s390/zcrypt: Validate length in CCA key requests
Subsystems (2)
Holger Dengler
maintainercover s390/zcrypt: Validate length in CCA key requests
The series contains two missing length field validations for requests with CCA AES cipher keys and CCA ECC private keys. In both cases, the length information is used to copy the payload to the request block without checking the available space. Malformed requests can so cause out-of-band writes on the heap.
This series applies on top of Linus' master branch.
Holger Dengler (2):
s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
base-commit: fc02acf6ac0ccde0c805c2daa9148683cdd01ba8
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Holger Dengler
maintainerPATCH 1/2 s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests
cca_cipher2protkey() derives the copy length for the CPRB parameter block directly from the length field in the key token. Reject the request early if the token length exceeds the available space in the parameter block.
--- drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +3 -0
@@ -1261,6 +1261,9 @@ int cca_cipher2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *ckey, }__packed * prepparm;int keytoklen = ((struct cipherkeytoken *)ckey)->len; +if (keytoklen >PARMBSIZE -sizeof (struct aureqparm )) +return -EINVAL ; +/* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */ rc =alloc_and_prep_cprbmem (PARMBSIZE , &mem, &preqcblk, &prepcblk, xflags);
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH v1 1/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Heap buffer overflow in cca_ecc2protkey when copying a user-provided ECC key token into a fixed-size buffer. --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH v1 1/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests --- commit 7b35c8aa05e7fb7c7837b88e5f3b7fc85f721c98
Author: Holger Dengler <[email protected]>
s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests
This commit adds a bounds check in cca_cipher2protkey() to ensure the copy length derived from the key token does not exceed the available space in the CPRB parameter block. If the length is too large, the request is rejected early with -EINVAL.
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c int cca_cipher2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *ckey, · line 1266
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +3
-0@@ -1261,6 +1261,9 @@ int cca_cipher2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *ckey, }__packed * prepparm;int keytoklen = ((struct cipherkeytoken *)ckey)->len; +if (keytoklen >PARMBSIZE -sizeof (struct aureqparm )) +return -EINVAL ; +
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does a similar heap buffer overflow exist in cca_ecc2protkey()?
It appears cca_ecc2protkey() also copies a user-provided ECC key token into a fixed-size buffer without a similar bounds check. A user with access to /dev/pkey could call the PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2 ioctl, passing an eccprivkeytoken with a large len field.
This would be passed down through cca_key2protkey() to cca_ecc2protkey(), where it allocates a 512-byte parameter block via alloc_and_prep_cprbmem() and copies the token:
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c:cca_ecc2protkey() {
...
int keylen = ((struct eccprivkeytoken *)key)->len;
/* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */
rc = alloc_and_prep_cprbmem(PARMBSIZE, &mem,
&preqcblk, &prepcblk, xflags);
...
/* kb, cca token */
preqparm->kb.len = keylen + 3 * sizeof(uint16_t);
preqparm->kb.cca_key_token_len = keylen + 2 * sizeof(uint16_t);
memcpy(preqparm->kb.cca_key_token, key, keylen);
...
}Since the parameter block header consumes 90 bytes, any keylen > 422 bytes could overflow the allocated memory. Is a similar check needed there?
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +0
-0/* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */ rc =alloc_and_prep_cprbmem (PARMBSIZE , &mem, &preqcblk, &prepcblk, xflags);
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Holger Dengler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 1/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests
This is fixed by patch 2/2 of this series.
Quoted 64 lines · On 7/29/26 11:58, [email protected] wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Heap buffer overflow incca_ecc2protkeywhen copying a user-provided ECC key token into a fixed-size buffer. ----- Patch [1]: [PATCH v1 1/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests --- commit
7b35c8aa05e7fb7c7837b88e5f3b7fc85f721c98
Author: Holger Dengler <[email protected]>s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests
This commit adds a bounds check in
cca_cipher2protkey()to ensure the copy length derived from the key token does not exceed the available space in the CPRB parameter block. If the length is too large, the request is rejected early with-EINVAL.drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c int cca_cipher2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *ckey, · line 1266
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +3
-0@@ -1261,6 +1261,9 @@ int cca_cipher2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *ckey, }__packed * prepparm;int keytoklen = ((struct cipherkeytoken *)ckey)->len; +if (keytoklen >PARMBSIZE -sizeof (struct aureqparm )) +return -EINVAL ; +[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does a similar heap buffer overflow exist incca_ecc2protkey()?It appears
cca_ecc2protkey()also copies a user-provided ECC key token into a fixed-size buffer without a similar bounds check. A user with access to/dev/pkeycould call thePKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2ioctl, passing an eccprivkeytoken with a large len field.This would be passed down through
cca_key2protkey()tocca_ecc2protkey(), where it allocates a 512-byte parameter block viaalloc_and_prep_cprbmem()and copies the token:drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c:cca_ecc2protkey() { ... int keylen = ((struct eccprivkeytoken *)key)->len; /* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */ rc = alloc_and_prep_cprbmem(PARMBSIZE, &mem, &preqcblk, &prepcblk, xflags); ... /* kb, cca token */ preqparm->kb.len = keylen + 3 * sizeof(uint16_t); preqparm->kb.cca_key_token_len = keylen + 2 * sizeof(uint16_t); memcpy(preqparm->kb.cca_key_token, key, keylen); ... }Since the parameter block header consumes 90 bytes, any keylen > 422 bytes could overflow the allocated memory. Is a similar check needed there?
