (u8 *)buf); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; ret =mma8452_set_runtime_pm_state (data->client, false);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 389/843 HID: logitech-hidpp: remove excess kernel-doc member in hidpp_scroll_counter
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rosen Penev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f22a5db8a7d38152556f230d6d68e59dbc27971b ]
The @dev member described in the kernel-doc does not exist in the struct. Remove the stale entry.
--- drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c +0 -1
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ struct hidpp_battery {/** * struct hidpp_scroll_counter - Utility class for processing high-resolution * scroll events. -* @dev: the input device for which events should be reported. * @wheel_multiplier: the scalar multiplier to be applied to each wheel event * @remainder: counts the number of high-resolution units moved since the last * low-resolution event (REL_WHEEL or REL_HWHEEL) was sent. Should
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 390/843 drm/amd/display: Add missing kdoc for ALLM parameters
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d4c6ec729fb7a8bf8a27b19bd70a1b945ad93dac ]
Add descriptions for the missing parameters for ALLMEnabled and ALLMValue to keep the function documentation synchronized with the function prototype mod_build_hf_vsif_infopacket().
Fixes the below with gcc W=1:../display/modules/info_packet/info_packet.c:507 function parameter 'ALLMEnabled' not described in 'mod_build_hf_vsif_infopacket' ../display/modules/info_packet/info_packet.c:507 function parameter 'ALLMValue' not described in 'mod_build_hf_vsif_infopacket'
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/info_packet/info_packet.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/info_packet/info_packet.c +2 -0
@@ -415,6 +415,8 @@ void mod_build_vsc_infopacket(const struct dc_stream_state *stream,* * @stream: contains data we may need to construct VSIF (i.e. timing_3d_format, etc.) * @info_packet: output structure where to store VSIF +* @ALLMEnabled: indicates whether ALLM HF-VSIF should be generated +* @ALLMValue: ALLM bit value to advertise in HF-VSIF */ void mod_build_hf_vsif_infopacket (const struct dc_stream_state *stream,struct dc_info_packet *info_packet)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 391/843 perf: Fix off-by-one stack buffer overflow in kallsyms__parse()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rui Qi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 68018df3f55eba96a20dd703f5f276a6518f4963 ]
In kallsyms__parse(), the loop reading symbol names iterates with i < sizeof(symbol_name), which allows i to reach sizeof(symbol_name) upon loop exit. The subsequent symbol_name[i] = '\0' then writes one byte past the end of the stack-allocated symbol_name[] array.
Fix this by changing the loop bound to KSYM_NAME_LEN, so the null terminator always lands within the array. The overflow is triggerable by a kallsyms entry with a symbol name of KSYM_NAME_LEN+1 or more characters (e.g., long Rust mangled names or a malicious /proc/kallsyms).
--- tools/lib/symbol/kallsyms.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/lib/symbol/kallsyms.c +4 -1
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ int kallsyms__parse(const char *filename, void *arg,read_to_eol (&io);continue ; } -for (i =0 ; i <sizeof (symbol_name); i++) { +for (i =0 ; i <KSYM_NAME_LEN ; i++) { ch =io__get_char (&io);if (ch <0 || ch =='\n' )break ;
@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ int kallsyms__parse(const char *filename, void *arg, } symbol_name[i] ='\0' ; +if (i ==KSYM_NAME_LEN ) +read_to_eol (&io); + err =process_symbol (arg, symbol_name, symbol_type, start);if (err)break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 392/843 perf mmap: Guard cpu__get_node() return in aio_bind()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f32dc302a090f48893477ef297a888db109ec0bd ]
perf_mmap__aio_bind() passes the cpu__get_node() return value directly to an unsigned long variable (node_index). When cpu__get_node() returns -1 for an unknown CPU, the implicit int-to-unsigned-long conversion sign-extends it to ULONG_MAX.
This causes bitmap_zalloc(ULONG_MAX + 1) which wraps to bitmap_zalloc(0), returning a zero-sized allocation. The subsequent __set_bit(ULONG_MAX, node_mask) then writes massively out of bounds.
