vduse: reject non-coherent iotlb entries in the coherent fault path
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 vduse: reject non-coherent iotlb entries in the coherent fault path
vduse_domain_get_coherent_page() turns an iotlb entry into a struct page with pfn_to_page((map->addr + iova - map->start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) and takes a reference on it, with no check that map->addr is a physical address.
That assumption only holds for entries created by the domain's own coherent allocator (vduse_domain_alloc_coherent(), which stores virt_to_phys()). VDUSE registers its vdpa device with use_va=true, so for a use_va device vhost_vdpa_va_map() passes a userspace virtual address as the map address, and vduse_domain_set_map() copies those entries verbatim into the same domain->iotlb. Both kinds of entry share one tree, and the mmap fault handler only splits them by iova < bounce_size, so a use_va entry placed above bounce_size lands in the coherent path.
A userspace daemon can exploit this: bind the device to virtio_vdpa so the coherent allocator mints an entry whose backing file is the domain's anon inode, obtain the domain fd with VDUSE_IOTLB_GET_FD2, rebind to vhost_vdpa without deleting the vdpa device (vdpa_dev_del() only calls _vdpa_unregister_device(), so the domain and the fd survive), install a VHOST_IOTLB_UPDATE over the same iova with an arbitrary uaddr, then fault the domain mapping. The kernel computes pfn = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT from the userspace value and hands the daemon a struct page for a pfn of its choosing -- an out-of-bounds vmemmap access for a wild value:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea8000000008 RIP: vduse_domain_mmap_fault+0x100/0x330
or, for a value that resolves to a valid pfn, a read/write window onto an arbitrary physical page (confirmed: a write through the domain mapping lands on a page selected purely by the fabricated pfn).
Coherent entries are always registered with domain->file as their backing file, while entries installed through a vhost IOTLB message carry the mapped vma's file (vhost_vdpa_va_map() stores get_file(vma->vm_file)). Reject any entry whose file is not domain->file before calling pfn_to_page(); the fault then returns VM_FAULT_SIGBUS. Legitimate coherent mappings are unaffected.
--- drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/iova_domain.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/iova_domain.c +12 -0
@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ vduse_domain_get_coherent_page(struct vduse_iova_domain *domain, u64 iova)u64 start = iova &PAGE_MASK ;u64 last = start +PAGE_SIZE -1 ;struct vhost_iotlb_map *map; +struct vdpa_map_file *map_file;struct page *page =NULL ;spin_lock (&domain->iotlb_lock);
@@ -228,6 +229,17 @@ vduse_domain_get_coherent_page(struct vduse_iova_domain *domain, u64 iova)if (!map) goto out; +/* +* Only coherent allocations made by this domain are backed by a real +* struct page here: their map->addr is a physical address and their +* backing file is the domain's own anon inode. Entries installed via a +* vhost IOTLB message on a use_va device instead carry a userspace +* virtual address in map->addr, and must never be fed to pfn_to_page(). +*/ + map_file = (struct vdpa_map_file *)map->opaque; +if (map_file->file != domain->file) + goto out; + page =pfn_to_page ((map->addr + iova - map->start) >>PAGE_SHIFT );get_page (page); out:
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] This problem wasn't introduced by this patch, but the patch fails to completely mitigate the pre-existing arbitrary physical memory read/write vulnerability because an attacker can map the VDUSE domain file descriptor and use it to trivially bypass the new backing file check. --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] vduse: reject non-coherent iotlb entries in the coherent fault path --- commit f4c50be37a9ca120f63ebae4dfab39a075d198c4
Author: Yu Zhang <[email protected]>
vduse: reject non-coherent iotlb entries in the coherent fault path
This commit attempts to fix a vulnerability where non-coherent IOTLB entries are treated as physical addresses in the coherent fault path. It introduces a check to ensure the backing file of the IOTLB entry matches the domain's file, assuming only valid coherent mappings use this file.
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/iova_domain.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/iova_domain.c +0
-0@@ -234,6 +235,17 @@ vduse_domain_get_coherent_page(struct vduse_iova_domain *domain, u64 iova)if (!map) goto out;
drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/iova_domain.c vduse_domain_get_coherent_page(struct vduse_iova_domain *domain, u64 iova) · line 247
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/iova_domain.c +10
-0+/* +* Only coherent allocations made by this domain are backed by a real +* struct page here: their map->addr is a physical address and their +* backing file is the domain's own anon inode. Entries installed via a +* vhost IOTLB message on a use_va device instead carry a userspace +* virtual address in map->addr, and must never be fed to pfn_to_page(). +*/ + map_file = (struct vdpa_map_file *)map->opaque; +if (map_file->file != domain->file) + goto out;
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this check completely mitigate the vulnerability?
An attacker can obtain the domain->file descriptor via the VDUSE_IOTLB_GET_FD2 ioctl and mmap() it into their address space. If they use this new virtual address in a VHOST_IOTLB_UPDATE message, vhost_vdpa_va_map() will assign this same domain->file to the mapping's vm_file.
When the attacker triggers a page fault on this IOVA in vduse_domain_get_coherent_page(), map_file->file will match domain->file, successfully passing this check. The kernel will then pass the attacker's arbitrary virtual address to pfn_to_page(), allowing them to regain arbitrary physical memory read/write access.
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/iova_domain.c +1
-0+ page =pfn_to_page ((map->addr + iova - map->start) >>PAGE_SHIFT );get_page (page); out:
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1