6.18.42-rc1 review

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Yi <[email protected]>

commit 9c7d8f7c8994c790fca501dc45ce66e7356cbe05 upstream.

ifs_set_range_dirty() and ifs_set_range_uptodate() compute last_blk as (off + len - 1) >> i_blkbits. When off is 0 and len is 0, the unsigned subtraction underflows to SIZE_MAX, producing a huge last_blk and nr_blks value that causes bitmap_set() to write far beyond the ifs->state allocation.

Regarding ifs_set_range_uptodate(), it is temporarily safe because len cannot be passed in as 0. However, for ifs_set_range_dirty() this is reachable from __iomap_write_end(): when copy_folio_from_iter_atomic() returns 0 (e.g. user buffer fault) and the folio is already uptodate, the guard at the top of __iomap_write_end() does not trigger because !folio_test_uptodate() is false, and iomap_set_range_dirty() is called with copied == 0.

Add a !len guard to both functions before the computation, so that a zero-length range is a no-op.

---
 fs/iomap/buffered-io.c |   22 ++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -47,11 +47,13 @@ static bool ifs_set_range_uptodate(struc
 		struct iomap_folio_state *ifs, size_t off, size_t len)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = folio->mapping->host;
-	unsigned int first_blk = off >> inode->i_blkbits;
-	unsigned int last_blk = (off + len - 1) >> inode->i_blkbits;
-	unsigned int nr_blks = last_blk - first_blk + 1;
+	unsigned int first_blk, last_blk;
 
-	bitmap_set(ifs->state, first_blk, nr_blks);
+	if (len) {
+		first_blk = off >> inode->i_blkbits;
+		last_blk = (off + len - 1) >> inode->i_blkbits;
+		bitmap_set(ifs->state, first_blk, last_blk - first_blk + 1);
+	}
 	return ifs_is_fully_uptodate(folio, ifs);
 }
 

@@ -154,13 +156,17 @@ static void ifs_set_range_dirty(struct f
 {
 	struct inode *inode = folio->mapping->host;
 	unsigned int blks_per_folio = i_blocks_per_folio(inode, folio);
-	unsigned int first_blk = (off >> inode->i_blkbits);
-	unsigned int last_blk = (off + len - 1) >> inode->i_blkbits;
-	unsigned int nr_blks = last_blk - first_blk + 1;
+	unsigned int first_blk, last_blk;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
+	if (!len)
+		return;
+
+	first_blk = off >> inode->i_blkbits;
+	last_blk = (off + len - 1) >> inode->i_blkbits;
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&ifs->state_lock, flags);
-	bitmap_set(ifs->state, first_blk + blks_per_folio, nr_blks);
+	bitmap_set(ifs->state, first_blk + blks_per_folio,
+		   last_blk - first_blk + 1);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ifs->state_lock, flags);
 }
 

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>

commit 780dfed688622ea01be3c9c2c55eec2207f05e04 upstream.

Hardware implementations report Scalable-Mode Page-walk Coherency Support via the SMPWCS field in the extended capability register. If the hardware does not support page-walk coherency, a clflush is required every time the page table entries (which are walked by the IOMMU hardware) are updated.

In the SVA case, page tables are managed by the CPU mm core, not by the IOMMU driver. Because the IOMMU driver has no way of knowing whether the CPU page table management code has ensured coherency via clflush, the driver must deny SVA if the hardware does not support coherent paging.

---
 drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 
 void intel_svm_check(struct intel_iommu *iommu)
 {
-	if (!pasid_supported(iommu))
+	if (!pasid_supported(iommu) || !ecap_smpwc(iommu->ecap))
 		return;
 
 	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES) &&

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Markus Breitenberger <[email protected]>

commit 0ab78ead2481adb52f9eb5b403865c529f6f2348 upstream.

intel_mac_finish() is registered as the phylink mac_finish() callback for the Elkhart Lake SGMII ports. phylink calls it at the end of every major link reconfiguration, including the initial one during probe.

The callback selects the PMC ModPHY LCPLL programming for the requested MAC-side interface and then power-cycles the SerDes. On Elkhart Lake that ModPHY is also used by the on-die AHCI SATA PHY. Reapplying the programming during the initial boot-time link-up disturbs the shared analog block while it is still driving SATA, so the SATA link fails to train:

ata1: SATA link down (SStatus 1 SControl 300)

The disk carrying the root filesystem is never detected and the system hangs at rootwait. Ethernet itself comes up normally, which makes the failure look unrelated to the network driver.

Before mac_finish() runs, the legacy SerDes power-up path has already programmed SERDES_GCR0 for the current interface. The 1G and 2.5G ModPHY tables selected by mac_finish() correspond to the SerDes lane rate, so read that rate back from SERDES_GCR0 and skip the PMC reprogramming and SerDes power-cycle when it already matches the selected interface.

This keeps the disruptive reprogramming out of the boot path when the SerDes is configured correctly, while preserving the previous behavior when a real SGMII/1000BASE-X to 2500BASE-X rate change is needed. If the register read fails, reconfigure as before.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-intel.c |   31 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)

@@ -524,6 +524,32 @@ static int intel_set_reg_access(const st
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Return true if the SerDes lane rate must change to serve @interface.
+ * If the current rate cannot be determined, reconfigure as before.
+ */
+static bool intel_serdes_needs_reconfig(struct stmmac_priv *priv,
+					struct intel_priv_data *intel_priv,
+					phy_interface_t interface)
+{
+	u32 cur_rate, want_rate;
+	int data;
+
+	if (!intel_priv->mdio_adhoc_addr)
+		return true;
+
+	data = mdiobus_read(priv->mii, intel_priv->mdio_adhoc_addr,
+			    SERDES_GCR0);
+	if (data < 0)
+		return true;
+
+	cur_rate = (data & SERDES_RATE_MASK) >> SERDES_RATE_PCIE_SHIFT;
+	want_rate = interface == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_2500BASEX ?
+			SERDES_RATE_PCIE_GEN2 : SERDES_RATE_PCIE_GEN1;
+
+	return cur_rate != want_rate;
+}
+
 static int intel_mac_finish(struct net_device *ndev,
 			    void *intel_data,
 			    unsigned int mode,

@@ -535,6 +561,11 @@ static int intel_mac_finish(struct net_d
 	int max_regs = 0;
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	if (!intel_serdes_needs_reconfig(priv, intel_priv, interface)) {
+		priv->plat->phy_interface = interface;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	ret = intel_tsn_lane_is_available(ndev, intel_priv);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		netdev_info(priv->dev, "No TSN lane available to set the registers.\n");

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

commit 0f71f852a96af9685858ce59fda34ecbf85c283d upstream.

pep_get_sb() doesn't consider that pskb_may_pull() might have relocated the skb data, and continue to access the older pointer, causing UAF.

Reproduced under KASAN:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0
  Read of size 1 at addr ff11000105510f50 by task repro/157
   pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0
   pipe_handler_do_rcv+0x5f7/0xa10
   pep_do_rcv+0x203/0x410
   __sk_receive_skb+0x471/0x4a0
   phonet_rcv+0x5b3/0x6c0
   __netif_receive_skb+0xcc/0x1d0

Refetch the header with skb_header_pointer() after pskb_may_pull(), so the possibly stale pointer is no longer dereferenced. There are better ways to solve this, but, this is the less instrusive one.

---
 net/phonet/pep.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ static unsigned char *pep_get_sb(struct
 	ph = skb_header_pointer(skb, 0, 2, &h);
 	if (ph == NULL || ph->sb_len < 2 || !pskb_may_pull(skb, ph->sb_len))
 		return NULL;
+	/* pskb_may_pull() may have reallocated the head; refetch ph. */
+	ph = skb_header_pointer(skb, 0, 2, &h);
 	ph->sb_len -= 2;
 	*ptype = ph->sb_type;
 	*plen = ph->sb_len;

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit 3a61bd9637f3d929aa846e4eb3d98b48c26fcb0e upstream.

A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the sticky underlay netns vxlan->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in vxlan->net can rewrite a vxlan device whose underlay lives in vxlan->net.

vxlan_changelink() validates and applies the new configuration against vxlan->net (vxlan_config_validate(vxlan->net, ...)) and can reopen the underlay socket in that netns, so the same reasoning as the tunnel changelink series applies here.

Gate vxlan_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and the rest of the "require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink" series.

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

---
 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -4415,6 +4415,9 @@ static int vxlan_changelink(struct net_d
 	struct vxlan_rdst *dst;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(dev, vxlan->net))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	dst = &vxlan->default_dst;
 	err = vxlan_nl2conf(tb, data, dev, &conf, true, extack);
 	if (err)

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sungmin Kang <[email protected]>

commit ee7f9bb9320add61f7b367d7e6cd55e3a3a4d65d upstream.

sl_realloc_bufs() replaces rbuff and updates buffsize while holding sl->lock. slip_receive_buf() reads those fields and writes through rbuff without holding the lock.

An MTU change can therefore race with receive processing. An MTU shrink can expose the new smaller rbuff with the old larger bound, causing an out-of-bounds write. A receive callback which already loaded the old rbuff can instead continue writing after that buffer has been freed.

Serialize receive processing with sl_realloc_bufs() by holding sl->lock while consuming each receive batch.

---
 drivers/net/slip/slip.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

@@ -693,6 +693,8 @@ static void slip_receive_buf(struct tty_
 	if (!sl || sl->magic != SLIP_MAGIC || !netif_running(sl->dev))
 		return;
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&sl->lock);
+
 	/* Read the characters out of the buffer */
 	while (count--) {
 		if (fp && *fp++) {

@@ -708,6 +710,8 @@ static void slip_receive_buf(struct tty_
 #endif
 			slip_unesc(sl, *cp++);
 	}
+
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sl->lock);
 }
 
 /************************************

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit 8efb8f8bbb353b8f2fdf4f37534c6d96c9f69e01 upstream.

A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the sticky underlay netns geneve->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in geneve->net can rewrite a geneve device whose underlay lives in geneve->net.

geneve_changelink() applies the new configuration against geneve->net:
geneve_link_config() and the geneve_quiesce()/geneve_unquiesce() pair reopen the underlay sockets in that netns (geneve_sock_add() uses geneve->net), so the same reasoning as the tunnel changelink series applies here.

Gate geneve_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and the rest of the "require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink" series.

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

---
 drivers/net/geneve.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -1736,6 +1736,9 @@ static int geneve_changelink(struct net_
 	struct geneve_config cfg;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(dev, geneve->net))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* If the geneve device is configured for metadata (or externally
 	 * controlled, for example, OVS), then nothing can be changed.
 	 */

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hidayath Khan <[email protected]>

commit 47a5116e56a6b6fe1e909f244e39cd0fc26ceee4 upstream.

afiucv_hs_callback_syn() allocates the child socket with GFP_ATOMIC. If the allocation fails, nsk is NULL.

The connection-refused path is entered when the listen state check fails, the accept backlog is full, or nsk is NULL. The code unconditionally calls iucv_sock_kill(nsk) in that path.

iucv_sock_kill() does not accept a NULL socket pointer and immediately dereferences sk via sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED). When nsk is NULL, calling iucv_sock_kill(nsk) results in a NULL pointer dereference.

Only call iucv_sock_kill() when a child socket was successfully allocated.

---
 net/iucv/af_iucv.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1872,7 +1872,8 @@ static int afiucv_hs_callback_syn(struct
 		afiucv_swap_src_dest(skb);
 		trans_hdr->flags = AF_IUCV_FLAG_SYN | AF_IUCV_FLAG_FIN;
 		err = dev_queue_xmit(skb);
-		iucv_sock_kill(nsk);
+		if (nsk)
+			iucv_sock_kill(nsk);
 		bh_unlock_sock(sk);
 		goto out;
 	}

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>

commit be7cc4656eb1f54029610e82d1f0fdd3f9b5ec0a upstream.

af_iucv queues not-yet-received message notifications on iucv->message_q, each holding a raw pointer to the connection's iucv_path. When the peer severs the connection, iucv_sever_path() frees that path with iucv_path_free() but leaves the notifications queued. A later recvmsg() drains message_q via iucv_process_message_q() and hands the stale path to message_receive() -- a use-after-free of the freed iucv_path.

Drop the queued notifications when the path is severed; once the path is gone they can no longer be received. This also frees the notifications leaked when a socket is closed with messages still queued.

---
 net/iucv/af_iucv.c |   14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

@@ -335,6 +335,7 @@ static void iucv_sever_path(struct sock
 	unsigned char user_data[16];
 	struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
 	struct iucv_path *path = iucv->path;
+	struct sock_msg_q *p, *n;
 
 	/* Whoever resets the path pointer, must sever and free it. */
 	if (xchg(&iucv->path, NULL)) {

@@ -346,6 +347,19 @@ static void iucv_sever_path(struct sock
 		} else
 			pr_iucv->path_sever(path, NULL);
 		iucv_path_free(path);
+
+		/*
+		 * Message notifications queued on message_q still reference
+		 * the now freed path; drop them, otherwise a later recvmsg()
+		 * would pass the freed iucv_path to message_receive() via
+		 * iucv_process_message_q().
+		 */
+		spin_lock_bh(&iucv->message_q.lock);
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, &iucv->message_q.list, list) {
+			list_del(&p->list);
+			kfree(p);
+		}
+		spin_unlock_bh(&iucv->message_q.lock);
 	}
 }
 

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Manjunath Patil <[email protected]>

commit e32649b4bad90a6216d8e93cd7dd050af8ac9740 upstream.

