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KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()

PATCH In review Fuad Tabba 3 participants 4 messages Aug 18

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Fuad Tabba

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()

pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() clamps only the upper bound of the host-provided sve_max_vl, so an invalid vector length reaches sve_state_size_from_vl() and the WARN_ON() there, which is fatal at EL2. The existing !sve_state_size test rejects such a length, but only after the macro has run.

Check sve_vl_valid() before deriving the state size. A valid length cannot yield a zero size, so the !sve_state_size test goes with it.

Fixes 5db1bef93342 ("KVM: arm64: Track SVE state in the hypervisor vcpu structure")

---

Notes:
Based on v7.2. Applies cleanly to kvmarm/next as well:
pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() is identical on both.

 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +3 -2
index 24d6f164129ac..095ebfce91b08 100644
@@ -460,14 +460,15 @@ static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h
 
 	/* Limit guest vector length to the maximum supported by the host. */
 	sve_max_vl = min(READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl), kvm_host_sve_max_vl);
-	sve_state_size = sve_state_size_from_vl(sve_max_vl);
 	sve_state = kern_hyp_va(READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->arch.sve_state));
 
-	if (!sve_state || !sve_state_size) {
+	if (!sve_vl_valid(sve_max_vl) || !sve_state) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto err;
 	}
 
+	sve_state_size = sve_state_size_from_vl(sve_max_vl);
+
 	ret = hyp_pin_shared_mem(sve_state, sve_state + sve_state_size);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
#1 lore raw
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] A fallible memory allocation failure inside hyp_pin_shared_mem() triggers a WARN_ON(), which results in a fatal hypervisor panic. --

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() --- commit f011c5300d433db59b3f2b97e822b9e148c39b84
Author: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()

This commit updates pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() to validate the host-provided SVE vector length before deriving its state size. This prevents an invalid length from reaching the sve_state_size_from_vl() macro and triggering a fatal EL2 WARN_ON().

Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +0 -0

[ ... ]

Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +0 -0
@@ -460,14 +460,15 @@ static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h

[ ... ]

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h · line 472

Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +2 -0
+	sve_state_size = sve_state_size_from_vl(sve_max_vl);
+
 	ret = hyp_pin_shared_mem(sve_state, sve_state + sve_state_size);

[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but looking at hyp_pin_shared_mem(), could a memory allocation failure here trigger a fatal hypervisor panic?

If host userspace repeatedly creates VMs and vCPUs to exhaust the hypervisor's memory pool, pkvm_create_mappings_locked() can return -ENOMEM.

Because hyp_pin_shared_mem() wraps this fallible call in a WARN_ON():

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c:hyp_pin_shared_mem() {
    ...
    for (cur = start; cur < end; cur += PAGE_SIZE) {
        p = hyp_virt_to_page(cur);
        hyp_page_ref_inc(p);
        if (p->refcount == 1)
            WARN_ON(pkvm_create_mappings_locked((void *)cur,
                                                (void *)cur + PAGE_SIZE,
                                                PAGE_HYP));
    }
    ...
}

And since WARN_ON() is fatal at EL2, does this allow unprivileged host userspace to intentionally crash the host system if the allocation fails?

Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +0 -0
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
author reviewer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · On Tue, 18 Aug 2026 at 10:43, <[email protected]> wrote:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] A fallible memory allocation failure inside hyp_pin_shared_mem() triggers a WARN_ON(), which results in a fatal hypervisor panic.

It can't fail. hyp_s1_pgtable_pages() provisions the hyp stage-1 page tables at init to cover all of memory at page granularity, so hpool can always map any host page into the hyp linear map.

/fuad

Quoted 54 lines

--

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() --- commit f011c5300d433db59b3f2b97e822b9e148c39b84
Author: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()

This commit updates pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() to validate the host-provided SVE vector length before deriving its state size. This prevents an invalid length from reaching the sve_state_size_from_vl() macro and triggering a fatal EL2 WARN_ON().

Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +0 -0

[ ... ]

Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +0 -0
@@ -460,14 +460,15 @@ static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h

[ ... ]

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h · line 472

Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +2 -0
+     sve_state_size = sve_state_size_from_vl(sve_max_vl);
+
      ret = hyp_pin_shared_mem(sve_state, sve_state + sve_state_size);

[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but looking at hyp_pin_shared_mem(), could a memory allocation failure here trigger a fatal hypervisor panic?

If host userspace repeatedly creates VMs and vCPUs to exhaust the hypervisor's memory pool, pkvm_create_mappings_locked() can return -ENOMEM.

Because hyp_pin_shared_mem() wraps this fallible call in a WARN_ON():

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c:hyp_pin_shared_mem() {
    ...
    for (cur = start; cur < end; cur += PAGE_SIZE) {
        p = hyp_virt_to_page(cur);
        hyp_page_ref_inc(p);
        if (p->refcount == 1)
            WARN_ON(pkvm_create_mappings_locked((void *)cur,
                                                (void *)cur + PAGE_SIZE,
                                                PAGE_HYP));
    }
    ...
}

And since WARN_ON() is fatal at EL2, does this allow unprivileged host userspace to intentionally crash the host system if the allocation fails?

Quoted 3 lines
      if (ret)
              goto err;

--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1

maintainer Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#3 lore raw
In reply to Fuad Tabba
Quoted 7 lines · Fuad Tabba

pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() clamps only the upper bound of the host-provided sve_max_vl, so an invalid vector length reaches sve_state_size_from_vl() and the WARN_ON() there, which is fatal at EL2. The existing !sve_state_size test rejects such a length, but only after the macro has run.

Quoted 6 lines

Check sve_vl_valid() before deriving the state size. A valid length cannot yield a zero size, so the !sve_state_size test goes with it.

Fixes 5db1bef93342 ("KVM: arm64: Track SVE state in the hypervisor vcpu structure")
	M.
Signature · 1 line
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