Harden DPFE driver against buggy/malicious DCPU
Subsystems (4)
cover Harden DPFE driver against buggy/malicious DCPU
This patch series hardens the Broadcom STB DPFE driver against potential exploitation through a buggy or compromised DCPU coprocessor.
The DPFE driver exchanges messages with the DCPU over shared memory-mapped regions and currently trusts DCPU supplied values without bounds checking them before use.
A compromised or malfunctioning DCPU could:
- On API v1/v2 boards, provide an arbitrary MMIO read/write primitive through the offset supplied in get_msg_ptr(), combined with root-writable and world-readable sysfs files.
- Make a user who reads world-readable sysfs files trigger an out-of-bounds stack read of arbitrary extent via an unvalidated checksum index.
Patch 1 addresses the MMIO read/write issue by rejecting an offset that, along with the largest field accessed (DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR + sizeof(u32)), exceeds the recorded mapping size.
Patch 2 addresses the stack over-read via the checksum index by checking it against MSG_FIELD_MAX after reading the response from the DCPU message RAM.
Justin Chen (2):
memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Fix out-of-bounds access due to DCPU offset
memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Bounds check DCPU-supplied MSG_ARG_COUNT
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
PATCH 1/2 memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Fix out-of-bounds access due to DCPU offset
From: Justin Chen <[email protected]>
On API v1/v2 boards, the DCPU coprocessor can steer kernel readl_relaxed() and writel_relaxed() to any address within 256 MB of the ioremapped DPFE dmem or regs base. The DCPU firmware provides a 28-bit offset which the driver adds to the ioremap base without any bounds checking in get_msg_ptr().
This allows a compromised DCPU firmware to trick the host kernel into reading or writing arbitrary memory-mapped I/O registers in vmalloc space. When combined with a root-writable sysfs file like dpfe_refresh, it provides an arbitrary MMIO write primitive. Similarly, world-readable sysfs files can be used to leak other devices' register contents.
Fix this by recording the resource_size() of the dmem and regs ioremaps at probe time, and rejecting any offset that, along with the largest field accessed (DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR + sizeof(u32)), exceeds the recorded mapping size.
--- drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c +20 -2
@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv {void __iomem *regs;void __iomem *dmem;void __iomem *imem; +resource_size_t regs_size; +resource_size_t dmem_size;struct device *dev;const struct dpfe_api *dpfe_api;struct mutex lock;
@@ -401,9 +403,14 @@ static void __iomem *get_msg_ptr(struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv, u32 response,*/ switch (msg_type) {case 1 : +if (DCPU_MSG_RAM_START + offset +DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR + +sizeof (u32) > priv->regs_size) + goto bad_offset; ptr = priv->regs +DCPU_MSG_RAM_START + offset;break ;case 0 : +if (offset +DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR +sizeof (u32) > priv->dmem_size) + goto bad_offset; ptr = priv->dmem + offset;break ;default :
@@ -415,6 +422,12 @@ static void __iomem *get_msg_ptr(struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv, u32 response, }return ptr; + +bad_offset: +dev_err (priv->dev,"DCPU returned out-of-range offset %#x\n" , offset); +if (buf && size) + *size =sprintf (buf,"ERROR: DCPU offset out of range\n" ); +return NULL ; }static void __finalize_command (struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv)
@@ -858,6 +871,7 @@ static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) {struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv; +struct resource *res;int ret; priv =devm_kzalloc (dev,sizeof (*priv),GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -869,17 +883,21 @@ static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)mutex_init (&priv->lock);platform_set_drvdata (pdev, priv); - priv->regs =devm_platform_ioremap_resource_byname (pdev,"dpfe-cpu" ); + res =platform_get_resource_byname (pdev,IORESOURCE_MEM ,"dpfe-cpu" ); + priv->regs =devm_ioremap_resource (dev, res);if (IS_ERR (priv->regs)) {dev_err (dev,"couldn't map DCPU registers\n" );return -ENODEV ; } + priv->regs_size =resource_size (res); - priv->dmem =devm_platform_ioremap_resource_byname (pdev,"dpfe-dmem" ); + res =platform_get_resource_byname (pdev,IORESOURCE_MEM ,"dpfe-dmem" ); + priv->dmem =devm_ioremap_resource (dev, res);if (IS_ERR (priv->dmem)) {dev_err (dev,"Couldn't map DCPU data memory\n" );return -ENOENT ; } + priv->dmem_size =resource_size (res); priv->imem =devm_platform_ioremap_resource_byname (pdev,"dpfe-imem" );if (IS_ERR (priv->imem)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Re: [PATCH 1/2] memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Fix out-of-bounds access due to DCPU offset