After PCIe DPC recovery, mlx5 reloads the affected functions and replays multiport affiliation events. In the reported failure, the first relevant device error was:

pcieport 0000:10:01.1: DPC: containment event
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Fatal)
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: [ 5] SDES (First)

mlx5 recovered the PCI functions and resumed 0000:11:00.1. During that resume, RDMA multiport binding replayed MLX5_DRIVER_EVENT_AFFILIATION_DONE and mlx5e sent MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP. The host then panicked with:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
  RIP: mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready+0x5/0x40 [mlx5_core]
  RDI: 0000000000000000

Call trace included:

mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready
mlx5e_devcom_event_mpv
mlx5_devcom_send_event
mlx5_ib_bind_slave_port
mlx5r_mp_probe
mlx5_pci_resume

MPV devcom registration publishes mlx5e private data to the component peer list before mlx5e_devcom_init_mpv() stores the returned component device in priv->devcom. A concurrent master-up event can therefore reach a peer whose private data is visible but whose priv->devcom backpointer is still NULL.

MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP already carries the sender/master mlx5e private data as event_data. The ready bit is stored on the shared devcom component, not on an individual peer. Use the sender devcom when marking the MPV component ready.

This preserves the readiness transition while avoiding a NULL dereference of the peer devcom pointer during affiliation replay after PCI error recovery.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -211,11 +211,11 @@ static void mlx5e_disable_async_events(s
 
 static int mlx5e_devcom_event_mpv(int event, void *my_data, void *event_data)
 {
-	struct mlx5e_priv *slave_priv = my_data;
+	struct mlx5e_priv *master_priv = event_data;
 
 	switch (event) {
 	case MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP:
-		mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready(slave_priv->devcom, true);
+		mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready(master_priv->devcom, true);
 		break;
 	case MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_DOWN:
 		/* no need for comp set ready false since we unregister after

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Lee <[email protected]>

commit 5499e0602d2faafd42c580d25f615903c3fbe11b upstream.

x25_kill_by_neigh() walks the global X.25 socket list looking for sockets attached to a terminating neighbour. x25_list_lock protects list membership while the lookup is in progress, but it does not pin a socket's lifetime after the lock is dropped.

The function currently drops x25_list_lock before calling lock_sock(s). A concurrent close can run x25_release(), remove the same socket from x25_list, and drop the last socket reference in that window. The neighbour teardown path can then lock or inspect a freed struct sock/struct x25_sock.

Take sock_hold(s) while x25_list_lock still proves that the list entry is live, then drop the temporary reference after the socket has been locked, rechecked, and released. Recheck x25_sk(s)->neighbour after lock_sock(), because another path may have disconnected the socket before this path acquired the socket lock. Restart the list walk after each disconnect because the list lock was dropped and the previous iterator state may no longer be valid.

A QEMU/KASAN run against origin/master reproduced a slab-use-after-free in x25_kill_by_neigh().

---
 net/x25/af_x25.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1772,15 +1772,19 @@ void x25_kill_by_neigh(struct x25_neigh
 {
 	struct sock *s;
 
+again:
 	write_lock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
 
 	sk_for_each(s, &x25_list) {
 		if (x25_sk(s)->neighbour == nb) {
+			sock_hold(s);
 			write_unlock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
 			lock_sock(s);
-			x25_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, 0, 0);
+			if (x25_sk(s)->neighbour == nb)
+				x25_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, 0, 0);
 			release_sock(s);
-			write_lock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
+			sock_put(s);
+			goto again;
 		}
 	}
 	write_unlock_bh(&x25_list_lock);

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shiming Cheng <[email protected]>

commit e751256486d0ded20f5a9f9863467f1dce65142f upstream.

Commit 0ab03f353d36 ("net-gro: Fix GRO flush when receiving a GSO packet.") added a flush check to skb_gro_receive(), but skb_gro_receive_list() lacks the same validation.

As a result, packets marked with NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush may still be re-aggregated.

This allows already-GRO'd packets with existing frag_list to be re-aggregated into a new GRO session, corrupting the frag_list chain structure. When skb_segment() attempts to unpack these malformed packets, it encounters invalid state and triggers a kernel panic.

Scenario (Tethering/Device forwarding):
1. Driver: Generated aggregated packet P1 via LRO with frag_list
2. Dev A: Receives aggregated fraglist packet and flush flag set
3. Dev A: Re-enters GRO, skb_gro_receive_list() is called
4. Missing flush check allows re-aggregation despite flush flag
5. Frag_list chain becomes corrupted (loops or dangling refs)
6. Dev B: TX path calls skb_segment(), crashes on corrupted frag_list

Root cause in skb_segment():
The check at line ~4891:

    if (hsize <= 0 && i >= nfrags && skb_headlen(list_skb) &&
        (skb_headlen(list_skb) == len || sg)) {

When frag_list is corrupted by double aggregation, when list_skb is a NULL pointer from skb->next, skb_headlen(list_skb) dereference NULL/corrupted pointers occurs.

Call Trace:
 skb_headlen(NULL skb)
 skb_segment
 tcp_gso_segment
 tcp4_gso_segment
 inet_gso_segment
 skb_mac_gso_segment
 __skb_gso_segment
 skb_gso_segment
 validate_xmit_skb
 validate_xmit_skb_list
 sch_direct_xmit
 qdisc_restart
 __qdisc_run
 qdisc_run
 net_tx_action

Fix: Add NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush validation to the early-return check in skb_gro_receive_list(), matching the defensive programming pattern of skb_gro_receive().

---
 net/core/gro.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -231,7 +231,9 @@ done:
 
 int skb_gro_receive_list(struct sk_buff *p, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	if (unlikely(p->len + skb->len >= 65536))
+	/* make sure to check flush flag and to not merge */
+	if (unlikely(p->len + skb->len >= 65536 ||
+		     NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush))
 		return -E2BIG;
 
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb))) {

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fan Wu <[email protected]>

commit 14fa65d10f5696b063a7d8d26e8291ea84a2c6ed upstream.

When build_skb() fails in hip04_rx_poll(), the driver jumps to the refill path without releasing the current RX buffer and its DMA mapping. Installing a replacement buffer then overwrites the slot references and leaks both resources.

Keep the current slot intact and return budget so NAPI retries the same buffer. Also free a newly allocated RX fragment when dma_map_single() fails.

This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hip04_eth.c |   11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -594,7 +594,11 @@ static int hip04_rx_poll(struct napi_str
 		skb = build_skb(buf, priv->rx_buf_size);
 		if (unlikely(!skb)) {
 			net_dbg_ratelimited("build_skb failed\n");
-			goto refill;
+			/* Retain the slot; return budget so NAPI retries this
+			 * buffer. Refill would overwrite rx_buf[]/rx_phys[]
+			 * and leak them.
+			 */
+			return budget;
 		}
 
 		dma_unmap_single(priv->dev, priv->rx_phys[priv->rx_head],

@@ -622,14 +626,15 @@ static int hip04_rx_poll(struct napi_str
 			rx++;
 		}
 
-refill:
 		buf = netdev_alloc_frag(priv->rx_buf_size);
 		if (!buf)
 			goto done;
 		phys = dma_map_single(priv->dev, buf,
 				      RX_BUF_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
-		if (dma_mapping_error(priv->dev, phys))
+		if (dma_mapping_error(priv->dev, phys)) {
+			skb_free_frag(buf);
 			goto done;
+		}
 		priv->rx_buf[priv->rx_head] = buf;
 		priv->rx_phys[priv->rx_head] = phys;
 		hip04_set_recv_desc(priv, phys);

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Coia Prant <[email protected]>

commit def9a4745e105145133e442dd8a1c126caf0f553 upstream.

Commit 2a22b7ae2fa3 ("net: pcs: xpcs: adapt Wangxun NICs for SGMII mode") added a path in xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii() that reads speed/duplex from BMCR after AN completes. However, BMCR does not reflect the negotiated result on the hardware where this has been tested:

- On RK3568 (MAC side SGMII), BMCR returns a fixed hardware reset value
- Wangxun engineer Jiawen Wu confirmed that on their side, "BMCR looks like it only wants to be return as 0" [0]

The correct information is available in CL37_ANSGM_STS, which contains the actual link status and negotiated speed/duplex.

This bug was previously masked by phylink core, which overrides the PCS link state with the PHY state when a PHY is present:

        /* If we have a phy, the "up" state is the union of both the
         * PHY and the MAC
         */
        if (phy)
                link_state.link &= pl->phy_state.link;

Thus, when the link is down, the PHY's link_down state is applied on top of whatever the PCS reports, hiding the broken PCS state reading path.

Modify xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii() to:
1. Read link state from CL37_ANSGM_STS
2. If link is up, report speed/duplex from CL37_ANSGM_STS
3. Remove the broken BMCR reading path entirely

Also properly set state->an_complete to reflect the AN completion status, and clear CL37_ANCMPLT_INTR when link is down to avoid stale state.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

---
 drivers/net/pcs/pcs-xpcs.c |   32 +++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

@@ -958,6 +958,7 @@ static int xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii(stru
 
 	/* Reset link_state */
 	state->link = false;
+	state->an_complete = false;
 	state->speed = SPEED_UNKNOWN;
 	state->duplex = DUPLEX_UNKNOWN;
 	state->pause = 0;

@@ -969,6 +970,8 @@ static int xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii(stru
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
+	state->an_complete = ret & DW_VR_MII_AN_STS_C37_ANCMPLT_INTR;
+
 	if (ret & DW_VR_MII_C37_ANSGM_SP_LNKSTS) {
 		int speed_value;
 

@@ -986,34 +989,13 @@ static int xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii(stru
 			state->duplex = DUPLEX_FULL;
 		else
 			state->duplex = DUPLEX_HALF;
-	} else if (ret == DW_VR_MII_AN_STS_C37_ANCMPLT_INTR) {
-		int speed, duplex;
-
-		state->link = true;
-
-		speed = xpcs_read(xpcs, MDIO_MMD_VEND2, MII_BMCR);
-		if (speed < 0)
-			return speed;
 
-		speed &= BMCR_SPEED100 | BMCR_SPEED1000;
-		if (speed == BMCR_SPEED1000)
-			state->speed = SPEED_1000;
-		else if (speed == BMCR_SPEED100)
-			state->speed = SPEED_100;
-		else if (speed == 0)
-			state->speed = SPEED_10;
-
-		duplex = xpcs_read(xpcs, MDIO_MMD_VEND2, MII_ADVERTISE);
-		if (duplex < 0)
-			return duplex;
-
-		if (duplex & ADVERTISE_1000XFULL)
-			state->duplex = DUPLEX_FULL;
-		else if (duplex & ADVERTISE_1000XHALF)
-			state->duplex = DUPLEX_HALF;
+		return 0;
+	}
 
+	/* Clear AN complete status or interrupt */
+	if (state->an_complete)
 		xpcs_write(xpcs, MDIO_MMD_VEND2, DW_VR_MII_AN_INTR_STS, 0);
-	}
 
 	return 0;
 }

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit 425224c2d700391729be7fe6929a88ef4e2d7a4e upstream.

Don't return the return value of down_read_killable() (0) when a ptrace access check fails, return -EACCES as intended.

---
 fs/proc/namespaces.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(stru
 	const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops = PROC_I(inode)->ns_ops;
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	struct path ns_path;
-	int error = -EACCES;
+	int error;
 
 	if (!dentry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);

@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(stru
 	if (error)
 		goto out_put_task;
 
+	error = -EACCES;
 	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS))
 		goto out;
 

@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ static int proc_ns_readlink(struct dentr
 	if (res)
 		goto out_put_task;
 
+	res = -EACCES;
 	if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
 		res = ns_get_name(name, sizeof(name), task, ns_ops);
 		if (res >= 0)

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]>

commit e78f1ac37afcb16cb6fef8a2c92591eab6558956 upstream.

Only register the physical clock when facility 28 is installed and PTFF QAF returns that PTFF QPT is available.

---
 drivers/ptp/ptp_s390.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -107,6 +107,9 @@ static __init int ptp_s390_init(void)
 	if (IS_ERR(ptp_stcke_clock))
 		return PTR_ERR(ptp_stcke_clock);
 
+	if (!test_facility(28) || !ptff_query(PTFF_QPT))
+		return 0;
+
 	ptp_qpt_clock = ptp_clock_register(&ptp_s390_qpt_info, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(ptp_qpt_clock)) {
 		ptp_clock_unregister(ptp_stcke_clock);

@@ -117,7 +120,8 @@ static __init int ptp_s390_init(void)
 
 static __exit void ptp_s390_exit(void)
 {
-	ptp_clock_unregister(ptp_qpt_clock);
+	if (ptp_qpt_clock)
+		ptp_clock_unregister(ptp_qpt_clock);
 	ptp_clock_unregister(ptp_stcke_clock);
 }
 

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Greenwalt <[email protected]>

commit f6a7e00b81e35ef1325234925f2fe1e53b466f92 upstream.

If a PF reset occurs when the PTP state is ICE_PTP_UNINIT, then ice_ptp_rebuild() will update the state to ICE_PTP_ERROR. This will result in the following PTP release call trace during driver unload:

    kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:52!
    ice_ptp_release+0x332/0x3c0 [ice]
    ice_deinit_features.part.0+0x10e/0x120 [ice]
    ice_remove+0x100/0x220 [ice]

This was observed when passing PF1 through to a VM. ice_ptp_init() fails because ctrl_pf is NULL and sets the state to ICE_PTP_UNINIT.

