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boot: fit: authenticate the dm-verity roothash

PATCH Superseded Daniel Golle 2 participants 6 messages Jul 14 – Jul 27

v2 of 4 Superseded Latest is v4 →

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover boot: fit: authenticate the dm-verity roothash

A signed FIT configuration can delegate the integrity of a (potentially large) root filesystem image to the kernel's dm-verity instead of having U-Boot hash the whole payload at boot: the FIT carries a "dm-verity" subnode with the roothash, salt and block parameters, U-Boot passes the roothash to Linux through the dm-mod.create bootargs, and dm-verity then validates the filesystem block by block against it.

For that to be safe the roothash has to be trusted, and in a signed configuration the only thing that establishes trust is the configuration signature. The roothash was not covered by it. fit_config_add_hash() collected the image node, its hash subnodes and its cipher subnode into the signed region, but not the dm-verity subnode, so the roothash, the sole integrity anchor for the filesystem, was left unsigned.

The result is a verified-boot bypass for the root filesystem: an attacker who can rewrite the boot medium can replace the filesystem, recompute a matching dm-verity tree, write the new roothash into the unsigned dm-verity subnode, and the configuration signature still verifies. dm-verity then faithfully validates the malicious filesystem against the attacker's roothash.

This series closes the gap.

v2: address comments by Tom Rini
* drop the VISIBLE_IF_UT visibility macro; fit_config_get_signed_nodes() is now simply non-static (previously the function would end up being inlined, so there *is* a real cost to this)
* document test_fit_verity_sign.py with pydoc docstrings including an ITS example, and add a page under doc/develop/pytest/ so the module is rendered in the generated documentation
* collect Reviewed-by tags on patches 1 and 2

Daniel Golle (3):
boot: fit: factor out node-path collection in fit_config_add_hash()
boot: fit: cover the dm-verity roothash with the config signature
test: fit: verify dm-verity roothash is covered by the config
signature

 boot/image-fit-sig.c                        | 108 +++++++----
 doc/develop/pytest/test_fit_verity_sign.rst |  10 +
 include/image.h                             |  23 +++
 test/boot/fit_verity.c                      | 194 +++++++++++++++++++
 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py       | 202 ++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/image-host.c                          |  22 +++
 6 files changed, 520 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 doc/develop/pytest/test_fit_verity_sign.rst
 create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py

base-commit: 6741b0dfb41dc82a284ab1cff4c58af6ef2f3f9c

Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/3 boot: fit: factor out node-path collection in fit_config_add_hash()

fit_config_add_hash() repeats the same sequence to append a node's path to the hashed-node list three times: for the image node, for each hash subnode and for the cipher subnode. Extract it into a helper, fit_config_add_node(), with no functional change.

---
v2: no changes

 boot/image-fit-sig.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
boot/image-fit-sig.c +44 -29
index 9b5ab754561..513ee9cc16a 100644
@@ -230,6 +230,37 @@ int fit_image_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * fit_config_add_node() - Append one node's path to the hashed-node list
+ *
+ * @fit:		FIT blob
+ * @noffset:		Offset of the node whose path should be added
+ * @node_inc:		Array of path pointers to fill
+ * @count:		Pointer to current count (updated on return)
+ * @max_nodes:		Maximum entries in @node_inc
+ * @buf:		Buffer for packed path strings
+ * @buf_used:		Pointer to bytes used in @buf (updated on return)
+ * @buf_len:		Total size of @buf
+ * Return: 0 on success, -ve on error
+ */
+static int fit_config_add_node(const void *fit, int noffset, char **node_inc,
+			       int *count, int max_nodes, char *buf,
+			       int *buf_used, int buf_len)
+{
+	int ret, len;
+
+	if (*count >= max_nodes)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used, buf_len - *buf_used);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return -ENOENT;
+	len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
+	node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
+	*buf_used += len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * fit_config_add_hash() - Add hash nodes for one image to the node list
  *
@@ -250,18 +281,12 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 			       char **node_inc, int *count, int max_nodes,
 			       char *buf, int *buf_used, int buf_len)
 {
-	int noffset, hash_count, ret, len;
+	int noffset, hash_count, ret;
 
