KVM: arm64: pKVM SVE vCPU init fixes
Fuad Tabba
reviewercover KVM: arm64: pKVM SVE vCPU init fixes
Hi folks,
If it's not the GIC, it's SVE. I found these while preparing the follow-up to the pKVM core series [1].
Patch 1 was posted on its own [2] and carries Marc's Reviewed-by. It is unchanged and included here because it has not been picked up yet and the rest of the series does not apply without it.
Patches 2 and 4 are two ways to reach the same broken state, a vCPU whose sve_state is NULL while vcpu_has_sve() is true, so the world switch loads the guest's SVE state from it. EL2 keeps two answers to "does this guest have SVE": KVM_ARCH_FLAG_GUEST_HAS_SVE, which the world switch reads, and KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE, which pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() reads. Patch 2 stops EL2 desynchronising them itself on an init failure. Patch 4 stops the host handing them over already desynchronised. Patch 3 keys the unpin on the state it unpins rather than on the feature bit, which agree for any vCPU that completed init.
All of it needs a host that misreports its own vCPU state, so none of it is reachable from host userspace.
Based on Linux 7.2, and applies cleanly to kvmarm/next.
Cheers,
/fuad
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Fuad Tabba (4):
KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()
KVM: arm64: Do not clear VM-wide SVE feature on vCPU init failure
KVM: arm64: Key unpin_host_sve_state() on the state it unpins
KVM: arm64: Derive GUEST_HAS_SVE from the SVE feature bit at EL2
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 29 +++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Fuad Tabba
reviewerPATCH 1/4 KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()
pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() clamps only the upper bound of the host-provided sve_max_vl, so an invalid vector length reaches sve_state_size_from_vl() and the WARN_ON() there, which is fatal at EL2. The existing !sve_state_size test rejects such a length, but only after the macro has run.
Check sve_vl_valid() before deriving the state size. A valid length cannot yield a zero size, so the !sve_state_size test goes with it.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +3 -2
@@ -460,14 +460,15 @@ static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h/* Limit guest vector length to the maximum supported by the host. */ sve_max_vl =min (READ_ONCE (host_vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl), kvm_host_sve_max_vl); - sve_state_size =sve_state_size_from_vl (sve_max_vl); sve_state =kern_hyp_va (READ_ONCE (host_vcpu->arch.sve_state)); -if (!sve_state || !sve_state_size) { +if (!sve_vl_valid (sve_max_vl) || !sve_state) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto err; } + sve_state_size =sve_state_size_from_vl (sve_max_vl); + ret =hyp_pin_shared_mem (sve_state, sve_state + sve_state_size);if (ret) goto err;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Fuad Tabba
reviewerPATCH 2/4 KVM: arm64: Do not clear VM-wide SVE feature on vCPU init failure
In reply to Fuad Tabbapkvm_vcpu_init_sve() clears KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE in kvm->arch.vcpu_features when it fails, but vcpu_has_sve() tests KVM_ARCH_FLAG_GUEST_HAS_SVE, which is left set. Later vCPUs on that VM then skip the SVE setup and register with a NULL sve_state, which the guest's first FP access hands to sve_load_state().
Return the error without touching vcpu_features.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 13 ++++--------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +4 -9
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *hunsigned int sve_max_vl;size_t sve_state_size;void *sve_state; -int ret =0 ; +int ret;if (!vcpu_has_feature (vcpu,KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE )) {vcpu_clear_flag (vcpu,VCPU_SVE_FINALIZED );
@@ -462,24 +462,19 @@ static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h sve_max_vl =min (READ_ONCE (host_vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl), kvm_host_sve_max_vl); sve_state =kern_hyp_va (READ_ONCE (host_vcpu->arch.sve_state)); -if (!sve_vl_valid (sve_max_vl) || !sve_state) { - ret = -EINVAL ; - goto err; - } +if (!sve_vl_valid (sve_max_vl) || !sve_state) +return -EINVAL ; sve_state_size =sve_state_size_from_vl (sve_max_vl); ret =hyp_pin_shared_mem (sve_state, sve_state + sve_state_size);if (ret) - goto err; +return ret; vcpu->arch.sve_state = sve_state; vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl = sve_max_vl;return 0 ; -err: -clear_bit (KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE , vcpu->kvm->arch.vcpu_features); -return ret; }static int vm_copy_id_regs (struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 2/4] KVM: arm64: Do not clear VM-wide SVE feature on vCPU init failure
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Hypervisor DoS via WARN_ON() upon page table allocation failure --
--- Patch [2]: [PATCH 2/4] KVM: arm64: Do not clear VM-wide SVE feature on vCPU init failure --- commit 1188c411e2a65143d7371d1038c2752c0f2de6c0
Author: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
KVM: arm64: Do not clear VM-wide SVE feature on vCPU init failure
pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() clears KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE in kvm->arch.vcpu_features when it fails, but vcpu_has_sve() tests KVM_ARCH_FLAG_GUEST_HAS_SVE, which is left set. Later vCPUs on that VM then skip the SVE setup and register with a NULL sve_state, which the guest's first FP access hands to sve_load_state().
