Improve code in zcrypt msg type 6 handling
Subsystems (2)
Harald Freudenberger
maintainerv4 cover Improve code in zcrypt msg type 6 handling
Rework the limit and overflow checks in the both functions xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx() and xcrb_msg_to_type6cprb_msgx().
Changelog:
v1: initial version, one patch dealing with overflow checks around
the use of the CEIL4 macro in zcrypt_msgtype6.c
v2: Sashiko found a regression: The check
if (ap_msg->len > ap_msg->bufsize)
was missing in the rework. Added again this important check.
v3: - Split into two patches - one for CCA one for EP11
- rework upper limit/overflow check
- add lower limit check
v4: - tried to address all the remaining complains from sashiko.
Harald Freudenberger (2):
s390/zcrypt: Improve CCA CPRB length and overflow checks s390/zcrypt: Improve EP11 CPRB length and overflow checks
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c | 97 ++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
Harald Freudenberger
maintainerPATCH v4 1/2 s390/zcrypt: Improve CCA CPRB length and overflow checks
The xcrb_msg_to_type6cprb_msgx() function lacks proper input validation, creating security vulnerabilities:
1. Integer overflow after CEIL4 alignment: Signed int variables could overflow during 4-byte boundary alignment, causing undersized buffer allocations or incorrect bounds checking.
2. Missing minimum size validation: The CPRBX structure is copied from userspace without verifying sufficient buffer length. Undersized buffers cause uninitialized memory access when reading structure fields like cprbx.cprb_len and cprbx.domain.
3. Arithmetic overflow in sum calculations: Adding control block and data block sizes could overflow, bypassing size checks and enabling buffer overflows.
4. Potential kernel memory leak if copy_from_user() only copies xcrb->request_control_blk_length bytes but the processing of the message works with the rounded up to 4 byte boundary buffer size.
Fix by using size_t for length calculations, adding U32_MAX boundary checks after alignment, validating minimum control block size before copying from userspace, and detecting sum calculation overflows. Fix the possible kernel memory leak by zeroing the trailing bytes.
--- drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c | 77 +++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +37 -40
@@ -342,49 +342,40 @@ static int xcrb_msg_to_type6cprb_msgx(bool userspace, struct ap_message *ap_msg, }; }__packed * msg = ap_msg->msg; -int rcblen =CEIL4 (xcrb->request_control_blk_length); -int req_sumlen, resp_sumlen; -char *req_data = ap_msg->msg +sizeof (struct type6_hdr ) + rcblen; -char *function_code; +size_t req_cblen, rep_cblen, req_sumlen, rep_sumlen; +char *function_code, *req_data; -if (CEIL4 (xcrb->request_control_blk_length) < - xcrb->request_control_blk_length) -return -EINVAL ;/* overflow after alignment*/ - -/* length checks */ +/* request length and overflow checks */ +if (xcrb->request_control_blk_length <sizeof (struct CPRBX )) +return -EINVAL ; + req_cblen =CEIL4 ((size_t )xcrb->request_control_blk_length); +if (req_cblen >U32_MAX ) +return -EINVAL ; ap_msg->len =sizeof (struct type6_hdr ) + -CEIL4 (xcrb->request_control_blk_length) + - xcrb->request_data_length; + req_cblen + xcrb->request_data_length;if (ap_msg->len > ap_msg->bufsize)return -EINVAL ; - -/* -* Overflow check -* sum must be greater (or equal) than the largest operand -*/ - req_sumlen =CEIL4 (xcrb->request_control_blk_length) + - xcrb->request_data_length; -if ((CEIL4 (xcrb->request_control_blk_length) <= - xcrb->request_data_length) ? + req_sumlen = req_cblen + xcrb->request_data_length; +if (req_sumlen >U32_MAX ) +return -EINVAL ; +if (req_cblen <= xcrb->request_data_length ? req_sumlen < xcrb->request_data_length : - req_sumlen <CEIL4 (xcrb->request_control_blk_length)) { + req_sumlen < req_cblen) {return -EINVAL ; } -if (CEIL4 (xcrb->reply_control_blk_length) < - xcrb->reply_control_blk_length) -return -EINVAL ;/* overflow after alignment*/ - -/* -* Overflow check -* sum must be greater (or equal) than the largest operand -*/ - resp_sumlen =CEIL4 (xcrb->reply_control_blk_length) + - xcrb->reply_data_length; -if ((CEIL4 (xcrb->reply_control_blk_length) <= - xcrb->reply_data_length) ? - resp_sumlen < xcrb->reply_data_length : - resp_sumlen <CEIL4 (xcrb->reply_control_blk_length)) { +/* reply length and overflow checks */ +if (xcrb->reply_control_blk_length <sizeof (struct CPRBX )) +return -EINVAL ; + rep_cblen =CEIL4 ((size_t )xcrb->reply_control_blk_length); +if (rep_cblen >U32_MAX ) +return -EINVAL ; + rep_sumlen = rep_cblen + xcrb->reply_data_length; +if (rep_sumlen >U32_MAX ) +return -EINVAL ; +if (rep_cblen <= xcrb->reply_data_length ? + rep_sumlen < xcrb->reply_data_length : + rep_sumlen < rep_cblen) {return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -393,7 +384,7 @@ static int xcrb_msg_to_type6cprb_msgx(bool userspace, struct ap_message *ap_msg,memcpy (msg->hdr.agent_id, &xcrb->agent_ID,sizeof (xcrb->agent_ID)); msg->hdr.tocardlen1 = xcrb->request_control_blk_length;if (xcrb->request_data_length) { - msg->hdr.offset2 = msg->hdr.offset1 + rcblen; + msg->hdr.offset2 = msg->hdr.offset1 + req_cblen; msg->hdr.tocardlen2 = xcrb->request_data_length; } msg->hdr.fromcardlen1 = xcrb->reply_control_blk_length;