-	if (*count >= max_nodes)
-		return -ENOSPC;
-
-	ret = fdt_get_path(fit, image_noffset, buf + *buf_used,
-			   buf_len - *buf_used);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return -ENOENT;
-	len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
-	node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
-	*buf_used += len;
+	ret = fit_config_add_node(fit, image_noffset, node_inc, count,
+				  max_nodes, buf, buf_used, buf_len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	/* Add all this image's hash subnodes */
 	hash_count = 0;
@@ -273,15 +298,10 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 		if (strncmp(name, FIT_HASH_NODENAME,
 			    strlen(FIT_HASH_NODENAME)))
 			continue;
-		if (*count >= max_nodes)
-			return -ENOSPC;
-		ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used,
-				   buf_len - *buf_used);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return -ENOENT;
-		len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
-		node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
-		*buf_used += len;
+		ret = fit_config_add_node(fit, noffset, node_inc, count,
+					  max_nodes, buf, buf_used, buf_len);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
 		hash_count++;
 	}
 
@@ -296,15 +316,10 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 	if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
 		if (noffset < 0)
 			return -EIO;
-		if (*count >= max_nodes)
-			return -ENOSPC;
-		ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used,
-				   buf_len - *buf_used);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return -ENOENT;
-		len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
-		node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
-		*buf_used += len;
+		ret = fit_config_add_node(fit, noffset, node_inc, count,
+					  max_nodes, buf, buf_used, buf_len);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/3 boot: fit: cover the dm-verity roothash with the config signature

In reply to Daniel Golle

A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot when it is loaded; its integrity is delegated to the kernel, which validates the filesystem on the fly against the roothash taken from the FIT dm-verity subnode. The roothash is therefore the sole integrity anchor for the filesystem, yet fit_config_add_hash() only added the image node, its hash subnodes and its cipher subnode to the signed region, leaving the dm-verity subnode (roothash, salt and block parameters) unsigned.

An attacker able to rewrite the boot medium could then replace both the filesystem and the roothash, recompute a matching dm-verity tree and keep the configuration signature valid, defeating verified boot for the root filesystem.

Add the dm-verity subnode to the list of nodes covered by the configuration signature, both when signing (tools/image-host.c) and when verifying (boot/image-fit-sig.c), so the roothash and salt are authenticated together with the rest of the configuration.

---
v2: no changes

 boot/image-fit-sig.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 tools/image-host.c   | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
boot/image-fit-sig.c +19 -4
index 513ee9cc16a..c2f09885492 100644
@@ -264,8 +264,8 @@ static int fit_config_add_node(const void *fit, int noffset, char **node_inc,
 /**
  * fit_config_add_hash() - Add hash nodes for one image to the node list
  *
- * Adds the image path, all its hash-* subnode paths, and its cipher
- * subnode path (if present) to the packed buffer.
+ * Adds the image path, all its hash-* subnode paths, and its cipher and
+ * dm-verity subnode paths (each if present) to the packed buffer.
  *
  * @fit:		FIT blob
  * @image_noffset:	Image node offset (e.g. /images/kernel-1)
@@ -322,6 +322,21 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 			return ret;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Add this image's dm-verity node if present. Its roothash is the
+	 * only integrity anchor for a dm-verity filesystem image, so it must
+	 * be covered by the configuration signature.
+	 */
+	noffset = fdt_subnode_offset(fit, image_noffset, FIT_VERITY_NODENAME);
+	if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
+		if (noffset < 0)
+			return -EIO;
+		ret = fit_config_add_node(fit, noffset, node_inc, count,
+					  max_nodes, buf, buf_used, buf_len);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -329,8 +344,8 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
  * fit_config_get_hash_list() - Build the list of nodes to hash
  *
  * Works through every image referenced by the configuration and collects the
- * node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash and
- * cipher subnodes.
+ * node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash,
+ * cipher and dm-verity subnodes.
  *
  * Properties known not to be image references (description, compatible,
  * default, load-only) are skipped, so any new image type is covered by default.
tools/image-host.c +22 -0
index 8f1e7be4066..235f7643d08 100644
@@ -1256,6 +1256,28 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 			goto err_mem;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Add this image's dm-verity node if present. Its roothash is the
+	 * only integrity anchor for a dm-verity filesystem image, so it must
+	 * be covered by the configuration signature.
+	 */
+	noffset = fdt_subnode_offset(fit, image_noffset,
+				     FIT_VERITY_NODENAME);
+	if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
+		if (noffset < 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+				"Failed to get dm-verity node in configuration '%s/%s' image '%s': %s\n",
+				conf_name, sig_name, iname,
+				fdt_strerror(noffset));
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+		ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, path, sizeof(path));
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto err_path;
+		if (strlist_add(node_inc, path))
+			goto err_mem;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 
 err_mem:
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/3 test: fit: verify dm-verity roothash is covered by the config signature