Fix by detecting the ICE_PTP_UNINIT state in ice_ptp_rebuild() and returning without error, preventing the invalid state transition to ICE_PTP_ERROR. The only valid path to ICE_PTP_ERROR is from ICE_PTP_RESETTING after a failed rebuild.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ptp.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -2994,6 +2994,11 @@ void ice_ptp_rebuild(struct ice_pf *pf,
 	struct ice_ptp *ptp = &pf->ptp;
 	int err;
 
+	if (ptp->state == ICE_PTP_UNINIT) {
+		dev_dbg(ice_pf_to_dev(pf), "PTP was not initialized, skipping rebuild\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (ptp->state == ICE_PTP_READY) {
 		ice_ptp_prepare_for_reset(pf, reset_type);
 	} else if (ptp->state != ICE_PTP_RESETTING) {

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>

commit 1a087033a6bad73b4140020b40e819b0933aafc3 upstream.

When running instance tests, 'ftracetest' creates a new ftrace instance and runs the tests inside it. Before starting each test, it executes 'initialize_system()' to reset the ftrace state to initial-state.

However, since 'initialize_system()' is executed in the context of the instance directory, it only cleans up triggers and filters of that instance.
Any triggers or dynamic events left behind in the top-level instance by previous failed top-level tests, are left completely untouched. These top-level leftovers can cause subsequent instance-based tests to fail or even crash the kernel.

Fix this by executing 'initialize_system()' in the top-level tracing directory once before entering the instance loop.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/ftracetest |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ for t in $TEST_CASES; do
 done
 
 # Test on instance loop
+(cd $TRACING_DIR; initialize_system)
 INSTANCE=" (instance) "
 for t in $TEST_CASES; do
   test_on_instance $t || continue

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit 749d7aa0377aae32af8c0a4ad43371e7bf830ab5 upstream.

do_thaw_all_callback() calls bdev_thaw() while holding sb->s_umount exclusively. If the block device was frozen via bdev_freeze() dropping the last block layer freeze reference calls fs_bdev_thaw() which reacquires s_umount:

do_thaw_all_callback(sb)

    super_lock_excl(sb)                     # holds sb->s_umount
    bdev_thaw(sb->s_bdev)
      mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex)
      # bd_fsfreeze_count drops 1 -> 0
      bd_holder_ops->thaw == fs_bdev_thaw
        get_bdev_super(bdev)
          bdev_super_lock(bdev, true)
            super_lock(sb, true)
              down_write(&sb->s_umount)     # same task: deadlock

The emergency thaw worker deadlocks against itself holding both s_umount and bd_fsfreeze_mutex. That fscks any subsequent unmount, freeze, or thaw of that filesystem and block device.

  [   81.878470] sysrq: Show Blocked State
  [   81.880140] task:kworker/0:1     state:D stack:0     pid:11    tgid:11    ppid:2      task_flags:0x4208060 flags:0x00080000
  [   81.884876] Workqueue: events do_thaw_all
  [   81.886656] Call Trace:
  [   81.887759]  <TASK>
  [   81.888763]  __schedule+0x579/0x1420
  [   81.890372]  schedule+0x3a/0x100
  [   81.891794]  schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30
  [   81.893848]  rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x1ea/0x900
  [   81.895191]  ? __pfx_do_thaw_all_callback+0x10/0x10
  [   81.896528]  down_write+0xbd/0xc0
  [   81.897505]  super_lock+0x91/0x180
  [   81.898457]  ? __mutex_lock+0xa99/0x1140
  [   81.900748]  ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x1f/0x400
  [   81.902069]  bdev_super_lock+0x5b/0x150
  [   81.903132]  get_bdev_super+0x10/0x60
  [   81.904042]  fs_bdev_thaw+0x23/0xf0
  [   81.904755]  bdev_thaw+0x82/0x100
  [   81.905484]  do_thaw_all_callback+0x2c/0x50
  [   81.906298]  __iterate_supers+0x5d/0x130
  [   81.907067]  do_thaw_all+0x20/0x40
  [   81.907739]  process_one_work+0x206/0x5e0
  [   81.908545]  worker_thread+0x1e2/0x3c0
  [   81.909339]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
  [   81.910171]  kthread+0xf4/0x130
  [   81.910799]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  [   81.911528]  ret_from_fork+0x2e2/0x3b0
  [   81.912259]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  [   81.913010]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  [   81.913806]  </TASK>

bdev_super_lock() even documents the violated requirement with lockdep_assert_not_held(&sb->s_umount).

Acquiring bd_fsfreeze_mutex under s_umount also inverts the bd_fsfreeze_mutex vs. s_umount ordering established by bdev_{freeze,thaw}() and can thus ABBA against a concurrent block-layer freeze even when the recursive path isn't hit.

Fix this by not holding s_umount around the bdev_thaw() loop at all. Pin the superblock with an active reference instead as filesystems_freeze_callback() does. The active reference keeps the superblock from being shut down and so ->s_bdev stays valid without holding s_umount. The block-layer-held freeze is dropped by fs_bdev_thaw() with FREEZE_MAY_NEST | FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE exactly as a regular unfreeze would and thaw_super_locked() handles filesystem-level freezes as before.

The emergency thaw path has deadlocked like this in one form or another for a long long time but the current exclusively-held shape dates back to commit [1] where thaw_bdev() already ended in thaw_super() with s_umount held by do_thaw_all_callback().

---
 fs/super.c |   29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

@@ -1139,16 +1139,30 @@ void emergency_remount(void)
 	}
 }
 
+static inline bool get_active_super(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	bool active = false;
+
+	if (super_lock_excl(sb)) {
+		active = atomic_inc_not_zero(&sb->s_active);
+		super_unlock_excl(sb);
+	}
+	return active;
+}
+
 static void do_thaw_all_callback(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
 {
-	if (!super_lock_excl(sb))
+	if (!get_active_super(sb))
 		return;
 
+	/* fs_bdev_thaw() acquires s_umount so it must not be held here */
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BLOCK))
 		while (sb->s_bdev && !bdev_thaw(sb->s_bdev))
 			pr_warn("Emergency Thaw on %pg\n", sb->s_bdev);
 
-	thaw_super_locked(sb, FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE, NULL);
+	if (super_lock_excl(sb))
+		thaw_super_locked(sb, FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE, NULL);
+	deactivate_super(sb);
 }
 
 static void do_thaw_all(struct work_struct *work)

@@ -1174,17 +1188,6 @@ void emergency_thaw_all(void)
 	}
 }
 
-static inline bool get_active_super(struct super_block *sb)
-{
-	bool active = false;
-
-	if (super_lock_excl(sb)) {
-		active = atomic_inc_not_zero(&sb->s_active);
-		super_unlock_excl(sb);
-	}
-	return active;
-}
-
 static const char *filesystems_freeze_ptr = "filesystems_freeze";
 
 static void filesystems_freeze_callback(struct super_block *sb, void *freeze_all_ptr)

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Raphael Zimmer <[email protected]>

commit a6c4250b81bd30beae94e1b7a4b26fa1193ad2e4 upstream.

In a reply message to an RBD request, a positive result code indicates a data payload, which is not allowed for writes. While rbd_osd_req_callback() already resets a positive result code for writes to zero, rbd_object_map_callback() does not. This allows a corrupted reply to an object map update to trigger the rbd_assert(*result < 0) in __rbd_obj_handle_request(). This happens, because rbd_object_map_callback() calls rbd_obj_handle_request() -> __rbd_obj_handle_request() and passes this positive result code. From __rbd_obj_handle_request(), rbd_obj_advance_write() is called, which leaves the positive result code unchanged and returns true. Therefore, the if(done && *result) branch is executed in __rbd_obj_handle_request() and the assertion triggers.

This patch fixes the issue by adjusting the logic in the rbd_object_map_callback() path. A positive result code for an object map update is now reset to zero (similar to rbd_osd_req_callback()), and the message is subsequently handled the same way as if the result code was zero from the beginning. Additionally, a WARN_ON_ONCE() is added for this case.

---
 drivers/block/rbd.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1957,10 +1957,15 @@ static int rbd_object_map_update_finish(
 	bool has_current_state;
 	void *p;
 
-	if (osd_req->r_result)
+	if (osd_req->r_result < 0)
 		return osd_req->r_result;
 
 	/*
+	 * Writes aren't allowed to return a data payload.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(osd_req->r_result > 0);
+
+	/*
 	 * Nothing to do for a snapshot object map.
 	 */
 	if (osd_req->r_num_ops == 1)

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Carl Johnson <[email protected]>

commit 2eb74eef4b7eda8df593d22fb48e94ef959ec8a5 upstream.

The macOS built-in SMB server returns STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK for a CREATE on a path whose final component is a symlink, but it does not include a Symbolic Link Error Response in the error data: both ErrorContextCount and ByteCount are zero, so the symlink target is not present in the response at all. Per [MS-SMB2] section 2.2.2 such a response should carry a valid Symbolic Link Error Response, so this is a server bug, but the target can still be retrieved with FSCTL_GET_REPARSE_POINT.

Frame from a capture against macOS 26.5.2 (build 25F84):

SMB2 hdr : Status=0x8000002d STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK, Cmd=Create Error Rsp: StructureSize=0x0009
Error Context Count: 0
Byte Count: 0
Error Data: 00

symlink_data() cannot find a struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp in such a response and returns -EINVAL, which parse_create_response() propagates, so smb2_query_path_info() bails out at

	if (rc || !data->reparse_point)
		goto out;

before it can retry with SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE. stat(), readlink() and ls of any server-side symlink then fail with -EINVAL:

  $ ls -la Config
  l????????? ? ? ? ? ? Config.json
  $ stat Config/Config.json
  stat: cannot statx 'Config/Config.json': Invalid argument

A 5.10 client resolves these symlinks correctly against the same server and share, so this is a regression for Apple SMB servers.

Handle it in several places:

- symlink_data() detects the empty response (ErrorContextCount and ByteCount both zero) and returns a distinct -ENODATA, so that "server did not send the target" can be told apart from a genuinely malformed response and only this case is worked around.

- parse_create_response() treats -ENODATA like STATUS_IO_REPARSE_TAG_NOT_HANDLED, which does not carry the target
either: leave the reparse tag unset and clear rc, so the existing SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE path retrieves the target.

- smb2_query_path_info() only fixes up the symlink target type when the target is already known. SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE sets data->reparse.tag but does not parse the target out of the reparse buffer; that happens later, in reparse_info_to_fattr(). Without this check smb2_fix_symlink_target_type() is called with a NULL target and returns -EIO. This could not happen with servers that send the target inline and therefore skip SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE.

- smb2_open_file() maps -ENODATA to -EIO, matching STATUS_IO_REPARSE_TAG_NOT_HANDLED, so its callers retrieve the target with SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE as well.

Tested on Debian 13, kernel 6.18.38 (armv7), against macOS 26.5.2:
symlinks now resolve, including relative, parent-traversing and directory symlinks, and reads through symlinks succeed.

---
 fs/smb/client/smb2file.c  |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c |   23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -30,6 +30,19 @@ static struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *syml
 	u8 *end = (u8 *)err + iov->iov_len;
 	u32 len;
 
+	/*
+	 * Per [MS-SMB2] section 2.2.2, a STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK response has to
+	 * carry a Symbolic Link Error Response, so ByteCount cannot be zero.  Some
+	 * servers (e.g. the macOS built-in SMB server) violate this and return an
+	 * empty error response, with both ErrorContextCount and ByteCount set to
+	 * zero, i.e. without the symlink target.  Detect this and return -ENODATA
+	 * so that callers can tell "server did not send the target" apart from a
+	 * malformed response, and retrieve the target with FSCTL_GET_REPARSE_POINT
+	 * instead.
+	 */
+	if (!err->ErrorContextCount && !le32_to_cpu(err->ByteCount))
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENODATA);
+
 	if (err->ErrorContextCount) {
 		struct smb2_error_context_rsp *p;
 

@@ -200,6 +213,14 @@ int smb2_open_file(const unsigned int xi
 			rc = smb2_parse_symlink_response(oparms->cifs_sb, &err_iov,
 							 oparms->path,
 							 &data->symlink_target);
+			/*
+			 * If smb2_parse_symlink_response returned -ENODATA then the
+			 * symlink_target was not sent. Treat this as if the SMB2_open()
+			 * failed with STATUS_IO_REPARSE_TAG_NOT_HANDLED status, which is
+			 * indicated by the -EIO errno.
+			 */
+			if (rc == -ENODATA)
+				rc = -EIO;
 			if (!rc) {
 				memset(smb2_data, 0, sizeof(*smb2_data));
 				oparms->create_options |= OPEN_REPARSE_POINT;

@@ -896,9 +896,19 @@ static int parse_create_response(struct
 		rc = smb2_parse_symlink_response(cifs_sb, iov,
 						 full_path,
 						 &data->symlink_target);
-		if (rc)
+		if (rc != 0 && rc != -ENODATA)
 			return rc;
-		tag = IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK;
+		/*
+		 * -ENODATA means that the response was parsed but did not contain
+		 * the symlink target at all (see symlink_data()).  Treat it like
+		 * STATUS_IO_REPARSE_TAG_NOT_HANDLED, which does not contain it
+		 * either: leave the tag unset and clear rc, so that the caller
+		 * retrieves the target with SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE.
+		 */
+		if (rc == -ENODATA)
+			rc = 0;
+		else
+			tag = IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK;
 		reparse_point = true;
 		break;
 	case STATUS_SUCCESS:

@@ -1091,7 +1101,14 @@ int smb2_query_path_info(const unsigned
 				rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		}
 
-		if (data->reparse.tag == IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK && !rc) {
+		/*
+		 * If the symlink was already parsed in create response then it is needed to fix
+		 * its type now (after the second call with OPEN_REPARSE_POINT which filled the
+		 * data->fi.Attributes). If the symlink was not parsed in create response then
+		 * the data->symlink_target was not filled yet and then the type will be fixed
+		 * later after data->symlink_target is filled.
+		 */
+		if (data->reparse.tag == IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK && !rc && data->symlink_target) {
 			bool directory = le32_to_cpu(data->fi.Attributes) & ATTR_DIRECTORY;
 			rc = smb2_fix_symlink_target_type(&data->symlink_target, directory, cifs_sb);
 		}

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: James Montgomery <[email protected]>

commit c74801ee524f477c174a1899782b6c3b6918d407 upstream.

