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390/zcrypt: Validate length information in reply

PATCH Superseded Holger Dengler 3 participants 6 messages Aug 20

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Holger Dengler

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover 390/zcrypt: Validate length information in reply

This series contains adds validation of a length information in a hardware reply, to prevent buffer over-read/over-write in case of a broken/modified replies.

This series applies on-top of Linus' master branch.

Holger Dengler (1):
s390/zcrypt: Validate length in reply before using it

 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

base-commit: 59e6295fac26b8e85c1ea859cdd89fa1e47519d7

Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 s390/zcrypt: Validate length in reply before using it

The length information in the reply is used to copy the key token to the target buffer. An invalid information in t->len of the reply may cause an over-read of the target buffer and also a over-write of the target buffer. To prevent that, check t->len before using it.

As the available space in destination and source buffer is always larger than the valid length value in the parameter block in the reply, compare t->len with this (already validated) length information. As a side effect, this check also prevents buffer over-read and over-write.

---
 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +14 -1
index d4ce6352b5b2..54b8edd1dfc7 100644
@@ -1158,8 +1158,21 @@ static int _ip_cprb_helper(u16 cardnr, u16 domain,
 
 	/* do not check the key here, it may be incomplete */
 
-	/* copy the vlsc key token back */
+	/*
+	 * Copy the vlsc key token back.
+	 * The available space in the destination (key_token) and the source
+	 * (t) buffer is always larger as the valid range of prepparm->kb.len.
+	 * Validate t->len ba comparing it with the length information in the
+	 * param block of the request (prepparm->kb.len)
+	 * The value range of prepparm->kb.len has been checked above.
+	 */
 	t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)prepparm->kb.tlv1.key_token;
+	if (t->len != prepparm->kb.len - 3 * sizeof(uint16_t)) {
+		ZCRYPT_DBF_ERR("%s reply with invalid key_token length %u\n",
+			       __func__, t->len);
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	memcpy(key_token, t, t->len);
 	*key_token_size = t->len;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Validate length in reply before using it

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The patch fixes an out-of-bounds read in _ip_cprb_helper() but misses identical vulnerabilities in cca_gencipherkey() and _ep11_genaeskey().
- [High] Unvalidated length fields in the CPRBX response payload are used to advance a memory pointer, causing severe out-of-bounds reads in cca_query_crypto_facility(). --

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH v1 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Validate length in reply before using it --- commit 3fcaad86f04a2a9419691d5f1a54cc873f326675
Author: Holger Dengler <[email protected]>

s390/zcrypt: Validate length in reply before using it

The length information in the reply is used to copy the key token to the target buffer. An invalid information in t->len of the reply may cause an over-read of the target buffer and also a over-write of the target buffer. To prevent that, check t->len before using it.

Quoted 16 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +7 -1
index d4ce6352b5b2e..54b8edd1dfc74 100644
@@ -1158,8 +1158,21 @@ static int _ip_cprb_helper(u16 cardnr, u16 domain,
 
 	/* do not check the key here, it may be incomplete */
 
-	/* copy the vlsc key token back */
+	/*
+	 * Copy the vlsc key token back.
+	 * The available space in the destination (key_token) and the source
+	 * (t) buffer is always larger as the valid range of prepparm->kb.len.
+	 * Validate t->len ba comparing it with the length information in the
+	 * param block of the request (prepparm->kb.len)
+	 * The value range of prepparm->kb.len has been checked above.

drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c static int _ip_cprb_helper(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, · line 1177

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +7 -0
+	 */
 	t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)prepparm->kb.tlv1.key_token;
+	if (t->len != prepparm->kb.len - 3 * sizeof(uint16_t)) {
+		ZCRYPT_DBF_ERR("%s reply with invalid key_token length %u\n",
+			       __func__, t->len);
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	memcpy(key_token, t, t->len);
 	*key_token_size = t->len;

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but since you are fixing the unvalidated length field from the device reply here, should similar validation be added to cca_gencipherkey() and _ep11_genaeskey()?

In drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c:cca_gencipherkey(), the code reads the generated token length directly from the untrusted reply and calculates the copy length without checking bounds against the structure size:

    keybuflen = prepparm->kb.tlv1.len - 2 * sizeof(uint16_t);
    ...
    if (keybuf) {
        if (*keybufsize >= keybuflen)
            memcpy(keybuf, t, keybuflen);

Could a malicious or compromised device return an inflated length, causing memcpy() to read thousands of bytes out-of-bounds from the cprbmem allocation and potentially leak kernel memory to userspace?

A similar unvalidated copy appears in drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ep11misc.c:_ep11_genaeskey(), which relies entirely on the untrusted device data length:

    memcpy(keybuf, rep_pl->data, rep_pl->data_len);

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does a similar vulnerability exist in drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c:cca_query_crypto_facility() where the unvalidated length field is used to advance a memory pointer?

In that function, the code blindly advances ptr using an unchecked length provided by the device payload:

    len = *((u16 *)ptr);
    if (len > sizeof(u16)) {
        ...
        ptr += len;
    }

If the hardware returns a corrupt or malicious length, could ptr advance far beyond the cprbmem buffer bounds, leading to an out-of-bounds dereference on the next iteration or exposing arbitrary kernel memory during the subsequent memcpy()?

Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Validate length in reply before using it

Quoted 60 lines · On 8/20/26 16:20, [email protected] wrote:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The patch fixes an out-of-bounds read in _ip_cprb_helper() but misses identical vulnerabilities in cca_gencipherkey() and _ep11_genaeskey().
- [High] Unvalidated length fields in the CPRBX response payload are used to advance a memory pointer, causing severe out-of-bounds reads in cca_query_crypto_facility(). --

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH v1 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Validate length in reply before using it --- commit 3fcaad86f04a2a9419691d5f1a54cc873f326675
Author: Holger Dengler <[email protected]>

s390/zcrypt: Validate length in reply before using it

The length information in the reply is used to copy the key token to the target buffer. An invalid information in t->len of the reply may cause an over-read of the target buffer and also a over-write of the target buffer. To prevent that, check t->len before using it.

Quoted 16 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +7 -1
index d4ce6352b5b2e..54b8edd1dfc74 100644
@@ -1158,8 +1158,21 @@ static int _ip_cprb_helper(u16 cardnr, u16 domain,
 
 	/* do not check the key here, it may be incomplete */
 
-	/* copy the vlsc key token back */
+	/*
+	 * Copy the vlsc key token back.
+	 * The available space in the destination (key_token) and the source
+	 * (t) buffer is always larger as the valid range of prepparm->kb.len.
+	 * Validate t->len ba comparing it with the length information in the
+	 * param block of the request (prepparm->kb.len)
+	 * The value range of prepparm->kb.len has been checked above.

drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c static int _ip_cprb_helper(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, · line 1177

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +7 -0
+	 */
 	t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)prepparm->kb.tlv1.key_token;
+	if (t->len != prepparm->kb.len - 3 * sizeof(uint16_t)) {
+		ZCRYPT_DBF_ERR("%s reply with invalid key_token length %u\n",
+			       __func__, t->len);
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	memcpy(key_token, t, t->len);
 	*key_token_size = t->len;

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but since you are fixing the unvalidated length field from the device reply here, should similar validation be added to cca_gencipherkey() and _ep11_genaeskey()?

In drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c:cca_gencipherkey(), the code reads the generated token length directly from the untrusted reply and calculates the copy length without checking bounds against the structure size:

    keybuflen = prepparm->kb.tlv1.len - 2 * sizeof(uint16_t);
    ...
    if (keybuf) {
        if (*keybufsize >= keybuflen)
            memcpy(keybuf, t, keybuflen);
Quoted 3 lines

Could a malicious or compromised device return an inflated length, causing memcpy() to read thousands of bytes out-of-bounds from the cprbmem allocation and potentially leak kernel memory to userspace?

The memcpy is only called, if keylen is less equal *keysize (which is the available space in keybuf). As far as I can see, this prevents any over-writes of the keybuf buffer, even with a malicious response from the hardware.

This objection is not relevant.