Check the return value in a signed temporary before assigning to node_index, and skip the NUMA binding when the node is unknown.
--- tools/perf/util/mmap.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/util/mmap.c +7 -1
@@ -103,9 +103,15 @@ static int perf_mmap__aio_bind(struct mmap *map, int idx, int cpu, int affinity)int err =0 ;if (affinity !=PERF_AFFINITY_SYS &&cpu__max_node () >1 ) { +int node; + data = map->aio.data[idx]; mmap_len =mmap__mmap_len (map); - node_index =cpu__get_node (cpu); + node =cpu__get_node (cpu); +/* -1 sign-extends to ULONG_MAX, wrapping bitmap_zalloc(0) and OOB __set_bit */ +if (node <0 ) +return 0 ; + node_index = node; node_mask =bitmap_zalloc (node_index +1 );if (!node_mask) {pr_err ("Failed to allocate node mask for mbind: error %m\n" );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 393/843 perf sched: Clean up idle_threads entry on init failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cda5a94ad9181cd60cbf04be11d524201bf489a2 ]
get_idle_thread() allocates a thread via thread__new() and stores it in idle_threads[cpu], then calls init_idle_thread() to set up the private data. If init_idle_thread() fails (e.g. OOM for the idle_thread_runtime struct), the function returns NULL but leaves the partially initialized thread in idle_threads[cpu].
On subsequent calls for the same CPU, get_idle_thread() finds a non-NULL idle_threads[cpu], skips allocation, and returns thread__get() on a thread that has no priv data. Callers then get a thread whose thread__priv() returns NULL, leading to unexpected behavior.
Release the thread and reset the slot to NULL on init failure so the entry doesn't persist in a corrupted state.
--- tools/perf/builtin-sched.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +4 -1
@@ -2289,8 +2289,11 @@ static struct thread *get_idle_thread(int cpu) idle_threads[cpu] =thread__new (0 ,0 );if (idle_threads[cpu]) { -if (init_idle_thread (idle_threads[cpu]) <0 ) +if (init_idle_thread (idle_threads[cpu]) <0 ) { +/* clean up so next call doesn't find a half-initialized thread */ +thread__zput (idle_threads[cpu]);return NULL ; + } } }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 394/843 perf sched: Replace BUG_ON and add NULL checks in replay event helpers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 75eafe4a3a93a0143a20c0cc286bfb9008ac1478 ]
get_new_event() has three issues:
1. The zalloc() result is dereferenced without a NULL check, crashing on allocation failure.
2. BUG_ON(!task->atoms) kills the process when realloc() fails. Since perf.data is untrusted input, this should be a graceful error.
3. The realloc pattern assigns directly to task->atoms, losing the old pointer on failure. task->nr_events is also incremented before the realloc, leaving corrupted state on failure.
Fix get_new_event() to:
- Check the zalloc() result before dereferencing
- Use a temporary for realloc() to avoid losing the old pointer
- Increment nr_events only after successful realloc
- Return NULL instead of calling BUG_ON on failure
Also fix add_sched_event_wakeup() where zalloc() for wait_sem is passed to sem_init() without a NULL check.
Update all callers (add_sched_event_run, add_sched_event_wakeup, add_sched_event_sleep) to handle NULL returns by returning early. The replay may produce incomplete output on OOM but will not crash.
