FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selinux: reject an unclaimed class value in" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree
Subsystems (2)
[email protected]
maintainerThe patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 22b05fec62c0fe9864cfceb52f7d0f3a34d9b1dd
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026082040-litmus-embargo-428a@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' 'HEAD^..'
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 22b05fec62c0fe9864cfceb52f7d0f3a34d9b1dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2026 12:44:11 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] selinux: reject an unclaimed class value in
security_get_classes()
security_get_classes() sizes an array by p_classes.nprim and fills it at value - 1, so a class value the policy never defines leaves a NULL. sel_make_classes() passes every entry to sel_make_dir(), reaching the same d_alloc_name() dereference as the permission array. The class symbol table is allowed to be sparse (policydb_class_isvalid() exists to absorb that), but this getter builds its own array straight from the hash table and has no such predicate.
Fail the lookup when a value went unclaimed instead of handing out the NULL. Conforming policies define every class they declare and are unaffected.
security/selinux/ss/services.c +19 -5
@@ -3304,6 +3304,7 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy, char ***classes, u32 *nclasses) { struct policydb *policydb; +u32 i;int rc; policydb = &policy->policydb;
@@ -3316,16 +3317,29 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy, rc =hashtab_map (&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback, *classes); -if (rc) { -u32 i; +if (rc) + goto err; -for (i =0 ; i < *nclasses; i++) -kfree ((*classes)[i]); -kfree (*classes); +/* +* The class symtab may be sparse, which policydb_class_isvalid() exists +* to absorb; the callback fills this array by value, so an unclaimed +* one leaves a NULL that sel_make_classes() hands to sel_make_dir(). +*/ +for (i =0 ; i < *nclasses; i++) { +if (!(*classes)[i]) { + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto err; + } } out:return rc; + +err: +for (i =0 ; i < *nclasses; i++) +kfree ((*classes)[i]); +kfree (*classes); +return rc; }static int get_permissions_callback (void *k,void *d,void *args)
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/2 selinux: avoid implicit conversions in services code
From: Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c50e125d057152bc68dfd5669b73611343653eb7 ]
Use u32 as the output parameter type in security_get_classes() and security_get_permissions(), based on the type of the symtab nprim member.
Declare the read-only class string parameter ofsecurity_get_permissions() const.
Avoid several implicit conversions by using the identical type for the destination.
Use the type identical to the source for local variables.
Stable-dep-of: 22b05fec62c0 ("selinux: reject an unclaimed class value in security_get_classes()")
--- security/selinux/include/security.h | 4 ++-- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 7 ++++--- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
security/selinux/include/security.h +2 -2
@@ -375,9 +375,9 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state, u32 *peer_sid);int security_get_classes (struct selinux_policy *policy, -char ***classes,int *nclasses); +char ***classes,u32 *nclasses);int security_get_permissions (struct selinux_policy *policy, -char *class,char ***perms,int *nperms); +const char *class,char ***perms,u32 *nperms);int security_get_reject_unknown (struct selinux_state *state);int security_get_allow_unknown (struct selinux_state *state);
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +4 -3
@@ -1870,7 +1870,8 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, char *objclass, int classvalue, struct dentry *dir) { - int i, rc, nperms; + u32 i, nperms; +int rc;char **perms; rc =security_get_permissions (newpolicy, objclass, &perms, &nperms);
@@ -1943,8 +1944,8 @@ static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,struct dentry *class_dir, unsigned long *last_class_ino) { - - int rc, nclasses, i; + u32 i, nclasses; +int rc;char **classes; rc =security_get_classes (newpolicy, &classes, &nclasses);
security/selinux/ss/services.c +12 -11
@@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,struct sidtab *sidtab;struct sidtab_entry *old_entry, *new_entry;struct type_datum *type; -int index; +u32 index;int rc;if (!selinux_initialized (state))
@@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,return -ENOMEM ;if (!selinux_initialized (state)) { -int i; +u32 i;for (i =1 ; i <SECINITSID_NUM ; i++) {const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
@@ -2883,7 +2883,6 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy, {struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb;struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab; -int len;u16 sclass;struct genfs *genfs;struct ocontext *c;
@@ -2905,7 +2904,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,return -ENOENT ;for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) { - len =strlen (c->u.name); +size_t len =strlen (c->u.name);if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) && (strncmp (c->u.name, path, len) ==0 ))break ;
@@ -3399,7 +3398,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) {struct class_datum *datum = d;char *name = k, **classes = args; -int value = datum->value -1 ; +u32 value = datum->value -1 ; classes[value] =kstrdup (name,GFP_ATOMIC );if (!classes[value])
@@ -3409,7 +3408,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) }int security_get_classes (struct selinux_policy *policy, -char ***classes,int *nclasses) +char ***classes,u32 *nclasses) {struct policydb *policydb;int rc;
@@ -3425,7 +3424,8 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy, rc =hashtab_map (&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback, *classes);if (rc) { -int i; +u32 i; +for (i =0 ; i < *nclasses; i++)kfree ((*classes)[i]);kfree (*classes);
@@ -3439,7 +3439,7 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) {struct perm_datum *datum = d;char *name = k, **perms = args; -int value = datum->value -1 ; +u32 value = datum->value -1 ; perms[value] =kstrdup (name,GFP_ATOMIC );if (!perms[value])
@@ -3449,10 +3449,11 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) }int security_get_permissions (struct selinux_policy *policy, -char *class,char ***perms,int *nperms) +const char *class,char ***perms,u32 *nperms) {struct policydb *policydb; -int rc, i; +u32 i; +int rc;struct class_datum *match; policydb = &policy->policydb;
@@ -3672,7 +3673,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */ int selinux_audit_rule_known (struct audit_krule *rule) { -int i; +u32 i;for (i =0 ; i < rule->field_count; i++) {struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 2/2 selinux: reject an unclaimed class value in security_get_classes()
From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 22b05fec62c0fe9864cfceb52f7d0f3a34d9b1dd ]
security_get_classes() sizes an array by p_classes.nprim and fills it at value - 1, so a class value the policy never defines leaves a NULL. sel_make_classes() passes every entry to sel_make_dir(), reaching the same d_alloc_name() dereference as the permission array. The class symbol table is allowed to be sparse (policydb_class_isvalid() exists to absorb that), but this getter builds its own array straight from the hash table and has no such predicate.
Fail the lookup when a value went unclaimed instead of handing out the NULL. Conforming policies define every class they declare and are unaffected.
--- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
security/selinux/ss/services.c +19 -5
@@ -3411,6 +3411,7 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy, char ***classes, u32 *nclasses) { struct policydb *policydb; +u32 i;int rc; policydb = &policy->policydb;
@@ -3423,16 +3424,29 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy, rc =hashtab_map (&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback, *classes); -if (rc) { -u32 i; +if (rc) + goto err; -for (i =0 ; i < *nclasses; i++) -kfree ((*classes)[i]); -kfree (*classes); +/* +* The class symtab may be sparse, which policydb_class_isvalid() exists +* to absorb; the callback fills this array by value, so an unclaimed +* one leaves a NULL that sel_make_classes() hands to sel_make_dir(). +*/ +for (i =0 ; i < *nclasses; i++) { +if (!(*classes)[i]) { + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto err; + } } out:return rc; + +err: +for (i =0 ; i < *nclasses; i++) +kfree ((*classes)[i]); +kfree (*classes); +return rc; }static int get_permissions_callback (void *k,void *d,void *args)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0