In ntlm_authenticate(), destroy_previous_session() is called using a user pointer resolved from the client-supplied NTLM blob username field before the NTLMv2 response is validated. An authenticated attacker can set the NTLM blob username to match a victim account and set PreviousSessionId to the victim's session ID; destroy_previous_session() destroys the victim's session while ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() subsequently rejects the request with -EPERM.

Move destroy_previous_session() and the prev_id assignment to after ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() returns success and use sess->user rather than the pre-authentication lookup result. This matches the ordering already used by krb5_authenticate(), where destroy_previous_session() is called only after ksmbd_krb5_authenticate() returns success.

---
 fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c |    9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -1492,11 +1492,6 @@ static int ntlm_authenticate(struct ksmb
 		return -EPERM;
 	}
 
-	/* Check for previous session */
-	prev_id = le64_to_cpu(req->PreviousSessionId);
-	if (prev_id && prev_id != sess->id)
-		destroy_previous_session(conn, user, prev_id);
-
 	if (sess->state == SMB2_SESSION_VALID) {
 		/*
 		 * Reuse session if anonymous try to connect

@@ -1534,6 +1529,10 @@ static int ntlm_authenticate(struct ksmb
 		}
 	}
 
+	prev_id = le64_to_cpu(req->PreviousSessionId);
+	if (prev_id && prev_id != sess->id)
+		destroy_previous_session(conn, sess->user, prev_id);
+
 	/*
 	 * If session state is SMB2_SESSION_VALID, We can assume
 	 * that it is reauthentication. And the user/password

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eddie Phillips <[email protected]>

commit b65352a1bac64442ad95e64f385b40ccb9f1b0db upstream.

When the system is under extreme memory pressure, page allocations can fail during the Rx buffer refill loop. If the number of buffers posted to hardware falls below a critical low threshold and the refill loop exits due to allocation failures, the queue can stall:

1. The device drops incoming packets because there are no descriptors.
2. Since no packets are processed, no Rx completions are generated.
3. Because no completions occur, NAPI is never scheduled, preventing the refill loop from running again even after memory is freed.

This results in a permanent queue stall.

Resolve this by introducing a starvation recovery timer for each Rx queue. If the number of buffers posted to hardware falls below a critical low threshold, start a timer to periodically reschedule NAPI. Once NAPI runs and successfully refills the queue above the threshold, the timer is not rescheduled.

The threshold is set to 32 because a single maximum-sized Receive Segment Coalescing (RSC) packet can consume up to 19 descriptors in the Rx path. Lower thresholds (such as 8 or 16) would be insufficient to process a complete maximum-sized RSC packet, risking packet drops or unexpected hardware behavior under memory pressure. Setting the threshold to 32 guarantees a safe margin to handle at least one full RSC packet.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve.h        |    3 ++
 drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_rx_dqo.c |   34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
 #include <linux/net_tstamp.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/timer.h>
 #include <linux/ptp_clock_kernel.h>
 #include <linux/u64_stats_sync.h>
 #include <net/page_pool/helpers.h>

@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@
 
 /* Interval to schedule a stats report update, 20000ms. */
 #define GVE_STATS_REPORT_TIMER_PERIOD	20000
+#define GVE_RX_NAPI_RESCHED_MS 20 /* msecs */
 
 /* Numbers of NIC tx/rx stats in stats report. */
 #define NIC_TX_STATS_REPORT_NUM	0

@@ -338,6 +340,7 @@ struct gve_rx_ring {
 	struct xdp_rxq_info xdp_rxq;
 	struct xsk_buff_pool *xsk_pool;
 	struct page_frag_cache page_cache; /* Page cache to allocate XDP frames */
+	struct timer_list starvation_timer; /* for queue starvation recovery */
 };
 
 /* A TX desc ring entry */

@@ -18,6 +18,16 @@
 #include <net/tcp.h>
 #include <net/xdp_sock_drv.h>
 
+static void gve_rx_starvation_timer(struct timer_list *t)
+{
+	struct gve_rx_ring *rx = timer_container_of(rx, t, starvation_timer);
+	struct gve_priv *priv = rx->gve;
+	struct gve_notify_block *block;
+
+	block = &priv->ntfy_blocks[rx->ntfy_id];
+	napi_schedule(&block->napi);
+}
+
 static void gve_rx_free_hdr_bufs(struct gve_priv *priv, struct gve_rx_ring *rx)
 {
 	struct device *hdev = &priv->pdev->dev;

@@ -120,6 +130,7 @@ void gve_rx_stop_ring_dqo(struct gve_pri
 
 	if (rx->dqo.page_pool)
 		page_pool_disable_direct_recycling(rx->dqo.page_pool);
+	timer_shutdown_sync(&rx->starvation_timer);
 	gve_remove_napi(priv, ntfy_idx);
 	gve_rx_remove_from_block(priv, idx);
 	gve_rx_reset_ring_dqo(priv, idx);

@@ -208,8 +219,10 @@ static int gve_rx_alloc_hdr_bufs(struct
 void gve_rx_start_ring_dqo(struct gve_priv *priv, int idx)
 {
 	int ntfy_idx = gve_rx_idx_to_ntfy(priv, idx);
+	struct gve_rx_ring *rx = &priv->rx[idx];
 
 	gve_rx_add_to_block(priv, idx);
+	timer_setup(&rx->starvation_timer, gve_rx_starvation_timer, 0);
 	gve_add_napi(priv, ntfy_idx, gve_napi_poll_dqo);
 }
 

@@ -363,6 +376,7 @@ void gve_rx_post_buffers_dqo(struct gve_
 	struct gve_rx_compl_queue_dqo *complq = &rx->dqo.complq;
 	struct gve_rx_buf_queue_dqo *bufq = &rx->dqo.bufq;
 	struct gve_priv *priv = rx->gve;
+	u32 num_bufs_avail_to_hw;
 	u32 num_avail_slots;
 	u32 num_full_slots;
 	u32 num_posted = 0;

@@ -398,6 +412,26 @@ void gve_rx_post_buffers_dqo(struct gve_
 	}
 
 	rx->fill_cnt += num_posted;
+
+	/* If the queue has fewer than GVE_RX_BUF_THRESH_DQO descriptors
+	 * visible to the hardware, the hardware is in danger of starving
+	 * and cannot trigger interrupts.
+	 *
+	 * We use a threshold of 32 because a single maximum-sized RSC
+	 * packet can consume up to 19 descriptors in the Rx path. Lower
+	 * thresholds (e.g., 8 or 16) would be unsafe as they could cause
+	 * the device to drop/stall on a maximum-sized RSC packet.
+	 *
+	 * Start the timer to periodically reschedule NAPI and recover.
+	 */
+	num_bufs_avail_to_hw =
+		((bufq->tail & ~(GVE_RX_BUF_THRESH_DQO - 1)) -
+		 bufq->head) & bufq->mask;
+
+	if (num_bufs_avail_to_hw < GVE_RX_BUF_THRESH_DQO) {
+		mod_timer(&rx->starvation_timer,
+			  jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(GVE_RX_NAPI_RESCHED_MS));
+	}
 }
 
 static void gve_rx_skb_csum(struct sk_buff *skb,

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]>

commit 59abb87159c53605c063f6e2ceb215b5eba43ee6 upstream.

set_bit(rslt->ptype, prof->ptypes) operates on a DECLARE_BITMAP of ICE_FLOW_PTYPE_MAX (1024) bits. Nothing prevents a malicious VF from providing ptype >= 1024 through VIRTCHNL, resulting in a write past the end of the bitmap and a kernel page fault.

Reproduced with a custom kernel module injecting a crafted VIRTCHNL_OP_ADD_RSS_CFG on E810-C QSFP (8086:1592), FW 4.91 0x800214af 1.3909.0, ICE COMMS DDP 1.3.53.0, kernel 7.1.0-rc1.

crash_parser: ice_parser_profile_init @ ffffffffc0d61b60
crash_parser: setting ptype=0xffff (max valid=1023)
crash_parser: calling ice_parser_profile_init -- expect OOB crash!

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 56 UID: 0 PID: 165011 Comm: insmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S U OE 7.1.0-rc1 #1
Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600BPB/S2600BPB
RIP: 0010:ice_parser_profile_init+0x2d/0x1d0 [ice]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __pfx_ice_parser_profile_init+0x10/0x10 [ice]
 crash_init+0x127/0xff0 [crash_parser]
 do_one_initcall+0x45/0x310
 do_init_module+0x64/0x270
 init_module_from_file+0xcc/0xf0
 idempotent_init_module+0x17b/0x280
 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x6e/0xe0

Bail out early with -EINVAL when ptype is out of range.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_parser.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -2368,6 +2368,9 @@ int ice_parser_profile_init(struct ice_p
 	u16 proto_off = 0;
 	u16 off;
 
+	if (rslt->ptype >= ICE_FLOW_PTYPE_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	memset(prof, 0, sizeof(*prof));
 	set_bit(rslt->ptype, prof->ptypes);
 	if (blk == ICE_BLK_SW) {

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sergey Temerkhanov <[email protected]>

commit 2915681b89f817677ab9f1166d95b595bc144f5f upstream.

ptp.cached_phc_time is a 64-bit value updated by a periodic work item on one CPU and read locklessly on another. On 32-bit or non-atomic architectures this can result in a torn read. Use READ_ONCE() to enforce a single atomic load.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ptp.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static u64 ice_ptp_extend_40b_ts(struct
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	return ice_ptp_extend_32b_ts(pf->ptp.cached_phc_time,
+	return ice_ptp_extend_32b_ts(READ_ONCE(pf->ptp.cached_phc_time),
 				     (in_tstamp >> 8) & mask);
 }
 

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 92d3817649df2b0b6a008a686c8275c88d7ef594 upstream.

ila_csum_adjust_transport() caches ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb) before calling pskb_may_pull(). On a non-linear skb whose transport header sits in a page fragment, pskb_may_pull() can call __pskb_pull_tail() / pskb_expand_head() and free the old skb head, leaving ip6h dangling; the following get_csum_diff(ip6h, p) then reads freed memory. ila_update_ipv6_locator() uses ip6h (and the iaddr derived from it) again after the csum-adjust call and additionally writes the new locator through that pointer.

Impact: a remote IPv6 packet routed through a configured ILA csum-adjust-transport route or receive-side mapping triggers a slab-use-after-free in ila_update_ipv6_locator() (KASAN). The route or mapping requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to configure, but trigger packets are unauthenticated once it exists.

Reload ip6h after each pskb_may_pull() in ila_csum_adjust_transport() before the csum-diff read. In ila_update_ipv6_locator() only the ILA_CSUM_ADJUST_TRANSPORT case pulls the skb, so reload ip6h and iaddr in that case alone before the destination-address write; the neutral-map modes never pull and keep their cached pointers.

---
 net/ipv6/ila/ila_common.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static void ila_csum_adjust_transport(st
 			struct tcphdr *th = (struct tcphdr *)
 					(skb_network_header(skb) + nhoff);
 
+			ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
 			diff = get_csum_diff(ip6h, p);
 			inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff(&th->check, skb,
 							diff, true, true);

@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ static void ila_csum_adjust_transport(st
 					(skb_network_header(skb) + nhoff);
 
 			if (uh->check || skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
+				ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
 				diff = get_csum_diff(ip6h, p);
 				inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff(&uh->check, skb,
 								diff, true, true);

@@ -109,6 +111,7 @@ static void ila_csum_adjust_transport(st
 			struct icmp6hdr *ih = (struct icmp6hdr *)
 					(skb_network_header(skb) + nhoff);
 
+			ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
 			diff = get_csum_diff(ip6h, p);
 			inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff(&ih->icmp6_cksum, skb,
 							diff, true, true);

@@ -126,6 +129,15 @@ void ila_update_ipv6_locator(struct sk_b
 	switch (p->csum_mode) {
 	case ILA_CSUM_ADJUST_TRANSPORT:
 		ila_csum_adjust_transport(skb, p);
+		/*
+		 * ila_csum_adjust_transport() calls pskb_may_pull(), which can
+		 * reallocate the skb head and leave ip6h (and the iaddr derived
+		 * from it) dangling; reload both before the write below.  The
+		 * other csum modes do not pull, so their cached pointers stay
+		 * valid.
+		 */
+		ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+		iaddr = ila_a2i(&ip6h->daddr);
 		break;
 	case ILA_CSUM_NEUTRAL_MAP:
 		if (sir2ila) {

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ibrahim Hashimov <[email protected]>

commit 234e5e898b713bc0b3a631b6f002897f43d046c8 upstream.

mac802154_scan_worker() captures the scanning sub-interface under RCU and then keeps dereferencing sdata->dev after rcu_read_unlock() and outside the rtnl -- in the failure traces, in mac802154_transmit_beacon_req() (skb->dev = sdata->dev), and in the end_scan cleanup. Nothing keeps that netdev alive across the worker iteration.