--- tools/perf/builtin-sched.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +25 -3
@@ -361,14 +361,25 @@ get_new_event(struct task_desc *task, u64 timestamp)struct sched_atom *event =zalloc (sizeof (*event));unsigned long idx = task->nr_events;size_t size; +struct sched_atom **atoms_p; + +if (event ==NULL ) { +pr_err ("ERROR: sched: failed to allocate event\n" ); +return NULL ; + } event->timestamp = timestamp; event->nr = idx; + size =sizeof (struct sched_atom *) * (task->nr_events +1 ); + atoms_p =realloc (task->atoms, size); +if (!atoms_p) { +pr_err ("ERROR: sched: failed to grow atoms array\n" ); +free (event); +return NULL ; + } + task->atoms = atoms_p; task->nr_events++; - size =sizeof (struct sched_atom *) * task->nr_events; - task->atoms =realloc (task->atoms, size); -BUG_ON (!task->atoms); task->atoms[idx] = event;
@@ -399,6 +410,8 @@ static void add_sched_event_run(struct perf_sched *sched, struct task_desc *task } event =get_new_event (task, timestamp); +if (event ==NULL ) +return ; event->type =SCHED_EVENT_RUN ; event->duration = duration;
@@ -412,6 +425,8 @@ static void add_sched_event_wakeup(struct perf_sched *sched, struct task_desc *tstruct sched_atom *event, *wakee_event; event =get_new_event (task, timestamp); +if (event ==NULL ) +return ; event->type =SCHED_EVENT_WAKEUP ; event->wakee = wakee;
@@ -426,6 +441,10 @@ static void add_sched_event_wakeup(struct perf_sched *sched, struct task_desc *t } wakee_event->wait_sem =zalloc (sizeof (*wakee_event->wait_sem)); +if (!wakee_event->wait_sem) { +pr_err ("ERROR: sched: failed to allocate semaphore\n" ); +return ; + }sem_init (wakee_event->wait_sem,0 ,0 ); wakee_event->specific_wait =1 ; event->wait_sem = wakee_event->wait_sem;
@@ -438,6 +457,9 @@ static void add_sched_event_sleep(struct perf_sched *sched, struct task_desc *ta {struct sched_atom *event =get_new_event (task, timestamp); +if (event ==NULL ) +return ; + event->type =SCHED_EVENT_SLEEP ; sched->nr_sleep_events++;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 395/843 perf mmap: Fix NULL deref in aio cleanup on alloc failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 25627346b10e6a564610ea2c49dc6dd54812226d ]
perf_mmap__aio_mmap() sets map->aio.nr_cblocks before allocating the data array. If calloc() for aiocb or cblocks fails before the data array is allocated, the return -1 path leads to perf_mmap__aio_munmap() which loops nr_cblocks times calling perf_mmap__aio_free(). Both versions of perf_mmap__aio_free() (NUMA and non-NUMA) dereference map->aio.data[idx] without checking if data is NULL, causing a NULL pointer dereference.
Add NULL checks for map->aio.data at the top of both perf_mmap__aio_free() variants so the cleanup path is safe when allocation fails partway through perf_mmap__aio_mmap().
--- tools/perf/util/mmap.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/mmap.c +6 -4
@@ -88,10 +88,10 @@ static int perf_mmap__aio_alloc(struct mmap *map, int idx)static void perf_mmap__aio_free (struct mmap *map,int idx) { -if (map->aio.data[idx]) { -munmap (map->aio.data[idx],mmap__mmap_len (map)); - map->aio.data[idx] =NULL ; - } +if (!map->aio.data || !map->aio.data[idx]) +return ; +munmap (map->aio.data[idx],mmap__mmap_len (map)); + map->aio.data[idx] =NULL ; }static int perf_mmap__aio_bind (struct mmap *map,int idx,int cpu,int affinity)
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ static int perf_mmap__aio_alloc(struct mmap *map, int idx)static void perf_mmap__aio_free (struct mmap *map,int idx) { +if (!map->aio.data) +return ;zfree (&(map->aio.data[idx])); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 396/843 perf c2c: Fix use-after-free in he__get_c2c_hists() error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5e5e6196d737c5be03d20647428316b36621608d ]
he__get_c2c_hists() assigns c2c_he->hists before calling c2c_hists__init(). If init fails, the error path calls free(hists) but leaves c2c_he->hists pointing to freed memory. On teardown, c2c_he_free() finds the non-NULL pointer and calls hists__delete_entries() on it, causing a use-after-free.
Set c2c_he->hists to NULL before freeing so teardown skips the already-freed allocation.
--- tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c +1 -0
@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ he__get_c2c_hists(struct hist_entry *he, ret =c2c_hists__init (hists, sort, nr_header_lines);if (ret) { + c2c_he->hists =NULL ;free (hists);return NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 397/843 dmaengine: qcom: gpi: set DMA_PRIVATE capability
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Icenowy Zheng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4e351f408743354d54ee1af5193fc78234f2044e ]
The GPI DMA controller is only responsible for QUP peripherals, and cannot work as a general-purpose DMA accelerator.
Set DMA_PRIVATE capability for it.
This fixes error messages about GPI being shown when an async-tx consumer is loaded.
--- drivers/dma/qcom/gpi.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/dma/qcom/gpi.c +1 -0
@@ -2246,6 +2246,7 @@ static int gpi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)/* clear and Set capabilities */ dma_cap_zero (gpi_dev->dma_device.cap_mask);dma_cap_set (DMA_SLAVE , gpi_dev->dma_device.cap_mask); +dma_cap_set (DMA_PRIVATE , gpi_dev->dma_device.cap_mask);/* configure dmaengine apis */ gpi_dev->dma_device.directions =BIT (DMA_DEV_TO_MEM ) |BIT (DMA_MEM_TO_DEV );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 398/843 dmaengine: Fix possible use after free
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nuno Sá <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 92f853f0645aebf1d05d333e97ab7c342ace1892 ]
In dma_release_channel(), check chan->device->privatecnt after call dma_chan_put(). However, dma_chan_put() call dma_device_put() which could release the last reference of the device if the DMA provider is already gone and hence free it.
Fixes it by moving dma_chan_put() after the check.
--- drivers/dma/dmaengine.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma/dmaengine.c +2 -1
@@ -906,11 +906,12 @@ void dma_release_channel(struct dma_chan *chan)mutex_lock (&dma_list_mutex);WARN_ONCE (chan->client_count !=1 ,"chan reference count %d != 1\n" , chan->client_count); -dma_chan_put (chan);/* drop PRIVATE cap enabled by __dma_request_channel() */ if (--chan->device->privatecnt ==0 )dma_cap_clear (DMA_PRIVATE , chan->device->cap_mask); +dma_chan_put (chan); +if (chan->slave) {sysfs_remove_link (&chan->dev->device.kobj,DMA_SLAVE_NAME );sysfs_remove_link (&chan->slave->kobj, chan->name);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 399/843 clk: qcom: a53: Corrected frequency multiplier for 1152MHz
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Phillip Varney <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bb56147ea9fce98ebde1d367335ba006cba61fbd ]
The 1152MHz frequency entry for the a53 currently selects a multiplier of 62, giving 1190MHz. This changes the mulitiplier to 60 giving the intended 1152MHz.
--- drivers/clk/qcom/a53-pll.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/clk/qcom/a53-pll.c +1 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@static const struct pll_freq_tbl a53pll_freq[] = { {998400000 ,52 ,0x0 ,0x1 ,0 }, {1094400000 ,57 ,0x0 ,0x1 ,0 }, - {1152000000 ,62 ,0x0 ,0x1 ,0 }, + {1152000000 ,60 ,0x0 ,0x1 ,0 }, {1209600000 ,63 ,0x0 ,0x1 ,0 }, {1248000000 ,65 ,0x0 ,0x1 ,0 }, {1363200000 ,71 ,0x0 ,0x1 ,0 },
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 400/843 pNFS/filelayout: fix cheking if a layout is striped
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 91668417d4e925c98cae4a55b1b9860380ddbf16 ]
A layout can still be striped with num_fh = 1 as it is perfectly possible that both MDS and DSs can handle the same filehandle. Hence check according to stripe_count > 1, which is the correct check to begin with.
We should not be called with flseg->dsaddr = NULL, but if for some reason we do, return our best guess with is flseg->num_fh > 1.
