package/busybox: re-introduce IGNORE_CVES for CVE-2023-42366
PATCH RESEND 1/5 package/busybox: re-introduce IGNORE_CVES for CVE-2023-42366
The patch 0008-awk.c-fix-CVE-2023-42366-bug-15874.patch was introduced in [1]. The IGNORE_CVES entry was removed while the patch is still present in [2].
Re-introduce this IGNORE_CVES entry.
[1] 75c594d446 package/busybox: fix pending CVEs
[2] f88537c46b package/busybox: drop stale IGNORE_CVES entries
--- package/busybox/busybox.mk | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
package/busybox/busybox.mk +4 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ BUSYBOX_CPE_ID_VENDOR = busybox # 0004-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2022-28391 +# This is not stale just wrong NVD entry. +# 0008-awk.c-fix-CVE-2023-42366-bug-15874.patch +BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2023-42366 + # 0012-archival-libarchive-sanitize-filenames-on-output.patch # 0013-testsuite-tar-tests-fix-test-after-cve-2025-46394.patch BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2025-46394
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2.55.0 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
PATCH RESEND 2/5 package/busybox: patch CVE-2024-58251
Based on the work of the Debian community, this patch fixes the following vulnerability:
- CVE-2024-58251:
In netstat in BusyBox through 1.37.0, local users can launch of network application with an argv[0] containing an ANSI terminal escape sequence, leading to a denial of service (terminal locked up) when netstat is used by a victim.
For more information, see:
- https://salsa.debian.org/installer-team/busybox/-/blob/master/debian/patches/netstat-sanitize-argv0-for-p-CVE-2024-58251.patch
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-58251
--- ...-sanitize-argv0-for-p-CVE-2024-58251.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++ package/busybox/busybox.mk | 3 ++ 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/busybox/0015-netstat-sanitize-argv0-for-p-CVE-2024-58251.patch
package/busybox/0015-netstat-sanitize-argv0-for-p-CVE-2024-58251.patch new file +50 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From: Valery Ushakov <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 12:31:53 +0000 +Subject: netstat: CVE-2024-58251 - sanitize argv0 for -p +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1104009 + +Signed-off-by: Valery Ushakov <[email protected]> +Upstream: https://salsa.debian.org/installer-team/busybox/-/blob/master/debian/patches/netstat-sanitize-argv0-for-p-CVE-2024-58251.patch +CVE: CVE-2024-58251 +Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <[email protected]> +--- + networking/netstat.c | 7 ++++++- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/networking/netstat.c b/networking/netstat.c +index 807800a62..d979f6079 100644 +--- a/networking/netstat.c ++++ b/networking/netstat.c +@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ + + #include "libbb.h" + #include "inet_common.h" ++#include "unicode.h" + + //usage:#define netstat_trivial_usage + //usage: "[-"IF_ROUTE("r")"al] [-tuwx] [-en"IF_FEATURE_NETSTAT_WIDE("W")IF_FEATURE_NETSTAT_PRG("p")"]" +@@ -314,9 +315,12 @@ static int FAST_FUNC dir_act(struct recursive_state *state, + return FALSE; + cmdline_buf[n] = '\0'; + ++ /* don't write process-controlled argv[0] to the user's terminal as-is */ ++ const char *argv0base = printable_string(bb_basename(cmdline_buf)); ++ + /* go through all files in /proc/PID/fd and check whether they are sockets */ + strcpy(proc_pid_fname + len - (sizeof("cmdline")-1), "fd"); +- pid_slash_progname = concat_path_file(pid, bb_basename(cmdline_buf)); /* "PID/argv0" */ ++ pid_slash_progname = concat_path_file(pid, argv0base); /* "PID/argv0" */ + n = recursive_action(proc_pid_fname, + ACTION_RECURSE | ACTION_QUIET, + add_to_prg_cache_if_socket, +@@ -686,6 +690,7 @@ int netstat_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) + unsigned opt; + + INIT_G(); ++ init_unicode(); + + /* Option string must match NETSTAT_xxx constants */ + opt = getopt32(argv, NETSTAT_OPTS); +-- +2.34.1 +
package/busybox/busybox.mk +3 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2022-28391 # 0008-awk.c-fix-CVE-2023-42366-bug-15874.patch BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2023-42366 +# 0015-netstat-sanitize-argv0-for-p-CVE-2024-58251.patch +BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2024-58251 + # 0012-archival-libarchive-sanitize-filenames-on-output.patch # 0013-testsuite-tar-tests-fix-test-after-cve-2025-46394.patch BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2025-46394
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2.55.0 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
PATCH RESEND 3/5 package/busybox: patch CVE-2023-39810
In reply to Thomas Perale via buildrootBased on the work of the Debian community, this commit patches the following vulnerability.
