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KVM: arm64: Fix host-directed debug for non-protected pKVM guests

PATCH Applied Fuad Tabba 3 participants 6 messages Jul 26 – Jul 31

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Fuad Tabba

author reviewer
#0 lore raw

cover KVM: arm64: Fix host-directed debug for non-protected pKVM guests

Hi folks,

Under pKVM, host-directed hardware debug of a non-protected guest (KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW) and userspace single-step never fire.

When the host owns the debug registers, the world switch loads MDSCR_EL1 from external_mdscr_el1, where the host's MDE/KDE/SS bits live. flush_debug_state() copies the guest's debug_owner and the owner-selected debug register state to the hyp vCPU, but not external_mdscr_el1, so the field reaches hardware as zero and the debug exceptions stay disabled. Patch 1 propagates it.

Patch 2 adds a debug-exceptions selftest for a userspace watchpoint, which the suite did not cover: it checks that the watchpoint fires and reports the accessed address in debug.arch.far. It fails without patch 1 and passes with it. The existing single-step test passes even when stepping never fires, so it does not catch this.

Found while adding self-hosted debug support for protected VMs.

Based on Linux 7.2-rc4 (1590cf0329716).

Cheers,
/fuad

Fuad Tabba (2):
KVM: arm64: Flush external_mdscr_el1 to the pKVM hyp vCPU
KVM: arm64: selftests: Add a userspace watchpoint test

 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c            | 10 ++++-
 .../selftests/kvm/arm64/debug-exceptions.c    | 41 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

base-commit: 1590cf0329716306e948a8fc29f1d3ee87d3989f

Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author reviewer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 KVM: arm64: Flush external_mdscr_el1 to the pKVM hyp vCPU

flush_debug_state() propagates the guest's debug_owner and the owner-selected debug register state to the hyp vCPU, but not external_mdscr_el1. While the host owns the debug registers, the world switch loads MDSCR_EL1 from external_mdscr_el1 (ctxt_mdscr_el1()), where the host's KDE/MDE/SS bits live. A non-protected guest under KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW or single-step therefore runs with MDSCR_EL1.MDE/SS clear in hardware, and its watchpoints, breakpoints and single-step never fire.

Propagate external_mdscr_el1 to the hyp vCPU alongside the host-owned debug state.

Fixes 4ad3a0b87f2ec ("KVM: arm64: Don't hijack guest context MDSCR_EL1")
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +8 -2
index d3c69de698f48..104026ee70e80 100644
@@ -108,10 +108,16 @@ static void flush_debug_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
 
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.debug_owner = host_vcpu->arch.debug_owner;
 
-	if (kvm_guest_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu))
+	if (kvm_guest_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu)) {
 		hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vcpu_debug_state = host_vcpu->arch.vcpu_debug_state;
-	else if (kvm_host_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu))
+	} else if (kvm_host_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu)) {
 		hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.external_debug_state = host_vcpu->arch.external_debug_state;
+		/*
+		 * The world switch loads MDSCR_EL1 from external_mdscr_el1
+		 * (ctxt_mdscr_el1()).
+		 */
+		hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.external_mdscr_el1 = host_vcpu->arch.external_mdscr_el1;
+	}
 }
 
 static void sync_debug_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: arm64: Flush external_mdscr_el1 to the pKVM hyp vCPU

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

New issues:
- [Critical] The patch breaks pKVM guest isolation by allowing the host to arm hardware debug exceptions against a protected VM.

Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] The hypervisor unconditionally copies trap configurations and debug states between the untrusted host and the protected VM on every entry and exit, violating pKVM state isolation and confidentiality. --

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: arm64: Flush external_mdscr_el1 to the pKVM hyp vCPU --- commit 11c3469e00f567f8f8ae658ca753847976608a5d
Author: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>

KVM: arm64: Flush external_mdscr_el1 to the pKVM hyp vCPU

This commit propagates the external_mdscr_el1 register state to the pKVM hyp vCPU during flush_debug_state(). This ensures that a non-protected guest runs with the correct hardware flags set by the host.

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void flush_debug_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 109

Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +0 -0
@@ -108,10 +108,16 @@ static void flush_debug_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
 
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.debug_owner = host_vcpu->arch.debug_owner;

[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this allow the host to hijack debug ownership for a protected VM?

The hypervisor unconditionally copies the untrusted host's debug_owner here on every guest entry.

