bpf: add support for KASAN checks in JITed programs
v6 cover bpf: add support for KASAN checks in JITed programs
Hello,
this is v6 of the series aiming to bring basic support for KASAN checks to BPF JITed programs. This new revision takes a step back on stack accessing insn tracking, as the previous attempt was fragile and error-prone, it brings back a simpler tracking, at the cost of some unecessary checks being inserted. While at it, I took this time a look at how many accesses are being instrumented, and how many of those are "wrongly" instrumented (because they access stack), and I got those rough numbers on the whole selftests set:
- total: 451997 checks inserted
- checks added on stack access (checking reg == BPF_REG_FP, not precise, but gives a rough idea): 21786
So that makes ~5% of "over-instrumented" accesses
Original cover letter:
"Traditional" KASAN allows to spot memory management mistakes by reserving a fraction of memory as "shadow memory" that will map to the rest of the memory and allow its monitoring. Each memory-accessing instruction is then instrumented at build time to call some ASAN check function, that will analyze the corresponding bits in shadow memory, and if it detects the access as invalid, trigger a detailed report. The goal of this series is to replicate this mechanism for BPF programs when they are being JITed into native instructions: that's then the JIT compiler that is in charge of inserting calls to the corresponding kasan checks, when a program is being loaded into the kernel. This task involves:
- identifying at program load time the instructions performing memory accesses
- identifying those accesses properties (size ? read or write ?) to define the relevant kasan check function to call
- just before the identified instructions:
- perform the basic context saving (ie: saving registers)
- inserting a call to the relevant kasan check function
- restore context
- whenever the instrumented program executes, if it performs an invalid access, it triggers a kasan report identical to those instrumented on kernel side at build time.
The series comes with new selftests programs that generate a wide variety of kasan reports: those need the kernel to be running with kasan_multi_shot enabled.
As discussed in [1], this series is based on some choices and assumptions:
- it focuses on x86_64 for now, and so only on KASAN_GENERIC
- not all memory accessing BPF instructions are being instrumented:
- it discards instructions accessing BPF program stack (already monitored by page guards)
- it discards possibly faulting instructions, like BPF_PROBE_MEM or BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC insns
---
Changes in v6:
- dropped instruction original offset tracking
- when patching instructions, track former non_stack_access flag by passing original insn to adjust_insn_aux_data
- drop unecessary dep on CONFIG_KASAN in Kconfig
- fold patch adding the emit_kasan_helper into the patch actually calling it, to avoid an unused static function warning
- move stack access check out of emit_kasan_check
- replace hardcoded ip value by a computed value
- add OoB testing
- add fix commit to make cmdline_contains stricter
- Link to v5: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Changes in v5:
- fixed a few instruction offset for generated fixups
- fix insn marking for single insn patches
- enforce more checks in tests
- skip tests if kasan_multi_shot isn't enabled
- Link to v4: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Changes in v4:
- fix insn_offs_in_patch leakage in bpf_convert_ctx_access
- handle BPF_ATOMIC in is_mem_insn
- correctly mark fixup instructions if a single insn is generated
- clarify new kconfig (Andrey) and drop VMAP_STACK dep
- refactor BPF_FETCH atomic handling in JIT loop
- make kernel log reading resilient to unrelated, interleaved logs in the selftests
- make new test kfuncs depend on BPF_JIT_KASAN rather than KASAN_GENERIC
- Link to v3: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Changes in v3:
- Do not insert KASAN instrumentation when dealing with cBPF
- Fix stack-accessing insn tracking for verifier patches, as original instruction location in the generated patch may vary
- drop cBPF support for stack-accessing insn marking
- make sure to flag correctly memory access if different verifier states involve different memory types (eg: stack in one path, non-stack in another path)
- refactor BPF_ST handling in x86 JIT compiler
- improve tests coverage (cover instrumentation for a few patches emitted by the verifier)
- Link to v2: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Changes in v2:
- declare asan functions as extern in JIT compiler rather than exposing them in kasan header
- invert stack-accessing instructions marking to make sure not to skip instructions that could end up accessing to-be-checked memory
- fix stack accesses marking when verifier patches instructions
- add best effort marking for cBPF
- add missing call depth accounting in jited instrumentation
- skip unused registers in kasan instrumentation save/restore
- remove faulty stack align in kasan instrumentation
- drop commit skipping some jit-related tests
- cover missing instructions: BPF_ST and atomics
- completely rework tests: directly tune shadow memory, increase coverage, do not consume kernel logs
- Link to v1: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
To: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
To: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
To: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
To: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
To: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
To: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]>
To: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]>
To: Song Liu <[email protected]>
To: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
To: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
To: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
To: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
To: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
To: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
To: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
To: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Bastien Curutchet <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
---
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) (9):
bpf: mark instructions accessing program stack
bpf: add BPF_JIT_KASAN for KASAN instrumentation of JITed programs bpf, x86: refactor BPF_ST management in do_jit
bpf, x86: emit KASAN checks in x86 JITed programs
bpf, x86: enable KASAN for JITed programs on x86 selftests/bpf: make cmdline_contains stricter selftests/bpf: add helpers for KASAN in JIT testing selftests/bpf: move bpf_jit_harden helper into testing_helpers selftests/bpf: add tests to validate KASAN on JIT programs
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 283 ++++++++++--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 2 + kernel/bpf/Kconfig | 17 + kernel/bpf/fixups.c | 45 +- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 9 + .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_insn_array.c | 44 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kasan.c | 454 ++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kasan.c | 462 +++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kasan_harden.c | 41 ++ .../testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c | 55 +++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.c | 32 ++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.h | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c | 21 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.h | 2 + 15 files changed, 1369 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 5fb2b9636c7043f415a12e3336f2bf6983c9e93a
change-id: 20260126-kasan-fcd68f64cd7b
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <[email protected]>
PATCH v6 1/9 bpf: mark instructions accessing program stack
In order to prepare to emit KASAN checks in JITed programs, JIT compilers need to be aware about whether some load/store instructions are targeting the bpf program stack, as those should not be monitored (we already have guard pages for that, and it is difficult anyway to correctly monitor any kind of data passed on stack).
To support this need, make the BPF verifier mark the instructions depending on whether they could access or not memory other than stack. As different states in the verifier could lead to different memory types for the same access, just marking an instruction as accessing stack only is not enough (it could be some other memory type in another verifier state), so the algorithm rather sets by default any load/store instruction as stack only, and if _any_ state leads to any memory access type other than PTR_TO_STACK, it overrides this setting. It also takes care about shifting back the instruction marking in adjust_insn_aux_data if the verifier patches instructions. However, if the verifier generates new BPF_ST/BPF_STX/BPF_LDX while patching some instructions, those new ones are systematically marked as non-stack-accessing: this may over-instrument a few memory accessing instructions, but it allows making sure that we will not miss accidentally any.
---
Changes in v6:
- drop original instruction offset tracking, but add a best effort original insn marking preservation
- update comment style
Changes in v5:
- fix incorrect marking for single instruction patch
Changes in v4:
- include BPF_ATOMIC in is_mem_insn
- correctly mark instructions in adjust_insn_aux_data if patch generates a single instruction (ie replace an instruction)
Changes in v3:
- drop getter
- drop cBPF handling
- update marking shifting logic to track more precisely orignal instructions
- systematically mark newly generated instructions as non-stack accessing
Changes in v2:
- invert marking logic to cover possible different reg types when the verifier covers different states
- add a best-effort processing for classical bpf programs, inspecting directly src and dst registers since we don't have verifier env
- make sure to keep marking in sync with prog when it is patched by verifier
--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 2 ++ kernel/bpf/fixups.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 9 +++++++++ 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +2 -0
@@ -723,6 +723,8 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {u16 const_reg_map_mask;u16 const_reg_subprog_mask;u32 const_reg_vals[10 ]; +/* instruction can access non-stack memory */ +bool non_stack_access; };#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64/* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
kernel/bpf/fixups.c +42 -3
89 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +9 -0
@@ -3213,6 +3213,11 @@ static void mark_indirect_target(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) env->insn_aux_data[idx].indirect_target = true; } +static void mark_non_stack_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int idx) +{ + env->insn_aux_data[idx].non_stack_access = true; +} +#define LR_FRAMENO_BITS 4#define LR_SPI_BITS 6#define LR_ENTRY_BITS (LR_SPI_BITS + LR_FRAMENO_BITS + 1)
@@ -6433,6 +6438,10 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bclear_scalar_id (®s[value_regno]); } } + +if (!err && reg->type !=PTR_TO_STACK ) +mark_non_stack_access (env, insn_idx); +return err; }
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
PATCH v6 2/9 bpf: add BPF_JIT_KASAN for KASAN instrumentation of JITed programs
In reply to Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)Add a new Kconfig option CONFIG_BPF_JIT_KASAN that automatically enables generic KASAN (Kernel Address SANitizer) memory access checks for JIT-compiled BPF programs as well, when both KASAN (and more specifically, generic KASAN with KASAN_VMALLOC) and JIT compiler are enabled. This new Kconfig is not a user selectable one: it is automatically enabled if KASAN is enabled on a compatible platform. When enabled, the JIT compiler will emit shadow memory checks before memory loads and stores to detect use-after-free or out-of-bounds accesses at runtime. The option is gated behind HAVE_EBPF_JIT_KASAN, as it needs proper arch-specific implementation.
---
Changes in v6:
- fix commit msg
- get rid of "if KASAN" when setting default value, already implied by KASAN_GENERIC
Changes in v4:
- reorganize dependencies (Andrey)
- drop VMAP_STACK dependency
Changes in v2:
- add dependency on kasan for vmalloc and vmalloc'ed stack
--- kernel/bpf/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/Kconfig +17 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ config HAVE_CBPF_JIT config HAVE_EBPF_JIT bool +# KASAN support for JIT compiler +config HAVE_EBPF_JIT_KASAN + bool + # Used by archs to tell that they want the BPF JIT compiler enabled by # default for kernels that were compiled with BPF JIT support. config ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_BPF_JIT
@@ -101,4 +105,17 @@ config BPF_LSM If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config BPF_JIT_KASAN + bool + depends on HAVE_EBPF_JIT_KASAN + depends on KASAN_GENERIC + depends on KASAN_VMALLOC + depends on BPF_JIT + default y + help + Makes JIT compiler insert generic outline KASAN checks in BPF + programs when they are inserted in the kernel. This feature is + automatically enabled if the needed set of KASAN and BPF + configuration options is enabled. + endmenu # "BPF subsystem"
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
PATCH v6 3/9 bpf, x86: refactor BPF_ST management in do_jit
In reply to Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)In order to prepare for KASAN checks insertion before every memory-related load or store, group all BPF_ST instructions that indeed access memory in a single helper to allow instrumenting those in one call, rather than having to instrument all cases individually.
