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can: dev: can_dropped_invalid_skb: drop CAN XL frames on non-CAN XL devices

PATCH In review Vincent Mailhol 3 participants 3 messages Jul 31 – Aug 1

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Vincent Mailhol

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 can: dev: can_dropped_invalid_skb: drop CAN XL frames on non-CAN XL devices

Sending a PF_PACKET bypasses the CAN framework logic and can directly reach a CAN driver's xmit() function. The PF_PACKET framework only checks that skb->len does not exceed the net_device MTU.

For a CAN device that is not CAN XL capable, anything above CANFD_MTU (72 bytes) is therefore dropped before it reaches the driver. However, CAN XL frames are variable length. can_is_canxl_skb() accepts lengths in the range CANXL_HDR_SIZE + CANXL_MIN_DLEN up to CANXL_MTU, i.e. 13 to 2060 bytes.

As a result, an ETH_P_CANXL skb with a length between 13 and 72 bytes can pass both the MTU and the can_dropped_invalid_skb() checks.

A driver that does not support CAN XL will interpret canxl_frame->flags as a length because of the overlap with can_frame->len. And because CANXL_XLF is set, the resulting length is between 128 and 255. For drivers that do not check can_frame->len before copying can_frame->data, as most drivers do, this results in a buffer overflow of up to 247 bytes.

Drop ETH_P_CANXL skbs if the device does not have the CAN_CAP_XL capability. Keep can_is_canxl_skb() for the validation of CAN XL skbs.

Fixes fb08cba12b52 ("can: canxl: update CAN infrastructure for CAN XL frames")

---
Cc: [email protected]

---
 drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c +2 -1
index 95fcdc1026f8..4f7a189de265 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2008-2009 Wolfgang Grandegger <[email protected]>
  */
 
+#include <linux/can/can-ml.h>
 #include <linux/can/dev.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <net/can.h>
@@ -384,7 +385,7 @@ bool can_dropped_invalid_skb(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		break;
 
 	case ETH_P_CANXL:
-		if (!can_is_canxl_skb(skb))
+		if (!can_cap_enabled(dev, CAN_CAP_XL) || !can_is_canxl_skb(skb))
 			goto inval_skb;
 		break;
 

---
base-commit: 8ba098e6b6ff0db8edf28528d1552be261af30d4
change-id: 20260731-drop_canxl_frames-189872010abc

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Vincent Mailhol <[email protected]>
#1 lore raw
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] can_skb_init_valid() directly modifies skb->data without checking if the SKB is cloned or shared, violating SKB shared buffer rules and causing data corruption. --

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] can: dev: can_dropped_invalid_skb: drop CAN XL frames on non-CAN XL devices --- commit 4602c4bbb604b601116708346040725e0603f25d
Author: Vincent Mailhol <[email protected]>

can: dev: can_dropped_invalid_skb: drop CAN XL frames on non-CAN XL devices

Sending a PF_PACKET bypasses the CAN framework logic and can directly reach a CAN driver's xmit() function. The PF_PACKET framework only checks that skb->len does not exceed the net_device MTU.

For a CAN device that is not CAN XL capable, anything above CANFD_MTU (72 bytes) is therefore dropped before it reaches the driver. However, CAN XL frames are variable length. can_is_canxl_skb() accepts lengths in the range CANXL_HDR_SIZE + CANXL_MIN_DLEN up to CANXL_MTU, i.e. 13 to 2060 bytes.

As a result, an ETH_P_CANXL skb with a length between 13 and 72 bytes can pass both the MTU and the can_dropped_invalid_skb() checks.

A driver that does not support CAN XL will interpret canxl_frame->flags as a length because of the overlap with can_frame->len. And because CANXL_XLF is set, the resulting length is between 128 and 255. For drivers that do not check can_frame->len before copying can_frame->data, as most drivers do, this results in a buffer overflow of up to 247 bytes.

Drop ETH_P_CANXL skbs if the device does not have the CAN_CAP_XL capability. Keep can_is_canxl_skb() for the validation of CAN XL skbs.

Fixes fb08cba12b52 ("can: canxl: update CAN infrastructure for CAN XL frames")
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c +0 -0
index 95fcdc1026f80..4f7a189de265d 100644

[ ... ]

drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c bool can_dropped_invalid_skb(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) · line 390

Quoted 8 lines
drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c +1 -1
@@ -384,7 +385,7 @@ bool can_dropped_invalid_skb(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		break;
 
 	case ETH_P_CANXL:
-		if (!can_is_canxl_skb(skb))
+		if (!can_cap_enabled(dev, CAN_CAP_XL) || !can_is_canxl_skb(skb))
 			goto inval_skb;
 		break;

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but looking at can_skb_init_valid() which is called right after this switch statement:

drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c:can_skb_init_valid() {
    ...
		/* set CANFD_FDF flag for CAN FD frames */
		if (can_is_canfd_skb(skb)) {
			struct canfd_frame *cfd;

			cfd = (struct canfd_frame *)skb->data;
			cfd->flags |= CANFD_FDF;
		}
    ...
}

Can this modification of skb->data happen without ensuring exclusive ownership via skb_unshare() or skb_cow_head()?