In reply to Daniel Golle

A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot; its integrity is delegated to the kernel, which trusts the roothash taken from the FIT dm-verity subnode. For that chain of trust to hold, the roothash (and salt) must be part of the region covered by the configuration signature, otherwise an attacker can replace both the filesystem and the roothash while keeping the signature valid.

Add two independent checks of this property:

- test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py signs a configuration that references a filesystem image carrying a dm-verity subnode, then confirms that tampering the roothash or the salt is rejected by fit_check_sign. A control that tampers a byte known to be signed proves the check can fail. A matching page is added under doc/develop/pytest/ so the module documentation is rendered with the rest of the generated docs.

- test/boot/fit_verity.c gains a runtime unit test that builds the exact node list the configuration signature is computed over, turns it into hashed regions and checks both that the roothash bytes fall inside a signed region and that tampering them changes the hash. It needs no private key, so it also runs on real devices and uses the same hash path a device would.

To let the unit test build the signed-region node list, rename the config node-list helper to fit_config_get_signed_nodes(), make it non-static and declare it in image.h.

---
v2: address comments by Tom Rini
* drop the VISIBLE_IF_UT visibility macro and simply make fit_config_get_signed_nodes() non-static
* convert the comment block in test_fit_verity_sign.py into a module docstring, add an ITS example and add a page under doc/develop/pytest/ so the module is rendered in the generated documentation

 boot/image-fit-sig.c                        |  14 +-
 doc/develop/pytest/test_fit_verity_sign.rst |  10 +
 include/image.h                             |  23 +++
 test/boot/fit_verity.c                      | 194 +++++++++++++++++++
 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py       | 202 ++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 436 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 doc/develop/pytest/test_fit_verity_sign.rst
 create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py
boot/image-fit-sig.c +7 -7
index c2f09885492..bfc6d2a8eed 100644
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 }
 
 /**
- * fit_config_get_hash_list() - Build the list of nodes to hash
+ * fit_config_get_signed_nodes() - Build the list of nodes to hash
  *
  * Works through every image referenced by the configuration and collects the
  * node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash,
@@ -358,9 +358,9 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
  * @buf_len:	Size of @buf
  * Return: number of entries in @node_inc, or -ve on error
  */
-static int fit_config_get_hash_list(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
-				    char **node_inc, int max_nodes,
-				    char *buf, int buf_len)
+int fit_config_get_signed_nodes(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
+				char **node_inc, int max_nodes,
+				char *buf, int buf_len)
 {
 	const char *conf_name;
 	int image_count;
@@ -500,9 +500,9 @@ static int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int conf_noffset,
 	}
 
 	/* Build the node list from the config, ignoring hashed-nodes */
-	count = fit_config_get_hash_list(fit, conf_noffset,
-					 node_inc, IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES,
-					 hash_buf, sizeof(hash_buf));
+	count = fit_config_get_signed_nodes(fit, conf_noffset,
+					    node_inc, IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES,
+					    hash_buf, sizeof(hash_buf));
 	if (count < 0) {
 		*err_msgp = "Failed to build hash node list";
 		return -1;
doc/develop/pytest/test_fit_verity_sign.rst new file +10 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..94a39b08952
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+
+test_fit_verity_sign
+====================
+
+.. automodule:: test_fit_verity_sign
+   :synopsis:
+   :member-order: bysource
+   :members:
+   :undoc-members:
include/image.h +23 -0
index 9c8a746d576..081508707ff 100644
@@ -1884,6 +1884,29 @@ struct image_region *fit_region_make_list(const void *fit,
 		struct fdt_region *fdt_regions, int count,
 		struct image_region *region);
 
