perf DSO hardening series
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerv2 cover perf DSO hardening series
Hi,
Please consider merging,
Five hardening fixes for the perf DSO data handling code path, all found by the sashiko-bot AI reviewer:
- __open_dso() can return a file descriptor of 0 (stdin) when dso__get_filename() fails without setting errno, so fd = -errno = 0 looked like a successfully opened DSO;
- dso__decompress_kmodule_path() calls close(fd) with fd = -1 when decompression fails or the DSO is not compressed, clobbering errno with EBADF on the error path;
- file_read() reads the stale global errno after try_to_open_dso() fails, when by then errno has been through mutex_lock(), nsinfo__mountns_enter() and several open() attempts;
- dso_cache__memcpy() underflows when cache->size is smaller than the
RB tree offset (short pread), computing a huge memcpy length;
- dso__read_symbol() asserts on an input-dependent condition instead of doing a runtime check, keeping the BPF metadata safe from crafted input.
Best regards,
- Arnaldo
What changed from v1 ([email protected]):
PATCH 1/5:
- __open_dso() now sets errno = ENOENT directly when dso__get_filename() fails with errno == 0, instead of only computing fd = -ENOENT. Callers that check errno after a negative fd (e.g. file_read() returning -errno) no longer get 0/EOF for an open failure [sashiko-bot review of PATCH 1/5].
- Rebased onto the current perf-tools-next head (bf10e6ee2ac3034c).
This series was developed with assistance from Claude (claude-opus-4.6) and Opencode (deepseek-v4-flash-free) for code analysis, patch generation, and commit message composition. All changes were validated by the maintainer.
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (5):
perf dso: Guard against errno==0 when dso__get_filename() returns NULL perf dso: Guard close() against invalid fd in
dso__decompress_kmodule_path()
perf dso: Use stored fd error instead of stale errno in file_read() perf dso: Guard against cache underflow on short reads in
dso_cache__memcpy()
perf dso: Replace assert with runtime check in dso__read_symbol()
tools/perf/util/dso.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
base-commit: bf10e6ee2ac3034c9068e03eed418fd16961984e
v1-head: f6cb9e46c7b8949b
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 1/5 perf dso: Guard against errno==0 when dso__get_filename() returns NULL
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
__open_dso() computes fd = -errno when dso__get_filename() returns NULL. Some failure paths in dso__get_filename() (e.g. binary type mismatch) return NULL without making a syscall, leaving errno at 0 from a prior successful call. fd = -0 = 0, which is stdin — subsequent code treats it as a valid file descriptor.
Fall back to ENOENT when errno is 0, ensuring fd is always negative on failure.
--- tools/perf/util/dso.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/dso.c +5 -2
@@ -640,10 +640,13 @@ static int __open_dso(struct dso *dso, struct machine *machine)mutex_lock (dso__lock (dso)); name =dso__get_filename (dso, machine ? machine->root_dir :"" , &decomp); -if (name) +if (name) { fd =do_open (name); -else + }else { +if (errno ==0 ) + errno =ENOENT ; fd = -errno; + }if (decomp)unlink (name);
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 2/5 perf dso: Guard close() against invalid fd in dso__decompress_kmodule_path()
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
dso__decompress_kmodule_path() unconditionally calls close(fd) on the return value of decompress_kmodule(). When decompression fails or the DSO is not compressed, decompress_kmodule() returns -1. close(-1) fails with EBADF and clobbers errno, which callers up the chain (dso__get_filename → __open_dso) depend on for error propagation.
Guard the close() call with fd >= 0 so only valid file descriptors are closed.
--- tools/perf/util/dso.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/util/dso.c +3 -1
@@ -395,7 +395,9 @@ int dso__decompress_kmodule_path(struct dso *dso, const char *name, {int fd =decompress_kmodule (dso, name, pathname, len); -close (fd); +/* decompress_kmodule() returns -1 on failure, don't close(-1) */ +if (fd >=0 ) +close (fd);return fd >=0 ?0 :-1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 3/5 perf dso: Use stored fd error instead of stale errno in file_read()
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
file_read() uses ret = -errno when dso__data(dso)->fd is negative after try_to_open_dso() fails. By this point errno has been through mutex_lock(), nsinfo__mountns_enter(), and multiple open() attempts inside try_to_open_dso() — it no longer reflects the actual open failure. If errno happens to be 0, ret = 0 looks like EOF rather than an error.