Additionally, similar unconditional copying occurs for trap configurations and debug states from the host structure:

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c:flush_hyp_vcpu() {
    ...
    hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2;
    ...
}

And on guest exit, state is copied back out to the host:

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c:sync_debug_state() {
    ...
    if (kvm_guest_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu))
        host_vcpu->arch.vcpu_debug_state = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vcpu_debug_state;
    ...
}

Could this allow the host to reconfigure the protected guest's execution environment via mdcr_el2, and leak private hardware debug register state back to the untrusted host?

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void flush_debug_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 119

Quoted 11 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +7 -2
-	if (kvm_guest_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu))
+	if (kvm_guest_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu)) {
 		hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vcpu_debug_state = host_vcpu->arch.vcpu_debug_state;
-	else if (kvm_host_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu))
+	} else if (kvm_host_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu)) {
 		hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.external_debug_state = host_vcpu->arch.external_debug_state;
+		/*
+		 * The world switch loads MDSCR_EL1 from external_mdscr_el1
+		 * (ctxt_mdscr_el1()).
+		 */
+		hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.external_mdscr_el1 = host_vcpu->arch.external_mdscr_el1;

[Severity: Critical]
Is this a regression that breaks pKVM guest isolation by allowing the host to arm hardware debug exceptions against a protected VM?

By copying external_mdscr_el1 from the untrusted host to the EL2 private state unconditionally, a malicious host could populate external_mdscr_el1 with debug flags (e.g., MDE=1 and SS=1) prior to KVM_RUN.

The world switch would then load these host-controlled values directly into the hardware MDSCR_EL1 register. Under the pKVM threat model, could this allow the host to intercept execution, extract register state, and modify control flow of a protected VM?

Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +1 -0
+	}
 }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
author reviewer
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: arm64: Flush external_mdscr_el1 to the pKVM hyp vCPU

Quoted 8 lines · On Sun, 26 Jul 2026 at 15:54, <[email protected]> wrote:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

New issues:
- [Critical] The patch breaks pKVM guest isolation by allowing the host to arm hardware debug exceptions against a protected VM.

Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] The hypervisor unconditionally copies trap configurations and debug states between the untrusted host and the protected VM on every entry and exit, violating pKVM state isolation and confidentiality.

For both issues, protected VM state isolation is WIP upstream [1], coming soon (fingers crossed).

/fuad

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Quoted 78 lines

--

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: arm64: Flush external_mdscr_el1 to the pKVM hyp vCPU --- commit 11c3469e00f567f8f8ae658ca753847976608a5d
Author: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>

KVM: arm64: Flush external_mdscr_el1 to the pKVM hyp vCPU

This commit propagates the external_mdscr_el1 register state to the pKVM hyp vCPU during flush_debug_state(). This ensures that a non-protected guest runs with the correct hardware flags set by the host.

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void flush_debug_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 109

Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +0 -0
@@ -108,10 +108,16 @@ static void flush_debug_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
 
      hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.debug_owner = host_vcpu->arch.debug_owner;

[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this allow the host to hijack debug ownership for a protected VM?

The hypervisor unconditionally copies the untrusted host's debug_owner here on every guest entry.

Additionally, similar unconditional copying occurs for trap configurations and debug states from the host structure:

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c:flush_hyp_vcpu() {
    ...
    hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2;
    ...
}

And on guest exit, state is copied back out to the host:

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c:sync_debug_state() {
    ...
    if (kvm_guest_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu))
        host_vcpu->arch.vcpu_debug_state = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vcpu_debug_state;
    ...
}

Could this allow the host to reconfigure the protected guest's execution environment via mdcr_el2, and leak private hardware debug register state back to the untrusted host?

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void flush_debug_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 119

Quoted 11 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +7 -2
-     if (kvm_guest_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu))
+     if (kvm_guest_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu)) {
              hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vcpu_debug_state = host_vcpu->arch.vcpu_debug_state;
-     else if (kvm_host_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu))
+     } else if (kvm_host_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu)) {
              hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.external_debug_state = host_vcpu->arch.external_debug_state;
+             /*
+              * The world switch loads MDSCR_EL1 from external_mdscr_el1
+              * (ctxt_mdscr_el1()).
+              */
+             hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.external_mdscr_el1 = host_vcpu->arch.external_mdscr_el1;

[Severity: Critical]
Is this a regression that breaks pKVM guest isolation by allowing the host to arm hardware debug exceptions against a protected VM?