---
Changes in v3:
- new patch
--- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +60 -39
@@ -1315,6 +1315,64 @@ static void emit_st_index(u8 **pprog, u32 size, u32 dst_reg, u32 index_reg, int *pprog = prog; } +static void emit_st (u8 **pprog,struct bpf_insn *insn,int dst_reg, +s32 outgoing_arg_base,u16 outgoing_rsp) +{ +s32 imm32 = insn->imm; +u8 *prog = *pprog; +s32 insn_off; + +switch (BPF_SIZE (insn->code)) { +case BPF_B : +if (is_ereg (dst_reg)) +EMIT2 (0x41 ,0xC6 ); +else +EMIT1 (0xC6 ); +break ; +case BPF_H : +if (is_ereg (dst_reg)) +EMIT3 (0x66 ,0x41 ,0xC7 ); +else +EMIT2 (0x66 ,0xC7 ); +break ; +case BPF_W : +if (is_ereg (dst_reg)) +EMIT2 (0x41 ,0xC7 ); +else +EMIT1 (0xC7 ); +break ; +case BPF_DW : +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS && insn->off ==-8 ) { +/* Arg 6: store immediate in r9 register */ +emit_mov_imm64 (&prog,X86_REG_R9 , imm32 >>31 , + (u32 )imm32); + *pprog = prog; +return ; + } +EMIT2 (add_1mod (0x48 , dst_reg),0xC7 ); +break ; + } + + insn_off = insn->off; +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS ) { +/* +* Args 7+: reverse BPF negative offsets to +* x86 positive rsp offsets. +* BPF off=-16 → [rsp+0], off=-24 → [rsp+8], ... +*/ + insn_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - + insn_off -16 ; + dst_reg =BPF_REG_FP ; + } +if (is_imm8 (insn_off)) +EMIT2 (add_1reg (0x40 , dst_reg), insn_off); +else +EMIT1_off32 (add_1reg (0x80 , dst_reg), insn_off); + +EMIT (imm32,bpf_size_to_x86_bytes (BPF_SIZE (insn->code))); + *pprog = prog; +} +static void emit_st_r12 (u8 **pprog,u32 size,u32 dst_reg,int off,int imm) {emit_st_index (pprog, size, dst_reg,X86_REG_R12 , off, imm);
@@ -2207,49 +2265,12 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *EMIT_LFENCE ();break ; -/* ST: *(u8*)(dst_reg + off) = imm */ case BPF_ST |BPF_MEM |BPF_B : -if (is_ereg (dst_reg)) -EMIT2 (0x41 ,0xC6 ); -else -EMIT1 (0xC6 ); - goto st;case BPF_ST |BPF_MEM |BPF_H : -if (is_ereg (dst_reg)) -EMIT3 (0x66 ,0x41 ,0xC7 ); -else -EMIT2 (0x66 ,0xC7 ); - goto st;case BPF_ST |BPF_MEM |BPF_W : -if (is_ereg (dst_reg)) -EMIT2 (0x41 ,0xC7 ); -else -EMIT1 (0xC7 ); - goto st;case BPF_ST |BPF_MEM |BPF_DW : -if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS && insn->off ==-8 ) { -/* Arg 6: store immediate in r9 register */ -emit_mov_imm64 (&prog,X86_REG_R9 , imm32 >>31 , (u32 )imm32); -break ; - } -EMIT2 (add_1mod (0x48 , dst_reg),0xC7 ); - -st: insn_off = insn->off; -if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS ) { -/* -* Args 7+: reverse BPF negative offsets to -* x86 positive rsp offsets. -* BPF off=-16 → [rsp+0], off=-24 → [rsp+8], ... -*/ - insn_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - insn_off -16 ; - dst_reg =BPF_REG_FP ; - } -if (is_imm8 (insn_off)) -EMIT2 (add_1reg (0x40 , dst_reg), insn_off); -else -EMIT1_off32 (add_1reg (0x80 , dst_reg), insn_off); - -EMIT (imm32,bpf_size_to_x86_bytes (BPF_SIZE (insn->code))); +emit_st (&prog, insn, dst_reg, outgoing_arg_base, + outgoing_rsp);break ;/* STX: *(u8*)(dst_reg + off) = src_reg */
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 3/9] bpf, x86: refactor BPF_ST management in do_jit
This isn't a bug, but any reason for `int dst_reg` here rather than the `u32 dst_reg` used by emit_stx()/emit_st_index() alongside it?
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c static void emit_st_index(u8 **pprog, u32 size, u32 dst_reg, u32 index_reg, int · line 1319
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +2
-0@@ -1315,6 +1315,64 @@ static void emit_st_index(u8 **pprog, u32 size, u32 dst_reg, u32 index_reg, int *pprog = prog; } +static void emit_st (u8 **pprog,struct bpf_insn *insn,int dst_reg, +s32 outgoing_arg_base,u16 outgoing_rsp)
This isn't a bug, but any reason for int dst_reg here rather than the u32 dst_reg used by emit_stx()/emit_st_index() alongside it?
Quoted 19 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +19
-0+{ +s32 imm32 = insn->imm; +u8 *prog = *pprog; +s32 insn_off; + +switch (BPF_SIZE (insn->code)) { +case BPF_B : +if (is_ereg (dst_reg)) +EMIT2 (0x41 ,0xC6 ); +else +EMIT1 (0xC6 ); +break ; +case BPF_H : +if (is_ereg (dst_reg)) +EMIT3 (0x66 ,0x41 ,0xC7 ); +else +EMIT2 (0x66 ,0xC7 ); +break ; +case BPF_W :
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c static void emit_st_index(u8 **pprog, u32 size, u32 dst_reg, u32 index_reg, int · line 1348
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +10
-0+if (is_ereg (dst_reg)) +EMIT2 (0x41 ,0xC7 ); +else +EMIT1 (0xC7 ); +break ; +case BPF_DW : +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS && insn->off ==-8 ) { +/* Arg 6: store immediate in r9 register */ +emit_mov_imm64 (&prog,X86_REG_R9 , imm32 >>31 , + (u32 )imm32);
This isn't a bug, but since these two lines now sit two levels shallower and fit in 80 columns unwrapped, could they stay on one line to keep the diff a pure code move?
The call unwrapped is:
emit_mov_imm64(&prog, X86_REG_R9, imm32 >> 31, (u32)imm32);
which is 75 columns at the new indentation level.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +6
-0+ *pprog = prog; +return ; + } +EMIT2 (add_1mod (0x48 , dst_reg),0xC7 ); +break ; + }
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c static void emit_st_index(u8 **pprog, u32 size, u32 dst_reg, u32 index_reg, int · line 1364
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +10
-0+ + insn_off = insn->off; +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS ) { +/* +* Args 7+: reverse BPF negative offsets to +* x86 positive rsp offsets. +* BPF off=-16 → [rsp+0], off=-24 → [rsp+8], ... +*/ + insn_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - + insn_off -16 ;
This isn't a bug, but this line also became shorter by two indentation levels. Unwrapped it is:
insn_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - insn_off - 16;
which is 76 columns. Could it stay on one line rather than splitting the arithmetic expression mid-subtraction?
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c static void emit_st_index(u8 **pprog, u32 size, u32 dst_reg, u32 index_reg, int · line 1374
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +10
-0+ dst_reg =BPF_REG_FP ; + } +if (is_imm8 (insn_off)) +EMIT2 (add_1reg (0x40 , dst_reg), insn_off); +else +EMIT1_off32 (add_1reg (0x80 , dst_reg), insn_off); + +EMIT (imm32,bpf_size_to_x86_bytes (BPF_SIZE (insn->code))); + *pprog = prog; +}
This isn't a bug, but would it be worth carrying the `/* ST: *(u8*)(dst_reg
+ off) = imm */` line over onto the new emit_st(), so it matches emit_ldx()/emit_stx()/emit_st_index() just above?
Looking at the neighbouring base emit helpers in this file, they all carry that one-line semantic summary: emit_ldx has `/* LDX: dst_reg = *(u8*)(src_reg
+ off) */, emit_ldsx, emit_stx, and emit_st_index has /* ST: *(u8*)(dst_reg + index_reg + off) = imm32 */. The hunk in do_jit deletes the /* ST:
*(u8*)(dst_reg + off) = imm */` one-liner that documented the BPF_ST arm, and the new emit_st() helper is added without an equivalent, making emit_st the only one of that group with no such line.
[ ... ]
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/30936192563
PATCH v6 4/9 bpf, x86: emit KASAN checks in x86 JITed programs
In reply to Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)Insert KASAN shadow memory checks before memory load and store operations in JIT-compiled BPF programs. This helps detect memory safety bugs such as use-after-free and out-of-bounds accesses at runtime.
The main instructions being targeted are BPF_ST, BPF_STX and BPF_LDX, but not all of them are being instrumented:
- if the load/store instruction is in fact accessing the program stack, emit_kasan_check silently skips the instrumentation, as we can already benefit from guard pages to monitor stack accesses.
- if the load/store instruction is a BPF_PROBE_MEM or a BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC instruction, we do not instrument it, as the passed address can fault (hence the custom fault management with BPF_PROBE_XXX instructions), and so the corresponding kasan check could fault as well.
To support those new instructions insertion, create the emit_kasan_check() helper that emits KASAN shadow memory checks before memory accesses in JIT-compiled BPF programs. The implementation relies on the existing __asan_{load,store}X functions from KASAN subsystem. The helper:
- saves registers. This includes caller-saved registers, but also temporary registers, as those were possibly used by the affected program. Theoretically, r10 and r11 should be saved as well, but the number of called function and their scope being limited, they are skipped for the sake of reducing the overhead
- computes the accessed address and stores it in %rdi
- calls the relevant function, depending on the instruction being a load or a store, and the size of the access.