Quoted 19 lines · Danesh Petigara
From: Justin Chen <[email protected]>
On API v1/v2 boards, the DCPU coprocessor can steer kernel
readl_relaxed()andwritel_relaxed()to any address within 256 MB of the ioremapped DPFE dmem or regs base. The DCPU firmware provides a 28-bit offset which the driver adds to the ioremap base without any bounds checking inget_msg_ptr().This allows a compromised DCPU firmware to trick the host kernel into reading or writing arbitrary memory-mapped I/O registers in vmalloc space. When combined with a root-writable sysfs file like
dpfe_refresh, it provides an arbitrary MMIO write primitive. Similarly, world-readable sysfs files can be used to leak other devices' register contents.Fix this by recording the
resource_size()of the dmem and regs ioremaps at probe time, and rejecting any offset that, along with the largest field accessed (DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR+ sizeof(u32)), exceeds the recorded mapping size.
Quoted 5 lines
Fixes fee5f1ef6cf7 ("memory: brcmstb: dpfe: support new way of passing data from the DCPU")Signed-off-by Justin Chen <[email protected]>Assisted-by Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview cursorSigned-off-by Danesh Petigara <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
Florian
Krzysztof Kozlowski
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/2] memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Fix out-of-bounds access due to DCPU offset
In reply to Danesh PetigaraQuoted 8 lines · Danesh Petigara
From: Justin Chen <[email protected]>
On API v1/v2 boards, the DCPU coprocessor can steer kernel
readl_relaxed()andwritel_relaxed()to any address within 256 MB of the ioremapped DPFE dmem or regs base. The DCPU firmware provides a 28-bit offset which the driver adds to the ioremap base without any bounds checking inget_msg_ptr().
Quoted 5 lines
This allows a compromised DCPU firmware to trick the host kernel into reading or writing arbitrary memory-mapped I/O registers in vmalloc space. When combined with a root-writable sysfs file like
dpfe_refresh, it provides an arbitrary MMIO write primitive. Similarly, world-readable sysfs files can be used to leak other devices' register contents.
If someone can compromise firmware to provide different addresses, then what stops this person to change DTB with completely different MMIO ranges for this device?
Isn't better just to drop root-writeable sysfs interfaces, since they are the insecure parts?
Quoted 65 lines
Fix this by recording the
resource_size()of the dmem and regs ioremaps at probe time, and rejecting any offset that, along with the largest field accessed (DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR+ sizeof(u32)), exceeds the recorded mapping size.Fixes fee5f1ef6cf7 ("memory: brcmstb: dpfe: support new way of passing data from the DCPU")Signed-off-by Justin Chen <[email protected]>Assisted-by Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview cursorSigned-off-by Danesh Petigara <[email protected]>--- drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c +14
-0@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv {void __iomem *regs;void __iomem *dmem;void __iomem *imem; +resource_size_t regs_size; +resource_size_t dmem_size;struct device *dev;const struct dpfe_api *dpfe_api;struct mutex lock;@@ -401,9 +403,14 @@ static void __iomem *get_msg_ptr(struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv, u32 response,*/ switch (msg_type) {case 1 : +if (DCPU_MSG_RAM_START + offset +DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR + +sizeof (u32) > priv->regs_size) + goto bad_offset; ptr = priv->regs +DCPU_MSG_RAM_START + offset;break ;case 0 : +if (offset +DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR +sizeof (u32) > priv->dmem_size) + goto bad_offset; ptr = priv->dmem + offset;break ;default :@@ -415,6 +422,12 @@ static void __iomem *get_msg_ptr(struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv, u32 response, }return ptr; + +bad_offset: +dev_err (priv->dev,"DCPU returned out-of-range offset %#x\n" , offset); +if (buf && size) + *size =sprintf (buf,"ERROR: DCPU offset out of range\n" ); +return NULL ; }static void __finalize_command (struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv)@@ -858,6 +871,7 @@ static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) {struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv; +struct resource *res;int ret; priv =devm_kzalloc (dev,sizeof (*priv),GFP_KERNEL );
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) · line 886
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c +1
-1@@ -869,17 +883,21 @@ static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)mutex_init (&priv->lock);platform_set_drvdata (pdev, priv); - priv->regs =devm_platform_ioremap_resource_byname (pdev,"dpfe-cpu" ); + res =platform_get_resource_byname (pdev,IORESOURCE_MEM ,"dpfe-cpu" );
You cannot use devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource()? Are the 'reg' entries flexible/random?