Return the error without touching vcpu_features.
Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +0
-3@@ -462,24 +462,19 @@ static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h sve_max_vl =min (READ_ONCE (host_vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl), kvm_host_sve_max_vl); sve_state =kern_hyp_va (READ_ONCE (host_vcpu->arch.sve_state)); -if (!sve_vl_valid (sve_max_vl) || !sve_state) { - ret = -EINVAL ; - goto err;
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h · line 472
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +3
-2- } +if (!sve_vl_valid (sve_max_vl) || !sve_state) +return -EINVAL ; sve_state_size =sve_state_size_from_vl (sve_max_vl); ret =hyp_pin_shared_mem (sve_state, sve_state + sve_state_size);if (ret) - goto err; +return ret;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but can the call to hyp_pin_shared_mem() trigger a hypervisor panic if EL2 memory is exhausted?
Looking at hyp_pin_shared_mem() in arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c, it wraps the mapping allocation in a WARN_ON:
if (p->refcount == 1)
WARN_ON(pkvm_create_mappings_locked((void *)cur,
(void *)cur + PAGE_SIZE,
PAGE_HYP));At EL2 under nVHE/pKVM, WARN_ON() expands to a BRK instruction which panics the hypervisor and brings down the host.
Since host userspace can repeatedly invoke KVM ioctls to create VMs or vCPUs and exhaust the bounded EL2 memory pool, pkvm_create_mappings_locked() might eventually fail and return -ENOMEM.
Does this allow an unprivileged host process to hit the WARN_ON and crash the host system?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=2
Fuad Tabba
reviewerRe: [PATCH 2/4] KVM: arm64: Do not clear VM-wide SVE feature on vCPU init failure
Quoted 5 lines · On Tue, 25 Aug 2026 at 10:18, <[email protected]> wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Hypervisor DoS viaWARN_ON()upon page table allocation failure
Nope [1]
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CA+EHjTyPxcObTOwi25QTUDbLwAYaKnWY0QJVB_aMso2=38PJUg@mail.gmail.com/
Quoted 65 lines
--
--- Patch [2]: [PATCH 2/4] KVM: arm64: Do not clear VM-wide SVE feature on vCPU init failure --- commit
1188c411e2a65143d7371d1038c2752c0f2de6c0
Author: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>KVM: arm64: Do not clear VM-wide SVE feature on vCPU init failure
pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()clearsKVM_ARM_VCPU_SVEinkvm->arch.vcpu_featureswhen it fails, butvcpu_has_sve()testsKVM_ARCH_FLAG_GUEST_HAS_SVE, which is left set. Later vCPUs on that VM then skip the SVE setup and register with a NULLsve_state, which the guest's first FP access hands tosve_load_state().Return the error without touching
vcpu_features.Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +0
-3@@ -462,24 +462,19 @@ static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h sve_max_vl =min (READ_ONCE (host_vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl), kvm_host_sve_max_vl); sve_state =kern_hyp_va (READ_ONCE (host_vcpu->arch.sve_state)); -if (!sve_vl_valid (sve_max_vl) || !sve_state) { - ret = -EINVAL ; - goto err;arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h · line 472
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +3
-2- } +if (!sve_vl_valid (sve_max_vl) || !sve_state) +return -EINVAL ; sve_state_size =sve_state_size_from_vl (sve_max_vl); ret =hyp_pin_shared_mem (sve_state, sve_state + sve_state_size);if (ret) - goto err; +return ret;[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but can the call tohyp_pin_shared_mem()trigger a hypervisor panic if EL2 memory is exhausted?Looking at
hyp_pin_shared_mem()inarch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c, it wraps the mapping allocation in aWARN_ON:if (p->refcount == 1) WARN_ON(pkvm_create_mappings_locked((void *)cur, (void *)cur + PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_HYP));At EL2 under nVHE/pKVM,
WARN_ON()expands to a BRK instruction which panics the hypervisor and brings down the host.Since host userspace can repeatedly invoke KVM ioctls to create VMs or vCPUs and exhaust the bounded EL2 memory pool,
pkvm_create_mappings_locked()might eventually fail and return-ENOMEM.Does this allow an unprivileged host process to hit the