--- fs/nfs/filelayout/filelayout.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/nfs/filelayout/filelayout.c +2 -0
@@ -786,6 +786,8 @@ filelayout_alloc_lseg(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *layoutid,static bool filelayout_lseg_is_striped (const struct nfs4_filelayout_segment *flseg) { +if (flseg->dsaddr) +return flseg->dsaddr->stripe_count >1 ;return flseg->num_fh >1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 401/843 NFSv4/pnfs: defer return_range callbacks until after inode unlock
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dai Ngo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 77b160b2d863d37f36b6c38e80a7d259ce939e69 ]
Sometimes unmounting an NFS filesystem mounted with pNFS SCSI layouts triggers the following warning:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: umount.nfs4/...
__schedule_bug+0xbd/0x100
schedule_debug.constprop.0+0x19f/0x220
__schedule+0x10d/0x10a0
schedule+0x74/0x190
schedule_timeout+0xf5/0x220
io_schedule_timeout+0xd5/0x160
__wait_for_common+0x186/0x4b0
blk_execute_rq+0x2ef/0x3a0
scsi_execute_cmd+0x1ff/0x700
sd_pr_out_command.isra.0+0x242/0x380 [sd_mod]
bl_unregister_scsi.constprop.0+0x109/0x3c0 [blocklayoutdriver]
bl_unregister_dev+0x175/0x1c0 [blocklayoutdriver]
bl_free_device+0x1f/0x1b0 [blocklayoutdriver]
bl_free_deviceid_node+0x12/0x30 [blocklayoutdriver]
nfs4_put_deviceid_node+0x171/0x360 [nfsv4]
ext_tree_remove+0x11c/0x1d0 [blocklayoutdriver]
_pnfs_return_layout+0x416/0x900 [nfsv4]
nfs4_evict_inode+0x108/0x130 [nfsv4]
evict+0x316/0x750
dispose_list+0xf1/0x1a0
evict_inodes+0x33f/0x440
generic_shutdown_super+0xc9/0x4e0
kill_anon_super+0x3a/0x90
nfs_kill_super+0x44/0x60 [nfs]
deactivate_locked_super+0xb8/0x1b0
cleanup_mnt+0x25a/0x380
task_work_run+0x13e/0x210
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x169/0x400
do_syscall_64+0x467/0x1550
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7eThe warning occurs because the block layout driver unregisters the SCSI device while the inode lock is still held. Device unregistration issues a SCSI PR command, which may sleep, resulting in a "scheduling while atomic" warning.
During layout return, ext_tree_remove() invokes the layout driver's return_range callback while holding the inode lock. For block layouts, this callback eventually calls bl_unregister_scsi(), which may block in scsi_execute_cmd() while issuing PR commands to the device.
Fix this by deferring the return_range callbacks until after the inode lock has been released. The layout header reference count is incremented before invoking return_range(), ensuring that the layout header remains valid while the layout driver removes extents from the extent tree.
--- fs/nfs/callback_proc.c | 9 +++++---- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/callback_proc.c +5 -4
@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ static u32 initiate_file_draining(struct nfs_client *clp,struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo;u32 rv =NFS4ERR_NOMATCHING_LAYOUT ;LIST_HEAD (free_me_list); +bool return_range = false; ino =nfs_layout_find_inode (clp, &args->cbl_fh, &args->cbl_stateid);if (IS_ERR (ino)) {
@@ -292,13 +293,13 @@ static u32 initiate_file_draining(struct nfs_client *clp,/* Embrace your forgetfulness! */ rv =NFS4ERR_NOMATCHING_LAYOUT ; -if (NFS_SERVER (ino)->pnfs_curr_ld->return_range) { -NFS_SERVER (ino)->pnfs_curr_ld->return_range (lo, - &args->cbl_range); - } + return_range = true; } unlock:spin_unlock (&ino->i_lock); +if (return_range &&NFS_SERVER (ino)->pnfs_curr_ld->return_range) +NFS_SERVER (ino)->pnfs_curr_ld->return_range (lo, + &args->cbl_range);pnfs_free_lseg_list (&free_me_list);/* Free all lsegs that are attached to commit buckets */ nfs_commit_inode (ino,0 );
fs/nfs/pnfs.c +2 -2
@@ -1372,8 +1372,6 @@ _pnfs_return_layout(struct inode *ino)pnfs_clear_layoutcommit (ino, &tmp_list);pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return (lo, &tmp_list, &range,0 ); -if (NFS_SERVER (ino)->pnfs_curr_ld->return_range) -NFS_SERVER (ino)->pnfs_curr_ld->return_range (lo, &range);/* Don't send a LAYOUTRETURN if list was initially empty */ if (!test_bit(NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN_REQUESTED, &lo->plh_flags) ||