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +0
-0/* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */ rc =alloc_and_prep_cprbmem (PARMBSIZE , &mem, &preqcblk, &prepcblk, xflags);
Signature · 2 lines
Mit freundlichen Grüßen / Kind regards Holger Dengler
Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests
In reply to Holger DenglerQuoted 28 lines · Holger Dengler
cca_cipher2protkey()derives the copy length for the CPRB parameter block directly from the length field in the key token. Reject the request early if the token length exceeds the available space in the parameter block.Fixes 4bc123b18ce6 ("s390/zcrypt: Add low level functions for CCA AEScipher keys")
Signed-off-by Holger Dengler <[email protected]>Cc [email protected] # 5.4+--- drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +3
-0@@ -1261,6 +1261,9 @@ int cca_cipher2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *ckey, }__packed * prepparm;int keytoklen = ((struct cipherkeytoken *)ckey)->len; +if (keytoklen >PARMBSIZE -sizeof (struct aureqparm )) +return -EINVAL ; +/* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */ rc = alloc_and_prep_cprbmem(PARMBSIZE, &mem,
Quoted 1 line
&preqcblk, &prepcblk, xflags);
Holger Dengler
maintainerPATCH 2/2 s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests
In reply to Holger Denglercca_ecc2protkey() derives the copy length for the CPRB parameter block directly from the length field in the key token. Reject the request early if the token length exceeds the available space in the parameter block.
--- drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +3 -0
@@ -1428,6 +1428,9 @@ int cca_ecc2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *key, }__packed * prepparm;int keylen = ((struct eccprivkeytoken *)key)->len; +if (keylen >PARMBSIZE -sizeof (struct aureqparm )) +return -EINVAL ; +/* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */ rc =alloc_and_prep_cprbmem (PARMBSIZE , &mem, &preqcblk, &prepcblk, xflags);
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests
Quoted 27 lines · Holger Dengler
cca_ecc2protkey()derives the copy length for the CPRB parameter block directly from the length field in the key token. Reject the request early if the token length exceeds the available space in the parameter block.Fixes fa6999e326fe ("s390/pkey: support CCA and EP11 secure ECC private keys")Signed-off-by Holger Dengler <[email protected]>Cc [email protected] # 5.10+--- drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +3
-0@@ -1428,6 +1428,9 @@ int cca_ecc2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *key, }__packed * prepparm;int keylen = ((struct eccprivkeytoken *)key)->len; +if (keylen >PARMBSIZE -sizeof (struct aureqparm )) +return -EINVAL ; +/* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */ rc = alloc_and_prep_cprbmem(PARMBSIZE, &mem,
Quoted 1 line
&preqcblk, &prepcblk, xflags);
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH v1 2/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests
In reply to Holger DenglerThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Missing bounds validation on user-provided keys leads to Slab Out-of-Bounds Reads.
- [High] Unvalidated token length from hardware reply causes Heap Buffer Overflow and Out-of-Bounds Read. --
--- Patch [2]: [PATCH v1 2/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests --- commit dd9e9a635152d7bae8edba05dc9b9aad02d9a1e9
Author: Holger Dengler <[email protected]>
s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests
This patch adds a length validation check for CCA ECC private key requests in cca_ecc2protkey(). It ensures the key token length does not exceed the available space in the parameter block before proceeding with CPRB memory allocation.
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +0
-0
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c int cca_ecc2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *key, · line 1436
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +3
-0@@ -1428,6 +1428,9 @@ int cca_ecc2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *key, }__packed * prepparm;int keylen = ((struct eccprivkeytoken *)key)->len; +if (keylen >PARMBSIZE -sizeof (struct aureqparm )) +return -EINVAL ; +/* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */ rc =alloc_and_prep_cprbmem (PARMBSIZE , &mem, &preqcblk, &prepcblk, xflags);
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but since we are adding length validations in this subsystem, is it possible for unprivileged users to trigger slab out-of-bounds reads in other functions like cca_apqns4key(), cca_verifykey(), and cca_key2protkey() in drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c?
If a user triggers an ioctl like PKEY_APQNS4K with an 8-byte buffer and sets keylen=8, _copy_key_from_user() will allocate exactly 8 bytes. The code only verifies that keylen is at least 8 bytes, but then casts the buffer to larger structures.
In drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:cca_apqns4key():
if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP)
ptr_cur_mkvp = t->mkvp;
Could this access t->mkvp well beyond the 8-byte allocation?
