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Guard against gso_segs overflows

PATCH Superseded Alice Mikityanska 2 participants 5 messages Aug 13 – Aug 19

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v2 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover Guard against gso_segs overflows

From: Alice Mikityanska <[email protected]>

This series is a follow-up on the discussion:

https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAD0BsJWzSr2zduf5v3mVC4zd=Lj6ZAoC+V42-VBdg42aDY8XXw@mail.gmail.com/T/#m1e22fca273c36cc8844e516505d3251cc1418fea

skb_segment is patched to avoid possible overflows in partial GSO. The primary possible source of too many GSO segments is also addressed:
virtio-net clamps gso_size to >=8 in TCP, as suggested by Eric.

v2 changes: dropped new checks in fastpath from skb_gro_receive and __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb, replaced the latter with a silent clamp for gso_size, kept the cheap guard in skb_segment.

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/

Alice Mikityanska (2):
net: Guard for gso_segs overflow in skb_segment
virtio-net: Ensure that TCP packets don't overflow gso_segs

 include/linux/virtio_net.h | 4 ++++
 net/core/skbuff.c          | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/2 net: Guard for gso_segs overflow in skb_segment

From: Alice Mikityanska <[email protected]>

skb_segment calculates 32-bit partial_segs as len / gso_size, and then assigns it to the 16-bit gso_segs field. The division might overflow in some edge cases where the SKB is BIG TCP (65536 <= len <= 8*65535), and gso_size < TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. While normally this can't happen due to TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE, an AF_PACKET PACKET_VNET_HDR socket can generate such a malformed packet.

Blocking malformed virtio_net packets is implemented in the next patch, but this patch clamps partial_segs in skb_segment itself for more generic robustness. Should len / gso_size happen to be bigger than 65535 in partial GSO, skb_segment will now just produce more than two output SKBs, all of which will be valid with gso_segs <= 65535.

---
 net/core/skbuff.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/core/skbuff.c +1 -1
index c82a1472a5ea..439cbfeb02bd 100644
@@ -4860,7 +4860,7 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
 		 * doesn't fit into an MSS sized block, so take care of that
 		 * now.
 		 */
-		partial_segs = len / mss;
+		partial_segs = min(len / mss, GSO_MAX_SEGS);
 		if (partial_segs > 1)
 			mss *= partial_segs;
 		else
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
maintainer
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH net-next v2 1/2] net: Guard for gso_segs overflow in skb_segment

Quoted 9 lines · Alice Mikityanska

From: Alice Mikityanska <[email protected]>

skb_segment calculates 32-bit partial_segs as len / gso_size, and then assigns it to the 16-bit gso_segs field. The division might overflow in some edge cases where the SKB is BIG TCP (65536 <= len <= 8*65535), and gso_size < TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. While normally this can't happen due to TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE, an AF_PACKET PACKET_VNET_HDR socket can generate such a malformed packet.

Quoted 5 lines

Blocking malformed virtio_net packets is implemented in the next patch, but this patch clamps partial_segs in skb_segment itself for more generic robustness. Should len / gso_size happen to be bigger than 65535 in partial GSO, skb_segment will now just produce more than two output SKBs, all of which will be valid with gso_segs <= 65535.

Minor nit: I think it would make sense to re-order the patches.

Quoted 10 lines
---
 net/core/skbuff.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/core/skbuff.c +0 -0
index c82a1472a5ea..439cbfeb02bd 100644

net/core/skbuff.c struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb, · line 4863

Quoted 5 lines
net/core/skbuff.c +1 -1
@@ -4860,7 +4860,7 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
 		 * doesn't fit into an MSS sized block, so take care of that
 		 * now.
 		 */
-		partial_segs = len / mss;
+		partial_segs = min(len / mss, GSO_MAX_SEGS);

Since on top of patch 2/2 the min() should always be a no-op, what about instead:

		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len/mss > GSO_MAX_SEGS))
			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

?

/P

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH net-next v2 1/2] net: Guard for gso_segs overflow in skb_segment

Quoted 23 lines · Paolo Abeni
Quoted 9 lines · Alice Mikityanska

From: Alice Mikityanska <[email protected]>

skb_segment calculates 32-bit partial_segs as len / gso_size, and then assigns it to the 16-bit gso_segs field. The division might overflow in some edge cases where the SKB is BIG TCP (65536 <= len <= 8*65535), and gso_size < TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. While normally this can't happen due to TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE, an AF_PACKET PACKET_VNET_HDR socket can generate such a malformed packet.

Quoted 5 lines

Blocking malformed virtio_net packets is implemented in the next patch, but this patch clamps partial_segs in skb_segment itself for more generic robustness. Should len / gso_size happen to be bigger than 65535 in partial GSO, skb_segment will now just produce more than two output SKBs, all of which will be valid with gso_segs <= 65535.

Minor nit: I think it would make sense to re-order the patches.

Quoted 5 lines
---
 net/core/skbuff.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 12 lines

net/core/skbuff.c struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb, · line 4863

Quoted 10 lines
net/core/skbuff.c +1 -1
index c82a1472a5ea..439cbfeb02bd 100644
@@ -4860,7 +4860,7 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
 		 * doesn't fit into an MSS sized block, so take care of that
 		 * now.
 		 */
-		partial_segs = len / mss;
+		partial_segs = min(len / mss, GSO_MAX_SEGS);

Since on top of patch 2/2 the min() should always be a no-op,

Not sure; it'll be a no-op in this specific virtio_net scenario, but what if there are more?

Quoted 4 lines

what about instead:

		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len/mss > GSO_MAX_SEGS))
			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

Yeah, it looks like a good idea to add a WARN to let syzbot uncover more possible cases, but:

1. I'd keep it non-failing rather than return an error: partial GSO can deal with smaller segment size pretty well, no need to fail.

2. I'd make it DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE to avoid the penalty in production.

I can do that if it passes Eric's filter for too much code in fastpath.

Quoted 3 lines

?

/P

#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/2 virtio-net: Ensure that TCP packets don't overflow gso_segs

In reply to Alice Mikityanska

From: Alice Mikityanska <[email protected]>

The user can specify any gso_size in a packet crafted with an AF_PACKET PACKET_VNET_HDR socket, even smaller than TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. At the same time, GSO_MAX_SIZE = 8 * GSO_MAX_SEGS = 8 * 65535. When the user crafts a packet with gso_size < 8, there is a risk for partial GSO to overflow the 16-bit gso_segs field when dividing the SKB length by gso_size.

Adjust gso_size of TCP packets to be at least TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. Keep gso_size of UDP GSO packets, as gso_size=1 is valid and explicitly tested at tools/testing/selftests/net/tun.c:649.

---
 include/linux/virtio_net.h | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
include/linux/virtio_net.h +4 -0
index f36d21b5bc19..c381b916c1b5 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/ip.h>
 #include <linux/ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <net/tcp.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/tcp.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/virtio_net.h>
 
@@ -179,6 +180,9 @@ static inline int __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL &&
 			    skb->csum_offset != offsetof(struct tcphdr, check))
 				return -EINVAL;
+
+			BUILD_BUG_ON(TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE * GSO_MAX_SEGS < GSO_MAX_SIZE);
+			gso_size = max(gso_size, TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE);
 			break;
 		}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0