Skip to contentSkip to conversation

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

PATCH New [email protected] 2 participants 3 messages Jul 29 – Aug 1

Subsystems (4)
lore
Share & tools
lore

[email protected]

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 4e1a53892ba7f8a3e1da6bfc53c83ae7c812dccd
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026072943-browse-aviator-abf1@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' 'HEAD^..'

Possible dependencies:

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 4e1a53892ba7f8a3e1da6bfc53c83ae7c812dccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2026 21:43:34 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer

virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds read / info leak).

Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array. Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected.

drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_vq.c +2 -1
index 67865810a2e7..c8b9475a7472 100644
@@ -897,7 +897,8 @@ static int virtio_get_edid_block(void *data, u8 *buf,
 	struct virtio_gpu_resp_edid *resp = data;
 	size_t start = block * EDID_LENGTH;
 
-	if (start + len > le32_to_cpu(resp->size))
+	if (start + len > le32_to_cpu(resp->size) ||
+	    start + len > sizeof(resp->edid))
 		return -EINVAL;
 	memcpy(buf, resp->edid + start, len);
 	return 0;
maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 drm/virtio: Return proper error codes instead of -1

From: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4c703f5d6f776eaa6a98611c9b5dfe800fbeb0c8 ]

Don't return -1 in error cases, return proper error code. The returned error codes propagate to error messages and to userspace and it's always good to have a meaningful error number for debugging purposes.

Stable-dep-of: 4e1a53892ba7 ("drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer")

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_vq.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_vq.c +3 -3
index 19a196b48a38..65c31fc4e7d3 100644
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static int virtio_gpu_queue_ctrl_sgs(struct virtio_gpu_device *vgdev,
 		if (fence && vbuf->objs)
 			virtio_gpu_array_unlock_resv(vbuf->objs);
 		free_vbuf(vgdev, vbuf);
-		return -1;
+		return -ENODEV;
 	}
 
 	if (vgdev->has_indirect)
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static int virtio_gpu_queue_fenced_ctrl_buffer(struct virtio_gpu_device *vgdev,
 			if (!sgt) {
 				if (fence && vbuf->objs)
 					virtio_gpu_array_unlock_resv(vbuf->objs);
-				return -1;
+				return -ENOMEM;
 			}
 
 			elemcnt += sg_ents;
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ static int virtio_get_edid_block(void *data, u8 *buf,
 	size_t start = block * EDID_LENGTH;
 
 	if (start + len > le32_to_cpu(resp->size))
-		return -1;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	memcpy(buf, resp->edid + start, len);
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer

From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4e1a53892ba7f8a3e1da6bfc53c83ae7c812dccd ]

virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds read / info leak).

Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array. Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_vq.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_vq.c +2 -1
index 65c31fc4e7d3..5383632569b7 100644
@@ -727,7 +727,8 @@ static int virtio_get_edid_block(void *data, u8 *buf,
 	struct virtio_gpu_resp_edid *resp = data;
 	size_t start = block * EDID_LENGTH;
 
-	if (start + len > le32_to_cpu(resp->size))
+	if (start + len > le32_to_cpu(resp->size) ||
+	    start + len > sizeof(resp->edid))
 		return -EINVAL;
 	memcpy(buf, resp->edid + start, len);
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0