can: ctucanfd: unmap BAR0 using base address
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 can: ctucanfd: unmap BAR0 using base address
BAR0 is mapped into bar0_base, while cra_addr points to an offset within that mapping and is used for other purposes.
Pass bar0_base to pci_iounmap(), instead of cra_addr, on the probe error path so the address returned by pci_iomap() is used for unmapping.
--- drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_pci.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_pci.c +1 -1
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static int ctucan_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,pci_set_drvdata (pdev,NULL );kfree (bdata); err_pci_iounmap_bar0: -pci_iounmap (pdev, cra_addr); +pci_iounmap (pdev, bar0_base); err_pci_iounmap_bar1:pci_iounmap (pdev, addr); err_release_regions:
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Hello Avi,
thanks for correction.
Quoted 18 lines · On Thursday 23 of July 2026 11:59:34 Avi Weiss wrote:
BAR0 is mapped into
bar0_base, whilecra_addrpoints to an offset within that mapping and is used for other purposes.Pass
bar0_basetopci_iounmap(), instead ofcra_addr, on the probe error path so the address returned bypci_iomap()is used for unmapping.Fixes 792a5b678e81 ("can: ctucanfd: CTU CAN FD open-source IP core - PCIbus support.") Signed-off-by: Avi Weiss <[email protected]>
--- drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_pci.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_pci.cindex625788fa8976..f845951c5d51100644
drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_pci.c static int ctucan_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, · line 200
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_pci.c +1
-1@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static int ctucan_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,pci_set_drvdata (pdev,NULL );kfree (bdata); err_pci_iounmap_bar0: -pci_iounmap (pdev, cra_addr); +pci_iounmap (pdev, bar0_base); err_pci_iounmap_bar1:pci_iounmap (pdev, addr); err_release_regions:
CRA has been on the start in initial PCIe integrated version and when it has been shifted the switch of the name has been done incorrectly for pci_iounmap
Best wishes,
Pavel Pisa
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AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] NAPI poll livelock on SKB allocation failure.
- [High] Missing bounds checks on PCI BAR lengths before MMIO accesses. --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH net] can: ctucanfd: unmap BAR0 using base address --- commit 6b71833578fcc5fa2bdb08928e4e80211ffbd177
Author: Avi Weiss <[email protected]>
can: ctucanfd: unmap BAR0 using base address
BAR0 is mapped into bar0_base, while cra_addr points to an offset within that mapping and is used for other purposes. This patch passes bar0_base to pci_iounmap(), instead of cra_addr, on the probe error path so the address returned by pci_iomap() is used for unmapping.
drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_pci.c static int ctucan_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, · line 200
Quoted 13 lines
drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_pci.c +1
-1@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static int ctucan_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,pci_set_drvdata (pdev,NULL );kfree (bdata); err_pci_iounmap_bar0: -pci_iounmap (pdev, cra_addr); +pci_iounmap (pdev, bar0_base); err_pci_iounmap_bar1:pci_iounmap (pdev, addr); err_release_regions:
While reviewing this patch, I noticed a couple of pre-existing issues in the driver.
Quoted 10 lines
@@ ... @@ static int ctucan_pci_probe(struct
pci_dev*pdev,drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_pci.c +0
-0if (driver_data ==CTUCAN_WITHOUT_CTUCAN_ID ) { cra_addr = bar0_base; num_cores =2 ; }else { cra_addr = bar0_base +CTUCAN_BAR0_CRA_BASE ; ctucan_id =ioread32 (bar0_base +CTUCAN_BAR0_CTUCAN_ID );dev_info (dev,"ctucan_id 0x%08lx\n" , (unsigned long )ctucan_id); num_cores = ctucan_id &0xf ; }
[ ... ]
drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_pci.c
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_pci.c +0
-0while (core_i < num_cores) { addr +=0x4000 ; ret =ctucan_probe_common (dev, addr, irq, ntxbufs,100000000 ,0 , ctucan_pci_set_drvdata);
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does this code lack bounds checking on the PCI BAR lengths?
The driver extracts num_cores from a hardware register, which could allow up to 15 cores. Then it advances the MMIO pointer 'addr' out-of-bounds by 0x4000 for each core and probes the device based on this untrusted value.
Can a malicious or malfunctioning PCIe device (or virtual device via passthrough) advertise a small BAR size but a large num_cores, triggering an out-of-bounds MMIO access and kernel panic?
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_base.c +0
-0@@ ... @@ static int
ctucan_rx(struct net_device *ndev)drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_base.c +0
-0if (unlikely (!skb)) { priv->rxfrm_first_word = ffw;set_bit (CTUCANFD_FLAG_RX_FFW_BUFFERED , &priv->drv_flags);return 0 ; }
[ ... ]
drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_base.c
Quoted 6 lines
@@ ... @@ static int
ctucan_rx_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int quota)drivers/net/can/ctucanfd/ctucanfd_base.c +0
-0if (!framecnt && res !=0 ) {if (napi_complete_done (napi, work_done)) {/* Clear and enable RBNEI. It is level-triggered, so * there is no race condition. */
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but could this cause a NAPI poll livelock on SKB allocation failure?
If alloc_can_skb() or alloc_canfd_skb() fails due to OOM in ctucan_rx(), it returns 0.
The NAPI poll routine ctucan_rx_poll() then skips napi_complete_done() because res == 0, causing the !framecnt && res != 0 check to evaluate to false.
Because it returns less than quota without calling napi_complete_done(), doesn't this violate NAPI semantics? The core will immediately reschedule the poll, creating an infinite loop trying to allocate memory and leading to 100% CPU usage and a potential system lockup.
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1