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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selinux: require a class's permission values to cover its" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

PATCH New [email protected] 2 participants 5 messages Aug 20 – Aug 25

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#0 lore raw

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x b98a8ac50775540f3804397ed08f61ef9910bcab
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026082023-agreeing-overbook-66d4@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' 'HEAD^..'

Possible dependencies:

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From b98a8ac50775540f3804397ed08f61ef9910bcab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2026 12:44:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] selinux: require a class's permission values to cover its
permission count

security_get_permissions() sizes an array by the class's permissions.nprim and fills it at value - 1, from the inherited common's permission table and then the class's own. A value no permission defines leaves a NULL that sel_make_perm_files() passes to d_alloc_name(), an oops inside sel_write_load() that strands selinux_state.policy_mutex and leaves every later load in uninterruptible sleep; two permissions sharing a value overwrite the first kstrdup(). Bounding each value by nprim catches neither, and neither would a count: the symbol table is keyed on the permission name, so duplicates pass.

Track the values each permission table claims and require them to cover exactly what its count declares, rejecting a count no value can reach. Conforming policies are unaffected.

Fixes 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +46 -5
index 69777e885ae7..d358200817bd 100644
@@ -1154,7 +1154,18 @@ int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
+/*
+ * Bitmap of the permission values a symtab has claimed.  Values are 1-based
+ * and bounded by SEL_VEC_MAX, the width of an access vector, so the whole set
+ * fits in a u32 and the callers reject an nprim past that width.
+ */
+static u32 perm_claimed_mask(u32 nprim)
+{
+	return nprim ? U32_MAX >> (SEL_VEC_MAX - nprim) : 0;
+}
+
+static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s,
+		     struct policy_file *fp, u32 *claimed)
 {
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct perm_datum *perdatum;
@@ -1178,6 +1189,10 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
 	/* indexes an nprim-sized array in security_get_permissions() */
 	if (perdatum->value > s->nprim)
 		goto bad;
+	/* two permissions cannot share one slot of that array */
+	if (*claimed & (1U << (perdatum->value - 1)))
+		goto bad;
+	*claimed |= 1U << (perdatum->value - 1);
 
 	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1198,7 +1213,7 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct common_datum *comdatum;
 	__le32 buf[4];
-	u32 i, len, nel;
+	u32 i, len, nel, claimed = 0;
 	int rc;
 
 	comdatum = kzalloc_obj(*comdatum);
@@ -1225,17 +1240,28 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 	comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	/* no permission value can reach a slot past SEL_VEC_MAX */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (comdatum->permissions.nprim > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
 
 	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
-		rc = perm_read(p, &comdatum->permissions, fp);
+		rc = perm_read(p, &comdatum->permissions, fp, &claimed);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 	}
 
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (claimed != perm_claimed_mask(comdatum->permissions.nprim)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  common %s does not define every permission it declares\n",
+		       key);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
 	hash_eval(&comdatum->permissions.table, "common_permissions", key);
 
 	rc = symtab_insert(s, key, comdatum);
@@ -1369,7 +1395,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct class_datum *cladatum;
 	__le32 buf[6];
-	u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val;
+	u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val, claimed = 0, inherited = 0;
 	int rc;
 
 	cladatum = kzalloc_obj(*cladatum);
@@ -1402,6 +1428,10 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 	cladatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+	/* no permission value can reach a slot past SEL_VEC_MAX */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (cladatum->permissions.nprim > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
 
 	ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
 
@@ -1436,11 +1466,22 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
 		}
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
-		rc = perm_read(p, &cladatum->permissions, fp);
+		rc = perm_read(p, &cladatum->permissions, fp, &claimed);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 	}
 
+	/* the class's own permissions must claim the slots the common leaves */
+	if (cladatum->comdatum)
+		inherited = cladatum->comdatum->permissions.nprim;
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (claimed != (perm_claimed_mask(cladatum->permissions.nprim) &
+			~perm_claimed_mask(inherited))) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  class %s does not define every permission it declares\n",
+		       key);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
 	hash_eval(&cladatum->permissions.table, "class_permissions", key);
 
 	rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp);
maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/4 selinux: use known type instead of void pointer

From: Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f07586160fd5492f8d48e7667e7a5d8797aa5090 ]

Improve type safety and readability by using the known type.

Stable-dep-of: b98a8ac50775 ("selinux: require a class's permission values to cover its permission count")

---
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c       |  8 +--
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h       | 10 ++--
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 12 ++--
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.h |  6 +-
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c     |  4 +-
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h     |  5 +-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c    | 92 ++++++++++++++++---------------
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h    | 16 +++---
 8 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
security/selinux/ss/avtab.c +4 -4
index c97695ae508f1..ada24c8c2bf94 100644
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ static uint16_t spec_order[] = {
 	AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
 };
 
-int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 		    int (*insertf)(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
 				   const struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
 		    void *p)
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static int avtab_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
 	return avtab_insert(a, k, d);
 }
 
-int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *pol)
 {
 	int rc;
 	__le32 buf[1];
@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
 	goto out;
 }
 
