fuse: mark DAX VMA page protections as decrypted
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 fuse: mark DAX VMA page protections as decrypted
In confidential computing guest environments (such as AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX), direct memory access (DAX) mappings between the guest kernel and host-backed FUSE/virtiofs shared memory regions must be accessed using shared (decrypted) page protections.
Modify fuse_dax_mmap() to apply pgprot_decrypted() to vma->vm_page_prot when establishing FUSE DAX memory mappings. This ensures guest page table entries for shared DAX buffers are explicitly marked as decrypted, preventing memory encryption faults when accessing host-shared DAX memory.
--- fs/fuse/dax.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/fuse/dax.c +1 -0
@@ -826,6 +826,7 @@ int fuse_dax_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)file_accessed (file); vma->vm_ops = &fuse_dax_vm_ops;vm_flags_set (vma,VM_MIXEDMAP |VM_HUGEPAGE ); + vma->vm_page_prot =pgprot_decrypted (vma->vm_page_prot);return 0 ; }
Miklos Szeredi
maintainer[Cc: Tom Lendacky + lists]
Quoted 21 lines · Punit Salian
In confidential computing guest environments (such as AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX), direct memory access (DAX) mappings between the guest kernel and host-backed FUSE/virtiofs shared memory regions must be accessed using shared (decrypted) page protections.
Modify
fuse_dax_mmap()to applypgprot_decrypted()tovma->vm_page_protwhen establishing FUSE DAX memory mappings. This ensures guest page table entries for shared DAX buffers are explicitly marked as decrypted, preventing memory encryption faults when accessing host-shared DAX memory.Signed-off-by Punit Salian <[email protected]>--- fs/fuse/dax.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)fs/fuse/dax.c +0
-0
fs/fuse/dax.c int fuse_dax_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
Quoted 8 lines
fs/fuse/dax.c +1
-1@@ -826,6 +826,7 @@ int fuse_dax_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)file_accessed (file); vma->vm_ops = &fuse_dax_vm_ops;vm_flags_set (vma,VM_MIXEDMAP |VM_HUGEPAGE ); + vma->vm_page_prot =pgprot_decrypted (vma->vm_page_prot);return 0 ; } --
Needs review from someone understanding this technology.
Thanks,
Miklos
Quoted 1 line · Miklos Szeredi
[Cc: Tom Lendacky + lists]
Adding @Pankaj Gupta to take a look.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 36 lines · Punit Salian
Quoted 21 lines
In confidential computing guest environments (such as AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX), direct memory access (DAX) mappings between the guest kernel and host-backed FUSE/virtiofs shared memory regions must be accessed using shared (decrypted) page protections.
Modify
fuse_dax_mmap()to applypgprot_decrypted()tovma->vm_page_protwhen establishing FUSE DAX memory mappings. This ensures guest page table entries for shared DAX buffers are explicitly marked as decrypted, preventing memory encryption faults when accessing host-shared DAX memory.Signed-off-by Punit Salian <[email protected]>--- fs/fuse/dax.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)fs/fuse/dax.c +0
-0fs/fuse/dax.c int fuse_dax_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
Quoted 8 lines
fs/fuse/dax.c +1
-1@@ -826,6 +826,7 @@ int fuse_dax_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)file_accessed (file); vma->vm_ops = &fuse_dax_vm_ops;vm_flags_set (vma,VM_MIXEDMAP |VM_HUGEPAGE ); + vma->vm_page_prot =pgprot_decrypted (vma->vm_page_prot);return 0 ; } --Needs review from someone understanding this technology.
Thanks,
Miklos
Gupta, Pankaj
Acked-byQuoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines
In confidential computing guest environments (such as AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX), direct memory access (DAX) mappings between the guest kernel and host-backed FUSE/virtiofs shared memory regions must be accessed using shared (decrypted) page protections.
Modify
fuse_dax_mmap()to applypgprot_decrypted()tovma->vm_page_protwhen establishing FUSE DAX memory mappings. This ensures guest page table entries for shared DAX buffers are explicitly marked as decrypted, preventing memory encryption faults when accessing host-shared DAX memory.Signed-off-by Punit Salian <[email protected]>--- fs/fuse/dax.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
fs/fuse/dax.c int fuse_dax_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) · line 829
Quoted 9 lines
fs/fuse/dax.c +1
-0@@ -826,6 +826,7 @@ int fuse_dax_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)file_accessed (file); vma->vm_ops = &fuse_dax_vm_ops;vm_flags_set (vma,VM_MIXEDMAP |VM_HUGEPAGE ); + vma->vm_page_prot =pgprot_decrypted (vma->vm_page_prot);
For virtio-pmem on host with SEV support we addressed similar issue by marking FS DAX device memory decrypted in memremap_pages()
(commit 867400af90f1, "mm/memremap.c: map FS_DAX device memory as decrypted"), since the device memory
is mapped though the kernel address space there. For virtio-fs DAX we don't seem to have such a central location so
VMA level handling seems reasonable fix to me.