- restores registers
The special care needed when inserting this instrumentation comes at the cost of a non negligeable increase in JITed code size. For example, a bare
mov 0x0(%si),rbx # Load in rbx content at address stored in rsi
becomes
push %rax push %rcx push %rdx push %rsi push %rdi push %r8 push %r9 mov %rsi,%rdi call 0xffffffff81da0a60 <__asan_load8> pop %r9 pop %r8 pop %rdi pop %rsi pop %rdx pop %rcx pop %rax mov 0x0(%rsi),rbx
---
Changes in v6:
- add a comment about r10/r11 being skipped in emit_kasan_check
- merge the commit defining the helper into the commit actually using it
- move non_stack_access check out of the emit_kasan_check helper
- replace hardcoded ip increment with actual computation
Changes in v5:
- (from former split commit) change access type (read -> write) for atomic RMW check
Changes in v4:
- (from former split commit) refactor BPF_FETCH handling
Changes in v3:
- skip kasan instrumentation if there is no verifier env (cBPF)
- move helper up in the file
- (from former split commit) fix LLVM23 build failure
Changes in v2:
- move asan functions declaration directly into jit compiler, and guard them with IS_ENABLED
- remove faulty stack alignment, no arg is passed to kasan funcs on the stack anyway
- make sure to emit call depth accounting code
- do not save unneeded registers
- update helper signature to let caller configure some values (eg:
is_write)
- (from former split commit) support BPF_ATOMICS
- (from former split commit) support BPF_ST
- (from former split commit) make sure to systematically pass correct instruction to kasan check
--- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 188 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 171 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +171 -17
@@ -21,6 +21,17 @@#include <asm/unwind.h> #include <asm/cfi.h> +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_BPF_JIT_KASAN ) +void __asan_load1 (void *p); +void __asan_store1 (void *p); +void __asan_load2 (void *p); +void __asan_store2 (void *p); +void __asan_load4 (void *p); +void __asan_store4 (void *p); +void __asan_load8 (void *p); +void __asan_store8 (void *p); +#endif +static bool all_callee_regs_used[4 ] = {true, true, true, true};static u8 *emit_code (u8 *ptr,u32 bytes,unsigned int len)
@@ -1110,6 +1121,92 @@ static void maybe_emit_1mod(u8 **pprog, u32 reg, bool is64) *pprog = prog; } +static int emit_kasan_check (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u8 **pprog, +u32 addr_reg,struct bpf_insn *insn,u8 *ip, +bool is_write) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_KASAN +u32 bpf_size =BPF_SIZE (insn->code); +s32 off = insn->off; +u8 *prog = *pprog; +void *kasan_func; + +if (!env) +return 0 ; + +/* Derive KASAN check function from access type and size */ +switch (bpf_size) { +case BPF_B : + kasan_func = is_write ? __asan_store1 : __asan_load1; +break ; +case BPF_H : + kasan_func = is_write ? __asan_store2 : __asan_load2; +break ; +case BPF_W : + kasan_func = is_write ? __asan_store4 : __asan_load4; +break ; +case BPF_DW : + kasan_func = is_write ? __asan_store8 : __asan_load8; +break ; +default : +return -EINVAL ; + } + +/* Save rax */ +EMIT1 (0x50 ); +/* Save rcx */ +EMIT1 (0x51 ); +/* Save rdx */ +EMIT1 (0x52 ); +/* Save rsi */ +EMIT1 (0x56 ); +/* Save rdi */ +EMIT1 (0x57 ); +/* Save r8 */ +EMIT2 (0x41 ,0x50 ); +/* Save r9 */ +EMIT2 (0x41 ,0x51 ); +/* +* SystemV ABI states that we should also save r10/r11, but in +* practice those registers are _not_ used by the limited set of +* kasan helpers we are calling here, so that's fine not to save those. +*/ + +/* mov rdi, addr_reg */ +EMIT_mov (BPF_REG_1 , addr_reg); + +/* add rdi, off (if offset is non-zero) */ +if (off) { +if (is_imm8 (off)) { +/* add rdi, imm8 */ +EMIT4 (0x48 ,0x83 ,0xC7 , (u8 )off); + }else { +/* add rdi, imm32 */ +EMIT3_off32 (0x48 ,0x81 ,0xC7 , off); + } + } + +/* Adjust ip to account for the instrumentation generated so far */ + ip += (prog - *pprog); +/* We emit a call, so update call depth counting */ + ip +=x86_call_depth_emit_accounting (&prog, kasan_func, ip); +/* call kasan_func */ +if (emit_call (&prog, kasan_func, ip)) +return -ERANGE ; + +EMIT2 (0x41 ,0x59 ); +EMIT2 (0x41 ,0x58 ); +EMIT1 (0x5F ); +EMIT1 (0x5E ); +EMIT1 (0x5A ); +EMIT1 (0x59 ); +EMIT1 (0x58 ); + + *pprog = prog; +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_JIT_KASAN */ +return 0 ; +} +/* LDX: dst_reg = *(u8*)(src_reg + off) */ static void emit_ldx (u8 **pprog,u32 size,u32 dst_reg,u32 src_reg,int off) {
@@ -1481,17 +1578,35 @@ static int emit_atomic_rmw_index(u8 **pprog, u32 atomic_op, u32 size,return 0 ; } -static int emit_atomic_ld_st (u8 **pprog,u32 atomic_op,u32 dst_reg, -u32 src_reg,s16 off,u8 bpf_size) +static int emit_atomic_ld_st (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u8 **pprog, +struct bpf_insn *insn,u8 *ip,u32 dst_reg, +u32 src_reg,bool accesses_stack_only) { +u32 atomic_op = insn->imm; +int err; +switch (atomic_op) {case BPF_LOAD_ACQ : +if (!accesses_stack_only) { + err =emit_kasan_check (env, pprog, src_reg, insn, ip, + false); +if (err) +return err; + }/* dst_reg = smp_load_acquire(src_reg + off16) */ -emit_ldx (pprog, bpf_size, dst_reg, src_reg, off); +emit_ldx (pprog,BPF_SIZE (insn->code), dst_reg, src_reg, + insn->off);break ;case BPF_STORE_REL : +if (!accesses_stack_only) { + err =emit_kasan_check (env, pprog, dst_reg, insn, ip, + true); +if (err) +return err; + }/* smp_store_release(dst_reg + off16, src_reg) */ -emit_stx (pprog, bpf_size, dst_reg, src_reg, off); +emit_stx (pprog,BPF_SIZE (insn->code), dst_reg, src_reg, + insn->off);break ;default : pr_err("bpf_jit: unknown atomic load/store opcode %02x\n",
@@ -1869,10 +1984,12 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *const s32 imm32 = insn->imm;u32 dst_reg = insn->dst_reg;u32 src_reg = insn->src_reg; +bool accesses_stack_only;u8 b2 =0 , b3 =0 ;u8 *start_of_ldx;s64 jmp_offset;s32 insn_off; +int insn_idx;u8 jmp_cond;u8 *func;int nops;
@@ -1889,6 +2006,10 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *EMIT_ENDBR (); ip = image + addrs[i -1 ] + (prog - temp); + insn_idx = i -1 + bpf_prog->aux->subprog_start; + accesses_stack_only = + env ? !env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].non_stack_access : + false;switch (insn->code) {/* ALU */
@@ -2269,6 +2390,13 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *case BPF_ST |BPF_MEM |BPF_H :case BPF_ST |BPF_MEM |BPF_W :case BPF_ST |BPF_MEM |BPF_DW : +if (!accesses_stack_only) { + err =emit_kasan_check (env, &prog, dst_reg, + insn, ip, true); +if (err) +return err; + } +emit_st (&prog, insn, dst_reg, outgoing_arg_base, outgoing_rsp);break ;
@@ -2288,6 +2416,12 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * insn_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - insn_off -16 ; dst_reg =BPF_REG_FP ; } +if (!accesses_stack_only) { + err =emit_kasan_check (env, &prog, dst_reg, + insn, ip, true); +if (err) +return err; + }emit_stx (&prog,BPF_SIZE (insn->code), dst_reg, src_reg, insn_off);break ;
@@ -2449,6 +2583,11 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int */* populate jmp_offset for JAE above to jump to start_of_ldx */ start_of_ldx = prog; end_of_jmp[-1 ] = start_of_ldx - end_of_jmp; + }else if (!accesses_stack_only) { + err =emit_kasan_check (env, &prog, src_reg, + insn, ip, false); +if (err) +return err; }if (BPF_MODE (insn->code) ==BPF_PROBE_MEMSX ||BPF_MODE (insn->code) ==BPF_MEMSX )
@@ -2510,28 +2649,42 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * } fallthrough;case BPF_STX |BPF_ATOMIC |BPF_W : -case BPF_STX |BPF_ATOMIC |BPF_DW : -if (insn->imm == (BPF_AND |BPF_FETCH ) || - insn->imm == (BPF_OR |BPF_FETCH ) || - insn->imm == (BPF_XOR |BPF_FETCH )) { -bool is64 =BPF_SIZE (insn->code) ==BPF_DW ; -u32 real_src_reg = src_reg; -u32 real_dst_reg = dst_reg; -u8 *branch_target; - +case BPF_STX |BPF_ATOMIC |BPF_DW : { +bool is64 =BPF_SIZE (insn->code) ==BPF_DW ; +u32 real_src_reg = src_reg; +u32 real_dst_reg = dst_reg; +u8 *branch_target; +u8 *pprog; +bool is_atomic_fetch = + (insn->imm == (BPF_AND |BPF_FETCH ) || + insn->imm == (BPF_OR |BPF_FETCH ) || + insn->imm == (BPF_XOR |BPF_FETCH )); +if (is_atomic_fetch) {/* * Can't be implemented with a single x86 insn. * Need to do a CMPXCHG loop. */ /* Will need RAX as a CMPXCHG operand so save R0 */ + pprog = prog;emit_mov_reg (&prog, true,BPF_REG_AX ,BPF_REG_0 );if (src_reg ==BPF_REG_0 ) real_src_reg =BPF_REG_AX ;if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_0 ) real_dst_reg =BPF_REG_AX ; - + ip += (prog - pprog); + } +if (!bpf_atomic_is_load_store (insn)) { +if (!accesses_stack_only) { + err =emit_kasan_check (env, &prog, + real_dst_reg, + insn, ip, true); +if (err) +return err; + } branch_target = prog; + } +if (is_atomic_fetch) {/* Load old value */ emit_ldx (&prog,BPF_SIZE (insn->code),BPF_REG_0 , real_dst_reg, insn->off);
@@ -2563,15 +2716,16 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * }if (bpf_atomic_is_load_store (insn)) - err =emit_atomic_ld_st (&prog, insn->imm, dst_reg, src_reg, - insn->off,BPF_SIZE (insn->code)); + err =emit_atomic_ld_st (env, &prog, insn, ip, + dst_reg, src_reg, + accesses_stack_only);else err =emit_atomic_rmw (&prog, insn->imm, dst_reg, src_reg, insn->off,BPF_SIZE (insn->code));if (err)return err;break ; - + }case BPF_STX |BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC |BPF_B :case BPF_STX |BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC |BPF_H :if (!bpf_atomic_is_load_store (insn)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 4/9] bpf, x86: emit KASAN checks in x86 JITed programs
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] emit_kasan_check fails to save caller-saved register R10 (BPF_REG_AX), causing BPF state…
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] emit_kasan_check fails to save caller-saved register R10 (BPF_REG_AX), causing BPF state corruption during atomic fetch operations and constant blinding. --
--- Patch [4]: [PATCH bpf-next v6 4/9] bpf, x86: emit KASAN checks in x86 JITed programs --- commit fb8c8d1198314de6985fab9f1a09f3f7baf90343
Author: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <[email protected]>
Subject: bpf, x86: emit KASAN checks in x86 JITed programs
This commit adds KASAN shadow memory checks before load and store operations in JIT-compiled BPF programs on x86. It aims to detect memory safety bugs at runtime by emitting calls to standard KASAN C helper functions.