+/**
+ * fit_config_get_signed_nodes() - Build the list of nodes covered by a config
+ *				   signature
+ *
+ * Collects the paths of the nodes that the configuration signature is
+ * computed over: the root node, the configuration node, and for each image
+ * referenced by the configuration its node, its hash subnodes and its cipher
+ * and dm-verity subnodes. The result is the same node list used when creating
+ * and verifying the signature, and is suitable for passing to
+ * fdt_find_regions().
+ *
+ * @fit:	FIT blob
+ * @conf_noffset: Configuration node offset
+ * @node_inc:	Array to fill with pointers to packed path strings
+ * @max_nodes:	Number of entries in @node_inc
+ * @buf:	Buffer for the packed null-terminated path strings
+ * @buf_len:	Size of @buf
+ * Return: number of entries written to @node_inc, or -ve on error
+ */
+int fit_config_get_signed_nodes(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
+				char **node_inc, int max_nodes,
+				char *buf, int buf_len);
+
 static inline int fit_image_check_target_arch(const void *fdt, int node)
 {
 #ifndef USE_HOSTCC
test/boot/fit_verity.c +194 -0

203 lines not on this page · raw message

test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py new file +202 -0

202 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
#4 lore raw
In reply to Daniel Golle
Quoted 14 lines · Daniel Golle

A signed FIT configuration can delegate the integrity of a (potentially large) root filesystem image to the kernel's dm-verity instead of having U-Boot hash the whole payload at boot: the FIT carries a "dm-verity" subnode with the roothash, salt and block parameters, U-Boot passes the roothash to Linux through the dm-mod.create bootargs, and dm-verity then validates the filesystem block by block against it.

For that to be safe the roothash has to be trusted, and in a signed configuration the only thing that establishes trust is the configuration signature. The roothash was not covered by it. fit_config_add_hash() collected the image node, its hash subnodes and its cipher subnode into the signed region, but not the dm-verity subnode, so the roothash, the sole integrity anchor for the filesystem, was left unsigned.

Quoted 6 lines

The result is a verified-boot bypass for the root filesystem: an attacker who can rewrite the boot medium can replace the filesystem, recompute a matching dm-verity tree, write the new roothash into the unsigned dm-verity subnode, and the configuration signature still verifies. dm-verity then faithfully validates the malicious filesystem against the attacker's roothash.

This fails in CI:
https://git.u-boot-project.org/u-boot/u-boot/-/jobs/50414

I've just made you a contributor area, so at least pushing this through CI until it works will be easier now.

Signature · 1 line
Tom
#5 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Tom Rini

This fails in CI:
https://git.u-boot-project.org/u-boot/u-boot/-/jobs/50414

I've just made you a contributor area, so at least pushing this through CI until it works will be easier now.

Thanks for flagging this, and for the contributor area -- that'll help a lot for iterating without round-tripping through the list.

Root cause: test_fit_verity_roothash_signed() (patch 3) builds a FIT with a dm-verity subnode, which makes mkimage shell out to veritysetup internally to compute the Merkle tree/roothash. The test only declared dtc, fdtget, fdtput and openssl as required tools, not veritysetup. The CI image doesn't have veritysetup installed, so mkimage's internal exec of it fails silently, since the diagnostic goes to a private pipe mkimage uses to parse veritysetup's own stdout, not to stderr.

Going to fix this by adding @pytest.mark.requiredtool('veritysetup') to test_fit_verity_roothash_signed(), matching test_fit_verity.py. Verified locally both ways: with veritysetup hidden from PATH the test now skips instead of failing, and with it present it still passes.

I'll push this through the CI and send v4 once it's green.

Cheers

Daniel