WARN_ONand crash the host system?--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=2
Fuad Tabba
reviewerPATCH 3/4 KVM: arm64: Key unpin_host_sve_state() on the state it unpins
In reply to Fuad Tabbaunpin_host_sve_state() gates on the VM's SVE feature bit, but what it unpins is the state pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() pinned. A vCPU that completed init has sve_state set exactly when that bit is set, so the two agree. Gate on sve_state, which is what is being unpinned.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +2 -2
@@ -398,10 +398,10 @@ static void unpin_host_sve_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) {void *sve_state; -if (!vcpu_has_feature (&hyp_vcpu->vcpu,KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE )) + sve_state = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.sve_state; +if (!sve_state)return ; - sve_state = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.sve_state;hyp_unpin_shared_mem (sve_state, sve_state +vcpu_sve_state_size (&hyp_vcpu->vcpu)); }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Fuad Tabba
reviewerPATCH 4/4 KVM: arm64: Derive GUEST_HAS_SVE from the SVE feature bit at EL2
In reply to Fuad Tabbapkvm_init_features_from_host() takes KVM_ARCH_FLAG_GUEST_HAS_SVE and KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE from the host separately, but pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() tests the bit while vcpu_has_sve() reads the flag. A host that sets the flag without the bit gets a vCPU with a NULL sve_state that the world switch loads the guest's SVE state from.
Derive the flag from the bit, and drop the protected path's copy of the host's flag, which is dead code since protected VMs are not allowed SVE.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +5 -4
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ static void pkvm_init_features_from_host(struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm, const strucif (test_bit (KVM_ARCH_FLAG_WRITABLE_IMP_ID_REGS , &host_arch_flags)) hyp_vm->kvm.arch.midr_el1 = host_kvm->arch.midr_el1; -return ; + goto out; }if (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed (kvm,KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE ))
@@ -379,13 +379,14 @@ static void pkvm_init_features_from_host(struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm, const strucif (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed (kvm,KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_GENERIC ))set_bit (KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC , allowed_features); -if (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed (kvm,KVM_CAP_ARM_SVE )) { +if (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed (kvm,KVM_CAP_ARM_SVE ))set_bit (KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE , allowed_features); - kvm->arch.flags |= host_arch_flags &BIT (KVM_ARCH_FLAG_GUEST_HAS_SVE ); - }bitmap_and (kvm->arch.vcpu_features, host_kvm->arch.vcpu_features, allowed_features,KVM_VCPU_MAX_FEATURES ); +out: +__assign_bit (KVM_ARCH_FLAG_GUEST_HAS_SVE , &kvm->arch.flags, +kvm_vcpu_has_feature (kvm,KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE )); }static void unpin_host_vcpu (struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Quoted 8 lines · Fuad Tabba
If it's not the GIC, it's SVE. I found these while preparing the follow-up to the pKVM core series [1].
Patch 1 was posted on its own [2] and carries Marc's Reviewed-by. It is unchanged and included here because it has not been picked up yet and the rest of the series does not apply without it.
[...]
Applied to fixes, thanks!
[1/4] KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()
https://git.kernel.org/kvmarm/kvmarm/c/2a2eb10795a1 [2/4] KVM: arm64: Do not clear VM-wide SVE feature on vCPU init failure https://git.kernel.org/kvmarm/kvmarm/c/a1b3c788ad31 [3/4] KVM: arm64: Key unpin_host_sve_state() on the state it unpins https://git.kernel.org/kvmarm/kvmarm/c/0d62fbf34d8f [4/4] KVM: arm64: Derive GUEST_HAS_SVE from the SVE feature bit at EL2 https://git.kernel.org/kvmarm/kvmarm/c/4f16c5fc8dc4
--
Best,
Oliver