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c static void maybe_emit_1mod(u8 **pprog, u32 reg, bool is64) · line 1129
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +9
-0@@ -1110,6 +1121,92 @@ static void maybe_emit_1mod(u8 **pprog, u32 reg, bool is64) +/* Save r8 */ +EMIT2 (0x41 ,0x50 ); +/* Save r9 */ +EMIT2 (0x41 ,0x51 ); +/* +* SystemV ABI states that we should also save r10/r11, but in +* practice those registers are _not_ used by the limited set of +* kasan helpers we are calling here, so that's fine not to save those. +*/
[Severity: High]
Is it safe to skip saving R10 (BPF_REG_AX) here?
Since R10 is a caller-saved register under the System V ABI, the compiler is free to use it in __asan_loadX or __asan_storeX. Furthermore, if a KASAN warning triggers, the kasan_report() slow path will clobber R10 before returning.
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +3
-0+ +/* mov rdi, addr_reg */ +EMIT_mov (BPF_REG_1 , addr_reg);
[ ... ]
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * · line 2424
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +6
-0@@ -2288,6 +2416,12 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * insn_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - insn_off -16 ; dst_reg =BPF_REG_FP ; } +if (!accesses_stack_only) { + err =emit_kasan_check (env, &prog, dst_reg, + insn, ip, true); +if (err) +return err; + }
[Severity: High]
Could emit_kasan_check clobber the source register here if constant blinding is used?
When bpf_jit_blind_constants rewrites a BPF_ST instruction, it places the unblinded constant into BPF_REG_AX (R10) and issues a BPF_STX with BPF_REG_AX as the source register. If R10 is clobbered by the KASAN check, does this cause a store of garbage memory?
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +0
-0emit_stx (&prog,BPF_SIZE (insn->code), dst_reg, src_reg, insn_off);break ;
[ ... ]
Quoted 37 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +12
-10@@ -2510,28 +2649,42 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * } fallthrough;case BPF_STX |BPF_ATOMIC |BPF_W : -case BPF_STX |BPF_ATOMIC |BPF_DW : -if (insn->imm == (BPF_AND |BPF_FETCH ) || - insn->imm == (BPF_OR |BPF_FETCH ) || - insn->imm == (BPF_XOR |BPF_FETCH )) { -bool is64 =BPF_SIZE (insn->code) ==BPF_DW ; -u32 real_src_reg = src_reg; -u32 real_dst_reg = dst_reg; -u8 *branch_target; - +case BPF_STX |BPF_ATOMIC |BPF_DW : { +bool is64 =BPF_SIZE (insn->code) ==BPF_DW ; +u32 real_src_reg = src_reg; +u32 real_dst_reg = dst_reg; +u8 *branch_target; +u8 *pprog; +bool is_atomic_fetch = + (insn->imm == (BPF_AND |BPF_FETCH ) || + insn->imm == (BPF_OR |BPF_FETCH ) || + insn->imm == (BPF_XOR |BPF_FETCH )); +if (is_atomic_fetch) {/* * Can't be implemented with a single x86 insn. * Need to do a CMPXCHG loop. */ /* Will need RAX as a CMPXCHG operand so save R0 */ + pprog = prog;emit_mov_reg (&prog, true,BPF_REG_AX ,BPF_REG_0 );if (src_reg ==BPF_REG_0 ) real_src_reg =BPF_REG_AX ;if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_0 ) real_dst_reg =BPF_REG_AX ; -
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * · line 2684
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +10
-0+ ip += (prog - pprog); + } +if (!bpf_atomic_is_load_store (insn)) { +if (!accesses_stack_only) { + err =emit_kasan_check (env, &prog, + real_dst_reg, + insn, ip, true); +if (err) +return err; + }
[Severity: High]
Will this result in BPF state corruption during atomic fetch operations?
Here, BPF_REG_0 (RAX) is temporarily saved to BPF_REG_AX (R10) just prior to calling emit_kasan_check(). If emit_kasan_check() clobbers R10, won't BPF_REG_0 be restored with corrupted data after the operation?
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +1
-0branch_target = prog; + }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=4
PATCH v6 5/9 bpf, x86: enable KASAN for JITed programs on x86
In reply to Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)Mark x86 as supporting KASAN checks in JITed programs so that the corresponding JIT compiler inserts checks on the translated instructions.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_SAMPLE_FTRACE_DIRECT if X86_64 select HAVE_SAMPLE_FTRACE_DIRECT_MULTI if X86_64 select HAVE_EBPF_JIT + select HAVE_EBPF_JIT_KASAN if X86_64 select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS select HAVE_EISA if X86_32 select HAVE_EXIT_THREAD
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 5/9] bpf, x86: enable KASAN for JITed programs on x86
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The x86 BPF JIT KASAN instrumentation fails to save R10 and R11 across calls to KASAN helpers, leading to arbitrary memory corruption when BPF_REG_AX is used as an address or value register. --
--- Patch [5]: [PATCH bpf-next v6 5/9] bpf, x86: enable KASAN for JITed programs on x86 --- commit d7d5cc9dc7fbffd1005cd390c1a9b1a31a2025be
Author: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <[email protected]>
bpf, x86: enable KASAN for JITed programs on x86
Mark x86 as supporting KASAN checks in JITed programs so that the corresponding JIT compiler inserts checks on the translated instructions.
arch/x86/Kconfig config X86 · line 236
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig +1
-0@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_SAMPLE_FTRACE_DIRECT if X86_64 select HAVE_SAMPLE_FTRACE_DIRECT_MULTI if X86_64 select HAVE_EBPF_JIT + select HAVE_EBPF_JIT_KASAN if X86_64
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but enabling this config exposes a pre-existing ABI violation in the x86 BPF JIT.
When a BPF program uses BPF_REG_0 as an address for an operation, the JIT moves BPF_REG_0 to BPF_REG_AX (which maps to x86 register R10). It then calls a C KASAN helper like __asan_store8 via emit_kasan_check().
In arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:do_jit():
emit_mov_reg(&prog, true, BPF_REG_AX, BPF_REG_0);
if (src_reg == BPF_REG_0)
real_src_reg = BPF_REG_AX;
...
err = emit_kasan_check(env, &prog, real_dst_reg,
insn, ip, true);However, emit_kasan_check() explicitly skips saving R10 and R11:
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:emit_kasan_check() {
/*
* SystemV ABI states that we should also save r10/r11, but in
* practice those registers are _not_ used by the limited set of
* kasan helpers we are calling here, so that's fine not to save those. */
}
Since R10 and R11 are caller-saved scratch registers in the System V AMD64 ABI, can the C compiler clobber R10 during the KASAN helper execution (depending on the compiler version or optimization)?
If R10 is clobbered, won't the JITed code subsequently use the corrupted register as a memory address, leading to arbitrary memory corruption?
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig +0
-0select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS select HAVE_EISA if X86_32 select HAVE_EXIT_THREAD
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=5
PATCH v6 6/9 selftests/bpf: make cmdline_contains stricter
In reply to Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)cmdline_contains is used by BPF selftests to check the presence of specific kernel commandline parameters, but it currently suffers from two issues:
- the read commandline isn't NULL terminated right after the read data but only at the end of the buffer, leaving uninitialized bytes that are then possibly tokenized
- the comparison of found tokens is done based on the size of found token. This could lead to too-short-but-matching tokens to wrongly match the search pattern.
Enforce stricter checks in cmdline_contains to avoid accidental matches.
--- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c +7 -4
@@ -72,8 +72,9 @@ static int config_contains(const char *pat)static bool cmdline_contains (const char *pat) { +int fd, cnt, ret = false;char cmdline[4096 ], *c; -int fd, ret = false; +size_t pat_len; fd =open ("/proc/cmdline" ,O_RDONLY );if (fd <0 ) {
@@ -81,14 +82,16 @@ static bool cmdline_contains(const char *pat)return false; } -if (read (fd, cmdline,sizeof (cmdline) -1 ) <0 ) { + cnt =read (fd, cmdline,sizeof (cmdline) -1 ); +if (cnt <0 ) {perror ("read /proc/cmdline" ); goto out; } - cmdline[sizeof (cmdline) -1 ] ='\0' ; + cmdline[cnt] ='\0' ; + pat_len =strlen (pat);for (c =strtok (cmdline," \n" ); c; c =strtok (NULL ," \n" )) { -if (strncmp (c, pat,strlen (c))) +if (strlen (c) != pat_len ||strcmp (c, pat))continue ; ret = true;break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 6/9] selftests/bpf: make cmdline_contains stricter
The commit message describes two concrete bugs in existing selftest code ('the read commandline isn't NULL terminated right after the read data but only at the end of the buffer, leaving…
Quoted 12 lines
selftests/bpf: make
cmdline_containsstricter
cmdline_containsis used by BPF selftests to check the presence of specific kernel commandline parameters, but it currently suffers from two issues:
- the read commandline isn't NULL terminated right after the read data but only at the end of the buffer, leaving uninitialized bytes that are then possibly tokenized
- the comparison of found tokens is done based on the size of found token. This could lead to too-short-but-matching tokens to wrongly match the search pattern.