@@ -1385,6 +1383,8 @@ _pnfs_return_layout(struct inode *ino) send =pnfs_prepare_layoutreturn (lo, &stateid, &cred,NULL );spin_unlock (&ino->i_lock); +if (NFS_SERVER (ino)->pnfs_curr_ld->return_range) +NFS_SERVER (ino)->pnfs_curr_ld->return_range (lo, &range);if (send) status =pnfs_send_layoutreturn (lo, &stateid, &cred,IOMODE_ANY , true); out_wait_layoutreturn:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 402/843 NFSv4/flexfiles: honor FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS on fatal DS connect errors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7a375cafc14ed151508f908ea5681caf0a9cc1d6 ]
Commit f06bedfa62d5 ("pNFS/flexfiles: don't attempt pnfs on fatal DS errors") teaches ff_layout_{read,write}_pagelist() to return PNFS_NOT_ATTEMPTED when nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds() fails with a nfs_error_is_fatal() errno (e.g. -ETIMEDOUT from a SOFTCONN connect deadline, -ENOMEM, -ERESTARTSYS), so that the client gives up instead of spinning. pnfs_do_{read,write}() then dispatches the I/O through pnfs_{read,write}_through_mds() → nfs_pageio_reset_{read,write}_mds().
That fallback is unconditional and silently violates FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS:
when the layout segment carries the flag (typically single-mirror appliance layouts where MDS I/O is explicitly forbidden), theout_failed: path's \&& !ds_fatal_error\ clause overrides the flag's short-circuit through ff_layout_avoid_mds_available_ds() and routes the I/O to the MDS file handle anyway.
This is reachable in practice during a data-server restart: SOFTCONN exhaustion produces -ETIMEDOUT, which is fatal per nfs_error_is_fatal(), which triggers PNFS_NOT_ATTEMPTED, which silently goes to MDS.
Preserve the upstream "don't spin on fatal errors" intent for layouts that permit MDS fallback. For layouts with FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS set, mark the layout for return and request PNFS_TRY_AGAIN instead; if the server cannot supply a usable layout the failure now surfaces cleanly via pnfs_update_layout(), rather than via silent MDS I/O that contradicts the flag.
--- fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c +16 -0
@@ -1889,6 +1889,14 @@ ff_layout_read_pagelist(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr) out_failed:if (ff_layout_avoid_mds_available_ds (lseg) && !ds_fatal_error)return PNFS_TRY_AGAIN ; +if (ff_layout_no_fallback_to_mds (lseg)) { +/* +* FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS: force fresh LAYOUTGET, +* never fall through to MDS I/O. +*/ +pnfs_error_mark_layout_for_return (hdr->inode, lseg); +return PNFS_TRY_AGAIN ; + }trace_pnfs_mds_fallback_read_pagelist (hdr->inode, hdr->args.offset, hdr->args.count,IOMODE_READ ,NFS_I (hdr->inode)->layout, lseg);
@@ -1960,6 +1968,14 @@ ff_layout_write_pagelist(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr, int sync) out_failed:if (ff_layout_avoid_mds_available_ds (lseg) && !ds_fatal_error)return PNFS_TRY_AGAIN ; +if (ff_layout_no_fallback_to_mds (lseg)) { +/* +* FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS: force fresh LAYOUTGET, +* never fall through to MDS I/O. +*/ +pnfs_error_mark_layout_for_return (hdr->inode, lseg); +return PNFS_TRY_AGAIN ; + }trace_pnfs_mds_fallback_write_pagelist (hdr->inode, hdr->args.offset, hdr->args.count,IOMODE_RW ,NFS_I (hdr->inode)->layout, lseg);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 403/843 NFSv4/flexfiles: honor FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS in pg_get_mirror_count_write
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1d62e659c0bf11649cf48e002c2a55d148f2610a ]
The FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS flag lives on each lseg, so any fallback decision made when there is no current lseg (e.g. between LAYOUTRETURN and the next LAYOUTGET) cannot run the per-lseg check.