@@ -404,6 +395,9 @@ static int xcrb_msg_to_type6cprb_msgx(bool userspace, struct ap_message *ap_msg, xcrb->request_control_blk_addr, xcrb->request_control_blk_length))return -EFAULT ; +if (xcrb->request_control_blk_length < req_cblen) +memset (msg->userdata + xcrb->request_control_blk_length, +0 , req_cblen - xcrb->request_control_blk_length);if (msg->cprbx.cprb_len +sizeof (msg->hdr.function_code) > xcrb->request_control_blk_length)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -437,10 +431,13 @@ static int xcrb_msg_to_type6cprb_msgx(bool userspace, struct ap_message *ap_msg, }/* copy data block */ -if (xcrb->request_data_length && -z_copy_from_user (userspace, req_data, xcrb->request_data_address, - xcrb->request_data_length)) -return -EFAULT ; +if (xcrb->request_data_length) { + req_data = ap_msg->msg +sizeof (struct type6_hdr ) + req_cblen; +if (z_copy_from_user (userspace, req_data, + xcrb->request_data_address, + xcrb->request_data_length)) +return -EFAULT ; + }return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH v4 1/2] s390/zcrypt: Improve CCA CPRB length and overflow checks
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] This problem wasn't introduced by this patch, but the patch completely misses identical logic flaws in the EP11 path (xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx). While the patch successfully fixes critical vulnerabilities in the CCA path, it leaves the kernel vulnerable to a catastrophic kernel panic (DoS), uninitialized kernel memory reads, and an uninitialized memory leak to hardware via the ZSENDEP11CPRB ioctl. --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH v4 1/2] s390/zcrypt: Improve CCA CPRB length and overflow checks --- commit 0472132f230811c8d94963dccf05ca137d96d8ec
Author: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
s390/zcrypt: Improve CCA CPRB length and overflow checks
This patch fixes integer overflows, minimum size validation, and potential kernel memory leaks in xcrb_msg_to_type6cprb_msgx(). It adds U32_MAX boundary checks, validates minimum control block sizes, and zeros trailing bytes to prevent leaking uninitialized memory.
Quoted 14 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +2
-4@@ -342,49 +342,40 @@ static int xcrb_msg_to_type6cprb_msgx(bool userspace, struct ap_message *ap_msg, }; }__packed * msg = ap_msg->msg; -int rcblen =CEIL4 (xcrb->request_control_blk_length); -int req_sumlen, resp_sumlen; -char *req_data = ap_msg->msg +sizeof (struct type6_hdr ) + rcblen; -char *function_code; +size_t req_cblen, rep_cblen, req_sumlen, rep_sumlen; +char *function_code, *req_data;
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c static int xcrb_msg_to_type6cprb_msgx(bool userspace, struct ap_message *ap_msg, · line 351
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +4
-5-if (CEIL4 (xcrb->request_control_blk_length) < - xcrb->request_control_blk_length) -return -EINVAL ;/* overflow after alignment*/ - -/* length checks */ +/* request length and overflow checks */ +if (xcrb->request_control_blk_length <sizeof (struct CPRBX )) +return -EINVAL ; + req_cblen =CEIL4 ((size_t )xcrb->request_control_blk_length);
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx() need these same fixes?
It looks like the EP11 path has the same logic flaws that this patch fixes for the CCA path. For example, if a large req_len is provided, couldn't the length calculation wrap around and bypass the buffer size check?
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c:xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx()
...
ap_msg->len = sizeof(struct type6_hdr) + CEIL4(xcrb->req_len);
...If the buffer size check is bypassed, could z_copy_from_user() fail access_ok() and zero out the destination buffer with a massive length, crashing the kernel?
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c:xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx()
...
if (z_copy_from_user(userspace, msg->userdata,
(char __force __user *)xcrb->req, xcrb->req_len)) {
...Additionally, if req_len is very small, could this lead to uninitialized memory reads when accessing msg->pld_lenfmt, since there doesn't appear to be a minimum control block size check?
