vpci: allow unaligned accesses by the hardware domain
v2 cover vpci: allow unaligned accesses by the hardware domain
Hello,
Mostly the same as v1, plus an additional patch that refuses accesses that cross a device boundary in pci_mmcfg_{read,write}() itself.
Thanks, Roger.
Roger Pau Monne (2):
x86/pci: prevent cross-device accesses in pci_mmcfg_{read,write}() xen/vpci: allow unaligned accesses by the hardware domain
tools/include/xen-tools/common-macros.h | 2 ++ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c | 6 ++++-- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/pci.c | 8 ++++---- xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c | 6 ++++-- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v2 1/2 x86/pci: prevent cross-device accesses in pci_mmcfg_{read,write}()
Introduce a specific check that prevents an accesses from spilling across two devices.
---
Changes since v1:
- New in this version.
--- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c +4 -2
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ int pci_mmcfg_read(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus,char __iomem *addr;/* Why do we have this when nobody checks it. How about a BUG()!? -AK */ -if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || (reg >4095 ))) { +if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || + (reg + len >PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE ))) { err: *value =-1 ;return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -91,7 +92,8 @@ int pci_mmcfg_write(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus,char __iomem *addr;/* Why do we have this when nobody checks it. How about a BUG()!? -AK */ -if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || (reg >4095 ))) +if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || + (reg + len >PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE )))return -EINVAL ; addr =pci_dev_base (seg, bus, devfn);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/pci: prevent cross-device accesses in pci_mmcfg_{read,write}()
Quoted 4 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Introduce a specific check that prevents an accesses from spilling across two devices.
Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
albeit with a remark:
Quoted 13 lines
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c +2
-1@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ int pci_mmcfg_read(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus,char __iomem *addr;/* Why do we have this when nobody checks it. How about a BUG()!? -AK */ -if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || (reg >4095 ))) { +if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || + (reg + len >PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE ))) { err: *value =-1 ;return -EINVAL ; }
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c int pci_mmcfg_write(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus, · line 99
Quoted 9 lines
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c +2
-1@@ -91,7 +92,8 @@ int pci_mmcfg_write(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus,char __iomem *addr;/* Why do we have this when nobody checks it. How about a BUG()!? -AK */ -if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || (reg >4095 ))) +if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || + (reg + len >PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE )))return -EINVAL ; addr =pci_dev_base (seg, bus, devfn);
In both cases the unlikely() uses won't have the intended effect, from all I know. They would help as used here only if the compiler managed to fold all three parts of the ||-expression into a single conditional branch, which I don't think it would end up doing.
Jan
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/pci: prevent cross-device accesses in pci_mmcfg_{read,write}()
Quoted 30 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Introduce a specific check that prevents an accesses from spilling across two devices.
Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>albeit with a remark:
Quoted 21 lines
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c +4
-2@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ int pci_mmcfg_read(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus,char __iomem *addr;/* Why do we have this when nobody checks it. How about a BUG()!? -AK */ -if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || (reg >4095 ))) { +if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || + (reg + len >PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE ))) { err: *value =-1 ;return -EINVAL ; }@@ -91,7 +92,8 @@ int pci_mmcfg_write(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus,char __iomem *addr;/* Why do we have this when nobody checks it. How about a BUG()!? -AK */ -if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || (reg >4095 ))) +if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || + (reg + len >PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE )))return -EINVAL ;
Quoted 6 lines
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c int pci_mmcfg_write(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus, · line 99
Quoted 1 line
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c +0
-0addr =pci_dev_base (seg, bus, devfn);In both cases the
unlikely()uses won't have the intended effect, from all I know. They would help as used here only if the compiler managed to fold all three parts of the ||-expression into a single conditional branch, which I don't think it would end up doing.
I don't mind dropping the unlikely() while changing the line. I tend to leave those alone if present, even when I'm not sure they are actually helpful. The comment ahead of the check is also not very useful IMO, but I've decided to leave it alone.
Thanks, Roger.
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/pci: prevent cross-device accesses in pci_mmcfg_{read,write}()
Quoted 38 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 30 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Introduce a specific check that prevents an accesses from spilling across two devices.
Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>albeit with a remark:
Quoted 21 lines
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c +4
-2@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ int pci_mmcfg_read(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus,char __iomem *addr;/* Why do we have this when nobody checks it. How about a BUG()!? -AK */ -if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || (reg >4095 ))) { +if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || + (reg + len >PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE ))) { err: *value =-1 ;return -EINVAL ; }@@ -91,7 +92,8 @@ int pci_mmcfg_write(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus,char __iomem *addr;/* Why do we have this when nobody checks it. How about a BUG()!? -AK */ -if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || (reg >4095 ))) +if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || + (reg + len >PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE )))return -EINVAL ;Quoted 6 lines
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c int pci_mmcfg_write(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus, · line 99
Quoted 1 line
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c +0
-0addr =pci_dev_base (seg, bus, devfn);In both cases the
unlikely()uses won't have the intended effect, from all I know. They would help as used here only if the compiler managed to fold all three parts of the ||-expression into a single conditional branch, which I don't think it would end up doing.
Quoted 3 lines
I don't mind dropping the
unlikely()while changing the line. I tend to leave those alone if present, even when I'm not sure they are actually helpful.
I think unlikely() is actually reasonable to have here, yet it would need to be four of them, not just one. Unless reachable from a DomU-accessible path, converting to BUG_ON() (or ASSERT_UNREACHABLE()) instead would also be an option.
Quoted 2 lines
The comment ahead of the check is also not very
useful IMO, but I've decided to leave it alone.
Indeed, that's an odd thing to survive over 20 years (I think).
Jan
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/pci: prevent cross-device accesses in pci_mmcfg_{read,write}()
Quoted 39 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 38 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 36 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Introduce a specific check that prevents an accesses from spilling across two devices.
Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>albeit with a remark:
Quoted 13 lines
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c +2
-1@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ int pci_mmcfg_read(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus,char __iomem *addr;/* Why do we have this when nobody checks it. How about a BUG()!? -AK */ -if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || (reg >4095 ))) { +if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || + (reg + len >PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE ))) { err: *value =-1 ;return -EINVAL ; }xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c int pci_mmcfg_write(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus, · line 99
Quoted 9 lines
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig_64.c +2
-1@@ -91,7 +92,8 @@ int pci_mmcfg_write(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus,char __iomem *addr;/* Why do we have this when nobody checks it. How about a BUG()!? -AK */ -if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || (reg >4095 ))) +if (unlikely ((bus >255 ) || (devfn >255 ) || + (reg + len >PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE )))return -EINVAL ; addr =pci_dev_base (seg, bus, devfn);In both cases the
unlikely()uses won't have the intended effect, from all I know. They would help as used here only if the compiler managed to fold all three parts of the ||-expression into a single conditional branch, which I don't think it would end up doing.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I don't mind dropping the
unlikely()while changing the line. I tend to leave those alone if present, even when I'm not sure they are actually helpful.I think
unlikely()is actually reasonable to have here, yet it would need to be four of them, not just one. Unless reachable from a DomU-accessible path, converting toBUG_ON()(orASSERT_UNREACHABLE()) instead would also be an option.
Hm, let's do that in a separate patch, I don't want to merge it with the work here.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The comment ahead of the check is also not very
useful IMO, but I've decided to leave it alone.Indeed, that's an odd thing to survive over 20 years (I think).
I can also take care of the comment there.
Thanks, Roger.
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/pci: prevent cross-device accesses in pci_mmcfg_{read,write}()
In reply to Roger Pau MonneQuoted 4 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Introduce a specific check that prevents an accesses from spilling across two devices.
Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
PATCH v2 2/2 xen/vpci: allow unaligned accesses by the hardware domain
In reply to Roger Pau MonneIt's possible for domains to generate unaligned PCI config space accesses when using ECAM, and hence vPCI should support those at least for the hardware domain. Such unaligned accesses to the PCI config space have been reported to come from ACPI logic.
Relax the checking in vpci_access_allowed() to allow such accesses for the hardware domain, and fix the handling in pci_conf_{read,write}{16,32}() to fulfill them using MMCFG.
MMCFG regions are identity exposed to the hardware domain, and hence such unaligned accesses can only come as a result of the host having MMCFG in the first place, as otherwise MMCFG won't be exposed to the hardware domain either.
Note that vpci_ecam_{read,write}() already refuse accesses that cross a device boundary unconditionally.