- CVE-2023-39810:
An issue in the CPIO command of Busybox v1.33.2 allows attackers to execute a directory traversal.
For more information, see:
- https://salsa.debian.org/installer-team/busybox/-/blob/master/debian/patches/archival-disallow-path-traversals-CVE-2023-39810.patch
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-39810
--- ...allow-path-traversals-CVE-2023-39810.patch | 126 ++++++++++++++++++ package/busybox/busybox.mk | 3 + 2 files changed, 129 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/busybox/0016-archival-disallow-path-traversals-CVE-2023-39810.patch
package/busybox/0016-archival-disallow-path-traversals-CVE-2023-39810.patch new file +126 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +Commit-ID: 9a8796436b9b0641e13480811902ea2ac57881d3 +From: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2024 10:12:05 +0200 +Subject: archival: disallow path traversals (CVE-2023-39810) +Origin: upstream, https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=9a8796436b9b0641e13480811902ea2ac57881d3 +Forwarded: not-needed +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1055307 + +Create new configure option for archival/libarchive based extractions to +disallow path traversals. +As this is a paranoid option and might introduce backward +incompatibility, default it to no. + +Based on the patch by Peter Kaestle <[email protected]> + +function old new delta +data_extract_all 921 945 +24 +strip_unsafe_prefix 101 102 +1 +------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +(add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 2/0 up/down: 25/0) Total: 25 bytes + +Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]> +CVE: CVE-2023-39810 +Upstream: https://salsa.debian.org/installer-team/busybox/-/blob/master/debian/patches/archival-disallow-path-traversals-CVE-2023-39810.patch +Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <[email protected]> +--- + archival/Config.src | 11 +++++++++++ + archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c | 8 ++++++++ + archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c | 6 +++++- + scripts/kconfig/lxdialog/check-lxdialog.sh | 2 +- + testsuite/cpio.tests | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++ + 5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/archival/Config.src b/archival/Config.src +index 6f4f30c43..cbcd7217c 100644 +--- a/archival/Config.src ++++ b/archival/Config.src +@@ -35,4 +35,15 @@ config FEATURE_LZMA_FAST + This option reduces decompression time by about 25% at the cost of + a 1K bigger binary. + ++config FEATURE_PATH_TRAVERSAL_PROTECTION ++ bool "Prevent extraction of filenames with /../ path component" ++ default n ++ help ++ busybox tar and unzip remove "PREFIX/../" (if it exists) ++ from extracted names. ++ This option enables this behavior for all other unpacking applets, ++ such as cpio, ar, rpm. ++ GNU cpio 2.15 has NO such sanity check. ++# try other archivers and document their behavior? ++ + endmenu +diff --git a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c +index 049c2c156..8a69711c1 100644 +--- a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c ++++ b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c +@@ -65,6 +65,14 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle) + } while (--n != 0); + } + #endif ++#if ENABLE_FEATURE_PATH_TRAVERSAL_PROTECTION ++ /* Strip leading "/" and up to last "/../" path component */ ++ dst_name = (char *)strip_unsafe_prefix(dst_name); ++#endif ++// ^^^ This may be a problem if some applets do need to extract absolute names. ++// (Probably will need to invent ARCHIVE_ALLOW_UNSAFE_NAME flag). ++// You might think that rpm needs it, but in my tests rpm's internal cpio ++// archive has names like "./usr/bin/FOO", not "/usr/bin/FOO". + + if (archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_CREATE_LEADING_DIRS) { + char *slash = strrchr(dst_name, '/'); +diff --git a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c +index 33e487bf9..667081195 100644 +--- a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c ++++ b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c +@@ -14,7 +14,11 @@ const char* FAST_FUNC strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) + cp++; + continue; + } +- if (is_prefixed_with(cp, "/../"+1)) { ++ /* We are called lots of times. ++ * is_prefixed_with(cp, "../") is slower than open-coding it, ++ * with minimal code growth (~few bytes). ++ */ ++ if (cp[0] == '.' && cp[1] == '.' && cp[2] == '/') { + cp += 3; + continue; + } +diff --git a/testsuite/cpio.tests b/testsuite/cpio.tests +index 85e746589..a4462c53e 100755 +--- a/testsuite/cpio.tests ++++ b/testsuite/cpio.tests +@@ -154,6 +154,29 @@ testing "cpio -R with extract" \ + " "" "" + SKIP= + ++# Create an archive containing a file with "../dont_write" filename. ++# See that it will not be allowed to unpack. ++# NB: GNU cpio 2.15 DOES NOT do such checks. ++optional FEATURE_PATH_TRAVERSAL_PROTECTION ++rm -rf cpio.testdir ++mkdir -p cpio.testdir/prepare/inner ++echo "file outside of destination was written" > cpio.testdir/prepare/dont_write ++echo "data" > cpio.testdir/prepare/inner/to_extract ++mkdir -p cpio.testdir/extract ++testing "cpio extract file outside of destination" "\ ++(cd cpio.testdir/prepare/inner && $ECHO -e '../dont_write\nto_extract' | cpio -o -H newc) | (cd cpio.testdir/extract && cpio -vi 2>&1) ++echo \$? ++ls cpio.testdir/dont_write 2>&1" \ ++"\ ++cpio: removing leading '../' from member names ++../dont_write ++to_extract ++1 blocks ++0 ++ls: cpio.testdir/dont_write: No such file or directory ++" "" "" ++SKIP= ++ + # Clean up + rm -rf cpio.testdir cpio.testdir2 2>/dev/null + +-- +2.47.2 +
package/busybox/busybox.mk +3 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2022-28391 # 0008-awk.c-fix-CVE-2023-42366-bug-15874.patch BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2023-42366 +# 0016-archival-disallow-path-traversals-CVE-2023-39810.patch +BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2023-39810 + # 0015-netstat-sanitize-argv0-for-p-CVE-2024-58251.patch BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2024-58251
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2.55.0 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
PATCH RESEND 4/5 package/busybox: patch CVE-2026-2615{7, 8}
In reply to Thomas Perale via buildrootBased on the work of the OpenEmbedded community. This commit patches the following vulnerabilities:
- CVE-2026-26157:
A flaw was found in BusyBox. Incomplete path sanitization in its archive extraction utilities allows an attacker to craft malicious archives that when extracted, and under specific conditions, may write to files outside the intended directory. This can lead to arbitrary file overwrite, potentially enabling code execution through the modification of sensitive system files.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-26157
- CVE-2026-26158:
A flaw was found in BusyBox. This vulnerability allows an attacker to modify files outside of the intended extraction directory by crafting a malicious tar archive containing unvalidated hardlink or symlink entries. If the tar archive is extracted with elevated privileges, this flaw can lead to privilege escalation, enabling an attacker to gain unauthorized access to critical system files.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-26158
--- ...tar-strip-unsafe-hardlink-components.patch | 198 ++++++++++++++++++ ...rip-unsafe-components-from-hardlinks.patch | 38 ++++ package/busybox/busybox.mk | 4 + 3 files changed, 240 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/busybox/0017-tar-strip-unsafe-hardlink-components.patch create mode 100644 package/busybox/0018-only-strip-unsafe-components-from-hardlinks.patch
package/busybox/0017-tar-strip-unsafe-hardlink-components.patch new file +198 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +From 3fb6b31c716669e12f75a2accd31bb7685b1a1cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2026 11:48:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] tar: strip unsafe hardlink components - GNU tar does the same + +Defends against files like these (python reproducer): + +import tarfile +ti = tarfile.TarInfo("leak_hosts") +ti.type = tarfile.LNKTYPE +ti.linkname = "/etc/hosts" # or "../etc/hosts" or ".." +ti.size = 0 +with tarfile.open("/tmp/hardlink.tar", "w") as t: + t.addfile(ti) + +function old new delta +skip_unsafe_prefix - 127 +127 +get_header_tar 