Quoted 3 lines
Enforce stricter checks in
cmdline_containsto avoid accidental matches.Signed-off-by Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <[email protected]>
The commit message describes two concrete bugs in existing selftest code ('the read commandline isn't NULL terminated right after the read data but only at the end of the buffer, leaving uninitialized bytes that are then possibly tokenized' and 'the comparison of found tokens is done based on the size of found token. This could lead to too-short-but-matching tokens to wrongly match the search pattern'), but there is no Fixes: tag.
Both defects were introduced together by 399f6185a1c0 ("selftests/bpf:
Fix selftests broken by mitigations=off"), which added the original helper:
+ if (read(fd, cmdline, sizeof(cmdline) - 1) < 0) {
...
+ cmdline[sizeof(cmdline) - 1] = '\0';
+ for (c = strtok(cmdline, " \n"); c; c = strtok(NULL, " \n")) {
+ if (strncmp(c, "mitigations=off", strlen(c)))The late NUL termination and the strncmp(c, pat, strlen(c)) prefix comparison are both present verbatim in that commit. The prefix-compare bug is real and reachable: a one-character token such as 'm' on the command line yields strlen(c) == 1, so strncmp(c, "mitigations=off", 1) returns 0 and the helper reports a match, causing get_unpriv_disabled() to skip the unprivileged verifier tests on a machine where mitigations are actually enabled.
Should this include:
Quoted 25 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c +4
-2@@ -72,8 +72,9 @@ static int config_contains(const char *pat)static bool cmdline_contains (const char *pat) { +int fd, cnt, ret = false;char cmdline[4096 ], *c; -int fd, ret = false; +size_t pat_len; fd =open ("/proc/cmdline" ,O_RDONLY );if (fd <0 ) {@@ -81,14 +82,16 @@ static bool cmdline_contains(const char *pat)return false; } -if (read (fd, cmdline,sizeof (cmdline) -1 ) <0 ) { + cnt =read (fd, cmdline,sizeof (cmdline) -1 ); +if (cnt <0 ) {perror ("read /proc/cmdline" ); goto out; }
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c static bool cmdline_contains(const char *pat) · line 97
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c +3
-2- cmdline[sizeof (cmdline) -1 ] ='\0' ; + cmdline[cnt] ='\0' ; + pat_len =strlen (pat);for (c =strtok (cmdline," \n" ); c; c =strtok (NULL ," \n" )) { -if (strncmp (c, pat,strlen (c))) +if (strlen (c) != pat_len ||strcmp (c, pat))continue ; ret = true;break ;
This isn't a bug, but since strcmp() already fails on strings of different lengths, would if (strcmp(c, pat)) on its own be enough here, letting pat_len go away and matching how config_contains() does the same check?
The sibling helper in the same file expresses the same idea with a bare strcmp:
config_contains(), unpriv_helpers.c:
if (strcmp(buf, pat) == 0) {---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/30936192563
PATCH v6 7/9 selftests/bpf: add helpers for KASAN in JIT testing
In reply to Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)Add two simple helpers to allow checking whether KASAN for eBPF tests should be executed:
- one helper to check if BPF_JIT_KASAN is enabled in kernel configuration
- one helper to check if the kernel is running with kasan_multi_shot (otherwise only the first test will be able to trigger a report)
---
Changes in v5:
- add kasan_multi_shot helper
Changes in v2:
- fix condition
--- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c | 10 ++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c +10 -0
@@ -145,3 +145,13 @@ bool get_unpriv_disabled(void) }return mitigations_off; } + +bool get_kasan_jit_enabled (void ) +{ +return config_contains ("CONFIG_BPF_JIT_KASAN=y" ) ==1 ; +} + +bool get_kasan_multi_shot_enabled (void ) +{ +return cmdline_contains ("kasan_multi_shot" ); +}
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.h +2 -0
@@ -5,3 +5,5 @@#define UNPRIV_SYSCTL "kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled"bool get_unpriv_disabled (void ); +bool get_kasan_jit_enabled (void ); +bool get_kasan_multi_shot_enabled (void );
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
PATCH v6 8/9 selftests/bpf: move bpf_jit_harden helper into testing_helpers
In reply to Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)Move set_bpf_jit_harden to testing helpers so that other selftests can change the hardening configuration without re-implementing a helper.
---
Changes in v5:
- check set_bpf_jit_harden return code in cleanup path
Changes in v3:
- new patch
--- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_insn_array.c | 44 +++------------------- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_insn_array.c +5 -39
@@ -227,42 +227,6 @@ static void check_incorrect_index(void)check_mid_insn_index (); } -static int set_bpf_jit_harden (char *level) -{ -char old_level; -int err =-1 ; -int fd =-1 ; - - fd =open ("/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden" ,O_RDWR |O_NONBLOCK ); -if (fd <0 ) { -ASSERT_FAIL ("open .../bpf_jit_harden returned %d (errno=%d)" , fd, errno); -return -1 ; - } - - err =read (fd, &old_level,1 ); -if (err !=1 ) { -ASSERT_FAIL ("read from .../bpf_jit_harden returned %d (errno=%d)" , err, errno); - err =-1 ; - goto end; - } - -lseek (fd,0 ,SEEK_SET ); - - err =write (fd, level,1 ); -if (err !=1 ) { -ASSERT_FAIL ("write to .../bpf_jit_harden returned %d (errno=%d)" , err, errno); - err =-1 ; - goto end; - } - - err =0 ; - *level = old_level; -end: -if (fd >=0 ) -close (fd); -return err; -} -static void check_blindness (void ) {struct bpf_insn insns[] = {
@@ -272,7 +236,7 @@ static void check_blindness(void)BPF_MOV64_IMM (BPF_REG_0 ,1 ), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }; -int prog_fd =-1 , map_fd; +int prog_fd =-1 , map_fd, ret;struct bpf_insn_array_value val = {};char bpf_jit_harden ='@' ;/* non-exizsting value */ int i;
@@ -291,7 +255,8 @@ static void check_blindness(void) goto cleanup; bpf_jit_harden ='2' ; -if (set_bpf_jit_harden (&bpf_jit_harden)) { + ret =set_bpf_jit_harden (&bpf_jit_harden); +if (!ASSERT_OK (ret,"set bpf_jit_harden" )) { bpf_jit_harden ='@' ;/* open, read or write failed => no write was done */ goto cleanup; }
@@ -313,7 +278,8 @@ static void check_blindness(void) cleanup:/* restore the old one */ if (bpf_jit_harden !='@' ) -set_bpf_jit_harden (&bpf_jit_harden); +ASSERT_OK (set_bpf_jit_harden (&bpf_jit_harden), +"restore hardening configuration" );close (prog_fd);close (map_fd);
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.c +32 -0
@@ -519,6 +519,38 @@ bool is_jit_enabled(void)return enabled; } +int set_bpf_jit_harden (char *level) +{ +char old_level; +int err =-1 ; +int fd =-1 ; + + fd =open ("/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden" ,O_RDWR |O_NONBLOCK ); +if (fd <0 ) +return -1 ; + + err =read (fd, &old_level,1 ); +if (err !=1 ) { + err =-1 ; + goto end; + } + +lseek (fd,0 ,SEEK_SET ); + + err =write (fd, level,1 ); +if (err !=1 ) { + err =-1 ; + goto end; + } + + err =0 ; + *level = old_level; +end: +if (fd >=0 ) +close (fd); +return err; +} +int stack_mprotect (void ) {void *buf;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.h +1 -0
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct bpf_insn;int get_xlated_program (int fd_prog,struct bpf_insn **buf,__u32 *cnt);int testing_prog_flags (void );bool is_jit_enabled (void ); +int set_bpf_jit_harden (char *level);int stack_mprotect (void );#endif /* __TESTING_HELPERS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
PATCH v6 9/9 selftests/bpf: add tests to validate KASAN on JIT programs
In reply to Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)Add a basic KASAN test runner that loads and test-run programs that can trigger memory management bugs. The test captures kernel logs and ensure that the expected KASAN splat is emitted by searching for the corresponding first lines in the report, hence validated that the needed instrumentation has been inserted by the JIT compiler before the relevant memory accesses. To allow each test to trigger the expected report, the kernel must run with the kasan_multi_shot configuration.
The runner covers different cases and settings: in the nominal case, it validates kasan reports on basic instructions (on all supported accesses sizes) but also when report _should not_ be emitted (eg: for accesses on program stack). The runner also comes with a few specialized tests that are then not executed for all sizes/locations:
- specific atomic ops
- test for instructions involving different verifier states, with some states flagging memory as stack, and other states as non-stack memory
- tests that validate the stack marking shifting when a patch is emitted by the verifier (zext/rnd_hi32, constant blindind).
Most of those tests are able to trigger kasan reports by altering the shadow memory (triggering faulty accesses is otherwise complex, because of the verifier). A few tests trigger actual faulty accesses (eg out-of-bound accesses)
A few of those tests depends on cpuv4 (load_acquire and store_release).