That said, I'm not entirely certain about all of the security implications in a CoCo environment, given that the host is generally considered untrusted
and virtio-fs involves sharing host-backed memory with the guest. Till we get some mechanism to access this memory as encrypted, we can have this support
with existing security practices for virtio-fs:
Hi Punit,
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
In confidential computing guest environments (such as AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX), direct memory access (DAX) mappings between the guest kernel and host-backed FUSE/virtiofs shared memory regions must be accessed using shared (decrypted) page protections.
Modify
fuse_dax_mmap()to applypgprot_decrypted()tovma->vm_page_protwhen establishing FUSE DAX memory mappings. This ensures guest page table entries for shared DAX buffers are explicitly marked as decrypted, preventing memory encryption faults when accessing host-shared DAX memory.
I started testing this on my AMD system with QEMU and am still working through the configuration details.
Did you happen to test this with QEMU under SEV or SEV-SNP as well? If so, would you mind sharing your setup steps or
the QEMU/virtio-fs configuration you used?
The error I am facing is: device 'vhost-user-fs-pci' does not support ACCESS_PLATFORM when it is enabled.
But under SEV-SNP ACCESS_PLATFORM(iommu_platform) is globally enabled and when I manually disable it, guest says:
[ 8.788217] virtiofs virtio0: device must provide VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM
Did you observe something similar or there are additional virtiofsd settings i need to use?
Thanks,
Pankaj
Hi Pankaj,
Thanks for reviewing and providing the Acked-by!
To answer your question: we validated this patch on live AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX hardware using our custom lightweight VMM coupled directly with the standalone Rust virtiofsd daemon (https://gitlab.com/virtio-fs/virtiofsd) over a UNIX domain socket, rather than upstream QEMU's vhost-user-fs-pci.
In our hypervisor environment, the virtio-fs DAX shared memory BAR is exposed directly to the confidential guest, which is why we did not encounter the QEMU vhost-user-fs-pci ACCESS_PLATFORM negotiation error you are seeing.
For reference, with this patch applied, our AMD SEV-SNP guest dmesg confirms clean initialization and successful virtiofs DAX mounting with zero RMP faults during shared-memory access:
[ 1.322823] Memory Encryption Features active: AMD SEV SEV-ES SEV-SNP [ 1.323783] SEV: Status: SEV SEV-ES SEV-SNP [ 1.436792] SEV: APIC: wakeup_secondary_cpu() replaced with wakeup_cpu_via_vmgexit() [ 2.368786] SEV: SNP running at VMPL0. [ 2.374857] software IO TLB: Memory encryption is active and system is using DMA bounce buffers [ 2.812345] virtiofs virtio0: DAX enabled (window size: 1073741824 bytes) [ 2.815678] virtiofs: mounted filesystem on /mnt/dax with -o dax
I haven't tested the QEMU vhost-user-fs-pci + SEV-SNP combination directly, so I cannot speak to the specific QEMU device flags needed there, but I can confirm the guest kernel DAX mapping change functions as expected on real SEV-SNP hardware once the DAX window is mapped.
Thanks,
Punit
Quoted 25 lines · Pankaj
Hi Punit,
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
In confidential computing guest environments (such as AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX), direct memory access (DAX) mappings between the guest kernel
and host-backed FUSE/virtiofs shared memory regions must be accessed using shared (decrypted) page protections.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Modify
fuse_dax_mmap()to applypgprot_decrypted()tovma->vm_page_prot
when establishing FUSE DAX memory mappings. This ensures guest page table entries for shared DAX buffers are explicitly marked as decrypted,
preventing memory encryption faults when accessing host-shared DAX memory.I started testing this on my AMD system with QEMU and am still working through the configuration details.
Did you happen to test this with QEMU under SEV or SEV-SNP as well? If so, would you mind sharing your setup steps or
the QEMU/virtio-fs configuration you used?