A concurrent DEL_INTERFACE or PHY removal can unregister the interface once the worker drops the rtnl between its two drv_set_channel() sections. unregister_netdevice() frees the netdev asynchronously from netdev_run_todo() with the rtnl already dropped, so neither holding the rtnl nor the per-PHY IEEE802154_IS_SCANNING flag prevents a stale worker iteration from dereferencing the freed netdev -- a KASAN slab-use-after-free, reachable by racing TRIGGER_SCAN against DEL_INTERFACE (both CAP_NET_ADMIN).

Pin the netdev with netdev_hold() while the RCU read lock is still held, and release it at every worker exit.

---
 net/mac802154/scan.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ void mac802154_scan_worker(struct work_s
 	enum nl802154_scan_types scan_req_type;
 	struct ieee802154_sub_if_data *sdata;
 	unsigned int scan_duration = 0;
+	netdevice_tracker dev_tracker;
 	struct wpan_phy *wpan_phy;
 	u8 scan_req_duration;
 	u8 page, channel;

@@ -209,6 +210,14 @@ void mac802154_scan_worker(struct work_s
 		return;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * sdata->dev is dereferenced below after rcu_read_unlock() and outside
+	 * the rtnl, and a concurrent DEL_INTERFACE / PHY teardown can free it
+	 * asynchronously from netdev_run_todo(). Pin it with a reference taken
+	 * while the RCU read lock is still held, and drop it at every exit.
+	 */
+	netdev_hold(sdata->dev, &dev_tracker, GFP_ATOMIC);
+
 	wpan_phy = scan_req->wpan_phy;
 	scan_req_type = scan_req->type;
 	scan_req_duration = scan_req->duration;

@@ -262,12 +271,14 @@ void mac802154_scan_worker(struct work_s
 		"Scan page %u channel %u for %ums\n",
 		page, channel, jiffies_to_msecs(scan_duration));
 	queue_delayed_work(local->mac_wq, &local->scan_work, scan_duration);
+	netdev_put(sdata->dev, &dev_tracker);
 	return;
 
 end_scan:
 	rtnl_lock();
 	mac802154_scan_cleanup_locked(local, sdata, false);
 	rtnl_unlock();
+	netdev_put(sdata->dev, &dev_tracker);
 }
 
 int mac802154_trigger_scan_locked(struct ieee802154_sub_if_data *sdata,

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit fd3a3f28ed60c6af4b2a39933b151d6b27842c3b upstream.

llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the AEAD request as

	assoclen += datalen - authlen;

where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen (4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that only spans the real frame.

The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.

Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.

---
 net/mac802154/llsec.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -891,6 +891,11 @@ llsec_do_decrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *sk
 	data = skb_mac_header(skb) + skb->mac_len;
 	datalen = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - data;
 
+	if (datalen < authlen) {
+		kfree_sensitive(req);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
 	sg_init_one(&sg, skb_mac_header(skb), assoclen + datalen);
 
 	if (!(hdr->sec.level & IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)) {

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit 793b9b729f1e8de57be8c8daf1a9838be96cabed upstream.

The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in mctp_serial_push_header() case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only:

	if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) {
		dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR;
	} else {
		dev->rxlen = c;
		dev->rxpos = 0;
		dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
		...
	}

A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state machine advances to STATE_DATA. In mctp_serial_push() STATE_DATA, the incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is tested:

	dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c;
	dev->rxpos++;
	dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
	if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) {
		dev->rxpos = 0;
		dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER;
	}

With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled 1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a frame (0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded.

Reaching this requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach the N_MCTP line discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which the bytes arrive via the tty receive path.

Route a zero-length frame straight to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser never enters STATE_DATA with rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can no longer occur.

KASAN, on a frame of 0x7e 0x01 0x00 followed by data bytes (before this change):

  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370
  index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]'
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf
  Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0
   mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf
   tty_ldisc_receive_buf
   flush_to_ldisc
  Allocated by task 152:
   alloc_netdev_mqs
   mctp_serial_open

v2: route zero-length frames to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_ERR so
the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr).

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

---
 drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static void mctp_serial_push_header(stru
 		} else {
 			dev->rxlen = c;
 			dev->rxpos = 0;
-			dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
+			dev->rxstate = c > 0 ? STATE_DATA : STATE_TRAILER;
 			dev->rxfcs = crc_ccitt_byte(dev->rxfcs, c);
 		}
 		break;

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Zeng <[email protected]>

commit 4032f8ed10fcb84d41c508dfb04be96589f78dfe upstream.

OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb length in OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment. A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater than skb->len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy().

Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a consumer handles it.

---
 net/openvswitch/actions.c  |   19 +++++++------------
 net/openvswitch/datapath.c |   25 ++++++++++++++-----------
 net/openvswitch/datapath.h |    2 +-
 net/openvswitch/vport.c    |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

@@ -836,12 +836,8 @@ static void do_output(struct datapath *d
 		u16 mru = OVS_CB(skb)->mru;
 		u32 cutlen = OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen;
 
-		if (unlikely(cutlen > 0)) {
-			if (skb->len - cutlen > ovs_mac_header_len(key))
-				pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - cutlen);
-			else
-				pskb_trim(skb, ovs_mac_header_len(key));
-		}
+		if (unlikely(cutlen < skb->len))
+			pskb_trim(skb, max(cutlen, ovs_mac_header_len(key)));
 
 		if (likely(!mru ||
 		           (skb->len <= mru + vport->dev->hard_header_len))) {

@@ -1233,7 +1229,7 @@ static void execute_psample(struct datap
 
 	psample_group.net = ovs_dp_get_net(dp);
 	md.in_ifindex = OVS_CB(skb)->input_vport->dev->ifindex;
-	md.trunc_size = skb->len - OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen;
+	md.trunc_size = min(skb->len, OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen);
 	md.rate_as_probability = 1;
 
 	rate = OVS_CB(skb)->probability ? OVS_CB(skb)->probability : U32_MAX;

@@ -1283,22 +1279,21 @@ static int do_execute_actions(struct dat
 			clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			if (clone)
 				do_output(dp, clone, port, key);
-			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0;
+			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 			break;
 		}
 
 		case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC: {
 			struct ovs_action_trunc *trunc = nla_data(a);
 
-			if (skb->len > trunc->max_len)
-				OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = skb->len - trunc->max_len;
+			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = trunc->max_len;
 			break;
 		}
 
 		case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE:
 			output_userspace(dp, skb, key, a, attr,
 						     len, OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen);
-			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0;
+			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 			if (nla_is_last(a, rem)) {
 				consume_skb(skb);
 				return 0;

@@ -1452,7 +1447,7 @@ static int do_execute_actions(struct dat
 
 		case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PSAMPLE:
 			execute_psample(dp, skb, a);
-			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0;
+			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 			if (nla_is_last(a, rem)) {
 				consume_skb(skb);
 				return 0;

@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ void ovs_dp_process_packet(struct sk_buf
 			upcall.portid = ovs_vport_find_upcall_portid(p, skb);
 
 		upcall.mru = OVS_CB(skb)->mru;
-		error = ovs_dp_upcall(dp, skb, key, &upcall, 0);
+		error = ovs_dp_upcall(dp, skb, key, &upcall, U32_MAX);
 		switch (error) {
 		case 0:
 		case -EAGAIN:

@@ -457,7 +457,8 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 	struct sk_buff *nskb = NULL;
 	struct sk_buff *user_skb = NULL; /* to be queued to userspace */
 	struct nlattr *nla;
-	size_t len;
+	size_t msg_size;
+	size_t skb_len;
 	unsigned int hlen;
 	int err, dp_ifindex;
 	u64 hash;

@@ -478,7 +479,8 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 		skb = nskb;
 	}
 
-	if (nla_attr_size(skb->len) > USHRT_MAX) {
+	skb_len = min(skb->len, cutlen);
+	if (nla_attr_size(skb_len) > USHRT_MAX) {
 		err = -EFBIG;
 		goto out;
 	}

@@ -493,13 +495,13 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 	 * padding logic. Only perform zerocopy if padding is not required.
 	 */
 	if (dp->user_features & OVS_DP_F_UNALIGNED)
-		hlen = skb_zerocopy_headlen(skb);
+		hlen = min(skb_zerocopy_headlen(skb), cutlen);
 	else
-		hlen = skb->len;
+		hlen = skb_len;
 
-	len = upcall_msg_size(upcall_info, hlen - cutlen,
-			      OVS_CB(skb)->acts_origlen);
-	user_skb = genlmsg_new(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	msg_size = upcall_msg_size(upcall_info, hlen,
+				   OVS_CB(skb)->acts_origlen);
+	user_skb = genlmsg_new(msg_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!user_skb) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;

@@ -560,7 +562,7 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 	}
 
 	/* Add OVS_PACKET_ATTR_LEN when packet is truncated */
-	if (cutlen > 0 &&
+	if (skb_len < skb->len &&
 	    nla_put_u32(user_skb, OVS_PACKET_ATTR_LEN, skb->len)) {
 		err = -ENOBUFS;
 		goto out;

@@ -585,9 +587,9 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 		err = -ENOBUFS;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	nla->nla_len = nla_attr_size(skb->len - cutlen);
+	nla->nla_len = nla_attr_size(skb_len);
 
-	err = skb_zerocopy(user_skb, skb, skb->len - cutlen, hlen);
+	err = skb_zerocopy(user_skb, skb, skb_len, hlen);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 

@@ -644,6 +646,7 @@ static int ovs_packet_cmd_execute(struct
 		packet->ignore_df = 1;
 	}
 	OVS_CB(packet)->mru = mru;
+	OVS_CB(packet)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 
 	if (a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_HASH]) {
 		hash = nla_get_u64(a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_HASH]);

@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ struct datapath {
  * @mru: The maximum received fragement size; 0 if the packet is not
  * fragmented.
  * @acts_origlen: The netlink size of the flow actions applied to this skb.
- * @cutlen: The number of bytes from the packet end to be removed.
+ * @cutlen: The number of bytes in the packet to preserve on output.
  * @probability: The sampling probability that was applied to this skb; 0 means
  * no sampling has occurred; U32_MAX means 100% probability.
  * @upcall_pid: Netlink socket PID to use for sending this packet to userspace;

@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ int ovs_vport_receive(struct vport *vpor
 
 	OVS_CB(skb)->input_vport = vport;
 	OVS_CB(skb)->mru = 0;
-	OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0;
+	OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 	OVS_CB(skb)->probability = 0;
 	OVS_CB(skb)->upcall_pid = 0;
 	if (unlikely(dev_net(skb->dev) != ovs_dp_get_net(vport->dp))) {

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pavitra Jha <[email protected]>

commit 63bbe18fc03062f483c627838a566a707b62da79 upstream.

When either the TCP RX or TX error path calls ovpn_peer_hold() followed by schedule_work(&peer->tcp.defer_del_work), and the work item is already pending from the other path, schedule_work() returns false and the work runs only once. Since ovpn_tcp_peer_del_work() calls ovpn_peer_put() exactly once, the extra reference taken by the losing path is never dropped, leaking the peer object.

The race window:

CPU0 (strparser/RX error): CPU1 (tcp_tx_work/TX error):
ovpn_peer_hold() <- refcnt+1 ovpn_peer_hold() <- refcnt+2
schedule_work() <- queued schedule_work() <- NO-OP
(work already pending)
ovpn_tcp_peer_del_work runs:

    ovpn_peer_del()
    ovpn_peer_put()  <- refcnt+1
                                   <- peer never freed

Fix by checking the return value of schedule_work() in both paths and calling ovpn_peer_put() to drop the extra reference if the work was already pending. ovpn_peer_hold() is kept unconditional in the TX path as it cannot fail at that point.

---
 drivers/net/ovpn/tcp.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 433bd07a4f1b..0af14055c39a 100644
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ static void ovpn_tcp_rcv(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	/* take reference for deferred peer deletion. should never fail */
 	if (WARN_ON(!ovpn_peer_hold(peer)))
 		goto err_nopeer;
-	schedule_work(&peer->tcp.defer_del_work);
+	if (!schedule_work(&peer->tcp.defer_del_work))
+		ovpn_peer_put(peer);
 	ovpn_dev_dstats_rx_dropped(peer->ovpn->dev);
 err_nopeer:
 	kfree_skb(skb);

@@ -283,7 +284,8 @@ static void ovpn_tcp_send_sock(struct ovpn_peer *peer, struct sock *sk)
 			 * stream therefore we abort the connection
 			 */
 			ovpn_peer_hold(peer);
-			schedule_work(&peer->tcp.defer_del_work);
+			if (!schedule_work(&peer->tcp.defer_del_work))
+				ovpn_peer_put(peer);
 
 			/* we bail out immediately and keep tx_in_progress set
 			 * to true. This way we prevent more TX attempts

2.55.0

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuvam Pandey <[email protected]>

commit a4710ae2e7e322fdaefb4be8604228279cfaf48c upstream.

ovpn_peer_keepalive_send() passes its peer reference to ovpn_xmit_special(), which ultimately drops it. The keepalive scheduler currently queues the work first and takes the reference only after schedule_work() reports that the work was queued.

Once schedule_work() queues the item, another CPU may run the worker before the caller gets to ovpn_peer_hold(). In that case the worker can consume a reference that was not acquired for it, corrupting the peer lifetime accounting.

Take the peer reference before queueing the work and drop it again when the work was already pending.