# ./test_progs -a kasan #171/1 kasan/st_1_not_on_stack:OK #171/2 kasan/st_1_on_stack:OK #171/3 kasan/st_2_not_on_stack:OK #171/4 kasan/st_2_on_stack:OK #171/5 kasan/st_4_not_on_stack:OK #171/6 kasan/st_4_on_stack:OK #171/7 kasan/st_8_not_on_stack:OK #171/8 kasan/st_8_on_stack:OK #171/9 kasan/stx_1_not_on_stack:OK #171/10 kasan/stx_1_on_stack:OK #171/11 kasan/stx_2_not_on_stack:OK #171/12 kasan/stx_2_on_stack:OK #171/13 kasan/stx_4_not_on_stack:OK #171/14 kasan/stx_4_on_stack:OK #171/15 kasan/stx_8_not_on_stack:OK #171/16 kasan/stx_8_on_stack:OK #171/17 kasan/ldx_1_not_on_stack:OK #171/18 kasan/ldx_1_on_stack:OK #171/19 kasan/ldx_2_not_on_stack:OK #171/20 kasan/ldx_2_on_stack:OK #171/21 kasan/ldx_4_not_on_stack:OK #171/22 kasan/ldx_4_on_stack:OK #171/23 kasan/ldx_8_not_on_stack:OK #171/24 kasan/ldx_8_on_stack:OK #171/25 kasan/simple_atomic_4_not_on_stack:OK #171/26 kasan/simple_atomic_4_on_stack:OK #171/27 kasan/simple_atomic_8_not_on_stack:OK #171/28 kasan/simple_atomic_8_on_stack:OK #171/29 kasan/simple_atomic_fetch:OK #171/30 kasan/simple_atomic_fetch:OK #171/31 kasan/load_acquire_1_not_on_stack:SKIP #171/32 kasan/load_acquire_1_on_stack:SKIP #171/33 kasan/load_acquire_2_not_on_stack:SKIP #171/34 kasan/load_acquire_2_on_stack:SKIP #171/35 kasan/load_acquire_4_not_on_stack:SKIP #171/36 kasan/load_acquire_4_on_stack:SKIP #171/37 kasan/load_acquire_8_not_on_stack:SKIP #171/38 kasan/load_acquire_8_on_stack:SKIP #171/39 kasan/store_release_1_not_on_stack:SKIP #171/40 kasan/store_release_1_on_stack:SKIP #171/41 kasan/store_release_2_not_on_stack:SKIP #171/42 kasan/store_release_2_on_stack:SKIP #171/43 kasan/store_release_4_not_on_stack:SKIP #171/44 kasan/store_release_4_on_stack:SKIP #171/45 kasan/store_release_8_not_on_stack:SKIP #171/46 kasan/store_release_8_on_stack:SKIP #171/47 kasan/ldx_patched:OK #171/48 kasan/ldx_patched:OK #171/49 kasan/verifier_paths_stack_and_non_stack:OK #171/50 kasan/ldx_oob_1_not_on_stack:OK #171/51 kasan/ldx_oob_2_not_on_stack:OK #171/52 kasan/ldx_oob_4_not_on_stack:OK #171/53 kasan/ldx_oob_8_not_on_stack:OK #171/54 kasan/st_blinded:OK #171 kasan:OK (SKIP: 16/54) Summary: 1/38 PASSED, 16 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
---
Changes in v6:
- rename test struct in kasan program
- add oob testing
- add atomic fetch tests
- refactor a bit the test runner so that ldx_patched tests are not treated as special cases
- break kernel log reading loop immediately if no bytes are read
Changes in v5:
- check snprintf return codes when checking kernel logs
- skip tests in kasan_multi_shot is not enabled
- update simple atomic test expected access type (read -> write)
Changes in v4:
- prevent interleaved kernel logs from breaking kasan report search
- make new kfuncs in bpf_testmod depend on BPF_JIT_KASAN rather than KASAN_GENERIC
- initialize buffer passed to bpf_prog_test_run_opts
Changes in v3:
- increase kernel log buffer size
- fix comment style
- check bpf_program__fd return code
- document kasan_multi_shot
- fix copy-paste mistakes on poisoning/unpoisoning sequences
- add test for patch due to constant blinding
Changes in v2:
- simplify tests by just manually poisoning test areas with a dedicated kfunc
- introduce one prog per covered instruction family
- make sure that tests do not consume kernel logs (use /dev/kmgs rather than klogctl)
- add tests for stack accesses:
- marking correctly set when there are diverging verifier states leading to different memory types
- marking kept in sync with prog when it is patched
--- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kasan.c | 454 ++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kasan.c | 462 +++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kasan_harden.c | 41 ++ .../testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c | 55 +++ 4 files changed, 1012 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kasan.c new file +454 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause + +/* +* Tests validating that KASAN reports are properly instrumented and +* generated on a wide variety of instructions. The running kernel needs +* kasan_multi_shot to run multiple kasan-generating subtests at once +*/ +#include <bpf/bpf.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <linux/if_ether.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <test_progs.h> +#include <unpriv_helpers.h> +#include "kasan.skel.h" +#include "kasan_harden.skel.h" + +#define SUBTEST_NAME_MAX_LEN 128 +#define PROG_NAME_MAX_LEN 128 + +#define MAX_LOG_SIZE (8 * 1024) +#define READ_CHUNK_SIZE 256 + +#define KASAN_PATTERN_SLAB_UAF "BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free " \ + "in bpf_prog_%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x_%s" +#define KASAN_PATTERN_SLAB_OOB "BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds " \ + "in bpf_prog_%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x_%s" +#define KASAN_PATTERN_REPORT "%s of size %d at addr" + +static char klog_buffer[MAX_LOG_SIZE ]; +static char record[MAX_LOG_SIZE ]; + +struct test_spec { +char *prog_type; +bool is_write; +bool only_32_or_64; +bool needs_load_acq_store_rel; +bool skip_multi_size_testing; +bool skip_on_stack_testing; +int run_size; +bool expect_no_report; +bool rnd_hi32; +bool is_oob; +}; + +struct kasan_write_val { +__u8 data_1; +__u16 data_2; +__u32 data_4; +__u64 data_8; +}; + +struct test_ctx { +__u8 prog_tag[BPF_TAG_SIZE ]; +struct bpf_object *obj; +int *access_size; +bool skip_load_acq_store_rel; +struct bpf_program *prog; +char prog_name[SUBTEST_NAME_MAX_LEN ]; +int klog_fd; +}; + +static int open_kernel_logs (void ) +{ +int fd; + + fd =open ("/dev/kmsg" ,O_RDONLY |O_NONBLOCK ); + +return fd; +} + +static void skip_kernel_logs (int fd) +{ +lseek (fd,0 ,SEEK_END ); +} + +static int read_kernel_logs (int fd,char *buf,size_t max_len) +{ +size_t total =0 ; +ssize_t n; + + buf[0 ] ='\0' ; +while (1 ) { +char *msg, *eol; +size_t len; + + n =read (fd, record,sizeof (record) -1 ); +if (n ==0 ) +break ; + +if (n <0 ) { +if (errno ==EAGAIN ) +break ; +return n; + } + record[n] ='\0' ; + +/* +* Each kmsg record starts with some metadata, separated +* from the actual content by a semi-colon +*/ + msg =strchr (record,';' ); +if (!msg) +continue ; + msg++; + eol =strchr (msg,'\n' ); +if (eol) + *eol ='\0' ; + + len =strlen (msg); +if (total + len +2 > max_len) +break ; +memcpy (buf + total, msg, len); + total += len; + buf[total++] ='\n' ; + buf[total] ='\0' ; + } + +return total; +} + +static int check_kasan_report_in_kernel_logs (char *buf,struct test_ctx *ctx, +bool is_write,int size, +bool is_oob) +{ +char access_log[READ_CHUNK_SIZE ]; +const char *pattern; +char *kasan_report_start; +int nsize; + + pattern = is_oob ?KASAN_PATTERN_SLAB_OOB :KASAN_PATTERN_SLAB_UAF ; + nsize =snprintf (access_log,READ_CHUNK_SIZE , pattern, + ctx->prog_tag[0 ], ctx->prog_tag[1 ], ctx->prog_tag[2 ], + ctx->prog_tag[3 ], ctx->prog_tag[4 ], ctx->prog_tag[5 ], + ctx->prog_tag[6 ], ctx->prog_tag[7 ], ctx->prog_name); +if (!ASSERT_GE (nsize,0 ,"format kasan access header line" )) +return nsize; +/* +* Searched kasan report is valid if +* - it contains the expected kasan pattern +* - the description of the faulty access is found somewhere +* after the header (not necessarily on the very next line, +* because other kernel messages may interleave) +* - faulty access properties match the tested type and size +*/ + kasan_report_start =strstr (buf, access_log); + +if (!kasan_report_start) +return 1 ; + + nsize =snprintf (access_log,READ_CHUNK_SIZE ,KASAN_PATTERN_REPORT , + is_write ?"Write" :"Read" , size); +if (!ASSERT_GE (nsize,0 ,"format kasan access report line" )) +return nsize; + +if (!strstr (kasan_report_start, access_log)) +return 1 ; + +return 0 ; +} + +static void exec_subtest (struct test_ctx *ctx,struct test_spec *test, +int access_size,bool on_stack) +{ +LIBBPF_OPTS (bpf_test_run_opts, topts); +struct bpf_prog_info info; +uint8_t buf[ETH_HLEN ] = {0 }; +int ret, prog_fd; +__u32 info_len; + + ctx->prog =bpf_object__find_program_by_name (ctx->obj, + ctx->prog_name); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (ctx->prog,"find test prog" )) +return ; + + info_len =sizeof (info); +memset (&info,0 , info_len); + prog_fd =bpf_program__fd (ctx->prog); +if (!ASSERT_OK_FD (prog_fd,"get prog fd" )) +return ; + ret =bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd (prog_fd, &info, &info_len); +if (!ASSERT_OK (ret,"fetch loaded program info" )) +return ; +memcpy (ctx->prog_tag, info.tag,BPF_TAG_SIZE ); + +skip_kernel_logs (ctx->klog_fd); + + topts.sz =sizeof (struct bpf_test_run_opts ); + topts.data_size_in =ETH_HLEN ; + topts.data_in = buf; +if (ctx->access_size) + *ctx->access_size = access_size; + ret =bpf_prog_test_run_opts (bpf_program__fd (ctx->prog), + &topts); +if (!ASSERT_OK (ret,"run prog" )) +return ; + + ret =read_kernel_logs (ctx->klog_fd, klog_buffer,MAX_LOG_SIZE ); +if (!ASSERT_GE (ret,0 ,"read kernel logs" )) +return ; + + ret =check_kasan_report_in_kernel_logs (klog_buffer, ctx, + test->is_write, access_size, + test->is_oob); +if (on_stack || test->expect_no_report) +ASSERT_NEQ (ret,0 ,"no report should be generated" ); +else +ASSERT_OK (ret,"report should be generated" ); +} + +static void run_subtest_with_size_and_location (struct test_ctx *ctx, +struct test_spec *test, +int access_size, +bool on_stack) +{ +char subtest_name[SUBTEST_NAME_MAX_LEN ]; + +if (test->skip_multi_size_testing) { +snprintf (subtest_name,SUBTEST_NAME_MAX_LEN ,"%s%s" , + test->prog_type, + test->skip_on_stack_testing ?"" : + on_stack ?"