-int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	__le16 buf16[4];
 	__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p)];
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
 	int rc = 0;
security/selinux/ss/avtab.h +6 -4
index d3ebea8d146f2..2d60ef7530f8b 100644
@@ -95,14 +95,16 @@ void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
 void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag);
 
 struct policydb;
-int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
+struct policy_file;
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 		    int (*insert)(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
 				  const struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
 		    void *p);
 
-int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol);
-int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp);
-int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp);
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *pol);
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur,
+		     struct policy_file *fp);
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp);
 
 struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
 					  const struct avtab_key *key,
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c +6 -6
index feb206f3acb4a..7e4f1f0b4318a 100644
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static int bool_isvalid(struct cond_bool_datum *b)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp,
+static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp,
 			     struct cond_av_list *list,
 			     struct cond_av_list *other)
 {
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static int expr_node_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr_node *expr)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
+static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	__le32 buf[2];
 	u32 i, len;
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
 	return cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, &node->true_list);
 }
 
-int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	__le32 buf[1];
 	u32 i, len;
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ int cond_write_bool(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
 	char *key = vkey;
 	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum = datum;
 	struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
-	void *fp = pd->fp;
+	struct policy_file *fp = pd->fp;
 	__le32 buf[3];
 	u32 len;
 	int rc;
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ static int cond_write_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	u32 i;
 	__le32 buf[1];
security/selinux/ss/conditional.h +3 -3
index e47ec6ddeaf61..c4c60413127cc 100644
@@ -69,10 +69,10 @@ int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p);
 
 int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
 
-int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp);
-int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp);
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp);
 int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
-int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp);
 
 void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
 		struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +2 -2
index 61fcbb8d0f880..6854aeb48289c 100644
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e)
 	return;
 }
 
-int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	struct ebitmap_node *n = NULL;
 	u32 mapunit, count, startbit, index;
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
 	goto out;
 }
 
-int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	struct ebitmap_node *n;
 	u32 count;
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +3 -2
index 9eb2d0af2805e..a721cd29ab118 100644
@@ -129,8 +129,9 @@ int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit);
 int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
 int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
 void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
-int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
-int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+struct policy_file;
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, struct policy_file *fp);
+int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, struct policy_file *fp);
 u32 ebitmap_hash(const struct ebitmap *e, u32 hash);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +47 -45

362 lines not on this page · raw message

security/selinux/ss/policydb.h +8 -8
index ffc4e7bad2054..862b6577e79d7 100644
@@ -315,14 +315,19 @@ struct policydb {
 	u32 process_trans_perms;
 } __randomize_layout;
 
+struct policy_file {
+	char *data;
+	size_t len;
+};
+
 extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
 extern int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s);
 extern int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
 extern int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class);
 extern int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type);
 extern int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role);
-extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
-extern int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp);
+extern int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp);
 
 extern struct filename_trans_datum *policydb_filenametr_search(
 	struct policydb *p, struct filename_trans_key *key);
@@ -345,14 +350,9 @@ extern struct role_trans_datum *policydb_roletr_search(
 #define POLICYDB_MAGIC SELINUX_MAGIC
 #define POLICYDB_STRING "SE Linux"
 
-struct policy_file {
-	char *data;
-	size_t len;
-};
-
 struct policy_data {
 	struct policydb *p;
-	void *fp;
+	struct policy_file *fp;
 };
 
 static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/4 selinux: more strict policy parsing

From: Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 18fa21f10d008a0fc22565109c7d38f304295912 ]

Be more strict during parsing of policies and reject invalid values.

Add some error messages in the case of policy parse failures, to enhance debugging, either on a malformed policy or a too strict check.

[PM: fixed checkpatch.pl warnings, style problems]

Stable-dep-of: b98a8ac50775 ("selinux: require a class's permission values to cover its permission count")

---
 security/selinux/include/security.h |  1 +
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c      | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |  6 ++----
 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/selinux/include/security.h +1 -0
index c0d966020ebdd..b0af661e581b6 100644
@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ int security_read_state_kernel(struct selinux_state *state,
 int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
 				 unsigned int req_cap);
 
+/* Maximum supported number of permissions per class */
 #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
 struct av_decision {
 	u32 allowed;
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +21 -5
index fcacc56424697..952a9656ead9c 100644
@@ -1132,6 +1132,9 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
 
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 	perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
 
 	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1152,8 +1155,8 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct common_datum *comdatum;
 	__le32 buf[4];
-	u32 len, nel;
-	int i, rc;
+	u32 i, len, nel;
+	int rc;
 
 	comdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!comdatum)
@@ -1166,6 +1169,9 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 	comdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (nel > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
 
 	rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, nel);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1317,8 +1323,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct class_datum *cladatum;
 	__le32 buf[6];
-	u32 len, len2, ncons, nel;
-	int i, rc;
+	u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val;
+	int rc;
 
 	cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!cladatum)
@@ -1330,8 +1336,16 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
 