---
 drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1280,8 +1280,10 @@ static time64_t ovpn_peer_keepalive_work
 		netdev_dbg(peer->ovpn->dev,
 			   "sending keepalive to peer %u\n",
 			   peer->id);
-		if (schedule_work(&peer->keepalive_work))
-			ovpn_peer_hold(peer);
+		if (WARN_ON(!ovpn_peer_hold(peer)))
+			return 0;
+		if (!schedule_work(&peer->keepalive_work))
+			ovpn_peer_put(peer);
 	}
 
 	if (next_run1 < next_run2)

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <[email protected]>

commit e9c238f6fe42fb1b4dba3a578277de32cb487937 upstream.

pppoe_sendmsg() saves a pointer to the PPPoE header before calling dev_hard_header(). Device header callbacks are allowed to reallocate the skb head, invalidating pointers into it.

This can happen when a send is blocked in copy_from_user() while the first non-Ethernet port is added to an empty team device. The team's delegated GRE header callback then expands the skb head. PPPoE subsequently writes six bytes through the stale pointer into the freed head.

Reload the PPPoE header through the skb's network-header offset after device header creation. pskb_expand_head() updates that offset when it relocates the head.

---
 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -903,6 +903,7 @@ static int pppoe_sendmsg(struct socket *
 	dev_hard_header(skb, dev, ETH_P_PPP_SES,
 			po->pppoe_pa.remote, NULL, total_len);
 
+	ph = pppoe_hdr(skb);
 	memcpy(ph, &hdr, sizeof(struct pppoe_hdr));
 
 	ph->length = htons(total_len);

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Justin Lai <[email protected]>

commit 1c50efa1faf3a1a96e100b07ec7a2f3164d90bee upstream.

The hardware performs packet parsing before packet transmission. Parsing incomplete IPv4, IPv6, TCP, or UDP headers may trigger a TX hang because the hardware parser expects additional protocol header data that is not present in the packet.

The hardware performs additional PTP parsing on UDP packets identified by destination ports 319/320 at the expected UDP destination port offset.

If such a packet has transport data smaller than RTASE_MIN_PAD_LEN, the hardware parser expects additional packet data and may trigger a TX hang.

To avoid these hardware issues, the driver applies the following workarounds.

Drop malformed packets that may trigger this hardware issue before transmission.

For IPv4 non-initial fragments, the hardware does not check the fragment offset before parsing the expected transport header location. As a result, these packets are still subject to transport header parsing even though they do not contain a transport header. If the transport data is shorter than the minimum transport header required by the hardware parser, pad the transport data to the minimum transport header length required by the hardware parser. Packets that also match the hardware PTP parsing conditions continue to follow the corresponding workaround.

For IPv6 fragmented packets, neither of the above hardware issues occurs because the hardware only continues packet parsing when the IPv6 Base Header Next Header field directly indicates UDP. Packets carrying a Fragment Header do not continue through the subsequent packet parsing stages.

For packets identified for hardware PTP parsing, pad the transport data so it reaches RTASE_MIN_PAD_LEN before transmission.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/rtase/rtase.h      |    8 
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/rtase/rtase_main.c |  197 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 205 insertions(+)

@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ enum rtase_sw_flag_content {
 	RTASE_SWF_MSIX_ENABLED = BIT(2),
 };
 
+enum rtase_parse_result {
+	RTASE_PARSE_OK,
+	RTASE_PARSE_SKIP,
+	RTASE_PARSE_DROP,
+};
+
 #define RSVD_MASK 0x3FFFC000
 
 struct rtase_tx_desc {

@@ -359,4 +365,6 @@ struct rtase_private {
 
 #define RTASE_MSS_MASK GENMASK(28, 18)
 
+#define RTASE_MIN_PAD_LEN 47
+
 #endif /* RTASE_H */

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yizhou Zhao <[email protected]>

commit e1a9d3cc11829c5414a75eb39c704f461936eb24 upstream.

tcp_v4_send_ack() and tcp_v6_send_response() construct standalone TCP responses with TCP-AO options. The option length carries the actual MAC length, but the TCP header length includes the option rounded up to a four-byte boundary.

tcp_ao_hash_hdr() writes the MAC only. Thus, when the MAC length is not four-byte aligned, the one to three bytes after the MAC are left uninitialized and may be transmitted. For the normal TCP-AO hashing mode, those bytes also have to be initialized before computing the MAC.

Initialize only the alignment padding in the TCP-AO branches, before hashing the header. Use TCPOPT_NOP, as in the normal TCP-AO output path. This avoids adding work to non-AO TCP responses while preserving a valid authenticated header.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c |    3 +++
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c |    2 ++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -998,6 +998,9 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_ack(const struct
 					  key->rcv_next);
 		arg.iov[0].iov_len += tcp_ao_len_aligned(key->ao_key);
 		rep.th.doff = arg.iov[0].iov_len / 4;
+		memset((u8 *)&rep.opt[offset] + tcp_ao_maclen(key->ao_key),
+		       TCPOPT_NOP, tcp_ao_len_aligned(key->ao_key) -
+				    tcp_ao_len(key->ao_key));
 
 		tcp_ao_hash_hdr(AF_INET, (char *)&rep.opt[offset],
 				key->ao_key, key->traffic_key,

@@ -941,6 +941,8 @@ static void tcp_v6_send_response(const s
 				(tcp_ao_len(key->ao_key) << 16) |
 				(key->ao_key->sndid << 8) |
 				(key->rcv_next));
+		memset((u8 *)topt + tcp_ao_maclen(key->ao_key), TCPOPT_NOP,
+		       tcp_ao_len_aligned(key->ao_key) - tcp_ao_len(key->ao_key));
 
 		tcp_ao_hash_hdr(AF_INET6, (char *)topt, key->ao_key,
 				key->traffic_key,

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yuxiang Yang <[email protected]>

commit a28c4fcbf774e23b4779cae468e3497a5ad1f4a1 upstream.

The SYN-RECEIVED request-socket path in tcp_check_req() accepts an in-window RST without requiring SEG.SEQ to exactly match RCV.NXT. A non-exact RST therefore removes the request instead of eliciting a challenge ACK.

RFC 9293 section 3.10.7.4 applies the RFC 5961 reset check in
SYN-RECEIVED: an exact RST resets the connection, while a non-exact in-window RST must trigger a challenge ACK and be dropped.

Apply that check before the ACK-field validation, following the RFC sequence-number, RST, then ACK processing order. Factor the per-netns challenge ACK quota out of tcp_send_challenge_ack() so request sockets can share it. Use the request socket's send_ack() callback and its own out-of-window ACK timestamp to send and rate-limit the response.

---
 include/net/tcp.h        |    2 +
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c     |   56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c |   12 +++++++++-
 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

@@ -1878,6 +1878,8 @@ static inline void tcp_fast_path_check(s
 
 bool tcp_oow_rate_limited(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb,
 			  int mib_idx, u32 *last_oow_ack_time);
+void tcp_reqsk_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				  struct request_sock *req);
 
 static inline void tcp_mib_init(struct net *net)
 {

@@ -822,7 +822,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *
 	 * elsewhere and is checked directly against the child socket rather
 	 * than req because user data may have been sent out.
 	 */
-	if ((flg & TCP_FLAG_ACK) && !fastopen &&
+	if ((flg & TCP_FLAG_ACK) && !(flg & TCP_FLAG_RST) && !fastopen &&
 	    (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq !=
 	     tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1))
 		return sk;

@@ -861,6 +861,16 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *
 		flg &= ~TCP_FLAG_SYN;
 	}
 
+	/* RFC 5961 section 3.2, as clarified by RFC 9293 section
+	 * 3.10.7.4, requires a challenge ACK for a non-exact
+	 * in-window RST in SYN-RECEIVED.
+	 */
+	if ((flg & TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
+	    TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq != tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt) {
+		tcp_reqsk_send_challenge_ack(sk, skb, req);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	/* RFC793: "second check the RST bit" and
 	 *	   "fourth, check the SYN bit"
 	 */

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daehyeon Ko <[email protected]>

commit ba0533fc163f905fe817cfabdf8ed4058da44800 upstream.

When tipc_sk_create() fails to insert the new socket (tipc_sk_insert() returns non-zero), its error path frees the sk with sk_free() but leaves sock->sk pointing at the freed object:

	if (tipc_sk_insert(tsk)) {
		sk_free(sk);
		pr_warn("Socket create failed; port number exhausted\n");
		return -EINVAL;
	}

This is harmless for plain socket(): the syscall layer clears sock->ops before releasing, so tipc_release() is never called. It is not harmless on the accept() path. tipc_accept() creates the pre-allocated child socket with tipc_sk_create(net, new_sock, 0, kern); on failure it leaves new_sock->sk dangling and new_sock->ops non-NULL, and do_accept() then fput()s the new file, so __sock_release() -> tipc_release() runs lock_sock(new_sock->sk) on the freed sk -- a use-after-free write of the sk_lock spinlock.

tipc_release() already guards this exact "failed accept() releases a pre-allocated child" case with "if (sk == NULL) return 0;", but the guard is bypassed because tipc_sk_create() left sock->sk non-NULL (dangling) rather than NULL.

Clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path so the existing tipc_release() NULL check fires and the use-after-free is avoided.

The tipc_sk_insert() failure is reached when the per-netns socket rhashtable hits its max_size (tsk_rht_params.max_size = 1048576, ~2M elements) -- i.e. once a netns holds ~2M TIPC sockets every insert returns -E2BIG.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839)
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880047cdc38 by task init/1
   lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839)
   tipc_release (net/tipc/socket.c:638)
   __sock_release (net/socket.c:710)
   sock_close (net/socket.c:1501)
   __fput (fs/file_table.c:512)
  Allocated by task 1:
   sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2308)
   tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:487)
   tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744)
   do_accept (net/socket.c:2034)
  Freed by task 1:
   __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2391)
   tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:504)
   tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744)
   do_accept (net/socket.c:2034)

---
 net/tipc/socket.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -501,6 +501,7 @@ static int tipc_sk_create(struct net *ne
 	tipc_set_sk_state(sk, TIPC_OPEN);
 	if (tipc_sk_insert(tsk)) {
 		sk_free(sk);
+		sock->sk = NULL;
 		pr_warn("Socket create failed; port number exhausted\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stefano Garzarella <[email protected]>

commit 2a12c05aef213ff304ecc9e2f351de20731946b8 upstream.

When many small packets accumulate in the receive queue, the skb overhead can exceed buf_alloc even while the payload is within bounds. This causes virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() to reject packets, leading to connection resets during large transfers under backpressure.

The issue was reported by Brien, who has a reproducer, but it is also easily reproducible with iperf-vsock [1] using a small packet size:

  iperf3 --vsock -c $CID -l 129

which fails immediately without this patch but with commit 059b7dbd20a6 ("vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue").

Inspired by TCP's tcp_collapse() which solves a similar problem, add virtio_transport_collapse_rx_queue() that walks the receive queue and re-copies data into compact linear skbs to reduce the overhead.

The collapse is triggered proactively from when the number of skb queued is close to exceeding the overhead budget.

A pre-scan counts the eligible bytes to size each allocation precisely, avoiding waste for isolated small packets. Partially consumed skbs are kept as-is to preserve buf_used/fwd_cnt accounting, EOM-marked skbs to maintain SEQPACKET message boundaries, and skbs already larger than the collapse target because they already have a good data-to-overhead ratio.

Walking a large queue may take a significant amount of time and cache misses, causing traffic burstiness. To limit this, the collapse stops once enough room is freed for this packet and the next one, but may opportunistically free more to fill each collapsed skb to capacity.

[1] https://github.com/stefano-garzarella/iperf-vsock

---
 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c |  165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 164 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -26,6 +26,13 @@
 /* Threshold for detecting small packets to copy */
 #define GOOD_COPY_LEN  128
 
+/* Max payload that can be collapsed into a single linear skb, using the same
+ * allocation threshold as virtio_vsock_alloc_skb() to avoid adding pressure
+ * on the page allocator.
+ */
+#define MAX_COLLAPSE_LEN \
+	SKB_MAX_ORDER(VIRTIO_VSOCK_SKB_HEADROOM, PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER)
+
 static void virtio_transport_cancel_close_work(struct vsock_sock *vsk,
 					       bool cancel_timeout);
 static s64 virtio_transport_has_space(struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs);