_on_stack" : +"_not_on_stack" ); + }else { +snprintf (subtest_name,SUBTEST_NAME_MAX_LEN ,"%s_%d_%s" , + test->prog_type, access_size, + on_stack ?"on_stack" :"not_on_stack" ); + } + +snprintf (ctx->prog_name,PROG_NAME_MAX_LEN ,"%s%s" , test->prog_type, + test->skip_on_stack_testing ?"" : + on_stack ?"_on_stack" : +"_not_on_stack" ); + +if (!test__start_subtest (subtest_name)) +return ; + +if (test->needs_load_acq_store_rel && ctx->skip_load_acq_store_rel) { +test__skip (); +return ; + } + +exec_subtest (ctx, test, access_size, on_stack); +} + +static void run_subtest_with_size (struct test_ctx *ctx,struct test_spec *test, +int size) +{ +run_subtest_with_size_and_location (ctx, test, size, false); +if (!test->skip_on_stack_testing) +run_subtest_with_size_and_location (ctx, test, size, true); +} + +static void run_subtest (struct test_ctx *ctx,struct test_spec *test) +{ +if (test->skip_multi_size_testing) { +run_subtest_with_size (ctx, test, test->run_size); +return ; + } + +if (!test->only_32_or_64) { +run_subtest_with_size (ctx, test,1 ); +run_subtest_with_size (ctx, test,2 ); + } +run_subtest_with_size (ctx, test,4 ); +run_subtest_with_size (ctx, test,8 ); +} + +static void run_blinding_subtest (void ) +{ +struct test_spec blinding_spec = { + .prog_type ="st_blinded" , + .is_write = true, + }; +char bpf_jit_harden ='2' ; +struct kasan_harden *skel; +struct test_ctx *ctx; + +if (!test__start_subtest ("st_blinded" )) +return ; + + ctx =calloc (1 ,sizeof (*ctx)); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (ctx,"alloc blinding ctx" )) +return ; + ctx->klog_fd =-1 ; + +if (set_bpf_jit_harden (&bpf_jit_harden)) + goto free_ctx; + + skel =kasan_harden__open_and_load (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"open and load blinded prog" )) + goto restore; + + ctx->klog_fd =open_kernel_logs (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_FD (ctx->klog_fd,"open kernel logs" )) + goto destroy; + + ctx->obj = skel->obj; +strncpy (ctx->prog_name,"st_blinded" ,PROG_NAME_MAX_LEN ); + +exec_subtest (ctx, &blinding_spec,1 , false); + +destroy: +close (ctx->klog_fd); +kasan_harden__destroy (skel); +restore: +set_bpf_jit_harden (&bpf_jit_harden); +free_ctx: +free (ctx); +} + +static struct test_spec tests[] = { + { + .prog_type ="st" , + .is_write = true + }, + { + .prog_type ="stx" , + .is_write = true + }, + { + .prog_type ="ldx" , + .is_write = false + }, + { + .prog_type ="simple_atomic" , + .is_write = true, + .only_32_or_64 = true + }, + { + .prog_type ="simple_atomic_fetch" , + .is_write = true, + .skip_multi_size_testing = true, + .run_size =8 , + }, + { + .prog_type ="load_acquire" , + .is_write = false, + .needs_load_acq_store_rel = true + }, + { + .prog_type ="store_release" , + .is_write = true, + .needs_load_acq_store_rel = true + }, + { + .prog_type ="ldx_patched" , + .is_write = false, + .skip_multi_size_testing = true, + .run_size =4 , + .rnd_hi32 = true + }, + { + .prog_type ="verifier_paths_stack_and_non_stack" , + .is_write = true, + .skip_multi_size_testing = true, + .skip_on_stack_testing = true, + .run_size =1 + }, + { + .prog_type ="ldx_oob" , + .is_write = false, + .skip_on_stack_testing = true, + .is_oob = true + }, +}; + +void test_kasan (void ) +{ +struct kasan_write_val val; +struct test_spec *test; +struct test_ctx *ctx; +struct kasan *skel; +__u32 key =0 ; +int i, ret; + + ctx =calloc (1 ,sizeof (struct test_ctx )); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (ctx,"alloc test ctx" )) +return ; + +if (!is_jit_enabled () || !get_kasan_jit_enabled () || + !get_kasan_multi_shot_enabled ()) { +test__skip (); + goto end; + } + + skel =kasan__open (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"open prog" )) + goto end; + +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (tests); i++) { +char prog_name[SUBTEST_NAME_MAX_LEN ]; +struct bpf_program *prog; + +if (!tests[i].rnd_hi32) +continue ; + +snprintf (prog_name,SUBTEST_NAME_MAX_LEN ,"%s_%s" , + tests[i].prog_type,"on_stack" ); + prog =bpf_object__find_program_by_name (skel->obj, prog_name); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (prog,"find rnd_hi32 on_stack prog" )) + goto destroy; +bpf_program__set_flags (prog,BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32 ); +snprintf (prog_name,SUBTEST_NAME_MAX_LEN ,"%s_%s" , + tests[i].prog_type,"not_on_stack" ); + prog =bpf_object__find_program_by_name (skel->obj, prog_name); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (prog,"find rnd_hi32 not_on_stack prog" )) + goto destroy; +bpf_program__set_flags (prog,BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32 ); + } + +if (!ASSERT_OK (kasan__load (skel),"load prog" )) + goto destroy; + + ctx->obj = skel->obj; + ctx->access_size = &skel->bss->access_size; + ctx->skip_load_acq_store_rel = skel->data->skip_load_acq_store_rel_tests; + + ctx->klog_fd =open_kernel_logs (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_FD (ctx->klog_fd,"open kernel logs" )) + goto destroy; + +/* Fill map with recognizable values */ + ret =bpf_map__lookup_elem (skel->maps.test_map, &key,sizeof (key), + &val,sizeof (val),0 ); +if (!ASSERT_OK (ret,"get map" )) + goto close; + val.data_1 =0xAA ; + val.data_2 =0xBBBB ; + val.data_4 =0xCCCCCCCC ; + val.data_8 =0xDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD ; + ret =bpf_map__update_elem (skel->maps.test_map, &key,sizeof (key), + &val,sizeof (val),0 ); +if (!ASSERT_OK (ret,"set map" )) + goto close; + +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (tests); i++) { + test = &tests[i]; +run_subtest (ctx, test); + } + +/* +* Blinding subtest is handled differently as it needs the +* corresponding program to be loaded with bpf_jit_harden raised +*/ +run_blinding_subtest (); + +close: +close (ctx->klog_fd); +destroy: +kasan__destroy (skel); +end: +free (ctx); +}
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kasan.c new file +462 -0
462 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kasan_harden.c new file +41 -0
41 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c +55 -0
73 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 9/9] selftests/bpf: add tests to validate KASAN on JIT programs
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] BPF JIT KASAN instrumentation fails to save R10/R11 registers, corrupting BPF register state…
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] BPF JIT KASAN instrumentation fails to save R10/R11 registers, corrupting BPF register state during atomic operations and memory probes.
- [High] BPF JIT emits KASAN checks for BPF_PROBE_MEM instructions, bypassing exception tables and causing log spam/DoS on expected invalid memory accesses. --
--- Patch [9]: [PATCH bpf-next v6 9/9] selftests/bpf: add tests to validate KASAN on JIT programs --- commit cb1fd6ebd1a7c30b4a1e50931fc142f072a09a37
Author: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <[email protected]>
selftests/bpf: add tests to validate KASAN on JIT programs
Add a basic KASAN test runner that loads and test-run programs that can trigger memory management bugs. The test captures kernel logs and ensure that the expected KASAN splat is emitted. The runner covers different cases and settings, including specialized tests for atomic ops.
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +0
-0@@ -1110,6 +1121,92 @@ static void maybe_emit_1mod(u8 **pprog, u32 reg, bool is64)
[ ... ]
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +9
-0+/* Save r8 */ +EMIT2 (0x41 ,0x50 ); +/* Save r9 */ +EMIT2 (0x41 ,0x51 ); +/* +* SystemV ABI states that we should also save r10/r11, but in +* practice those registers are _not_ used by the limited set of +* kasan helpers we are calling here, so that's fine not to save those. +*/
[Severity: High]
Is it safe to skip saving r10 and r11 here?
If the compiler allocates r10 in the KASAN helper, or if a KASAN report is triggered calling kasan_report(), it appears r10 could be clobbered. This could corrupt the BPF register state for operations that rely on BPF_REG_AX (which maps to x86 r10).
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +3
-0+ +/* mov rdi, addr_reg */ +EMIT_mov (BPF_REG_1 , addr_reg);
[ ... ]
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * · line 2591
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +5
-0@@ -2449,6 +2583,11 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int */* populate jmp_offset for JAE above to jump to start_of_ldx */ start_of_ldx = prog; end_of_jmp[-1 ] = start_of_ldx - end_of_jmp; + }else if (!accesses_stack_only) { + err =emit_kasan_check (env, &prog, src_reg, + insn, ip, false); +if (err) +return err; }
[Severity: High]
Does this code emit KASAN checks for BPF_PROBE_MEM and BPF_PROBE_MEMSX instructions?
Tracing programs frequently probe pointers that may be NULL or point to userspace memory using BPF_PROBE_MEM. The verifier emits these instructions to use the BPF exception table, which safely faults without crashing or logging.
If emit_kasan_check() is called here unconditionally, it evaluates the pointer using __asan_load*, which will call kasan_report() on NULL or userspace pointers. Won't this bypass the exception table entirely and print a KASAN BUG report to dmesg for every expected invalid pointer, potentially causing log spam?