Introduce a sticky hdr-level ditto for FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS in struct nfs4_flexfile_layout::flags (NFS4_FF_HDR_NO_IO_THRU_MDS bit), set whenever ff_layout_alloc_lseg() parses an lseg with the flag. The bit is never cleared for the lifetime of the layout hdr; the server is assumed to be consistent in its no-fallback policy per file. kzalloc() in ff_layout_alloc_layout_hdr() zero-initializes the field.
Use the new ff_layout_hdr_no_fallback_to_mds() helper to gate ff_layout_pg_get_mirror_count_write(): when pnfs_update_layout() returns NULL (e.g. NFS_LAYOUT_BULK_RECALL, pnfs_layout_io_test_failed, pnfs_layoutgets_blocked) the existing code unconditionally calls nfs_pageio_reset_write_mds(). This is a source of unwanted WRITE to MDS. Fix it by checking NFS4_FF_HDR_NO_IO_THRU_MDS bit, and if set surface -EAGAIN instead; the writepage-side caller (nfs_do_writepage() for buffered, nfs_direct_write_reschedule() for O_DIRECT) then redirties the request so writeback retries via pNFS.
--- fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c | 13 +++++++++++++ fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c +13 -0
@@ -533,6 +533,9 @@ ff_layout_alloc_lseg(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lh,if (!p) goto out_sort_mirrors; fls->flags =be32_to_cpup (p); +if (fls->flags &FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS ) +set_bit (NFS4_FF_HDR_NO_IO_THRU_MDS , + &FF_LAYOUT_FROM_HDR (lh)->flags); p =xdr_inline_decode (&stream,4 );if (!p)
@@ -995,6 +998,16 @@ ff_layout_pg_get_mirror_count_write(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio,0 ,NFS4_MAX_UINT64 ,IOMODE_RW ,NFS_I (pgio->pg_inode)->layout, pgio->pg_lseg); +if (NFS_I (pgio->pg_inode)->layout && +ff_layout_hdr_no_fallback_to_mds (NFS_I (pgio->pg_inode)->layout)) { +/* +* FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS: no current lseg but the server's +* policy forbids MDS fallback. Surface -EAGAIN so writeback +* retries rather than silently issuing the WRITE via MDS. +*/ + pgio->pg_error = -EAGAIN ; + goto out; + }/* no lseg means that pnfs is not in use, so no mirroring here */ nfs_pageio_reset_write_mds (pgio); out:
fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.h +16 -0
@@ -102,12 +102,16 @@ struct nfs4_ff_layout_segment {struct nfs4_ff_layout_mirror *mirror_array[]; }; +/* nfs4_flexfile_layout::flags bit indices */ +#define NFS4_FF_HDR_NO_IO_THRU_MDS 0/* any lseg has had FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS */ +struct nfs4_flexfile_layout {struct pnfs_layout_hdr generic_hdr;struct pnfs_ds_commit_info commit_info;struct list_head mirrors;struct list_head error_list;/* nfs4_ff_layout_ds_err */ ktime_t last_report_time;/* Layoutstat report times */ +unsigned long flags; };struct nfs4_flexfile_layoutreturn_args {
@@ -174,6 +178,18 @@ ff_layout_no_fallback_to_mds(struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg)return FF_LAYOUT_LSEG (lseg)->flags &FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS ; } +/* +* Sticky hdr-level mirror of FF_FLAGS_NO_IO_THRU_MDS so callers that have +* no current lseg (e.g. between LAYOUTRETURN and the next LAYOUTGET) can +* still honor the no-MDS-fallback policy. +*/ +static inline bool +ff_layout_hdr_no_fallback_to_mds (struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo) +{ +return test_bit (NFS4_FF_HDR_NO_IO_THRU_MDS , + &FF_LAYOUT_FROM_HDR (lo)->flags); +} +static inline bool ff_layout_no_read_on_rw (struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 404/843 PCI: mediatek: Fix operator precedence in PCIE_FTS_NUM_L0 macro
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Li RongQing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 282305d7e9c0e27fd8b4df34b7cd5506a1eccdd6 ]
The original PCIE_FTS_NUM_L0(x) macro was buggy due to improper operator precedence, where ((x) & 0xff << 8) was evaluated as ((x) & 0xff00).