@@ -422,6 +429,145 @@ static int virtio_transport_send_pkt_inf
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static bool virtio_transport_can_collapse(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	/* skbs that are partially consumed, mark a SEQPACKET message boundary,
+	 * or are already large enough should not be collapsed: they either
+	 * need special accounting, carry protocol state, or already have a
+	 * good data-to-overhead ratio.
+	 */
+	if (VIRTIO_VSOCK_SKB_CB(skb)->offset)
+		return false;
+	if (le32_to_cpu(virtio_vsock_hdr(skb)->flags) & VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM)
+		return false;
+	if (skb->len >= MAX_COLLAPSE_LEN)
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/* Iterate through the packets in the queue starting from the current skb to
+ * count the number of bytes we can collapse.
+ */
+static unsigned int
+virtio_transport_collapse_size(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *queue)
+{
+	unsigned int target = skb->len - VIRTIO_VSOCK_SKB_CB(skb)->offset;
+
+	while ((skb = skb_peek_next(skb, queue)) &&
+	       virtio_transport_can_collapse(skb)) {
+		unsigned int len = skb->len - VIRTIO_VSOCK_SKB_CB(skb)->offset;
+
+		if (len > MAX_COLLAPSE_LEN - target)
+			return target;
+
+		target += len;
+	}
+
+	return target;
+}
+
+/* Called under lock_sock to compact the receive queue by merging small skbs.
+ * @min_to_free: minimum number of skbs to eliminate from the queue. May free
+ *               more to fill each collapsed skb to capacity.
+ */
+static void
+virtio_transport_collapse_rx_queue(struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs,
+				   u32 min_to_free)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb, *next_skb, *new_skb = NULL;
+	struct sk_buff_head new_queue;
+	u32 saved = 0;
+
+	__skb_queue_head_init(&new_queue);
+
+	skb_queue_walk_safe(&vvs->rx_queue, skb, next_skb) {
+		struct virtio_vsock_hdr *hdr = virtio_vsock_hdr(skb);
+		u32 src_off = VIRTIO_VSOCK_SKB_CB(skb)->offset;
+		u32 src_len = skb->len - src_off;
+		bool keep;
+
+		keep = !virtio_transport_can_collapse(skb);
+		if (keep) {
+			/* Finalize pending collapsed skb to preserve packet
+			 * ordering.
+			 */
+			if (new_skb) {
+				__skb_queue_tail(&new_queue, new_skb);
+				new_skb = NULL;
+				saved--;
+			}
+			goto next;
+		}
+
+		/* Finalize if this packet won't fit in the remaining tailroom,
+		 * so we can allocate a right-sized new_skb.
+		 */
+		if (new_skb && src_len > skb_tailroom(new_skb)) {
+			__skb_queue_tail(&new_queue, new_skb);
+			new_skb = NULL;
+			saved--;
+		}
+
+		if (!new_skb) {
+			unsigned int alloc_size;
+
+			/* Check after finalizing to opportunistically fill
+			 * each collapsed skb to capacity, merging more skbs
+			 * than strictly required.
+			 */
+			if (saved >= min_to_free)
+				break;
+
+			alloc_size = virtio_transport_collapse_size(skb, &vvs->rx_queue);
+
+			/* Only this skb's data is eligible, nothing to merge
+			 * with. Keep as-is.
+			 */
+			if (alloc_size <= src_len) {
+				keep = true;
+				goto next;
+			}
+
+			new_skb = virtio_vsock_alloc_linear_skb(alloc_size +
+					VIRTIO_VSOCK_SKB_HEADROOM, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!new_skb)
+				break;
+
+			memcpy(virtio_vsock_hdr(new_skb), hdr,
+			       sizeof(struct virtio_vsock_hdr));
+			virtio_vsock_hdr(new_skb)->len = 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Cannot fail since src_off/src_len are within bounds, but if
+		 * it does, discard new_skb to avoid queuing corrupted data.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(skb_copy_bits(skb, src_off,
+					       skb_put(new_skb, src_len),
+					       src_len))) {
+			kfree_skb(new_skb);
+			new_skb = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		le32_add_cpu(&virtio_vsock_hdr(new_skb)->len, src_len);
+		virtio_vsock_hdr(new_skb)->flags |= hdr->flags;
+
+next:
+		__skb_unlink(skb, &vvs->rx_queue);
+		if (keep) {
+			__skb_queue_tail(&new_queue, skb);
+		} else {
+			consume_skb(skb);
+			saved++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (new_skb)
+		__skb_queue_tail(&new_queue, new_skb);
+
+	skb_queue_splice(&new_queue, &vvs->rx_queue);
+}
+
 static bool virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt(struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs,
 					u32 len)
 {

@@ -1341,12 +1487,29 @@ virtio_transport_recv_enqueue(struct vso
 {
 	struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs = vsk->trans;
 	bool can_enqueue, free_pkt = false;
+	u32 len, queue_max, queue_len;
 	struct virtio_vsock_hdr *hdr;
-	u32 len;
 
 	hdr = virtio_vsock_hdr(skb);
 	len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->len);
 
+	/* virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() rejects packets when the per-skb
+	 * overhead (skb_queue_len * SKB_TRUESIZE(0)) exceeds buf_alloc.
+	 * Proactively collapse the queue before that happens.
+	 * No rx_lock needed: lock_sock is held by caller, preventing
+	 * concurrent enqueue or dequeue.
+	 */
+	queue_max = vvs->buf_alloc / SKB_TRUESIZE(0);
+	queue_len = skb_queue_len(&vvs->rx_queue);
+	if (queue_len >= queue_max) {
+		/* Walking a large queue may take a significant amount of time
+		 * and cache misses, causing traffic burstiness. Limit the
+		 * collapse to freeing room for this packet and the next one.
+		 * It may free more to fill each collapsed skb to capacity.
+		 */
+		virtio_transport_collapse_rx_queue(vvs, queue_len + 2 - queue_max);
+	}
+
 	spin_lock_bh(&vvs->rx_lock);
 
 	can_enqueue = virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt(vvs, len);

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: James Raphael Tiovalen <[email protected]>

commit dcd9b465965422b9654f6026e8a2fa8984f74c3c upstream.

When replacing the source list of an MDB remote entry, all existing sources are first marked for deletion and vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add() is then called to add the new source list. Sources present in the new list have their deletion mark cleared, and any sources left marked afterwards are removed.

If vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add() fails partway through, its error path deletes all entries on the remote's source list. That rollback is only correct for its other caller, vxlan_mdb_remote_add(), where the remote was just allocated and the list contains solely entries added during the call. On the replace path the list also holds pre-existing sources, so a failed replace tears them down together with their (S, G) forwarding entries instead of leaving the entry unchanged.

This is reachable from an existing (*, G) remote. An EXCLUDE filter that loses sources starts forwarding traffic that should be blocked, while an INCLUDE filter that loses sources drops traffic that should be forwarded.

Mark entries created during the current pass with a new VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW flag. On failure, delete only those entries and clear the deletion mark on the pre-existing ones, so a failed replace leaves the source list untouched. Retain the flag until the whole operation succeeds and then clear it. Also stop vxlan_mdb_remote_src_add() from deleting a pre-existing entry it only looked up when adding that entry's forwarding entry fails.

---
 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_mdb.c |   30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct vxlan_mdb_remote {
 };
 
 #define VXLAN_SGRP_F_DELETE	BIT(0)
+#define VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW	BIT(1)
 
 struct vxlan_mdb_src_entry {
 	struct hlist_node node;

@@ -844,6 +845,7 @@ vxlan_mdb_remote_src_add(const struct vx
 		ent = vxlan_mdb_remote_src_entry_add(remote, &src->addr);
 		if (!ent)
 			return -ENOMEM;
+		ent->flags |= VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW;
 	} else if (!(cfg->nlflags & NLM_F_REPLACE)) {
 		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Source entry already exists");
 		return -EEXIST;

@@ -853,15 +855,16 @@ vxlan_mdb_remote_src_add(const struct vx
 	if (err)
 		goto err_src_del;
 
-	/* Clear flags in case source entry was marked for deletion as part of
-	 * replace flow.
+	/* Clear the deletion mark so the entry survives the replace sweep.
+	 * The new mark is retained until the whole operation succeeds.
 	 */
-	ent->flags = 0;
+	ent->flags &= ~VXLAN_SGRP_F_DELETE;
 
 	return 0;
 
 err_src_del:
-	vxlan_mdb_remote_src_entry_del(ent);
+	if (ent->flags & VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW)
+		vxlan_mdb_remote_src_entry_del(ent);
 	return err;
 }
 

@@ -889,11 +892,19 @@ static int vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add(con
 			goto err_src_del;
 	}
 
+	hlist_for_each_entry(ent, &remote->src_list, node)
+		ent->flags &= ~VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW;
+
 	return 0;
 
 err_src_del:
-	hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &remote->src_list, node)
-		vxlan_mdb_remote_src_del(cfg->vxlan, &cfg->group, remote, ent);
+	hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &remote->src_list, node) {
+		if (ent->flags & VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW)
+			vxlan_mdb_remote_src_del(cfg->vxlan, &cfg->group, remote,
+						 ent);
+		else
+			ent->flags &= ~VXLAN_SGRP_F_DELETE;
+	}
 	return err;
 }
 

@@ -1069,7 +1080,7 @@ vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_replace(const stru
 
 	err = vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add(cfg, remote, extack);
 	if (err)
-		goto err_clear_delete;
+		return err;
 
 	hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &remote->src_list, node) {
 		if (ent->flags & VXLAN_SGRP_F_DELETE)

@@ -1078,11 +1089,6 @@ vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_replace(const stru
 	}
 
 	return 0;
-
-err_clear_delete:
-	hlist_for_each_entry(ent, &remote->src_list, node)
-		ent->flags &= ~VXLAN_SGRP_F_DELETE;
-	return err;
 }
 
 static int vxlan_mdb_remote_replace(const struct vxlan_mdb_config *cfg,

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ethan Nelson-Moore <[email protected]>

commit 2b37415618bfc6a83d4aceb00fd8d6491096f2ed upstream.

The s32g_wdt driver uses two incorrect constants in the options field of its watchdog_info struct. This bit mask should contain WDIOF_* constants, but the driver uses two WDIOC_* ioctl constants (in addition to correct WDIOF_* constants). This causes many incorrect bits to be set in the bit mask. The functionality indicated by these ioctl constants is supported by all drivers using the watchdog framework, so this patch simply removes them.

---
 drivers/watchdog/s32g_wdt.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

index ad55063060af..6422a694fc65 100644
@@ -56,8 +56,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(early_enable,
 
 static const struct watchdog_info s32g_wdt_info = {
 	.identity = "s32g watchdog",
-	.options = WDIOF_KEEPALIVEPING | WDIOF_SETTIMEOUT | WDIOF_MAGICCLOSE |
-	WDIOC_GETTIMEOUT | WDIOC_GETTIMELEFT,
+	.options = WDIOF_KEEPALIVEPING | WDIOF_SETTIMEOUT | WDIOF_MAGICCLOSE,
 };
 
 static struct s32g_wdt_device *wdd_to_s32g_wdt(struct watchdog_device *wdd)

2.55.0

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yang Wang <[email protected]>

commit 238baca26a6279e688d1a156bd031390b82eb578 upstream.

amdgpu_pm_info displayed power sensor readings with the wrong fractional unit. It treated the low byte of the raw sensor value as the decimal part of watts, while that field represents milliwatts in the decoded value. As a result, debugfs could report misleading SoC power when the remainder was not already a two-digit centiwatt value.

Example with query = 0x00000354:

raw field value
---------------------

  query >> 8       3 W
  query & 0xff     84 mW
  decoded power    3084 mW

output value
---------------------
before 3.84 W
after 3.08 W

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/amdgpu_pm.c |   21 ++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
 
 #define DEVICE_ATTR_IS(_name)		(attr_id == device_attr_id__##_name)
 
+#define power_2_mwatt(power)	(((power) >> 8) * 1000 + ((power) & 0xff))
+
 struct od_attribute {
 	struct kobj_attribute	attribute;
 	struct list_head	entry;

@@ -3261,7 +3263,6 @@ static int amdgpu_hwmon_get_power(struct
 				  enum amd_pp_sensors sensor)
 {
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-	unsigned int uw;
 	u32 query = 0;
 	int r;
 

@@ -3270,9 +3271,7 @@ static int amdgpu_hwmon_get_power(struct
 		return r;
 
 	/* convert to microwatts */
-	uw = (query >> 8) * 1000000 + (query & 0xff) * 1000;
-
-	return uw;
+	return power_2_mwatt(query) * 1000;
 }
 
 static ssize_t amdgpu_hwmon_show_power_avg(struct device *dev,

@@ -4804,7 +4803,7 @@ static int amdgpu_debugfs_pm_info_pp(str
 {
 	uint32_t mp1_ver = amdgpu_ip_version(adev, MP1_HWIP, 0);
 	uint32_t gc_ver = amdgpu_ip_version(adev, GC_HWIP, 0);
-	uint32_t value;
+	uint32_t value, mwatt, centiwatt;
 	uint64_t value64 = 0;
 	uint32_t query = 0;
 	int size;

@@ -4829,17 +4828,21 @@ static int amdgpu_debugfs_pm_info_pp(str
 		seq_printf(m, "\t%u mV (VDDNB)\n", value);
 	size = sizeof(uint32_t);
 	if (!amdgpu_dpm_read_sensor(adev, AMDGPU_PP_SENSOR_GPU_AVG_POWER, (void *)&query, &size)) {
+		mwatt = power_2_mwatt(query);
+		centiwatt = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(mwatt, 10);
 		if (adev->flags & AMD_IS_APU)
-			seq_printf(m, "\t%u.%02u W (average SoC including CPU)\n", query >> 8, query & 0xff);
+			seq_printf(m, "\t%u.%02u W (average SoC including CPU)\n", centiwatt / 100, centiwatt % 100);
 		else
-			seq_printf(m, "\t%u.%02u W (average SoC)\n", query >> 8, query & 0xff);
+			seq_printf(m, "\t%u.%02u W (average SoC)\n", centiwatt / 100, centiwatt % 100);
 	}
 	size = sizeof(uint32_t);
 	if (!amdgpu_dpm_read_sensor(adev, AMDGPU_PP_SENSOR_GPU_INPUT_POWER, (void *)&query, &size)) {
+		mwatt = power_2_mwatt(query);
+		centiwatt = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(mwatt, 10);
 		if (adev->flags & AMD_IS_APU)
-			seq_printf(m, "\t%u.%02u W (current SoC including CPU)\n", query >> 8, query & 0xff);
+			seq_printf(m, "\t%u.%02u W (current SoC including CPU)\n", centiwatt / 100, centiwatt % 100);
 		else
-			seq_printf(m, "\t%u.%02u W (current SoC)\n", query >> 8, query & 0xff);
+			seq_printf(m, "\t%u.%02u W (current SoC)\n", centiwatt / 100, centiwatt % 100);
 	}
 	size = sizeof(value);
 	seq_printf(m, "\n");

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yang Wang <[email protected]>

commit 53c78ab388bfc1a4d72e756815d0db0a842c812e upstream.

