keys: trusted: tpm1: add bounds check in tpm_seal() before memcpy
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 keys: trusted: tpm1: add bounds check in tpm_seal() before memcpy
tpm_seal() computes storedsize from TPM response fields and passes it directly to memcpy() into a MAX_BLOB_SIZE buffer without bounds validation. A forged TPM response can set storedsize to 4086, overflowing the 512-byte blob by 3574 bytes into adjacent slab objects.
Add a check that storedsize does not exceed MAX_BLOB_SIZE before the memcpy, returning -EINVAL on oversized responses.
Reported-by sn0x-sharma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by sn0x-sharma <[email protected]>
--- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +4 -0
@@ -531,6 +531,10 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,/* copy the returned blob to caller */ if (!ret) { +if (storedsize >MAX_BLOB_SIZE ) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + }memcpy (blob, tb->data +TPM_DATA_OFFSET , storedsize); *bloblen = storedsize; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0