Quoted 5 lines

A similar unvalidated copy appears in drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ep11misc.c:_ep11_genaeskey(), which relies entirely on the untrusted device data length:

    memcpy(keybuf, rep_pl->data, rep_pl->data_len);

In _ep11_genaeskey(), the rep_pl->data_len must be less equal *keybufsize, otherwise the function returns with an error.

This objection is false.

Quoted 14 lines

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does a similar vulnerability exist in drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c:cca_query_crypto_facility() where the unvalidated length field is used to advance a memory pointer?

In that function, the code blindly advances ptr using an unchecked length provided by the device payload:

    len = *((u16 *)ptr);
    if (len > sizeof(u16)) {
        ...
        ptr += len;
    }
Quoted 4 lines

If the hardware returns a corrupt or malicious length, could ptr advance far beyond the cprbmem buffer bounds, leading to an out-of-bounds dereference on the next iteration or exposing arbitrary kernel memory during the subsequent memcpy()?

This objection is under investigation and will be fixed (if required) in another series.

Signature · 2 lines
Mit freundlichen Grüßen / Kind regards
Holger Dengler
maintainer Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Validate length in reply before using it

In reply to Holger Dengler
Quoted 32 lines · Holger Dengler

The length information in the reply is used to copy the key token to the target buffer. An invalid information in t->len of the reply may cause an over-read of the target buffer and also a over-write of the target buffer. To prevent that, check t->len before using it.

As the available space in destination and source buffer is always larger than the valid length value in the parameter block in the reply, compare t->len with this (already validated) length information. As a side effect, this check also prevents buffer over-read and over-write.

---
 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +4 -1
index d4ce6352b5b2..54b8edd1dfc7 100644
@@ -1158,8 +1158,21 @@ static int _ip_cprb_helper(u16 cardnr, u16 
 domain,
 
 	/* do not check the key here, it may be incomplete */
 
-	/* copy the vlsc key token back */
+	/*
+	 * Copy the vlsc key token back.
+	 * The available space in the destination (key_token) and the source
+	 * (t) buffer is always larger as the valid range of 

prepparm->kb.len.

drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c static int _ip_cprb_helper(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, · line 1165

Quoted 1 line
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +1 -0
+	 * Validate t->len ba comparing it with the length information in the

what is this funny "ba" in the previous sentence ?

drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c static int _ip_cprb_helper(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, · line 1177

Quoted 12 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +9 -0
+	 * param block of the request (prepparm->kb.len)
+	 * The value range of prepparm->kb.len has been checked above.
+	 */
 	t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)prepparm->kb.tlv1.key_token;
+	if (t->len != prepparm->kb.len - 3 * sizeof(uint16_t)) {
+		ZCRYPT_DBF_ERR("%s reply with invalid key_token length %u\n",
+			       __func__, t->len);
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	memcpy(key_token, t, t->len);
 	*key_token_size = t->len;
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Validate length in reply before using it

Quoted 15 lines · Harald Freudenberger
Quoted 14 lines · Holger Dengler
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +4 -1
index d4ce6352b5b2..54b8edd1dfc7 100644
@@ -1158,8 +1158,21 @@ static int _ip_cprb_helper(u16 cardnr, u16 domain,
 
      /* do not check the key here, it may be incomplete */
 
-    /* copy the vlsc key token back */
+    /*
+     * Copy the vlsc key token back.
+     * The available space in the destination (key_token) and the source
+     * (t) buffer is always larger as the valid range of prepparm-
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

kb.len.

+     * Validate t->len ba comparing it with the length information in the

what is this funny "ba" in the previous sentence ?

A typo. Should be "by". Will be fixed in v2.

Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 13 lines

+     * param block of the request (prepparm->kb.len)
+     * The value range of prepparm->kb.len has been checked above. +     */
     t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)prepparm->kb.tlv1.key_token; +    if (t->len != prepparm->kb.len - 3 * sizeof(uint16_t)) { +        ZCRYPT_DBF_ERR("%s reply with invalid key_token length %u\n", +                   __func__, t->len);
+        rc = -EIO;
+        goto out;
+    }
     memcpy(key_token, t, t->len);
     *key_token_size = t->len;

Quoted 1 line

Thx, I'll pick it for the v2.

Signature · 2 lines
Mit freundlichen Grüßen / Kind regards
Holger Dengler