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PCI/proc: Warn on writes to kernel-exclusive config space regions

PATCH Applied Krzysztof Wilczyński 2 participants 3 messages Jul 29 – Aug 1 PCI

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PATCH 1/1 PCI/proc: Warn on writes to kernel-exclusive config space regions

Currently, a driver can claim a region of a device's config space as exclusive using pci_request_config_region_exclusive(), after which a write to that region originating from user space is expected to emit a warning and taint the kernel. The check is advisory only, as the write itself is still allowed to proceed.

Since commit 278294798ac9 ("PCI: Allow drivers to request exclusive config regions"), the sysfs config space attribute performs this check in pci_write_config(), but the procfs interface was never updated. A write performed through /proc/bus/pci/BB/DD.F therefore bypasses the detection entirely, even though both interfaces offer the same level of access.

Thus, add the same resource_is_exclusive() check to proc_bus_pci_write().

---
 drivers/pci/proc.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/pci/proc.c +8 -0
index 71ad289fcb8e..12200979d3a8 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/panic.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 #include "pci.h"
 
@@ -122,6 +124,12 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	if (resource_is_exclusive(&dev->driver_exclusive_resource, pos, nbytes)) {
+		pci_warn_once(dev, "%s: Unexpected write to kernel-exclusive config offset %x",
+			      current->comm, pos);
+		add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+	}
+
 	if (pos >= size)
 		return 0;
 	if (nbytes >= size)
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
#1 lore raw
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Integer truncation of the 64-bit file offset to a 32-bit signed int allows bypassing bounds checks and the new exclusive region check, leading to massive out-of-bounds memory writes. --

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] PCI/proc: Warn on writes to kernel-exclusive config space regions --- commit ae079df2d52cc5cc8959cf281ed5e461ff2fcfd8
Author: Krzysztof Wilczyński <[email protected]>

PCI/proc: Warn on writes to kernel-exclusive config space regions

This patch updates proc_bus_pci_write() to check if a user space write targets a kernel-exclusive config space region. If so, it emits a warning and taints the kernel, bringing the procfs interface to parity with the sysfs interface.

Quoted 4 lines
drivers/pci/proc.c +0 -0
index 71ad289fcb8e3..12200979d3a82 100644

[ ... ]

drivers/pci/proc.c static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, · line 132

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/pci/proc.c +6 -0
@@ -122,6 +124,12 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	if (resource_is_exclusive(&dev->driver_exclusive_resource, pos, nbytes)) {
+		pci_warn_once(dev, "%s: Unexpected write to kernel-exclusive config offset %x",
+			      current->comm, pos);
+		add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+	}
+

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does truncating the 64-bit file offset to a 32-bit signed integer earlier in proc_bus_pci_write() allow bypassing this new exclusive region check?

A large positive 64-bit file offset provided via pwrite64() gets truncated to a negative value:

drivers/pci/proc.c:proc_bus_pci_write() {
    ...
	int pos = *ppos;
    ...
}

Because resource_is_exclusive() takes a u64 address, the negative pos will sign-extend into a massive 64-bit value that won't match any exclusive region, bypassing this detection entirely.

Additionally, this truncation also bypasses the subsequent bounds checks:

	if (pos >= size)
		return 0;
	if (nbytes >= size)
		nbytes = size;
	if (pos + nbytes > size)
		nbytes = size - pos;

The signed comparison if (pos >= size) evaluates to false for a negative pos. Because nbytes is unsigned, the length clipping if (pos + nbytes > size) evaluates using unsigned arithmetic and becomes true for a negative pos. This erroneously increases nbytes up to massive out-of-bounds lengths, potentially leading to large writes outside the PCI configuration space.

Quoted 3 lines
drivers/pci/proc.c +0 -0
 	if (pos >= size)
 		return 0;
 	if (nbytes >= size)
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
author Applied
#2 lore raw
In reply to Krzysztof Wilczyński

Hello,

Quoted 6 lines

Currently, a driver can claim a region of a device's config space as exclusive using pci_request_config_region_exclusive(), after which a write to that region originating from user space is expected to emit a warning and taint the kernel. The check is advisory only, as the write itself is still allowed to proceed.

Quoted 8 lines

Since commit 278294798ac9 ("PCI: Allow drivers to request exclusive config regions"), the sysfs config space attribute performs this check in pci_write_config(), but the procfs interface was never updated. A write performed through /proc/bus/pci/BB/DD.F therefore bypasses the detection entirely, even though both interfaces offer the same level of access.

Thus, add the same resource_is_exclusive() check to proc_bus_pci_write().

Applied to the procfs branch.

Thank you!

Krzysztof