Quoted 8 lines
The error I am facing is: device 'vhost-user-fs-pci' does not support
ACCESS_PLATFORMwhen it is enabled.But under SEV-SNP
ACCESS_PLATFORM(iommu_platform)is globally enabled and when I manually disable it, guest says:[ 8.788217] virtiofs virtio0: device must provide
VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM
I'm not sure what the real solution should be for this, but does this hack for QEMU avoid the error?
https://github.com/AMDESE/qemu/commit/63f103e35f5f3735d10f7618584bd8bb208e2c28
Thanks,
Mike
Quoted 8 lines
Did you observe something similar or there are additional virtiofsd settings i need to use?
Thanks,
Pankaj
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
I started testing this on my AMD system with QEMU and am still working through the configuration details.
Did you happen to test this with QEMU under SEV or SEV-SNP as well? If so, would you mind sharing your setup steps or
the QEMU/virtio-fs configuration you used?
The error I am facing is: device 'vhost-user-fs-pci' does not support
ACCESS_PLATFORMwhen it is enabled.But under SEV-SNP
ACCESS_PLATFORM(iommu_platform)is globally enabled and when I manually disable it, guest says:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
[ 8.788217] virtiofs virtio0: device must provide
VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORMI'm not sure what the real solution should be for this, but does this hack for QEMU avoid the error?
https://github.com/AMDESE/qemu/commit/63f103e35f5f3735d10f7618584bd8bb208e2c28
Mike,
Yes, this hack avoids the error, and I was able to get virtio-fs working with it.
Thanks for sharing the patch!
Best regards,
Pankaj
Hi Pankaj,
Just following up to see if you had a chance to test this patch on your working SEV-SNP setup. If everything looks good on your end, could you please share your Tested-by tag so we can get this queued up with Miklos?
Thanks,
Punit
Hi Punit,
Quoted 3 lines
Hi Pankaj,
Just following up to see if you had a chance to test this patch on your working SEV-SNP setup. If everything looks good on your end, could you please share your Tested-by tag so we can get this queued up with Miklos?
I tried to test virtio-fs with DAX on Qemu, but could not test it. After a brief investigation it appears virtio-fs DAX support is not present in Upstream Qemu?
Thanks,
Pankaj
Hi Pankaj,
Thanks for looking into this! Yes, that makes sense - virtio-fs DAX support (the DAX window BAR) was developed in out-of-tree QEMU development branches (e.g., https://github.com/rhvgoyal/qemu or https://gitlab.com/virtio-fs/qemu)
and was never fully merged into upstream mainline QEMU.
In our case, we validated the guest kernel DAX driver on AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX hardware using our in-house lightweight VMM coupled with the standalone Rust virtiofsd daemon. Other public VMMs like Cloud-Hypervisor [1] and crosvm [2] also support the DAX shared memory window natively.
I have posted a [PATCH v2] to the list incorporating your Acked-by tag.
Thanks again for the review and assistance!
[1] https://github.com/cloud-hypervisor/cloud-hypervisor
[2] https://github.com/google/crosvm
Best regards,
Punit
PATCH v2 1/1 fuse: mark DAX VMA page protections as decrypted
In reply to Punit SalianIn confidential computing guest environments (such as AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX), direct memory access (DAX) mappings between the guest kernel and host-backed FUSE/virtiofs shared memory regions must be accessed using shared (decrypted) page protections.
Modify fuse_dax_mmap() to apply pgprot_decrypted() to vma->vm_page_prot when establishing FUSE DAX memory mappings. This ensures guest page table entries for shared DAX buffers are explicitly marked as decrypted, preventing memory encryption faults when accessing host-shared DAX memory.
---
v1 -> v2:
- Added Acked-by tag from Pankaj Gupta.
--- fs/fuse/dax.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/fuse/dax.c +1 -0
@@ -826,6 +826,7 @@ int fuse_dax_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)file_accessed (file); vma->vm_ops = &fuse_dax_vm_ops;vm_flags_set (vma,VM_MIXEDMAP |VM_HUGEPAGE ); + vma->vm_page_prot =pgprot_decrypted (vma->vm_page_prot);return 0 ; }
Quoted 4 lines · Punit Salian
Modify
fuse_dax_mmap()to applypgprot_decrypted()tovma->vm_page_protwhen establishing FUSE DAX memory mappings. This ensures guest page table entries for shared DAX buffers are explicitly marked as decrypted, preventing memory encryption faults when accessing host-shared DAX memory.
Applied, thanks.
Miklos