The fd field already carries the negated errno from __open_dso() (e.g. -EINVAL, -ENOENT), so use it directly instead of reading the stale global errno.
--- tools/perf/util/dso.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/util/dso.c +2 -1
@@ -1029,7 +1029,8 @@ static ssize_t file_read(struct dso *dso, struct machine *machine,if (dso__data (dso)->fd <0 ) {dso__data (dso)->status =DSO_DATA_STATUS_ERROR ; - ret = -errno; +/* fd already carries the negated errno from __open_dso() */ + ret =dso__data (dso)->fd; goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 4/5 perf dso: Guard against cache underflow on short reads in dso_cache__memcpy()
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
dso_cache__memcpy() computes cache_offset = offset - cache->offset, then cache_size = min(cache->size - cache_offset, size). The RB tree lookup in __dso_cache__find() matches using the full DSO__DATA_CACHE_SIZE window, but cache->size reflects the actual pread return value from dso_cache__populate().
A short pread (e.g. near end-of-file) makes cache->size smaller than DSO__DATA_CACHE_SIZE. If a subsequent access targets an offset past cache->offset + cache->size but within the DSO__DATA_CACHE_SIZE window, the cache entry is found but cache_offset exceeds cache->size. Since both are u64, the subtraction cache->size - cache_offset wraps to a large value, min() selects the caller's size, and memcpy reads out of bounds.
Return 0 (cache miss) when cache_offset falls outside the valid cached range, so the caller re-reads from the backing file.
--- tools/perf/util/dso.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/util/dso.c +11 -1
@@ -1005,7 +1005,17 @@ static ssize_t dso_cache__memcpy(struct dso_cache *cache, u64 offset, u8 *data, u64 size, bool out) {u64 cache_offset = offset - cache->offset; -u64 cache_size =min (cache->size - cache_offset, size); +u64 cache_size; + +/* +* The RB tree matches using DSO__DATA_CACHE_SIZE, but a short +* pread may leave cache->size smaller. Treat an offset past +* the valid data as a cache miss so the caller re-reads. +*/ +if (cache_offset >= cache->size) +return 0 ; + + cache_size =min (cache->size - cache_offset, size);if (out)memcpy (data, cache->data + cache_offset, cache_size);
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 5/5 perf dso: Replace assert with runtime check in dso__read_symbol()
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
dso__read_symbol() asserts that len <= jited_prog_len, where len comes from sym->end - sym->start (parsed from PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL in perf.data). Both values originate from untrusted file input.
With NDEBUG (production builds), the assert is compiled out, allowing an out-of-bounds heap read when the BPF program buffer is accessed. Without NDEBUG, a crafted perf.data crashes perf with an assertion failure.
Replace the assert with a runtime bounds check that returns NULL with an appropriate error code, matching the existing error handling pattern in this function.
--- tools/perf/util/dso.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/util/dso.c +6 -1
@@ -2027,7 +2027,12 @@ const u8 *dso__read_symbol(struct dso *dso, const char *symfs_filename, errno =SYMBOL_ANNOTATE_ERRNO__BPF_MISSING_BTF ; return NULL; } -assert (len <= info_linear->info.jited_prog_len); +if (len > info_linear->info.jited_prog_len) { +pr_debug ("BPF symbol length %zu exceeds jited_prog_len %u\n" , + len, info_linear->info.jited_prog_len); + errno =SYMBOL_ANNOTATE_ERRNO__BPF_MISSING_BTF ; +return NULL ; + } *out_buf_len = len;return (const u8 *)(uintptr_t )(info_linear->info.jited_prog_insns);#else
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0