bpf, sockmap: fix page_counter underflow in strparser SK_PASS
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 bpf, sockmap: fix page_counter underflow in strparser SK_PASS
tcp_bpf_strp_read_sock() delays cleanup of SK_PASS bytes by subtracting psock->ingress_bytes from the amount passed to __tcp_cleanup_rbuf(). But when sk_psock_verdict_apply() queues the skb directly through sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(), skb_set_owner_r() is called unconditionally and charges the skb again.
The duplicated charge is later released independently and can trigger a page_counter underflow.
Add a charge_skb argument to sk_psock_skb_ingress_self() and skip skb_set_owner_r() only for the direct strparser SK_PASS path. Keep existing accounting for the other self-ingress caller and for non-strparser SK_PASS.
---
Crash reproduced on Linux tree 94515f3a7d4256a5062176b7d6ed0471938cd51a with KASAN, MEMCG, panic_on_warn=1, and oops=panic.
Reproducer/log/config: https://gist.github.com/ZirAjs/16c95c89972ace73910d9b5ac78a5807
The reproducer drives the strparser SK_PASS path until teardown reports:
page_counter underflow
Workqueue: events sk_psock_destroy Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
net/core/skmsg.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
net/core/skmsg.c +17 -12
@@ -586,7 +586,8 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, }static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (struct sk_psock *psock,struct sk_buff *skb, -u32 off,u32 len,bool take_ref); +u32 off,u32 len,bool take_ref, +bool charge_skb);static int sk_psock_skb_ingress (struct sk_psock *psock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 off,u32 len)
@@ -595,12 +596,9 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb,struct sk_msg *msg;int err; -/* If we are receiving on the same sock skb->sk is already assigned, -* skip memory accounting and owner transition seeing it already set -* correctly. -*/ if (unlikely (skb->sk == sk)) -return sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (psock, skb, off, len, true); +return sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (psock, skb, off, len, true, + true); msg =sk_psock_create_ingress_msg (sk, skb);if (!msg)return -EAGAIN ;
@@ -618,12 +616,14 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb,return err; } -/* Puts an skb on the ingress queue of the socket already assigned to the -* skb. In this case we do not need to check memory limits or skb_set_owner_r -* because the skb is already accounted for here. +/* Puts an skb on the ingress queue for psock->sk. +* +* When charge_skb is false, the direct strparser SK_PASS path keeps the TCP +* receive queue accounting in place and must not call skb_set_owner_r(). */ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (struct sk_psock *psock,struct sk_buff *skb, -u32 off,u32 len,bool take_ref) +u32 off,u32 len,bool take_ref, +bool charge_skb) {struct sk_msg *msg =alloc_sk_msg (GFP_ATOMIC );struct sock *sk = psock->sk;
@@ -631,7 +631,8 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skbif (unlikely (!msg))return -EAGAIN ; -skb_set_owner_r (skb, sk); +if (charge_skb) +skb_set_owner_r (skb, sk);/* This is used in tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser() to determine whether the * data originates from the socket's own protocol stack. No need to
@@ -1017,6 +1018,8 @@ static int sk_psock_verdict_apply(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb,* retrying later from workqueue. */ if (skb_queue_empty (&psock->ingress_skb)) { +bool charge_skb = true; + len = skb->len; off =0 ;if (skb_bpf_strparser (skb)) {
@@ -1024,8 +1027,10 @@ static int sk_psock_verdict_apply(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb, off = stm->offset; len = stm->full_len; + charge_skb = false; } - err =sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (psock, skb, off, len, false); + err =sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (psock, skb, off, len, + false, charge_skb); }if (err <0 ) {spin_lock_bh (&psock->ingress_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Critical] Bypassing memory accounting in strparser SK_PASS path allows remote memory exhaustion (DoS) --
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Critical] Bypassing memory accounting in strparser SK_PASS path allows remote memory exhaustion (DoS) --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH bpf] bpf, sockmap: fix page_counter underflow in strparser SK_PASS --- commit 5073ca36b1b9677d098ec43e3f231a7423b5d727
Author: Junseo Lim <[email protected]>
bpf, sockmap: fix page_counter underflow in strparser SK_PASS
This patch adds a charge_skb flag to skip memory accounting in the direct strparser SK_PASS path. It attempts to fix a page_counter underflow by preventing duplicate charges on the cloned SKB.
Quoted 4 lines
net/core/skmsg.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 1 line
net/core/skmsg.c +0
-0@@ -618,12 +616,14 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb,
[ ... ]
Quoted 8 lines
static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(struct
sk_psock*psock, structsk_buff*skb,net/core/skmsg.c +2
-1- u32 off, u32 len, bool take_ref) + u32 off, u32 len, bool take_ref, + bool charge_skb) { struct sk_msg *msg = alloc_sk_msg(GFP_ATOMIC);struct sock *sk = psock->sk;
net/core/skmsg.c static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb · line 635
Quoted 6 lines
net/core/skmsg.c +2
-1@@ -631,7 +631,8 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skbif (unlikely (!msg))return -EAGAIN ; -skb_set_owner_r (skb, sk); +if (charge_skb) +skb_set_owner_r (skb, sk);
[Severity: Critical]
Does skipping skb_set_owner_r() here leave the cloned SKB without an accounted truesize and without a destructor?
When charge_skb is false, the cloned SKB is queued without being charged. At the same time, __tcp_read_sock() unlinks and frees the original SKB via tcp_eat_recv_skb().
This invokes sock_rfree() and immediately subtracts skb->truesize from sk->sk_rmem_alloc.