--- tools/include/xen-tools/common-macros.h | 2 ++ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/pci.c | 8 ++++---- xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c | 6 ++++-- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
tools/include/xen-tools/common-macros.h +2 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ })#endif +#define IS_ALIGNED (val, align) (!((val) & ((align) - 1))) +#define ROUNDUP (x, a) (((x) + (a) - 1) & ~((a) - 1))#define ROUNDDOWN (x, a) ((x) & ~((a) - 1))
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/pci.c +4 -4
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ uint8_t pci_conf_read8(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg)uint16_t pci_conf_read16 (pci_sbdf_t sbdf,unsigned int reg) { -if ( sbdf.seg || reg >255 ) +if ( sbdf.seg || reg >255 || !IS_ALIGNED (reg,2 ) ) {uint32_t value;
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ uint16_t pci_conf_read16(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg)uint32_t pci_conf_read32 (pci_sbdf_t sbdf,unsigned int reg) { -if ( sbdf.seg || reg >255 ) +if ( sbdf.seg || reg >255 || !IS_ALIGNED (reg,4 ) ) {uint32_t value;
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ void pci_conf_write8(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, uint8_t data)void pci_conf_write16 (pci_sbdf_t sbdf,unsigned int reg,uint16_t data) { -if ( sbdf.seg || reg >255 ) +if ( sbdf.seg || reg >255 || !IS_ALIGNED (reg,2 ) )pci_mmcfg_write (sbdf.seg, sbdf.bus, sbdf.devfn, reg,2 , data);else pci_conf_write (PCI_CONF_ADDRESS (sbdf, reg), reg &2 ,2 , data);
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void pci_conf_write16(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, uint16_t data)void pci_conf_write32 (pci_sbdf_t sbdf,unsigned int reg,uint32_t data) { -if ( sbdf.seg || reg >255 ) +if ( sbdf.seg || reg >255 || !IS_ALIGNED (reg,4 ) )pci_mmcfg_write (sbdf.seg, sbdf.bus, sbdf.devfn, reg,4 , data);else pci_conf_write (PCI_CONF_ADDRESS (sbdf, reg),0 ,4 , data);
xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c +4 -2
@@ -685,6 +685,8 @@ void vpci_write(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned int size,/* Helper function to check an access size and alignment on vpci space. */ bool vpci_access_allowed (unsigned int reg,unsigned int len) { +const struct domain *currd = current->domain; +/* Check access size. */ if ( len !=1 && len !=2 && len !=4 && len !=8 )return false;
@@ -695,8 +697,8 @@ bool vpci_access_allowed(unsigned int reg, unsigned int len)return false;#endif -/* Check that access is size aligned. */ -if ( (reg & (len -1 )) ) +/* Refuse unaligned accesses for non-hardware domains. */ +if ( !is_hardware_domain (currd) && !IS_ALIGNED (reg, len) )return false;return true;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] xen/vpci: allow unaligned accesses by the hardware domain
Quoted 14 lines · Roger Pau Monne
It's possible for domains to generate unaligned PCI config space accesses when using ECAM, and hence vPCI should support those at least for the hardware domain. Such unaligned accesses to the PCI config space have been reported to come from ACPI logic.
Relax the checking in
vpci_access_allowed()to allow such accesses for the hardware domain, and fix the handling in pci_conf_{read,write}{16,32}() to fulfill them using MMCFG.MMCFG regions are identity exposed to the hardware domain, and hence such unaligned accesses can only come as a result of the host having MMCFG in the first place, as otherwise MMCFG won't be exposed to the hardware domain either.
Quoted 5 lines
Note that vpci_ecam_{read,write}() already refuse accesses that cross a device boundary unconditionally.
Reported-by Jason Andryuk <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
Albeit without the intent to override possible remaining objections by Andrew.
Jan
Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] xen/vpci: allow unaligned accesses by the hardware domain
In reply to Roger Pau MonneQuoted 14 lines · Roger Pau Monne
It's possible for domains to generate unaligned PCI config space accesses when using ECAM, and hence vPCI should support those at least for the hardware domain. Such unaligned accesses to the PCI config space have been reported to come from ACPI logic.
Relax the checking in
vpci_access_allowed()to allow such accesses for the hardware domain, and fix the handling in pci_conf_{read,write}{16,32}() to fulfill them using MMCFG.MMCFG regions are identity exposed to the hardware domain, and hence such unaligned accesses can only come as a result of the host having MMCFG in the first place, as otherwise MMCFG won't be exposed to the hardware domain either.
Quoted 5 lines
Note that vpci_ecam_{read,write}() already refuse accesses that cross a device boundary unconditionally.
Reported-by Jason Andryuk <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>