Best regards,
Krzysztof
Florian Fainelli
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/2] memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Fix out-of-bounds access due to DCPU offset
Quoted 15 lines · Krzysztof Kozlowski
Quoted 8 lines · Danesh Petigara
From: Justin Chen <[email protected]>
On API v1/v2 boards, the DCPU coprocessor can steer kernel
readl_relaxed()andwritel_relaxed()to any address within 256 MB of the ioremapped DPFE dmem or regs base. The DCPU firmware provides a 28-bit offset which the driver adds to the ioremap base without any bounds checking inget_msg_ptr().Quoted 5 lines
This allows a compromised DCPU firmware to trick the host kernel into reading or writing arbitrary memory-mapped I/O registers in vmalloc space. When combined with a root-writable sysfs file like
dpfe_refresh, it provides an arbitrary MMIO write primitive. Similarly, world-readable sysfs files can be used to leak other devices' register contents.
Quoted 3 lines
If someone can compromise firmware to provide different addresses, then what stops this person to change DTB with completely different MMIO ranges for this device?
On our platforms the DTB is part of the boot loader which is signed+encrypted and customers do not build any UART driver or user-interface so changing the DTB is somewhat difficult. Same goes with the Linux kernel, it's also signed+encrypted. This is defense in depth at this point.
Quoted 3 lines
Isn't better just to drop root-writeable sysfs interfaces, since they are the insecure parts?
Yes that would probably be an acceptable move forward. Markus do you remember what was the use case for the dpfe_refresh file to be R/W?
Quoted 69 lines
Quoted 69 lines
Fix this by recording the
resource_size()of the dmem and regs ioremaps at probe time, and rejecting any offset that, along with the largest field accessed (DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR+ sizeof(u32)), exceeds the recorded mapping size.Fixes fee5f1ef6cf7 ("memory: brcmstb: dpfe: support new way of passing data from the DCPU")Signed-off-by Justin Chen <[email protected]>Assisted-by Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview cursorSigned-off-by Danesh Petigara <[email protected]>--- drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c +14
-0@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv {void __iomem *regs;void __iomem *dmem;void __iomem *imem; +resource_size_t regs_size; +resource_size_t dmem_size;struct device *dev;const struct dpfe_api *dpfe_api;struct mutex lock;@@ -401,9 +403,14 @@ static void __iomem *get_msg_ptr(struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv, u32 response,*/ switch (msg_type) {case 1 : +if (DCPU_MSG_RAM_START + offset +DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR + +sizeof (u32) > priv->regs_size) + goto bad_offset; ptr = priv->regs +DCPU_MSG_RAM_START + offset;break ;case 0 : +if (offset +DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR +sizeof (u32) > priv->dmem_size) + goto bad_offset; ptr = priv->dmem + offset;break ;default :@@ -415,6 +422,12 @@ static void __iomem *get_msg_ptr(struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv, u32 response, }return ptr; + +bad_offset: +dev_err (priv->dev,"DCPU returned out-of-range offset %#x\n" , offset); +if (buf && size) + *size =sprintf (buf,"ERROR: DCPU offset out of range\n" ); +return NULL ; }static void __finalize_command (struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv)@@ -858,6 +871,7 @@ static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) {struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv; +struct resource *res;int ret; priv =devm_kzalloc (dev,sizeof (*priv),GFP_KERNEL );@@ -869,17 +883,21 @@ static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)mutex_init (&priv->lock);platform_set_drvdata (pdev, priv);
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) · line 886
Quoted 2 lines
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c +1
-1- priv->regs =devm_platform_ioremap_resource_byname (pdev,"dpfe-cpu" ); + res =platform_get_resource_byname (pdev,IORESOURCE_MEM ,"dpfe-cpu" );You cannot use
devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource()? Are the 'reg' entries flexible/random?