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +0
-0if (BPF_MODE (insn->code) ==BPF_PROBE_MEMSX ||BPF_MODE (insn->code) ==BPF_MEMSX )
[ ... ]
Quoted 37 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +12
-10@@ -2510,28 +2649,42 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * } fallthrough;case BPF_STX |BPF_ATOMIC |BPF_W : -case BPF_STX |BPF_ATOMIC |BPF_DW : -if (insn->imm == (BPF_AND |BPF_FETCH ) || - insn->imm == (BPF_OR |BPF_FETCH ) || - insn->imm == (BPF_XOR |BPF_FETCH )) { -bool is64 =BPF_SIZE (insn->code) ==BPF_DW ; -u32 real_src_reg = src_reg; -u32 real_dst_reg = dst_reg; -u8 *branch_target; - +case BPF_STX |BPF_ATOMIC |BPF_DW : { +bool is64 =BPF_SIZE (insn->code) ==BPF_DW ; +u32 real_src_reg = src_reg; +u32 real_dst_reg = dst_reg; +u8 *branch_target; +u8 *pprog; +bool is_atomic_fetch = + (insn->imm == (BPF_AND |BPF_FETCH ) || + insn->imm == (BPF_OR |BPF_FETCH ) || + insn->imm == (BPF_XOR |BPF_FETCH )); +if (is_atomic_fetch) {/* * Can't be implemented with a single x86 insn. * Need to do a CMPXCHG loop. */ /* Will need RAX as a CMPXCHG operand so save R0 */ + pprog = prog;emit_mov_reg (&prog, true,BPF_REG_AX ,BPF_REG_0 );if (src_reg ==BPF_REG_0 ) real_src_reg =BPF_REG_AX ;if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_0 ) real_dst_reg =BPF_REG_AX ; -
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * · line 2684
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +10
-0+ ip += (prog - pprog); + } +if (!bpf_atomic_is_load_store (insn)) { +if (!accesses_stack_only) { + err =emit_kasan_check (env, &prog, + real_dst_reg, + insn, ip, true); +if (err) +return err; + }
[Severity: High]
Could this call to emit_kasan_check() corrupt the BPF register state?
Just above, BPF_REG_0 is saved into BPF_REG_AX, which is mapped to x86 r10. Since emit_kasan_check() explicitly skips saving r10, any clobbering of r10 by the KASAN helpers will silently corrupt the saved value of BPF_REG_0.
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +1
-0branch_target = prog; + }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=9
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v6 9/9] selftests/bpf: add tests to validate KASAN on JIT programs
On Tue Aug 4, 2026 at 8:35 PM CEST, sashiko-bot wrote:
[...]
Quoted 20 lines
Review static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * · line 2591
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +5
-0@@ -2449,6 +2583,11 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * /* populate jmp_offset for JAE above to jump to start_of_ldx */ start_of_ldx = prog; end_of_jmp[-1] = start_of_ldx - end_of_jmp; + } else if (!accesses_stack_only) { + err = emit_kasan_check(env, &prog, src_reg, + insn, ip, false); + if (err) + return err; }[Severity: High]
Does this code emit KASAN checks forBPF_PROBE_MEMandBPF_PROBE_MEMSXinstructions?Tracing programs frequently probe pointers that may be NULL or point to userspace memory using
BPF_PROBE_MEM. The verifier emits these instructions to use the BPF exception table, which safely faults without crashing or logging.
Quoted 5 lines
If
emit_kasan_check()is called here unconditionally, it evaluates the pointer using __asan_load*, which will callkasan_report()on NULL or userspace pointers. Won't this bypass the exception table entirely and print a KASAN BUG report to dmesg for every expected invalid pointer, potentially causing log spam?
Aside from the usual r10/r11 complain: I am confused about why the bot is raising this concern in an answer to the selftests patch, I guess it should have been an answer to patch 4/9.
Anyway, no, this is not instrumenting BPF_PROBE_MEM/BPF_PROBE_MEMSX insns, and it should not. We are in the else branch of the if actually checking if we are dealing with PROBE_MEM/PROBE_MEMSX.
Alexis
Signature · 3 lines
Alexis Lothoré, Bootlin Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering https://bootlin.com
Quoted 140 lines · Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
Hello,
this is v6 of the series aiming to bring basic support for KASAN checks to BPF JITed programs. This new revision takes a step back on stack accessing insn tracking, as the previous attempt was fragile and error-prone, it brings back a simpler tracking, at the cost of some unecessary checks being inserted. While at it, I took this time a look at how many accesses are being instrumented, and how many of those are "wrongly" instrumented (because they access stack), and I got those rough numbers on the whole selftests set:
- total: 451997 checks inserted
- checks added on stack access (checking reg ==BPF_REG_FP, not precise, but gives a rough idea): 21786So that makes ~5% of "over-instrumented" accesses
Original cover letter:
"Traditional" KASAN allows to spot memory management mistakes by reserving a fraction of memory as "shadow memory" that will map to the rest of the memory and allow its monitoring. Each memory-accessing instruction is then instrumented at build time to call some ASAN check function, that will analyze the corresponding bits in shadow memory, and if it detects the access as invalid, trigger a detailed report. The goal of this series is to replicate this mechanism for BPF programs when they are being JITed into native instructions: that's then the JIT compiler that is in charge of inserting calls to the corresponding kasan checks, when a program is being loaded into the kernel. This task involves:
- identifying at program load time the instructions performing memory accesses
- identifying those accesses properties (size ? read or write ?) to define the relevant kasan check function to call
- just before the identified instructions:
- perform the basic context saving (ie: saving registers)
- inserting a call to the relevant kasan check function
- restore context
- whenever the instrumented program executes, if it performs an invalid access, it triggers a kasan report identical to those instrumented on kernel side at build time.The series comes with new selftests programs that generate a wide variety of kasan reports: those need the kernel to be running with
kasan_multi_shotenabled.As discussed in [1], this series is based on some choices and assumptions:
- it focuses onx86_64for now, and so only onKASAN_GENERIC
- not all memory accessing BPF instructions are being instrumented:
- it discards instructions accessing BPF program stack (already monitored by page guards)
- it discards possibly faulting instructions, likeBPF_PROBE_MEMorBPF_PROBE_ATOMICinsns---
Changes in v6:
- dropped instruction original offset tracking
- when patching instructions, track formernon_stack_accessflag by passing original insn toadjust_insn_aux_data
- drop unecessary dep onCONFIG_KASANinKconfig
- fold patch adding theemit_kasan_helperinto the patch actually calling it, to avoid an unused static function warning
- move stack access check out ofemit_kasan_check
- replace hardcoded ip value by a computed value
- add OoB testing
- add fix commit to makecmdline_containsstricter- Link to v5: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Changes in v5:
- fixed a few instruction offset for generated fixups
- fix insn marking for single insn patches
- enforce more checks in tests
- skip tests ifkasan_multi_shotisn't enabled
- Link to v4: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]Changes in v4:
- fixinsn_offs_in_patchleakage inbpf_convert_ctx_access
- handleBPF_ATOMICinis_mem_insn
- correctly mark fixup instructions if a single insn is generated
- clarify new kconfig (Andrey) and dropVMAP_STACKdep
- refactorBPF_FETCHatomic handling in JIT loop
- make kernel log reading resilient to unrelated, interleaved logs in the selftests
- make new test kfuncs depend onBPF_JIT_KASANrather thanKASAN_GENERIC
- Link to v3: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]Changes in v3:
- Do not insert KASAN instrumentation when dealing with cBPF
- Fix stack-accessing insn tracking for verifier patches, as original instruction location in the generated patch may vary
- drop cBPF support for stack-accessing insn marking
- make sure to flag correctly memory access if different verifier states involve different memory types (eg: stack in one path, non-stack in another path)
- refactorBPF_SThandling in x86 JIT compiler
- improve tests coverage (cover instrumentation for a few patches emitted by the verifier)
- Link to v2: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]Changes in v2:
- declare asan functions as extern in JIT compiler rather than exposing them in kasan header
- invert stack-accessing instructions marking to make sure not to skip instructions that could end up accessing to-be-checked memory
- fix stack accesses marking when verifier patches instructions
- add best effort marking for cBPF
- add missing call depth accounting in jited instrumentation
- skip unused registers in kasan instrumentation save/restore
- remove faulty stack align in kasan instrumentation
- drop commit skipping some jit-related tests
- cover missing instructions:BPF_STand atomics
- completely rework tests: directly tune shadow memory, increase coverage, do not consume kernel logs
- Link to v1: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]To: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
To: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
To: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
To: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
To: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
To: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]>
To: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]>
To: Song Liu <[email protected]>
To: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
To: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
To: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
To: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
To: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
To: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
To: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
To: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Bastien Curutchet <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Quoted 12 lines
---
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) (9):
bpf: mark instructions accessing program stack
bpf: addBPF_JIT_KASANfor KASAN instrumentation of JITed programs bpf, x86: refactorBPF_STmanagement indo_jit
bpf, x86: emit KASAN checks in x86 JITed programs
bpf, x86: enable KASAN for JITed programs on x86 selftests/bpf: makecmdline_containsstricter selftests/bpf: add helpers for KASAN in JIT testing selftests/bpf: movebpf_jit_hardenhelper intotesting_helpersselftests/bpf: add tests to validate KASAN on JIT programs
Alexis, please resend your patch set rebased on the latest bpf-next, it has a merge conflict. Hopefully we'll get around to reviewing this after the resend, thanks!
pw-bot: cr
Quoted 24 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 283 ++++++++++--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 2 + kernel/bpf/Kconfig | 17 + kernel/bpf/fixups.c | 45 +- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 9 + .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_insn_array.c | 44 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kasan.c | 454 ++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kasan.c | 462 +++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kasan_harden.c | 41 ++ .../testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c | 55 +++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.c | 32 ++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.h | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c | 21 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.h | 2 + 15 files changed, 1369 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-)---
base-commit:5fb2b9636c7043f415a12e3336f2bf6983c9e93a
change-id: 20260126-kasan-fcd68f64cd7bBest regards,
--
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <[email protected]>
Hi Andrii,
Quoted 2 lines · Andrii Nakryiko
On Tue, Aug 4, 2026 at 10:45 AM Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <[email protected]> wrote:
[...]
Quoted 5 lines
Alexis, please resend your patch set rebased on the latest bpf-next, it has a merge conflict. Hopefully we'll get around to reviewing this after the resend, thanks!
pw-bot: cr
Sure, on it.
Alexis
Signature · 3 lines
Alexis Lothoré, Bootlin Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering https://bootlin.com