SCPM owns power feature control when enabled.

Make pp_features read-only during sysfs setup by clearing its write bits and store callback.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/amdgpu_pm.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -2619,6 +2619,11 @@ static int default_attr_update(struct am
 		     gc_ver != IP_VERSION(9, 4, 3)) ||
 		    gc_ver < IP_VERSION(9, 0, 0))
 			*states = ATTR_STATE_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+		if (adev->scpm_enabled) {
+			dev_attr->attr.mode &= ~S_IWUGO;
+			dev_attr->store = NULL;
+		}
 	} else if (DEVICE_ATTR_IS(gpu_metrics)) {
 		if (gc_ver < IP_VERSION(9, 1, 0))
 			*states = ATTR_STATE_UNSUPPORTED;

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit d06c4173a7c38c7a39e98859f839ce714c7af2c9 upstream.

There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v10_0.c |   13 +++++--------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -4022,7 +4022,7 @@ static void gfx_v10_0_wait_reg_mem(struc
 			   WAIT_REG_MEM_ENGINE(eng_sel)));
 
 	if (mem_space)
-		BUG_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+		WARN_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr0);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr1);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, ref);

@@ -8674,7 +8674,7 @@ static void gfx_v10_0_ring_emit_ib_gfx(s
 	}
 
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, header);
-	BUG_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+	WARN_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 		(2 << 0) |

@@ -8709,7 +8709,7 @@ static void gfx_v10_0_ring_emit_ib_compu
 	}
 
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_INDIRECT_BUFFER, 2));
-	BUG_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+	WARN_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 				(2 << 0) |

@@ -8742,9 +8742,9 @@ static void gfx_v10_0_ring_emit_fence(st
 	 * aligned if only send 32bit data low (discard data high)
 	 */
 	if (write64bit)
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x7);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x7);
 	else
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x3);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x3);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, upper_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(seq));

@@ -8792,9 +8792,6 @@ static void gfx_v10_0_ring_emit_fence_ki
 {
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = ring->adev;
 
-	/* we only allocate 32bit for each seq wb address */
-	BUG_ON(flags & AMDGPU_FENCE_FLAG_64BIT);
-
 	/* write fence seq to the "addr" */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_WRITE_DATA, 3));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, (WRITE_DATA_ENGINE_SEL(0) |

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 0eebcab1ea2a77f086a04108f386f82ee3496022 upstream.

There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v11_0.c |   13 +++++--------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static void gfx_v11_0_wait_reg_mem(struc
 			   WAIT_REG_MEM_ENGINE(eng_sel)));
 
 	if (mem_space)
-		BUG_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+		WARN_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr0);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr1);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, ref);

@@ -5901,7 +5901,7 @@ static void gfx_v11_0_ring_emit_ib_gfx(s
 	}
 
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, header);
-	BUG_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+	WARN_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 		(2 << 0) |

@@ -5936,7 +5936,7 @@ static void gfx_v11_0_ring_emit_ib_compu
 	}
 
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_INDIRECT_BUFFER, 2));
-	BUG_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+	WARN_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 				(2 << 0) |

@@ -5969,9 +5969,9 @@ static void gfx_v11_0_ring_emit_fence(st
 	 * aligned if only send 32bit data low (discard data high)
 	 */
 	if (write64bit)
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x7);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x7);
 	else
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x3);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x3);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, upper_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(seq));

@@ -6025,9 +6025,6 @@ static void gfx_v11_0_ring_emit_fence_ki
 {
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = ring->adev;
 
-	/* we only allocate 32bit for each seq wb address */
-	BUG_ON(flags & AMDGPU_FENCE_FLAG_64BIT);
-
 	/* write fence seq to the "addr" */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_WRITE_DATA, 3));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, (WRITE_DATA_ENGINE_SEL(0) |

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit cd3b3efa1ced05528d9128755338baa62a6b562d upstream.

There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v12_0.c |   13 +++++--------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static void gfx_v12_0_wait_reg_mem(struc
 			   WAIT_REG_MEM_ENGINE(eng_sel)));
 
 	if (mem_space)
-		BUG_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+		WARN_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr0);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr1);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, ref);

@@ -4424,7 +4424,7 @@ static void gfx_v12_0_ring_emit_ib_gfx(s
 	control |= ib->length_dw | (vmid << 24);
 
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, header);
-	BUG_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+	WARN_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 		(2 << 0) |

@@ -4443,7 +4443,7 @@ static void gfx_v12_0_ring_emit_ib_compu
 	u32 control = INDIRECT_BUFFER_VALID | ib->length_dw | (vmid << 24);
 
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_INDIRECT_BUFFER, 2));
-	BUG_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+	WARN_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 				(2 << 0) |

@@ -4474,9 +4474,9 @@ static void gfx_v12_0_ring_emit_fence(st
 	 * aligned if only send 32bit data low (discard data high)
 	 */
 	if (write64bit)
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x7);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x7);
 	else
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x3);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x3);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, upper_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(seq));

@@ -4524,9 +4524,6 @@ static void gfx_v12_0_ring_emit_fence_ki
 {
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = ring->adev;
 
-	/* we only allocate 32bit for each seq wb address */
-	BUG_ON(flags & AMDGPU_FENCE_FLAG_64BIT);
-
 	/* write fence seq to the "addr" */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_WRITE_DATA, 3));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, (WRITE_DATA_ENGINE_SEL(0) |

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 84a1a8a952ab4b8c23c5dd1f2eea4049cb4914f5 upstream.

There's no need to crash the kernel for this case.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v8_0.c |    3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)

@@ -6226,9 +6226,6 @@ static void gfx_v8_0_ring_emit_fence_com
 static void gfx_v8_0_ring_emit_fence_kiq(struct amdgpu_ring *ring, u64 addr,
 					 u64 seq, unsigned int flags)
 {
-	/* we only allocate 32bit for each seq wb address */
-	BUG_ON(flags & AMDGPU_FENCE_FLAG_64BIT);
-
 	/* write fence seq to the "addr" */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_WRITE_DATA, 3));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, (WRITE_DATA_ENGINE_SEL(0) |

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 00f4050f7c367d7bdce347ca279ce467c434cf15 upstream.

There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v9_4_3.c |   11 ++++-------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ static void gfx_v9_4_3_wait_reg_mem(stru
 				 WAIT_REG_MEM_ENGINE(eng_sel)));
 
 	if (mem_space)
-		BUG_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+		WARN_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr0);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr1);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, ref);

@@ -2871,7 +2871,7 @@ static void gfx_v9_4_3_ring_emit_ib_comp
 	}
 
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_INDIRECT_BUFFER, 2));
-	BUG_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+	WARN_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 				(2 << 0) |

@@ -2905,9 +2905,9 @@ static void gfx_v9_4_3_ring_emit_fence(s
 	 * aligned if only send 32bit data low (discard data high)
 	 */
 	if (write64bit)
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x7);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x7);
 	else
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x3);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x3);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, upper_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(seq));

@@ -2967,9 +2967,6 @@ static void gfx_v9_4_3_ring_emit_fence_k
 {
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = ring->adev;
 
-	/* we only allocate 32bit for each seq wb address */
-	BUG_ON(flags & AMDGPU_FENCE_FLAG_64BIT);
-
 	/* write fence seq to the "addr" */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_WRITE_DATA, 3));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, (WRITE_DATA_ENGINE_SEL(0) |

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 6302be10b521f5106ce01eb5a724b9e7945a5061 upstream.

There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v9_0.c |   10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@ static void gfx_v9_0_wait_reg_mem(struct
 				 WAIT_REG_MEM_ENGINE(eng_sel)));
 
 	if (mem_space)
-		BUG_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+		WARN_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr0);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr1);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, ref);

@@ -5473,7 +5473,7 @@ static void gfx_v9_0_ring_emit_ib_gfx(st
 	}
 
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, header);
-	BUG_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+	WARN_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 		(2 << 0) |

@@ -5569,7 +5569,7 @@ static void gfx_v9_0_ring_emit_ib_comput
 	}
 
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_INDIRECT_BUFFER, 2));
-	BUG_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+	WARN_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 				(2 << 0) |

@@ -5610,9 +5610,9 @@ static void gfx_v9_0_ring_emit_fence(str
 	 * aligned if only send 32bit data low (discard data high)
 	 */
 	if (write64bit)
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x7);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x7);
 	else
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x3);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x3);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, upper_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(seq));

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Boyuan Zhang <[email protected]>

commit c44af3810fc8b3adf6910a332038aa566560c8fa upstream.

jpeg_v4_0_3_is_idle() initializes ret to false and then accumulates ring idle status using &=. Since false & condition always remains false, the function can never report the JPEG block as idle.

Initialize ret to true so the function returns true only when all JPEG rings report RB_JOB_DONE.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v4_0_3.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ void jpeg_v4_0_3_dec_ring_nop(struct amd
 static bool jpeg_v4_0_3_is_idle(struct amdgpu_ip_block *ip_block)
 {
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = ip_block->adev;
-	bool ret = false;
+	bool ret = true;
 	int i, j;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < adev->jpeg.num_jpeg_inst; ++i) {

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Boyuan Zhang <[email protected]>

commit efcedeececcf995fcf717b21e39aa7c446fa3bf7 upstream.

jpeg_v5_0_1_is_idle() initializes ret to false and then accumulates ring idle status using &=. Since false & condition always remains false, the function can never report the JPEG block as idle.

Initialize ret to true so the function returns true only when all JPEG rings report RB_JOB_DONE.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v5_0_1.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ static void jpeg_v5_0_1_dec_ring_set_wpt
 static bool jpeg_v5_0_1_is_idle(struct amdgpu_ip_block *ip_block)
 {
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = ip_block->adev;
-	bool ret = false;
+	bool ret = true;
 	int i, j;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < adev->jpeg.num_jpeg_inst; ++i) {

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 40cdbe9fa424cc6264a7aed93a04bd7d69109d9e upstream.

There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/sdma_v4_4_2.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ static void sdma_v4_4_2_ring_emit_fence(
 	/* write the fence */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, SDMA_PKT_HEADER_OP(SDMA_OP_FENCE));
 	/* zero in first two bits */
-	BUG_ON(addr & 0x3);
+	WARN_ON(addr & 0x3);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, upper_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(seq));

@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ static void sdma_v4_4_2_ring_emit_fence(
 		addr += 4;
 		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, SDMA_PKT_HEADER_OP(SDMA_OP_FENCE));
 		/* zero in first two bits */
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x3);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x3);
 		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(addr));
 		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, upper_32_bits(addr));
 		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, upper_32_bits(seq));

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jakob Linke <[email protected]>

commit aff079bdce65f6d085e4b0091fdf87fffa95b0d9 upstream.

For SOC24 ASICs (RDNA4 / Navi 4x dGPUs) re-enabling PM features fails if an S3 suspend got aborted, the same issue already handled for SOC21 and SOC15:

commit df3c7dc5c58b ("drm/amdgpu: Reset dGPU if suspend got aborted") commit 38e8ca3e4b6d ("amdgpu/soc15: enable asic reset for dGPU in case of suspend abort")

The aborted resume fails with:

amdgpu: SMU: No response msg_reg: 6 resp_reg: 0
amdgpu: Failed to enable requested dpm features!
amdgpu: resume of IP block <smu> failed -62

Apply the same workaround for soc24: detect the aborted-suspend state at resume via the sign-of-life register and reset the device before re-init.

This is a workaround till a proper solution is finalized.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/soc24.c |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)

@@ -526,8 +526,36 @@ static int soc24_common_suspend(struct a
 	return soc24_common_hw_fini(ip_block);
 }
 
+static bool soc24_need_reset_on_resume(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
+{
+	u32 sol_reg1, sol_reg2;
+
+	/* Will reset for the following suspend abort cases.
+	 * 1) Only reset dGPU side.
+	 * 2) S3 suspend got aborted and TOS is active.
+	 *    As for dGPU suspend abort cases the SOL value
+	 *    will be kept as zero at this resume point.
+	 */
+	if (!(adev->flags & AMD_IS_APU) && adev->in_s3) {
+		sol_reg1 = RREG32_SOC15(MP0, 0, regMPASP_SMN_C2PMSG_81);
+		msleep(100);
+		sol_reg2 = RREG32_SOC15(MP0, 0, regMPASP_SMN_C2PMSG_81);
+
+		return (sol_reg1 != sol_reg2);
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 static int soc24_common_resume(struct amdgpu_ip_block *ip_block)
 {
+	struct amdgpu_device *adev = ip_block->adev;
+
+	if (soc24_need_reset_on_resume(adev)) {
+		dev_info(adev->dev, "S3 suspend aborted, resetting...");
+		soc24_asic_reset(adev);
+	}
+
 	return soc24_common_hw_init(ip_block);
 }
 

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Boyuan Zhang <[email protected]>

commit 186bfdc4e26d019b2e7570cb121964a1d89b2e5b upstream.

Fix a security vulnerability where malicious VCE command streams with oversized dimensions (e.g. 65536×65536) cause 32-bit integer overflow, wrapping the calculated buffer size to 0. This bypasses validation and allows GPU firmware to perform out-of-bound memory access.

The fix uses 64-bit arithmetic to detect overflow and rejects invalid dimensions before they reach the hardware.

V2: remove redundant check
V3: modify max height value
V4: remove size64