Instead of just fixing the parentheses, use the standard FIELD_PREP() macro. This makes the code more robust by automatically handling masks and shifts, while also adding compile-time type and range checking to ensure the value fits within PCIE_FTS_NUM_MASK.
--- drivers/pci/controller/pcie-mediatek.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pci/controller/pcie-mediatek.c +2 -1
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@* Honghui Zhang <[email protected]> */ +#include <linux/bitfield.h> #include <linux/clk.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/iopoll.h>
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@/* MediaTek specific configuration registers */ #define PCIE_FTS_NUM 0x70c#define PCIE_FTS_NUM_MASK GENMASK(15, 8) -#define PCIE_FTS_NUM_L0 (x) ((x) & 0xff << 8) +#define PCIE_FTS_NUM_L0 (x) FIELD_PREP(PCIE_FTS_NUM_MASK, x)#define PCIE_FC_CREDIT 0x73c#define PCIE_FC_CREDIT_MASK (GENMASK(31, 31) | GENMASK(28, 16))
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 405/843 perf tools: Fix get_max_num() size_t underflow on empty sysfs file
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0a012113bb3a44482c163f16f4db03ccaa37a339 ]
get_max_num() reads a sysfs file (cpu/possible, cpu/present, or node/possible) and scans backward from the end to find the last number. If the file is empty, filename__read_str() returns num == 0. The loop while (--num) decrements the size_t from 0 to SIZE_MAX, reading backward across the heap until a comma or hyphen is found or unmapped memory is hit.
Add an early return for empty files before the backward scan.
--- tools/perf/util/cpumap.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/cpumap.c +6 -0
@@ -307,6 +307,12 @@ static int get_max_num(char *path, int *max) buf[num] ='\0' ; +/* empty file — nothing to parse */ +if (num ==0 ) { + err =-1 ; + goto out; + } +/* start on the right, to find highest node num */ while (--num) {if ((buf[num] ==',' ) || (buf[num] =='-' )) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 406/843 perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5484b43a0ec8231c36fba6ead654cb72dbba8b8f ]
machine__resolve() accesses env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id after checking al->cpu >= 0 and env->cpu != NULL, but without validating al->cpu against env->nr_cpus_avail. Since al->cpu comes from the untrusted perf.data sample, a crafted file with a large CPU index causes an out-of-bounds heap read.
Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() which validates both NULL and bounds. Also bounds-check al->cpu before the cast to struct perf_cpu (int16_t):
without this, values like 65536 silently truncate to 0, bypassing the accessor's internal check and returning CPU 0's topology.
--- tools/perf/util/event.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/event.c +13 -2
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#include <linux/zalloc.h> #include "cpumap.h" #include "dso.h" +#include "env.h" #include "event.h" #include "debug.h" #include "hist.h"
@@ -688,8 +689,18 @@ int machine__resolve(struct machine *machine, struct addr_location *al,if (al->cpu >=0 ) {struct perf_env *env = machine->env; -if (env && env->cpu) - al->socket = env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id; +/* +* Bounds-check al->cpu (s32) before casting to struct perf_cpu +* (int16_t): without this, e.g. 65536 truncates to 0 and silently +* returns CPU 0's topology. Can go once perf_cpu.cpu is widened. +*/ +if (env && al->cpu < env->nr_cpus_avail) { +struct cpu_topology_map *topo; + + topo =perf_env__get_cpu_topology (env, (struct perf_cpu ){ al->cpu }); +if (topo) + al->socket = topo->socket_id; + } }if (al->map) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0