If a local user constructs a linear CANFD packet via AF_PACKET, which is then cloned (e.g., via TC mirred or BPF redirect) and queued to a CAN interface, it seems can_skb_init_valid() will directly modify cfd->flags in the shared data buffer.

Since the network core's validate_xmit_skb() does not unclone an already-linear SKB, could this corrupt other users of the same buffer data and lead to silent data corruption in unrelated code paths?

Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
#2 lore raw
Quoted 73 lines · On 31.07.26 18:45, [email protected] wrote:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] can_skb_init_valid() directly modifies skb->data without checking if the SKB is cloned or shared, violating SKB shared buffer rules and causing data corruption. --

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] can: dev: can_dropped_invalid_skb: drop CAN XL frames on non-CAN XL devices --- commit 4602c4bbb604b601116708346040725e0603f25d
Author: Vincent Mailhol <[email protected]>

can: dev: can_dropped_invalid_skb: drop CAN XL frames on non-CAN XL devices

Sending a PF_PACKET bypasses the CAN framework logic and can directly reach a CAN driver's xmit() function. The PF_PACKET framework only checks that skb->len does not exceed the net_device MTU.

For a CAN device that is not CAN XL capable, anything above CANFD_MTU (72 bytes) is therefore dropped before it reaches the driver. However, CAN XL frames are variable length. can_is_canxl_skb() accepts lengths in the range CANXL_HDR_SIZE + CANXL_MIN_DLEN up to CANXL_MTU, i.e. 13 to 2060 bytes.

As a result, an ETH_P_CANXL skb with a length between 13 and 72 bytes can pass both the MTU and the can_dropped_invalid_skb() checks.

A driver that does not support CAN XL will interpret canxl_frame->flags as a length because of the overlap with can_frame->len. And because CANXL_XLF is set, the resulting length is between 128 and 255. For drivers that do not check can_frame->len before copying can_frame->data, as most drivers do, this results in a buffer overflow of up to 247 bytes.

Drop ETH_P_CANXL skbs if the device does not have the CAN_CAP_XL capability. Keep can_is_canxl_skb() for the validation of CAN XL skbs.

Fixes fb08cba12b52 ("can: canxl: update CAN infrastructure for CAN XL frames")
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c +0 -0
index 95fcdc1026f80..4f7a189de265d 100644

[ ... ]

drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c bool can_dropped_invalid_skb(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) · line 390

Quoted 8 lines
drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c +1 -1
@@ -384,7 +385,7 @@ bool can_dropped_invalid_skb(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
  		break;
 
  	case ETH_P_CANXL:
-		if (!can_is_canxl_skb(skb))
+		if (!can_cap_enabled(dev, CAN_CAP_XL) || !can_is_canxl_skb(skb))
  			goto inval_skb;
  		break;

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but looking at can_skb_init_valid() which is called right after this switch statement:

drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c:can_skb_init_valid() {
     ...
		/* set CANFD_FDF flag for CAN FD frames */
		if (can_is_canfd_skb(skb)) {
			struct canfd_frame *cfd;

			cfd = (struct canfd_frame *)skb->data;
			cfd->flags |= CANFD_FDF;
		}
     ...
}

Can this modification of skb->data happen without ensuring exclusive ownership via skb_unshare() or skb_cow_head()?

Quoted 9 lines

If a local user constructs a linear CANFD packet via AF_PACKET, which is then cloned (e.g., via TC mirred or BPF redirect) and queued to a CAN interface, it seems can_skb_init_valid() will directly modify cfd->flags in the shared data buffer.

Since the network core's validate_xmit_skb() does not unclone an already-linear SKB, could this corrupt other users of the same buffer data and lead to silent data corruption in unrelated code paths?

The finding about can_skb_init_valid() modifying skb->data on a potentially shared buffer is not relevant for this (correct) patch.

The FDF-flag write in can_skb_init_valid() only matters for PF_PACKET use: PF_CAN allocators already set CANFD_FDF. The write exists to normalize frames for PF_PACKET observers (tcpdump/Wireshark) so they can distinguish classic CAN from CAN FD at the netdev level, and to compensate for PF_PACKET senders that omit the bit. That normalization is functionally required.

The shared-buffer concern only becomes realistic through a specific chain: a PF_PACKET sender injects a CANFD-sized frame, the CAN driver's loopback puts an echo skb back into can_rcv(), and cgw (without modfuncs) clones it for forwarding to another interface. Only on that second can_skb_init_valid() call is the skb cloned. By then the bit was already set on the exclusive skb during the initial xmit path, so the flags |= CANFD_FDF write is strictly idempotent for any parallel consumer of the shared buffer — no memory-safety or information-disclosure consequence. It's a formal violation of the skb sharing rules without an observable effect, so the current code can stay as-is.

Best regards,
Oliver