x86/bugs: Adapt SRSO mitigation to Zen6
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 x86/bugs: Adapt SRSO mitigation to Zen6
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Zen6 has BTB protection which isolates the different contexts (user/kernel, guest/host) from one another. This makes the SafeRET mitigation there unnecessary leaving the user/user and guest/guest attack vectors open, whose protection is handled by the Spectre v2 mitigation setting to do IBPB on a context switch.
Detect that setting and report it with a new mitigation string.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -420,6 +420,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+ 1)/* "succor" Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */ #define X86_FEATURE_CPPC_PERF_PRIO (17*32+ 2)/* CPPC Floor Perf support */ #define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+ 3)/* "smca" Scalable MCA */ +#define X86_FEATURE_BTB_CTX_ISOLATION (17*32+ 4)/* AMD: Branch predictions contexts isolated */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2)/* "avx512_4vnniw" AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +16 -2
@@ -1175,6 +1175,7 @@ enum srso_mitigation {SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB ,SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT ,SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE , + SRSO_MITIGATION_USER_IBPB, };static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation__ro_after_init =SRSO_MITIGATION_AUTO ;
@@ -2908,7 +2909,8 @@ static const char * const srso_strings[] = { [SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET] = "Mitigation: Safe RET", [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB", [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only", - [SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE] = "Mitigation: Reduced Speculation" + [SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE] = "Mitigation: Reduced Speculation", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_USER_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB on context switch", };static int __init srso_parse_cmdline (char *str)
@@ -2948,7 +2950,9 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)* required. Otherwise the 'microcode' mitigation is sufficient * to protect the user->user and guest->guest vectors. */ -if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST ) || +if ((cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST ) && + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_BTB_CTX_ISOLATION )) + || (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL ) && !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO ))) { srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET ;
@@ -3024,6 +3028,16 @@ static void __init srso_update_mitigation(void) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE)) srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB ; +/* +* See if IBPB on context switch is the only thing needed to address +* GUEST/GUEST and USER/USER vectors. +*/ +if (srso_mitigation ==SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE && +boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO ) && +boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_BTB_CTX_ISOLATION ) && + spectre_v2_user_ibpb !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE ) + srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_USER_IBPB ; +pr_info ("%s\n" , srso_strings[srso_mitigation]); }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +1 -0
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_AMD_WORKLOAD_CLASS, CPUID_EAX, 22, 0x80000021, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO, CPUID_ECX, 1, 0x80000021, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x80000021, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_BTB_CTX_ISOLATION, CPUID_ECX, 8, 0x80000021, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x80000022, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x80000022, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE, CPUID_EAX, 2, 0x80000022, 0 },
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: ae1d2082d93bc04604dc08e9b7f9cdba5e0c28e6 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/ae1d2082d93bc04604dc08e9b7f9cdba5e0c28e6 Author: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Fri, 21 Aug 2026 18:32:31 -07:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Tue, 01 Sep 2026 18:45:46 -07:00
x86/bugs: Adapt SRSO mitigation to Zen6
Zen6 has BTB protection which isolates the different contexts (user/kernel, guest/host) from one another. This makes the SafeRET mitigation there unnecessary leaving the user/user and guest/guest attack vectors open, whose protection is handled by the Spectre v2 mitigation setting to do IBPB on a context switch.
Detect that setting and report it with a new mitigation string.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+ 1)/* "succor" Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */ #define X86_FEATURE_CPPC_PERF_PRIO (17*32+ 2)/* CPPC Floor Perf support */ #define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+ 3)/* "smca" Scalable MCA */ +#define X86_FEATURE_BTB_CTX_ISOLATION (17*32+ 4)/* AMD: Branch predictions contexts isolated */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2)/* "avx512_4vnniw" AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +16 -2
@@ -1175,6 +1175,7 @@ enum srso_mitigation {SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB ,SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT ,SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE , + SRSO_MITIGATION_USER_IBPB, };static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation__ro_after_init =SRSO_MITIGATION_AUTO ;
@@ -2908,7 +2909,8 @@ static const char * const srso_strings[] = { [SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET] = "Mitigation: Safe RET", [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB", [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only", - [SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE] = "Mitigation: Reduced Speculation" + [SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE] = "Mitigation: Reduced Speculation", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_USER_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB on context switch", };static int __init srso_parse_cmdline (char *str)
@@ -2948,7 +2950,9 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)* required. Otherwise the 'microcode' mitigation is sufficient * to protect the user->user and guest->guest vectors. */ -if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST ) || +if ((cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST ) && + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_BTB_CTX_ISOLATION )) + || (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL ) && !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO ))) { srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET ;
@@ -3024,6 +3028,16 @@ static void __init srso_update_mitigation(void) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE)) srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB ; +/* +* See if IBPB on context switch is the only thing needed to address +* GUEST/GUEST and USER/USER vectors. +*/ +if (srso_mitigation ==SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE && +boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO ) && +boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_BTB_CTX_ISOLATION ) && + spectre_v2_user_ibpb !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE ) + srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_USER_IBPB ; +pr_info ("%s\n" , srso_strings[srso_mitigation]); }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +1 -0
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_AMD_WORKLOAD_CLASS, CPUID_EAX, 22, 0x80000021, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO, CPUID_ECX, 1, 0x80000021, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x80000021, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_BTB_CTX_ISOLATION, CPUID_ECX, 8, 0x80000021, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x80000022, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x80000022, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE, CPUID_EAX, 2, 0x80000022, 0 },