Because this queued clone lacks a destructor and was never charged, could sk_rmem_alloc artificially drop to 0?
If so, tcp_select_window() might compute free_space as if the buffer is entirely empty, continuously advertising a fully open TCP window and potentially allowing a remote attacker to stream infinite data and exhaust kernel memory.
[ ... ]
Quoted 21 lines
net/core/skmsg.c +5
-1@@ -1017,6 +1018,8 @@ static int sk_psock_verdict_apply(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb,* retrying later from workqueue. */ if (skb_queue_empty (&psock->ingress_skb)) { +bool charge_skb = true; + len = skb->len; off =0 ;if (skb_bpf_strparser (skb)) {@@ -1024,8 +1027,10 @@ static int sk_psock_verdict_apply(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb, off = stm->offset; len = stm->full_len; + charge_skb = false; } - err =sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (psock, skb, off, len, false); + err =sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (psock, skb, off, len, + false, charge_skb); }if (err <0 ) {spin_lock_bh (&psock->ingress_lock);
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Emil Tsalapatis
reviewerQuoted 5 lines · Junseo Lim
tcp_bpf_strp_read_sock()delays cleanup ofSK_PASSbytes by subtractingpsock->ingress_bytesfrom the amount passed to__tcp_cleanup_rbuf(). But whensk_psock_verdict_apply()queues the skb directly throughsk_psock_skb_ingress_self(),skb_set_owner_r()is called unconditionally and charges the skb again.
Can you specify in the commit that this is about sk_forward_alloc (AFAICT)? The eventual page_counter underflow is a second-order effect even if it's what eventually causes the crash.
Quoted 8 lines
The duplicated charge is later released independently and can trigger a
page_counterunderflow.Add a
charge_skbargument tosk_psock_skb_ingress_self()and skipskb_set_owner_r()only for the direct strparserSK_PASSpath. Keep existing accounting for the other self-ingress caller and for non-strparserSK_PASS.
Quoted 5 lines
Fixes 36b62df5683c ("bpf: Fix wrong copied_seq calculation")Signed-off-by Junseo Lim <[email protected]>---
Crash reproduced on Linux tree94515f3a7d4256a5062176b7d6ed0471938cd51awith KASAN, MEMCG, panic_on_warn=1, and oops=panic.
Can you make a selftest out of the reproducer?
Quoted 61 lines
Reproducer/log/config: https://gist.github.com/ZirAjs/16c95c89972ace73910d9b5ac78a5807
The reproducer drives the strparser
SK_PASSpath until teardown reports:
page_counterunderflowWorkqueue: events sk_psock_destroy Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...net/core/skmsg.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)net/core/skmsg.c +10
-10@@ -586,7 +586,8 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, }static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (struct sk_psock *psock,struct sk_buff *skb, -u32 off,u32 len,bool take_ref); +u32 off,u32 len,bool take_ref, +bool charge_skb);static int sk_psock_skb_ingress (struct sk_psock *psock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 off,u32 len)@@ -595,12 +596,9 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb,struct sk_msg *msg;int err; -/* If we are receiving on the same sock skb->sk is already assigned, -* skip memory accounting and owner transition seeing it already set -* correctly. -*/ if (unlikely (skb->sk == sk)) -return sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (psock, skb, off, len, true); +return sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (psock, skb, off, len, true, + true); msg =sk_psock_create_ingress_msg (sk, skb);if (!msg)return -EAGAIN ;@@ -618,12 +616,14 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb,return err; } -/* Puts an skb on the ingress queue of the socket already assigned to the -* skb. In this case we do not need to check memory limits or skb_set_owner_r -* because the skb is already accounted for here. +/* Puts an skb on the ingress queue for psock->sk. +* +* When charge_skb is false, the direct strparser SK_PASS path keeps the TCP +* receive queue accounting in place and must not call skb_set_owner_r(). */ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (struct sk_psock *psock,struct sk_buff *skb, -u32 off,u32 len,bool take_ref) +u32 off,u32 len,bool take_ref, +bool charge_skb) {struct sk_msg *msg =alloc_sk_msg (GFP_ATOMIC );struct sock *sk = psock->sk;
net/core/skmsg.c static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb · line 635
Quoted 6 lines
net/core/skmsg.c +2
-1@@ -631,7 +631,8 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skbif (unlikely (!msg))return -EAGAIN ; -skb_set_owner_r (skb, sk); +if (charge_skb) +skb_set_owner_r (skb, sk);
Sashiko's right that skipping this leaves the skb half-configured. Since the point is to not double-count sk_forward_alloc but we still have to account truesize, can you try something like:
if (!skb_charge)
sk_rmem_schedule(sk, skb, 0);
skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
to just ajust the sk_forward_alloc?
pw-bot: cr
Quoted 24 lines
net/core/skmsg.c +5
-1/* This is used in tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser() to determine whether the * data originates from the socket's own protocol stack. No need to @@ -1017,6 +1018,8 @@ static int sk_psock_verdict_apply(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb,* retrying later from workqueue. */ if (skb_queue_empty (&psock->ingress_skb)) { +bool charge_skb = true; + len = skb->len; off =0 ;if (skb_bpf_strparser (skb)) {@@ -1024,8 +1027,10 @@ static int sk_psock_verdict_apply(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb, off = stm->offset; len = stm->full_len; + charge_skb = false; } - err =sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (psock, skb, off, len, false); + err =sk_psock_skb_ingress_self (psock, skb, off, len, + false, charge_skb); }if (err <0 ) {spin_lock_bh (&psock->ingress_lock);