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 	len2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
-	cladatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
 	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (nel > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
+
+	val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (val > U16_MAX)
+		goto bad;
+	cladatum->value = val;
 
 	rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, nel);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1416,6 +1430,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
 	return 0;
 bad:
 	cls_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("SELinux:  invalid class\n");
 	return rc;
 }
 
security/selinux/ss/services.c +2 -4
index 2b3e0e305ba99..5292cdd3bf582 100644
@@ -451,8 +451,6 @@ static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 	struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
 	char **permission_names = args;
 
-	BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
-
 	permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -471,7 +469,7 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
 	char *tclass_name;
 	char *scontext_name = NULL;
 	char *tcontext_name = NULL;
-	char *permission_names[32];
+	char *permission_names[SEL_VEC_MAX];
 	int index;
 	u32 length;
 	bool need_comma = false;
@@ -512,7 +510,7 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
 			 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
 			 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
 
-	for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+	for (index = 0; index < SEL_VEC_MAX; index++) {
 		u32 mask = (1 << index);
 
 		if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/4 selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d14b5d0e97fccd27974fedc03b903408872907fd ]

perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1] into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the nested per-class permission table is not.

Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected.

Fixes 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
[PM: tweak comment for line length]

Stable-dep-of: b98a8ac50775 ("selinux: require a class's permission values to cover its permission count")

---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +3 -0
index 952a9656ead9c..2a73aa201ca5e 100644
@@ -1135,6 +1135,9 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
 	rc = -EINVAL;
 	if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX)
 		goto bad;
+	/* indexes an nprim-sized array in security_get_permissions() */
+	if (perdatum->value > s->nprim)
+		goto bad;
 
 	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/4 selinux: require a class's permission values to cover its permission count

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b98a8ac50775540f3804397ed08f61ef9910bcab ]

security_get_permissions() sizes an array by the class's permissions.nprim and fills it at value - 1, from the inherited common's permission table and then the class's own. A value no permission defines leaves a NULL that sel_make_perm_files() passes to d_alloc_name(), an oops inside sel_write_load() that strands selinux_state.policy_mutex and leaves every later load in uninterruptible sleep; two permissions sharing a value overwrite the first kstrdup(). Bounding each value by nprim catches neither, and neither would a count: the symbol table is keyed on the permission name, so duplicates pass.

Track the values each permission table claims and require them to cover exactly what its count declares, rejecting a count no value can reach. Conforming policies are unaffected.

Fixes 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
[ dropped the two `hash_eval()` context lines since 5.15 has only the 2-arg DEBUG_HASHES variant ]
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +46 -5
index 2a73aa201ca5e..7cc112939d9b5 100644
@@ -1114,7 +1114,18 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
+/*
+ * Bitmap of the permission values a symtab has claimed.  Values are 1-based
+ * and bounded by SEL_VEC_MAX, the width of an access vector, so the whole set
+ * fits in a u32 and the callers reject an nprim past that width.
+ */
+static u32 perm_claimed_mask(u32 nprim)
+{
+	return nprim ? U32_MAX >> (SEL_VEC_MAX - nprim) : 0;
+}
+
+static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s,
+		     struct policy_file *fp, u32 *claimed)
 {
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct perm_datum *perdatum;
@@ -1138,6 +1149,10 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
 	/* indexes an nprim-sized array in security_get_permissions() */
 	if (perdatum->value > s->nprim)
 		goto bad;
+	/* two permissions cannot share one slot of that array */
+	if (*claimed & (1U << (perdatum->value - 1)))
+		goto bad;
+	*claimed |= 1U << (perdatum->value - 1);
 
 	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1158,7 +1173,7 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct common_datum *comdatum;
 	__le32 buf[4];
-	u32 i, len, nel;
+	u32 i, len, nel, claimed = 0;
 	int rc;
 
 	comdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1180,17 +1195,28 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 	comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	/* no permission value can reach a slot past SEL_VEC_MAX */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (comdatum->permissions.nprim > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
 
 	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
-		rc = perm_read(p, &comdatum->permissions, fp);
+		rc = perm_read(p, &comdatum->permissions, fp, &claimed);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 	}
 
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (claimed != perm_claimed_mask(comdatum->permissions.nprim)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  common %s does not define every permission it declares\n",
+		       key);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
 	rc = symtab_insert(s, key, comdatum);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
@@ -1326,7 +1352,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct class_datum *cladatum;
 	__le32 buf[6];
-	u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val;
+	u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val, claimed = 0, inherited = 0;
 	int rc;
 
 	cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1354,6 +1380,10 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 	cladatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+	/* no permission value can reach a slot past SEL_VEC_MAX */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (cladatum->permissions.nprim > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
 
 	ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
 
@@ -1388,11 +1418,22 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
 		}
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
-		rc = perm_read(p, &cladatum->permissions, fp);
+		rc = perm_read(p, &cladatum->permissions, fp, &claimed);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 	}
 
+	/* the class's own permissions must claim the slots the common leaves */
+	if (cladatum->comdatum)
+		inherited = cladatum->comdatum->permissions.nprim;
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (claimed != (perm_claimed_mask(cladatum->permissions.nprim) &
+			~perm_claimed_mask(inherited))) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  class %s does not define every permission it declares\n",
+		       key);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
 	rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0