fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_cursor()
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_cursor()
bit_cursor() fetches the glyph under the cursor with
c = scr_readw(vc_pos); src = vc_font.data + ((c & charmask) * w * height);
where charmask is 0x1ff when vc_hi_font_mask is set. The screen buffer value comes directly from scr_readw() and may be larger than the current font's glyph count.
Syzkaller triggers this via vcs_write(). The Call Trace shows vcs_write() in vc_screen.c writing an arbitrary 16-bit value with writev() to /dev/vcsa, which vcs_write_buf() in vc_screen.c stores via vcs_scr_writew() without checking charcount. The stored value is later read in bit_cursor() in bitblit.c.
When the font is changed from a font with 512 glyphs to a font with 256 glyphs, the screen buffer can retain characters with the high bit set from the previous mode, which could also produce the same out-of-bounds access.
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70 Read of size 16 at addr ffff800086c57970 Call Trace: soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70 bit_cursor+0xa90/0x1108 drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c:365 fbcon_cursor+0x344/0x498 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:1427 hide_cursor+0xdc/0x2d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:883 update_region+0x100/0x18c drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:669 vcs_write+0x8ec/0xaf0 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:685
bit_putcs_aligned() and bit_putcs_unaligned() already clamp the glyph index to vc_font.charcount. Apply the same clamp in bit_cursor() after extracting the attribute and masking, before indexing fontdata.
The fix completes the bounds checking started in commit 18c4ef4e765a ("fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*"), which missed the cursor path.
This change should be safe because the clamp reuses the existing contract from fbcon: charcount is maintained under console_lock in con_font_set() and fbcon_font_set(), and hi_font_mask is cleared when switching from 512 to 256 glyphs. When stale screen data with high bits remains after a font switch, or when vcs_write() stores an arbitrary value, clamping the index to 0 prevents the out-of-bounds read without changing cursor semantics — the same fallback bit_putcs uses.
--- drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c +7 -2
@@ -273,9 +273,14 @@ static void bit_cursor(struct vc_data *vc, struct fb_info *info, bool enable,if (!vc->vc_font.data)return ; - c =scr_readw ((u16 *) vc->vc_pos); + c =scr_readw ((u16 *) vc->vc_pos); attribute =get_attribute (info, c); - src = vc->vc_font.data + ((c & charmask) * (w * vc->vc_font.height)); + c &= charmask; + +/* Clamp to font size, same as bit_putcs_aligned() */ +if (c >= vc->vc_font.charcount) + c =0 ; + src = vc->vc_font.data + (c * (w * vc->vc_font.height));if (par->cursor_state.image.data != (const char *)src || par->cursor_reset) {
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The bounds checking for glyph indices is missing in software rotation paths (fbcon_ccw.c, fbcon_cw.c, fbcon_ud.c), leaving them vulnerable to out-of-bounds heap reads. --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_cursor() --- commit eb8c6b0049962d4bc836a2579e035e53104adf59
Author: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_cursor()
This commit adds bounds checking for the glyph index in bit_cursor() to prevent out-of-bounds reads when fetching glyphs. It addresses cases where the screen buffer contains values larger than the current font's glyph count, which can happen after a font resize or via malicious writes to /dev/vcsa.
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c +0
-0@@ -273,9 +273,14 @@ static void bit_cursor(struct vc_data *vc, struct fb_info *info, bool enable,if (!vc->vc_font.data)return ;
drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c static void bit_cursor(struct vc_data *vc, struct fb_info *info, bool enable, · line 283
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c +7
-2- c =scr_readw ((u16 *) vc->vc_pos); + c =scr_readw ((u16 *) vc->vc_pos); attribute =get_attribute (info, c); - src = vc->vc_font.data + ((c & charmask) * (w * vc->vc_font.height)); + c &= charmask; + +/* Clamp to font size, same as bit_putcs_aligned() */ +if (c >= vc->vc_font.charcount) + c =0 ; + src = vc->vc_font.data + (c * (w * vc->vc_font.height));
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but while checking the bounds for the glyph index in bitblit.c is a great fix, could similar out-of-bounds reads still occur in the software rotation paths?
Looking at the rotation code (fbcon_ccw.c, fbcon_cw.c, fbcon_ud.c), the bounds checking appears to be missing entirely. For example, in fbcon_ccw.c:
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon_ccw.c:ccw_cursor() {
...
c = scr_readw((u16 *) vc->vc_pos);
attribute = get_attribute(info, c);
src = par->rotated.buf + ((c & charmask) * (w * vc->vc_font.width));
...
}And in the putcs equivalents:
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon_ccw.c:ccw_putcs_aligned() {
...
src = par->rotated.buf + (scr_readw(s--) & charmask) * cellsize;
...
}If a user loads a custom font with fewer than 256 or 512 glyphs (e.g., 100 glyphs), the rotation buffer par->rotated.buf is sized dynamically based on charcount. If they then write an arbitrary 16-bit character index (e.g., 255) to the screen buffer via /dev/vcsa using vcs_write(), these rotated blit functions will mask the index with 0xff or 0x1ff and directly use it to index par->rotated.buf.
Without clamping against vc->vc_font.charcount, wouldn't this result in reading past the end of the heap-allocated rotation buffer?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260807221956.4e9dde5c@fangorn?part=1
Helge Deller
maintainerQuoted 54 lines · Rik van Riel
bit_cursor()fetches the glyph under the cursor withc = scr_readw(vc_pos); src = vc_font.data + ((c & charmask) * w * height);where charmask is
0x1ffwhenvc_hi_font_maskis set. The screen buffer value comes directly fromscr_readw()and may be larger than the current font's glyph count.Syzkaller triggers this via
vcs_write(). The Call Trace showsvcs_write()invc_screen.cwriting an arbitrary 16-bit value withwritev()to/dev/vcsa, whichvcs_write_buf()invc_screen.cstores viavcs_scr_writew()without checking charcount. The stored value is later read inbit_cursor()inbitblit.c.When the font is changed from a font with 512 glyphs to a font with 256 glyphs, the screen buffer can retain characters with the high bit set from the previous mode, which could also produce the same out-of-bounds access.
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70 Read of size 16 at addr ffff800086c57970 Call Trace: soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70 bit_cursor+0xa90/0x1108 drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c:365 fbcon_cursor+0x344/0x498 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:1427 hide_cursor+0xdc/0x2d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:883 update_region+0x100/0x18c drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:669 vcs_write+0x8ec/0xaf0 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:685
bit_putcs_aligned()andbit_putcs_unaligned()already clamp the glyph index to vc_font.charcount. Apply the same clamp inbit_cursor()after extracting the attribute and masking, before indexing fontdata.The fix completes the bounds checking started in commit
18c4ef4e765a("fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*"), which missed the cursor path.This change should be safe because the clamp reuses the existing contract from fbcon: charcount is maintained under
console_lockincon_font_set()andfbcon_font_set(), andhi_font_maskis cleared when switching from 512 to 256 glyphs. When stale screen data with high bits remains after a font switch, or whenvcs_write()stores an arbitrary value, clamping the index to 0 prevents the out-of-bounds read without changing cursor semantics — the same fallbackbit_putcsuses.Reported-by [email protected]Fixes 18c4ef4e765a ("fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*")Assisted-by Hermes:muse-spark-1.2 syzkallerSigned-off-by Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Quoted 3 lines
--- drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Patch applied to fbdev git tree.
Thanks!
Helge