Similarly, in drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:cca_key2protkey():
if (cca_check_secaescipherkey(pkey_dbf_info,
3, key, 0, 1))Does this pass the key buffer to a function that reads up to 60 bytes, without verifying the key is actually large enough (since checking against hdr->len could be bypassed if the user sets hdr->len = 8)?
And in drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:cca_verifykey():
*keybitsize = t->bitsize;
Does this access t->bitsize at offset 56 directly after only verifying the 8-byte header?
[Severity: High]
This is also a pre-existing issue, but I noticed there might be another spot in zcrypt_ccamisc.c where we trust token lengths without sufficient bounds checking.
If a malfunctioning or compromised APQN crypto device returns a CPRB hardware reply with a large t->len value, could this lead to an out-of-bounds read or heap buffer overflow?
In drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c:_ip_cprb_helper():
memcpy(key_token, t, t->len);
Does this trust the t->len value from the hardware response blindly, potentially causing an unbounded write to the destination buffer?
Also, in drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c:cca_gencipherkey():
if (*keybufsize >= t->len)
memcpy(keybuf, t, t->len);Since *keybufsize is user-controlled (up to 8192) but the CPRB parameter block backing t is strictly allocated to PARMBSIZE (512 bytes), could an oversized t->len bypass this check? Would this cause memcpy() to read beyond the 512-byte allocation and leak kernel memory back to userspace?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=2
Holger Dengler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests
The findings will be covered in a separate series.
Quoted 93 lines · On 7/29/26 12:16, [email protected] wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Missing bounds validation on user-provided keys leads to Slab Out-of-Bounds Reads.
- [High] Unvalidated token length from hardware reply causes Heap Buffer Overflow and Out-of-Bounds Read. ----- Patch [2]: [PATCH v1 2/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests --- commit
dd9e9a635152d7bae8edba05dc9b9aad02d9a1e9
Author: Holger Dengler <[email protected]>s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests
This patch adds a length validation check for CCA ECC private key requests in
cca_ecc2protkey(). It ensures the key token length does not exceed the available space in the parameter block before proceeding with CPRB memory allocation.Quoted 5 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +0
-0drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c int cca_ecc2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *key, · line 1436
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +3
-0@@ -1428,6 +1428,9 @@ int cca_ecc2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *key, }__packed * prepparm;int keylen = ((struct eccprivkeytoken *)key)->len; +if (keylen >PARMBSIZE -sizeof (struct aureqparm )) +return -EINVAL ; +/* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */ rc =alloc_and_prep_cprbmem (PARMBSIZE , &mem, &preqcblk, &prepcblk, xflags);[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but since we are adding length validations in this subsystem, is it possible for unprivileged users to trigger slab out-of-bounds reads in other functions likecca_apqns4key(),cca_verifykey(), andcca_key2protkey()indrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c?If a user triggers an ioctl like
PKEY_APQNS4Kwith an 8-byte buffer and sets keylen=8,_copy_key_from_user()will allocate exactly 8 bytes. The code only verifies that keylen is at least 8 bytes, but then casts the buffer to larger structures.In drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:cca_apqns4key():
if (flags &
PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP)
ptr_cur_mkvp=t->mkvp;Could this access
t->mkvpwell beyond the 8-byte allocation?Similarly, in drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:cca_key2protkey():
if (cca_check_secaescipherkey(pkey_dbf_info, 3, key, 0, 1))Does this pass the key buffer to a function that reads up to 60 bytes, without verifying the key is actually large enough (since checking against
hdr->lencould be bypassed if the user setshdr->len= 8)?And in drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:cca_verifykey():
*keybitsize = t->bitsize;Does this access
t->bitsizeat offset 56 directly after only verifying the 8-byte header?[Severity: High]
This is also a pre-existing issue, but I noticed there might be another spot inzcrypt_ccamisc.cwhere we trust token lengths without sufficient bounds checking.If a malfunctioning or compromised APQN crypto device returns a CPRB hardware reply with a large
t->lenvalue, could this lead to an out-of-bounds read or heap buffer overflow?In drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c:_ip_cprb_helper():
memcpy(key_token, t, t->len);Does this trust the
t->lenvalue from the hardware response blindly, potentially causing an unbounded write to the destination buffer?Also, in drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c:cca_gencipherkey():
if (*keybufsize >= t->len) memcpy(keybuf, t, t->len);Since *keybufsize is user-controlled (up to 8192) but the CPRB parameter block backing t is strictly allocated to PARMBSIZE (512 bytes), could an oversized
t->lenbypass this check? Would this causememcpy()to read beyond the 512-byte allocation and leak kernel memory back to userspace?
Signature · 2 lines
Mit freundlichen Grüßen / Kind regards Holger Dengler
Quoted 6 lines · Holger Dengler
The series contains two missing length field validations for requests with CCA AES cipher keys and CCA ECC private keys. In both cases, the length information is used to copy the payload to the request block without checking the available space. Malformed requests can so cause out-of-band writes on the heap.
Quoted 8 lines
This series applies on top of Linus' master branch.
Holger Dengler (2):
s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requestsdrivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
Applied, thank you!