By copying external_mdscr_el1 from the untrusted host to the EL2 private state unconditionally, a malicious host could populate external_mdscr_el1 with debug flags (e.g., MDE=1 and SS=1) prior to KVM_RUN.

The world switch would then load these host-controlled values directly into the hardware MDSCR_EL1 register. Under the pKVM threat model, could this allow the host to intercept execution, extract register state, and modify control flow of a protected VM?

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void flush_debug_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 121

Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +1 -0
+     }
 }

--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1

author reviewer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 KVM: arm64: selftests: Add a userspace watchpoint test

In reply to Fuad Tabba

debug-exceptions covers guest self-hosted debug and userspace single-step, but not a userspace (KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW) watchpoint, whose KVM_EXIT_DEBUG reports the accessed address in debug.arch.far. Add a test that installs a host-directed write watchpoint and checks that the reported address matches the accessed variable.

---
 .../selftests/kvm/arm64/debug-exceptions.c    | 41 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/debug-exceptions.c +41 -0
index 3eb4b1b6682dc..7dc5f0b4f6adf 100644
@@ -527,6 +527,46 @@ void test_single_step_from_userspace(int test_cnt)
 	kvm_vm_free(vm);
 }
 
+static void guest_code_wp(void)
+{
+	write_data = 'x';
+	GUEST_DONE();
+}
+
+/*
+ * A userspace hardware watchpoint (KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW) must fire and report
+ * the accessed address in debug.arch.far, exercising the watchpoint exit path.
+ */
+static void test_watchpoint_from_userspace(void)
+{
+	struct kvm_guest_debug debug = {};
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	struct kvm_run *run;
+	struct kvm_vm *vm;
+
+	vm = vm_create_with_one_vcpu(&vcpu, guest_code_wp);
+	run = vcpu->run;
+
+	debug.control = KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW;
+	debug.arch.dbg_wcr[0] = DBGWCR_LEN8 | DBGWCR_RD | DBGWCR_WR |
+				DBGWCR_EL1 | DBGWCR_E;
+	/*
+	 * BAS = 0xff (LEN8) requires a doubleword-aligned DBGWVR; FAR still
+	 * reports the exact accessed byte.
+	 */
+	debug.arch.dbg_wvr[0] = PC(write_data) & ~7UL;
+	vcpu_guest_debug_set(vcpu, &debug);
+
+	vcpu_run(vcpu);
+	TEST_ASSERT(run->exit_reason == KVM_EXIT_DEBUG,
+		    "Expected KVM_EXIT_DEBUG, got %u", run->exit_reason);
+	TEST_ASSERT((u64)run->debug.arch.far == PC(write_data),
+		    "Watchpoint FAR 0x%lx != accessed address 0x%lx",
+		    (u64)run->debug.arch.far, PC(write_data));
+
+	kvm_vm_free(vm);
+}
+
 /*
  * Run debug testing using the various breakpoint#, watchpoint# and
  * context-aware breakpoint# with the given ID_AA64DFR0_EL1 configuration.
@@ -600,6 +640,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 
 	test_guest_debug_exceptions_all(aa64dfr0);
 	test_single_step_from_userspace(ss_iteration);
+	test_watchpoint_from_userspace();
 
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
maintainer Applied
#5 lore raw
In reply to Fuad Tabba
Quoted 11 lines · Fuad Tabba

Under pKVM, host-directed hardware debug of a non-protected guest (KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW) and userspace single-step never fire.

When the host owns the debug registers, the world switch loads MDSCR_EL1 from external_mdscr_el1, where the host's MDE/KDE/SS bits live. flush_debug_state() copies the guest's debug_owner and the owner-selected debug register state to the hyp vCPU, but not external_mdscr_el1, so the field reaches hardware as zero and the debug exceptions stay disabled. Patch 1 propagates it.

[...]

Applied to next, thanks!

[1/2] KVM: arm64: Flush external_mdscr_el1 to the pKVM hyp vCPU

      https://git.kernel.org/kvmarm/kvmarm/c/119a9a23fbae
[2/2] KVM: arm64: selftests: Add a userspace watchpoint test
      https://git.kernel.org/kvmarm/kvmarm/c/3be99f8751c9

--
Best,
Oliver