mctp: serial: handle zero-length frames to prevent rx buffer overflow
Subsystems (4)
PATCH v2 1/1 mctp: serial: handle zero-length frames to prevent rx buffer overflow
The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in mctp_serial_push_header() case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only:
if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) {
dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR;
} else {
dev->rxlen = c;
dev->rxpos = 0;
dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
...
}A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state machine advances to STATE_DATA. In mctp_serial_push() STATE_DATA, the incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is tested:
dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c;
dev->rxpos++;
dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) {
dev->rxpos = 0;
dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER;
}With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled 1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a frame (0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded.
Reaching this requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach the N_MCTP line discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which the bytes arrive via the tty receive path.
Route a zero-length frame straight to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser never enters STATE_DATA with rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can no longer occur.
KASAN, on a frame of 0x7e 0x01 0x00 followed by data bytes (before this change):
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370 index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]' BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0 mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf tty_ldisc_receive_buf flush_to_ldisc Allocated by task 152: alloc_netdev_mqs mctp_serial_open
v2: route zero-length frames to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_ERR so
the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr).
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
--- drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c +1 -1
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static void mctp_serial_push_header(struct mctp_serial *dev, u8 c) }else { dev->rxlen = c; dev->rxpos =0 ; - dev->rxstate =STATE_DATA ; + dev->rxstate = c >0 ?STATE_DATA :STATE_TRAILER ; dev->rxfcs =crc_ccitt_byte (dev->rxfcs, c); }break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 59 lines · Doruk Tan Ozturk
The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in
mctp_serial_push_header()case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only:if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) { dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR; } else { dev->rxlen = c; dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; ... }A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state machine advances to
STATE_DATA. Inmctp_serial_push()STATE_DATA, the incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is tested:dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c; dev->rxpos++; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) { dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER; }With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled 1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a frame (
0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded.Reaching this requires
CAP_NET_ADMINto attach theN_MCTPline discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which the bytes arrive via the tty receive path.Route a zero-length frame straight to
STATE_TRAILERinstead ofSTATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser never entersSTATE_DATAwith rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can no longer occur.KASAN, on a frame of
0x7e0x010x00followed by data bytes (before this change):UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370 index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]' BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0 mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf tty_ldisc_receive_buf flush_to_ldisc Allocated by task 152: alloc_netdev_mqs mctp_serial_openv2: route zero-length frames to
STATE_TRAILERinstead ofSTATE_ERRso
the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr).
Quoted 6 lines
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Fixes a0c2ccd9b5ad ("mctp: Add MCTP-over-serial transport binding")Suggested-by Jeremy Kerr <[email protected]>Assisted-by 0sec:multi-modelSigned-off-by Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>:
Quoted 12 lines · On Wed, 15 Jul 2026 10:20:21 +0200 you wrote:
The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in
mctp_serial_push_header()case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only:if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) { dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR; } else { dev->rxlen = c; dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; ... }
Quoted 1 line
[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [net,v2] mctp: serial: handle zero-length frames to prevent rx buffer overflow
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/793b9b729f1e
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
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