xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() advances to the fragment containing @offset with an unbounded loop:
while (offset >= walk->past + walk->frags[walk->fragi].len) walk->past += walk->frags[walk->fragi++].len;
walk->fragi is advanced and walk->frags[walk->fragi] is dereferenced without ever checking fragi against walk->nr_frags. When the requested offset is at or beyond the total length spanned by the walk's fragments, fragi runs past nr_frags and off the end of the fixed-size on-stack frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1] array, reading out-of-bounds stack memory.
The two callers behave differently: iptfs_skb_add_frags() already guards against this with
if (!walk->nr_frags || offset >= walk->total + walk->initial_offset) return len;
but iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() has no such guard and calls iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() unconditionally, so it performs the out-of-range walk. Its own "fragi < walk->nr_frags" bound check runs only afterwards, too late to prevent the read.
This is reachable from the receive path: a crafted IP-TFS (AGGFRAG) payload delivered to an IPTFS SA drives iptfs_reassem_cont() -> iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() with an offset past the fragment total, e.g.:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888008ad7210 by task repro/345 iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:392 iptfs_skb_can_add_frags+0x155/0x310 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:420 iptfs_reassem_cont+0xcf8/0x1140 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:902 iptfs_input_ordered+0x552/0x670 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1280 iptfs_input+0x3d6/0xde0 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1741 xfrm_input+0x282f/0x6140 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:700 xfrm4_esp_rcv+0x93/0x120 net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c:104 ip_rcv+0x278/0x2d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612
Give iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() the same up-front guard that iptfs_skb_add_frags() already has, so the walk is never entered with an out-of-range offset. When it triggers, the caller falls back to the existing linearize-and-copy path, which is safe.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c +8 -0
@@ -416,6 +416,14 @@ static bool iptfs_skb_can_add_frags(const struct sk_buff *skb,if (skb_has_frag_list (skb) || skb->pp_recycle != walk->pp_recycle)return false; +/* Reject an @offset that is at or beyond the end of the walk's data +* before calling iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk(), whose fragment-advance +* loop is otherwise unbounded and would index past walk->frags[]. +* This mirrors the guard already present in iptfs_skb_add_frags(). +*/ +if (!walk->nr_frags || offset >= walk->total + walk->initial_offset) +return false; +/* Make offset relative to current frag after setting that */ offset =iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk (walk, offset);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 39 lines · Roshan Kumar
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()advances to the fragment containing @offset with an unbounded loop:while (offset >= walk->past + walk->frags[walk->fragi].len) walk->past += walk->frags[walk->fragi++].len;
walk->fragiis advanced and walk->frags[walk->fragi] is dereferenced without ever checking fragi againstwalk->nr_frags. When the requested offset is at or beyond the total length spanned by the walk's fragments, fragi runs pastnr_fragsand off the end of the fixed-size on-stack frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1] array, reading out-of-bounds stack memory.The two callers behave differently:
iptfs_skb_add_frags()already guards against this withif (!walk->nr_frags || offset >= walk->total + walk->initial_offset) return len;but
iptfs_skb_can_add_frags()has no such guard and callsiptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()unconditionally, so it performs the out-of-range walk. Its own "fragi <walk->nr_frags" bound check runs only afterwards, too late to prevent the read.This is reachable from the receive path: a crafted IP-TFS (AGGFRAG) payload delivered to an IPTFS SA drives
iptfs_reassem_cont()->iptfs_skb_can_add_frags()with an offset past the fragment total, e.g.:BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888008ad7210 by task repro/345 iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:392 iptfs_skb_can_add_frags+0x155/0x310 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:420 iptfs_reassem_cont+0xcf8/0x1140 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:902 iptfs_input_ordered+0x552/0x670 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1280 iptfs_input+0x3d6/0xde0 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1741 xfrm_input+0x282f/0x6140 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:700 xfrm4_esp_rcv+0x93/0x120 net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c:104 ip_rcv+0x278/0x2d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612
Quoted 8 lines
Give
iptfs_skb_can_add_frags()the same up-front guard thatiptfs_skb_add_frags()already has, so the walk is never entered with an out-of-range offset. When it triggers, the caller falls back to the existing linearize-and-copy path, which is safe.Fixes 5f2b6a909574 ("xfrm: iptfs: add skb-fragment sharing code")Reported-by Roshan Kumar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Roshan Kumar <[email protected]>
Applied, thanks a lot!