IIRC the names and indexes are stable so we could do a positional index resource lookup, but maybe what we want is to introduce a devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource_by_name()?
Signature · 1 line
Florian
Krzysztof Kozlowski
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/2] memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Fix out-of-bounds access due to DCPU offset
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 15 lines · Krzysztof Kozlowski
Quoted 8 lines · Danesh Petigara
From: Justin Chen <[email protected]>
On API v1/v2 boards, the DCPU coprocessor can steer kernel
readl_relaxed()andwritel_relaxed()to any address within 256 MB of the ioremapped DPFE dmem or regs base. The DCPU firmware provides a 28-bit offset which the driver adds to the ioremap base without any bounds checking inget_msg_ptr().Quoted 5 lines
This allows a compromised DCPU firmware to trick the host kernel into reading or writing arbitrary memory-mapped I/O registers in vmalloc space. When combined with a root-writable sysfs file like
dpfe_refresh, it provides an arbitrary MMIO write primitive. Similarly, world-readable sysfs files can be used to leak other devices' register contents.Quoted 3 lines
If someone can compromise firmware to provide different addresses, then what stops this person to change DTB with completely different MMIO ranges for this device?
Quoted 5 lines
On our platforms the DTB is part of the boot loader which is signed+encrypted and customers do not build any UART driver or user-interface so changing the DTB is somewhat difficult. Same goes with the Linux kernel, it's also signed+encrypted. This is defense in depth at this point.
Ack
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Isn't better just to drop root-writeable sysfs interfaces, since they are the insecure parts?
Yes that would probably be an acceptable move forward. Markus do you remember what was the use case for the
dpfe_refreshfile to be R/W?
That's in this case separate solution, worth anyway investigating.
Quoted 76 lines
Quoted 70 lines
Quoted 70 lines
Fix this by recording the
resource_size()of the dmem and regs ioremaps at probe time, and rejecting any offset that, along with the largest field accessed (DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR+ sizeof(u32)), exceeds the recorded mapping size.Fixes fee5f1ef6cf7 ("memory: brcmstb: dpfe: support new way of passing data from the DCPU")Signed-off-by Justin Chen <[email protected]>Assisted-by Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview cursorSigned-off-by Danesh Petigara <[email protected]>--- drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c +14
-0@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv {void __iomem *regs;void __iomem *dmem;void __iomem *imem; +resource_size_t regs_size; +resource_size_t dmem_size;struct device *dev;const struct dpfe_api *dpfe_api;struct mutex lock;@@ -401,9 +403,14 @@ static void __iomem *get_msg_ptr(struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv, u32 response,*/ switch (msg_type) {case 1 : +if (DCPU_MSG_RAM_START + offset +DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR + +sizeof (u32) > priv->regs_size) + goto bad_offset; ptr = priv->regs +DCPU_MSG_RAM_START + offset;break ;case 0 : +if (offset +DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR +sizeof (u32) > priv->dmem_size) + goto bad_offset; ptr = priv->dmem + offset;break ;default :@@ -415,6 +422,12 @@ static void __iomem *get_msg_ptr(struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv, u32 response, }return ptr; + +bad_offset: +dev_err (priv->dev,"DCPU returned out-of-range offset %#x\n" , offset); +if (buf && size) + *size =sprintf (buf,"ERROR: DCPU offset out of range\n" ); +return NULL ; }static void __finalize_command (struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv)@@ -858,6 +871,7 @@ static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) {struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv; +struct resource *res;int ret; priv =devm_kzalloc (dev,sizeof (*priv),GFP_KERNEL );@@ -869,17 +883,21 @@ static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)mutex_init (&priv->lock);platform_set_drvdata (pdev, priv);Quoted 5 lines
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) · line 886
Quoted 2 lines
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c +1
-1- priv->regs =devm_platform_ioremap_resource_byname (pdev,"dpfe-cpu" ); + res =platform_get_resource_byname (pdev,IORESOURCE_MEM ,"dpfe-cpu" );You cannot use
devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource()? Are the 'reg' entries flexible/random?