1752 1754 +2 +.rodata 106861 106856 -5 +unzip_main 2715 2706 -9 +strip_unsafe_prefix 102 18 -84 +(add/remove: 1/0 grow/shrink: 1/3 up/down: 129/-98) Total: 31 bytes + +Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-26157 +CVE: CVE-2026-26158 +Upstream: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=3fb6b31c716669e12f75a2accd31bb7685b1a1cb +Upstream: https://gogs.librecmc.org/OWEALS/busybox/commit/3fb6b31c716669e12f75a2accd31bb7685b1a1cb +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <[email protected]> +--- + archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c | 7 +++-- + archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c | 11 ++++++-- + archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++---- + archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c | 1 + + archival/tar.c | 2 +- + archival/unzip.c | 2 +- + include/bb_archive.h | 3 ++- + 7 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c +index 8a69711..b84b960 100644 +--- a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c ++++ b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c +@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle) + } + #endif + #if ENABLE_FEATURE_PATH_TRAVERSAL_PROTECTION +- /* Strip leading "/" and up to last "/../" path component */ +- dst_name = (char *)strip_unsafe_prefix(dst_name); ++ /* Skip leading "/" and past last ".." path component */ ++ dst_name = (char *)skip_unsafe_prefix(dst_name); + #endif + // ^^^ This may be a problem if some applets do need to extract absolute names. + // (Probably will need to invent ARCHIVE_ALLOW_UNSAFE_NAME flag). +@@ -185,8 +185,7 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle) + + /* To avoid a directory traversal attack via symlinks, + * do not restore symlinks with ".." components +- * or symlinks starting with "/", unless a magic +- * envvar is set. ++ * or symlinks starting with "/" + * + * For example, consider a .tar created via: + * $ tar cvf bug.tar anything.txt +diff --git a/archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c b/archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c +index cc6f3f0..1c40ece 100644 +--- a/archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c ++++ b/archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c +@@ -454,8 +454,15 @@ char FAST_FUNC get_header_tar(archive_handle_t *archive_handle) + #endif + + /* Everything up to and including last ".." component is stripped */ +- overlapping_strcpy(file_header->name, strip_unsafe_prefix(file_header->name)); +-//TODO: do the same for file_header->link_target? ++ strip_unsafe_prefix(file_header->name); ++ if (file_header->link_target) { ++ /* GNU tar 1.34 examples: ++ * tar: Removing leading '/' from hard link targets ++ * tar: Removing leading '../' from hard link targets ++ * tar: Removing leading 'etc/../' from hard link targets ++ */ ++ strip_unsafe_prefix(file_header->link_target); ++ } + + /* Strip trailing '/' in directories */ + /* Must be done after mode is set as '/' is used to check if it's a directory */ +diff --git a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c +index 6670811..89a371a 100644 +--- a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c ++++ b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c +@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ + #include "libbb.h" + #include "bb_archive.h" + +-const char* FAST_FUNC strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) ++const char* FAST_FUNC skip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) + { + const char *cp = str; + while (1) { +- char *cp2; ++ const char *cp2; + if (*cp == '/') { + cp++; + continue; +@@ -22,10 +22,25 @@ const char* FAST_FUNC strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) + cp += 3; + continue; + } +- cp2 = strstr(cp, "/../"); ++ cp2 = cp; ++ find_dotdot: ++ cp2 = strstr(cp2, "/.."); + if (!cp2) +- break; +- cp = cp2 + 4; ++ break; /* No (more) malicious components */ ++ ++ /* We found "/..something" */ ++ cp2 += 3; ++ if (*cp2 != '/') { ++ if (*cp2 == '\0') { ++ /* Trailing "/..": malicious, return "" */ ++ /* (causes harmless errors trying to create or hardlink a file named "") */ ++ return cp2; ++ } ++ /* "/..name" is not malicious, look for next "/.." */ ++ goto find_dotdot; ++ } ++ /* Found "/../": malicious, advance past it */ ++ cp = cp2 + 1; + } + if (cp != str) { + static smallint warned = 0; +@@ -37,3 +52,8 @@ const char* FAST_FUNC strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) + } + return cp; + } ++ ++void FAST_FUNC strip_unsafe_prefix(char *str) ++{ ++ overlapping_strcpy(str, skip_unsafe_prefix(str)); ++} +diff --git a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c +index f8dc803..d764c89 100644 +--- a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c ++++ b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c +@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ void FAST_FUNC create_links_from_list(llist_t *list) + *list->data ? "hard" : "sym", + list->data + 1, target + ); ++ /* Note: GNU tar 1.34 errors out only _after_ all links are (attempted to be) created */ + } + list = list->link; + } +diff --git a/archival/tar.c b/archival/tar.c +index 9de3759..cf8c2d1 100644 +--- a/archival/tar.c ++++ b/archival/tar.c +@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ static int FAST_FUNC writeFileToTarball(struct recursive_state *state, + DBG("writeFileToTarball('%s')", fileName); + + /* Strip leading '/' and such (must be before memorizing hardlink's name) */ +- header_name = strip_unsafe_prefix(fileName); ++ header_name = skip_unsafe_prefix(fileName); + + if (header_name[0] == '\0') + return TRUE; +diff --git a/archival/unzip.c b/archival/unzip.c +index 691a2d8..5844215 100644 +--- a/archival/unzip.c ++++ b/archival/unzip.c +@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv) + + /* Guard against "/abspath", "/../" and similar attacks */ + // NB: UnZip 6.00 has option -: to disable this +- overlapping_strcpy(dst_fn, strip_unsafe_prefix(dst_fn)); ++ strip_unsafe_prefix(dst_fn); + + /* Filter zip entries */ + if (find_list_entry(zreject, dst_fn) +diff --git a/include/bb_archive.h b/include/bb_archive.h +index e0ef8fc..1dc77f3 100644 +--- a/include/bb_archive.h ++++ b/include/bb_archive.h +@@ -202,7 +202,8 @@ char get_header_tar_xz(archive_handle_t *archive_handle) FAST_FUNC; + void seek_by_jump(int fd, off_t amount) FAST_FUNC; + void seek_by_read(int fd, off_t amount) FAST_FUNC; + +-const char *strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) FAST_FUNC; ++const char *skip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) FAST_FUNC; ++void strip_unsafe_prefix(char *str) FAST_FUNC; + void create_or_remember_link(llist_t **link_placeholders, + const char *target, + const char *linkname, +-- +2.50.1
package/busybox/0018-only-strip-unsafe-components-from-hardlinks.patch new file +38 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 599f5dd8fac390c18b79cba4c14c334957605dae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Radoslav Kolev <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2026 11:50:04 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] tar: only strip unsafe components from hardlinks, not + symlinks + +commit 3fb6b31c7 introduced a check for unsafe components in +tar archive hardlinks, but it was being applied to symlinks too +which broke "Symlinks and hardlinks coexist" tar test. + +Signed-off-by: Radoslav Kolev <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-26157 +CVE: CVE-2026-26158 +Upstream: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=599f5dd8fac390c18b79cba4c14c334957605dae +Upstream: https://gogs.librecmc.org/OWEALS/busybox/commit/599f5dd8fac390c18b79cba4c14c334957605dae +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <[email protected]> +--- + archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c b/archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c +index 1c40ece..606d806 100644 +--- a/archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c ++++ b/archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c +@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ char FAST_FUNC get_header_tar(archive_handle_t *archive_handle) + + /* Everything up to and including last ".." component is stripped */ + strip_unsafe_prefix(file_header->name); +- if (file_header->link_target) { ++ if (file_header->link_target && !S_ISLNK(file_header->mode)) { + /* GNU tar 1.34 examples: + * tar: Removing leading '/' from hard link targets + * tar: Removing leading '../' from hard link targets +-- +2.50.1