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c:xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx()
...
if ((msg->pld_lenfmt & 0x80) == 0x80) { /*ext.len.fmt 2 or 3*/
...Finally, if req_len requires padding, does the trailing padding get zeroed out, or could it leak uninitialized kernel heap memory to the hardware?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Harald Freudenberger
maintainerPATCH v4 2/2 s390/zcrypt: Improve EP11 CPRB length and overflow checks
In reply to Harald FreudenbergerThe xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx() function lacks proper input validation, creating security vulnerabilities:
1. Missing minimum size validation: The ep11_cprb structure and subsequent payload fields (pld_tag, pld_lenfmt) are copied from userspace without verifying sufficient buffer length.
2. Arithmetic overflow in length calculations: CEIL4 alignment could overflow, bypassing size checks and enabling buffer overflows.
Fix by using size_t for length calculations, adding U32_MAX boundary checks after alignment, and validating minimum request size and minimum reply size before copying from userspace.
--- drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +14 -6
@@ -477,16 +477,24 @@ static int xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx(bool userspace, struct ap_message *apunsigned int dom_val;/* domain id */ }__packed * payload_hdr =NULL ; -if (CEIL4 (xcrb->req_len) < xcrb->req_len) -return -EINVAL ;/* overflow after alignment*/ +size_t req_len, rep_len; -/* length checks */ - ap_msg->len =sizeof (struct type6_hdr ) +CEIL4 (xcrb->req_len); +/* request length and overflow checks */ +if (xcrb->req_len <sizeof (struct ep11_cprb ) +2 *sizeof (unsigned char )) +return -EINVAL ; + req_len =CEIL4 (xcrb->req_len); +if (req_len < xcrb->req_len || req_len >U32_MAX ) +return -EINVAL ; + ap_msg->len =sizeof (struct type6_hdr ) + req_len;if (ap_msg->len > ap_msg->bufsize)return -EINVAL ; -if (CEIL4 (xcrb->resp_len) < xcrb->resp_len) -return -EINVAL ;/* overflow after alignment*/ +/* reply length and overflow checks */ +if (xcrb->resp_len <sizeof (struct ep11_cprb )) +return -EINVAL ; + rep_len =CEIL4 (xcrb->resp_len); +if (rep_len < xcrb->resp_len || rep_len >U32_MAX ) +return -EINVAL ;/* prepare type6 header */ msg->hdr = static_type6_ep11_hdr;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH v4 2/2] s390/zcrypt: Improve EP11 CPRB length and overflow checks
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Medium] Incomplete minimum length check for EP11 CPRB requests leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes of uninitialized kernel heap memory.
- [Medium] Uninitialized padding bytes are leaked to the AP coprocessor hardware.
--
--- Patch [2]: [PATCH v4 2/2] s390/zcrypt: Improve EP11 CPRB length and overflow checks --- commit 35795525c75a20e288cf1cb8e4a3621e47212c8d
Author: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
s390/zcrypt: Improve EP11 CPRB length and overflow checks
The xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx() function lacks proper input validation, creating security vulnerabilities:
1. Missing minimum size validation: The ep11_cprb structure and subsequent payload fields (pld_tag, pld_lenfmt) are copied from userspace without verifying sufficient buffer length.
2. Arithmetic overflow in length calculations: CEIL4 alignment could overflow, bypassing size checks and enabling buffer overflows.
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +0
-0@@ -477,16 +477,24 @@ static int xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx(bool userspace, struct ap_message *apunsigned int dom_val;/* domain id */ }__packed * payload_hdr =NULL ;
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c static int xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx(bool userspace, struct ap_message *ap · line 484
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +4
-4-if (CEIL4 (xcrb->req_len) < xcrb->req_len) -return -EINVAL ;/* overflow after alignment*/ +size_t req_len, rep_len; -/* length checks */ - ap_msg->len =sizeof (struct type6_hdr ) +CEIL4 (xcrb->req_len); +/* request length and overflow checks */ +if (xcrb->req_len <sizeof (struct ep11_cprb ) +2 *sizeof (unsigned char )) +return -EINVAL ;
[Severity: Medium]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this minimum length check ensure enough data is copied for the payload header?
Later in xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx(), payload_hdr->func_val is accessed:
xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx() {
...
payload_hdr = (struct pld_hdr *)((&msg->pld_lenfmt) + lfmt);
*fcode = payload_hdr->func_val & 0xFFFF;
...
}If xcrb->req_len is smaller than the required size for the payload header, could this result in reading uninitialized kernel heap memory?
Additionally, could this lead to an out-of-bounds write in zcrypt_msgtype6_send_ep11_cprb() when it assigns payload_hdr->dom_val?
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c static int xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx(bool userspace, struct ap_message *ap · line 488
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +4
-0+ req_len =CEIL4 (xcrb->req_len); +if (req_len < xcrb->req_len || req_len >U32_MAX ) +return -EINVAL ; + ap_msg->len =sizeof (struct type6_hdr ) + req_len;
[Severity: Medium]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but do we need to zero out the padding bytes added by CEIL4()?
If xcrb->req_len is not a multiple of 4, the length is rounded up, but the padding bytes don't appear to be initialized. Could this leak up to 3 bytes of uninitialized kernel memory to the AP hardware?
Quoted 2 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +0
-0if (ap_msg->len > ap_msg->bufsize)return -EINVAL ;
[ ... ]
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=2