Quoted 3 lines
IIRC the names and indexes are stable so we could do a positional index resource lookup, but maybe what we want is to introduce a
devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource_by_name()?
If the bindings enforces strict order, that could be a way, but I do not want to push towards new devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource_by_name() because that could lead to long patchset with bikeshedding about how many wrappers we need...
Approach is fine then. New wrapper can be brought on top.
Best regards,
Krzysztof
Re: [PATCH 1/2] memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Fix out-of-bounds access due to DCPU offset
Quoted 119 lines · Krzysztof Kozlowski
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 15 lines · Krzysztof Kozlowski
Quoted 8 lines · Danesh Petigara
From: Justin Chen <[email protected]>
On API v1/v2 boards, the DCPU coprocessor can steer kernel
readl_relaxed()andwritel_relaxed()to any address within 256 MB of the ioremapped DPFE dmem or regs base. The DCPU firmware provides a 28-bit offset which the driver adds to the ioremap base without any bounds checking inget_msg_ptr().Quoted 5 lines
This allows a compromised DCPU firmware to trick the host kernel into reading or writing arbitrary memory-mapped I/O registers in vmalloc space. When combined with a root-writable sysfs file like
dpfe_refresh, it provides an arbitrary MMIO write primitive. Similarly, world-readable sysfs files can be used to leak other devices' register contents.Quoted 3 lines
If someone can compromise firmware to provide different addresses, then what stops this person to change DTB with completely different MMIO ranges for this device?
Quoted 5 lines
On our platforms the DTB is part of the boot loader which is signed+encrypted and customers do not build any UART driver or user-interface so changing the DTB is somewhat difficult. Same goes with the Linux kernel, it's also signed+encrypted. This is defense in depth at this point.
Ack
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Isn't better just to drop root-writeable sysfs interfaces, since they are the insecure parts?
Yes that would probably be an acceptable move forward. Markus do you remember what was the use case for the
dpfe_refreshfile to be R/W?That's in this case separate solution, worth anyway investigating.
Quoted 76 lines
Quoted 70 lines
Quoted 70 lines
Fix this by recording the
resource_size()of the dmem and regs ioremaps at probe time, and rejecting any offset that, along with the largest field accessed (DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR+ sizeof(u32)), exceeds the recorded mapping size.Fixes fee5f1ef6cf7 ("memory: brcmstb: dpfe: support new way of passing data from the DCPU")Signed-off-by Justin Chen <[email protected]>Assisted-by Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview cursorSigned-off-by Danesh Petigara <[email protected]>--- drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c +14
-0@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv {void __iomem *regs;void __iomem *dmem;void __iomem *imem; +resource_size_t regs_size; +resource_size_t dmem_size;struct device *dev;const struct dpfe_api *dpfe_api;struct mutex lock;@@ -401,9 +403,14 @@ static void __iomem *get_msg_ptr(struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv, u32 response,*/ switch (msg_type) {case 1 : +if (DCPU_MSG_RAM_START + offset +DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR + +sizeof (u32) > priv->regs_size) + goto bad_offset; ptr = priv->regs +DCPU_MSG_RAM_START + offset;break ;case 0 : +if (offset +DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR +sizeof (u32) > priv->dmem_size) + goto bad_offset; ptr = priv->dmem + offset;break ;default :@@ -415,6 +422,12 @@ static void __iomem *get_msg_ptr(struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv, u32 response, }return ptr; + +bad_offset: +dev_err (priv->dev,"DCPU returned out-of-range offset %#x\n" , offset); +if (buf && size) + *size =sprintf (buf,"ERROR: DCPU offset out of range\n" ); +return NULL ; }static void __finalize_command (struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv)@@ -858,6 +871,7 @@ static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) {struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv; +struct resource *res;int ret; priv =devm_kzalloc (dev,sizeof (*priv),GFP_KERNEL );@@ -869,17 +883,21 @@ static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)mutex_init (&priv->lock);platform_set_drvdata (pdev, priv);Quoted 5 lines
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) · line 886
Quoted 2 lines
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c +1
-1- priv->regs =devm_platform_ioremap_resource_byname (pdev,"dpfe-cpu" ); + res =platform_get_resource_byname (pdev,IORESOURCE_MEM ,"dpfe-cpu" );You cannot use
devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource()? Are the 'reg' entries flexible/random?Quoted 3 lines
IIRC the names and indexes are stable so we could do a positional index resource lookup, but maybe what we want is to introduce a
devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource_by_name()?