package/busybox/busybox.mk +4 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2025-46394 # 0014-wget-dont-allow-control-characters-or-spaces-in-the-URL.patch BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2025-60876 +# 0017-tar-strip-unsafe-hardlink-components.patch +# 0018-only-strip-unsafe-components-from-hardlinks.patch +BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2026-26157 CVE-2026-26158 + BUSYBOX_CFLAGS = \ $(TARGET_CFLAGS)
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2.55.0 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
PATCH RESEND 5/5 package/busybox: patch CVE-2026-29004
In reply to Thomas Perale via buildrootThanks to the OpenEmbedded community for the patches. This fixes the following vulnerability:
- CVE-2026-29004:
BusyBox before commit 42202bf contains a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the DHCPv6 client (udhcpc6) DNS_SERVERS option handler in networking/udhcp/d6_dhcpc.c that allows network-adjacent attackers to trigger memory corruption by sending a crafted DHCPv6 response with a malformed D6_OPT_DNS_SERVERS option. Attackers can exploit incorrect heap buffer allocation calculations in the option_to_env() function to cause denial of service or achieve arbitrary code execution on embedded systems without heap hardening.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-29004
--- package/busybox/0019-CVE-2026-29004-01.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++ package/busybox/0020-CVE-2026-29004-02.patch | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++ package/busybox/busybox.mk | 4 ++ 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/busybox/0019-CVE-2026-29004-01.patch create mode 100644 package/busybox/0020-CVE-2026-29004-02.patch
package/busybox/0019-CVE-2026-29004-01.patch new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From d9a718cc17535c31d38f31fccb904a30e823166d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 07:25:38 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] udhcpc6: fix buffer overflow + +Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]> + +Upstream: https://github.com/vda-linux/busybox_mirror/commit/42202bfb1e6ac51fa995beda8be4d7b654aeee2a +CVE: CVE-2026-29004 +Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <[email protected]> +--- + networking/udhcp/d6_dhcpc.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/networking/udhcp/d6_dhcpc.c b/networking/udhcp/d6_dhcpc.c +index 79cef1999..d13b05829 100644 +--- a/networking/udhcp/d6_dhcpc.c ++++ b/networking/udhcp/d6_dhcpc.c +@@ -351,15 +351,15 @@ static void option_to_env(const uint8_t *option, const uint8_t *option_end) + addrs = option[3] >> 4; + + /* Setup environment variable */ +- *new_env() = dlist = xmalloc(4 + addrs * 40 - 1); ++ *new_env() = dlist = xmalloc(4 + addrs * 40 + 1); + dlist = stpcpy(dlist, "dns="); + option_offset = 0; + +- while (addrs--) { ++ while (addrs-- != 0) { + sprint_nip6(dlist, option + 4 + option_offset); + dlist += 39; + option_offset += 16; +- if (addrs) ++ if (addrs != 0) + *dlist++ = ' '; + } + +-- +2.34.1
package/busybox/0020-CVE-2026-29004-02.patch new file +45 -0
45 lines not on this page · raw message
package/busybox/busybox.mk +4 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2025-60876 # 0018-only-strip-unsafe-components-from-hardlinks.patch BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2026-26157 CVE-2026-26158 +# 0019-CVE-2026-29004-01.patch +# 0020-CVE-2026-29004-02.patch +BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2026-29004 + BUSYBOX_CFLAGS = \ $(TARGET_CFLAGS)
Signature · 6 lines
2.55.0 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Quoted 10 lines · Thomas Perale via buildroot
The patch
0008-awk.c-fix-CVE-2023-42366-bug-15874.patchwas introduced in [1]. TheIGNORE_CVESentry was removed while the patch is still present in [2].Re-introduce this
IGNORE_CVESentry.[1]
75c594d446package/busybox: fix pending CVEs
[2]f88537c46bpackage/busybox: drop staleIGNORE_CVESentriesSigned-off-by Thomas Perale <[email protected]>
Series applied to 2025.02.x, thanks !
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