ntfs: apply Windows name checks only with windows_names
Namjae Jeon
maintainerPATCH 1/2 ntfs: apply Windows name checks only with windows_names
The windows_names mount option is documented to reject names containing characters forbidden by Windows. However, ntfs_check_bad_windows_name() unconditionally rejects those characters before checking the mount option.
Move the character validation after the option check so a default NTFS mount accepts POSIX names such as names containing ':'. Mounts using windows_names retain the existing Windows-compatible validation, including reserved device names and trailing spaces or dots.
--- fs/ntfs/namei.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ntfs/namei.c +3 -3
@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ static int ntfs_check_bad_windows_name(struct ntfs_volume *vol, const __le16 *wc, unsigned int wc_len) { - if (ntfs_check_bad_char(wc, wc_len)) - return -EINVAL; - if (!NVolCheckWindowsNames(vol)) return 0; + if (ntfs_check_bad_char(wc, wc_len)) + return -EINVAL; +/* Check for trailing space or dot. */ if (wc_len > 0 && (wc[wc_len - 1] == cpu_to_le16(' ') ||
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Namjae Jeon
maintainerPATCH 2/2 ntfs: preserve chmod mode before applying mount masks
fmask and dmask must continue to constrain the effective permissions of every file on a mount. Applying either mask before persisting an ATTR_MODE change, however, stores the masked mode in . later remount with a less restrictive mask then cannot restore the mode that chmod requested.
Store the requested mode in first, then apply the mount mask to the in-memory inode. This retains the mount-wide access restriction without making it permanent. Also return failures while writing the WSL inode EA to the caller.
--- fs/ntfs/file.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ntfs/file.c +7 -4
@@ -342,14 +342,17 @@ int ntfs_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,if (ia_valid &ATTR_MODE ) flags |=NTFS_EA_MODE ; +mutex_lock (&ni->mrec_lock); + err =ntfs_ea_set_wsl_inode (vi,0 ,NULL , flags); +mutex_unlock (&ni->mrec_lock); +if (err) + goto out; + +/* Apply mount masks after saving the unmasked POSIX mode. */ if (S_ISDIR (vi->i_mode)) vi->i_mode &= ~vol->dmask;else vi->i_mode &= ~vol->fmask; - -mutex_lock (&ni->mrec_lock); -ntfs_ea_set_wsl_inode (vi,0 ,NULL , flags); -mutex_unlock (&ni->mrec_lock); }mark_inode_dirty (vi);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH 2/2] ntfs: preserve chmod mode before applying mount masks
2026년 7월 25일 (토) 오전 12:49, Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>님이 작성:
Quoted 6 lines
fmask and dmask must continue to constrain the effective permissions of every file on a mount. Applying either mask before persisting an
ATTR_MODEchange, however, stores the masked mode in . later remount with a less restrictive mask then cannot restore the mode that chmod requested.
Quoted 6 lines
Store the requested mode in first, then apply the mount mask to the in-memory inode. This retains the mount-wide access restriction without making it permanent. Also return failures while writing the WSL inode EA to the caller.
Signed-off-by Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
Looks good to me.
Quoted 33 lines
--- fs/ntfs/file.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)fs/ntfs/file.c +7
-5@@ -342,14 +342,17 @@ int ntfs_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,if (ia_valid &ATTR_MODE ) flags |=NTFS_EA_MODE ; +mutex_lock (&ni->mrec_lock); + err =ntfs_ea_set_wsl_inode (vi,0 ,NULL , flags); +mutex_unlock (&ni->mrec_lock); +if (err) + goto out; + +/* Apply mount masks after saving the unmasked POSIX mode. */ if (S_ISDIR (vi->i_mode)) vi->i_mode &= ~vol->dmask;else vi->i_mode &= ~vol->fmask; - -mutex_lock (&ni->mrec_lock); -ntfs_ea_set_wsl_inode (vi,0 ,NULL , flags); -mutex_unlock (&ni->mrec_lock); }mark_inode_dirty (vi); --2.25.1
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Hyunchul
2026년 7월 25일 (토) 오전 12:49, Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>님이 작성:
Quoted 11 lines
The
windows_namesmount option is documented to reject names containing characters forbidden by Windows. However,ntfs_check_bad_windows_name()unconditionally rejects those characters before checking the mount option.Move the character validation after the option check so a default NTFS mount accepts POSIX names such as names containing ':'. Mounts using
windows_namesretain the existing Windows-compatible validation, including reserved device names and trailing spaces or dots.Signed-off-by Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
Looks good to me.
Quoted 27 lines
--- fs/ntfs/namei.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)fs/ntfs/namei.c +3
-4@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ static int ntfs_check_bad_windows_name(struct ntfs_volume *vol, const __le16 *wc, unsigned int wc_len) { - if (ntfs_check_bad_char(wc, wc_len)) - return -EINVAL; - if (!NVolCheckWindowsNames(vol)) return 0; + if (ntfs_check_bad_char(wc, wc_len)) + return -EINVAL; + /* Check for trailing space or dot. */ if (wc_len > 0 && (wc[wc_len - 1] == cpu_to_le16(' ') || --2.25.1
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Hyunchul