Quoted 6 lines
If the bindings enforces strict order, that could be a way, but I do not want to push towards new
devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource_by_name()because that could lead to long patchset with bikeshedding about how many wrappers we need...Approach is fine then. New wrapper can be brought on top.
I would like to confirm that the patches are acceptable in their current form, or if
they require additional changes.
Thanks,
Danesh
Markus Mayer
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/2] memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Fix out-of-bounds access due to DCPU offset
In reply to Krzysztof KozlowskiQuoted 32 lines · Krzysztof Kozlowski
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 15 lines · Krzysztof Kozlowski
Quoted 8 lines · Danesh Petigara
From: Justin Chen <[email protected]>
On API v1/v2 boards, the DCPU coprocessor can steer kernel
readl_relaxed()andwritel_relaxed()to any address within 256 MB of the ioremapped DPFE dmem or regs base. The DCPU firmware provides a 28-bit offset which the driver adds to the ioremap base without any bounds checking inget_msg_ptr().Quoted 5 lines
This allows a compromised DCPU firmware to trick the host kernel into reading or writing arbitrary memory-mapped I/O registers in vmalloc space. When combined with a root-writable sysfs file like
dpfe_refresh, it provides an arbitrary MMIO write primitive. Similarly, world-readable sysfs files can be used to leak other devices' register contents.Quoted 3 lines
If someone can compromise firmware to provide different addresses, then what stops this person to change DTB with completely different MMIO ranges for this device?
Quoted 5 lines
On our platforms the DTB is part of the boot loader which is signed+encrypted and customers do not build any UART driver or user-interface so changing the DTB is somewhat difficult. Same goes with the Linux kernel, it's also signed+encrypted. This is defense in depth at this point.
Ack
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Isn't better just to drop root-writeable sysfs interfaces, since they are the insecure parts?
Yes that would probably be an acceptable move forward. Markus do you remember what was the use case for the
dpfe_refreshfile to be R/W?That's in this case separate solution, worth anyway investigating.
As I recall, there was a reason the refresh rate was changeable. Note, however, that this is only available for the older version of the communication API. This hasn't been used in a while. So, unless you are on an older architecture chip, there will be no "refresh" attribute at all (because it'll be using the v3 sysfs attributes).
I'll dig some more through documentation and old email threads to find the concrete explanation behind the "refresh" attribute.
Quoted 86 lines
Quoted 73 lines
Quoted 67 lines
Quoted 67 lines
Fix this by recording the
resource_size()of the dmem and regs ioremaps at probe time, and rejecting any offset that, along with the largest field accessed (DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR+ sizeof(u32)), exceeds the recorded mapping size.Fixes fee5f1ef6cf7 ("memory: brcmstb: dpfe: support new way of passing data from the DCPU")Signed-off-by Justin Chen <[email protected]>Assisted-by Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview cursorSigned-off-by Danesh Petigara <[email protected]>--- drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c +14
-0@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv {void __iomem *regs;void __iomem *dmem;void __iomem *imem; +resource_size_t regs_size; +resource_size_t dmem_size;struct device *dev;const struct dpfe_api *dpfe_api;struct mutex lock;@@ -401,9 +403,14 @@ static void __iomem *get_msg_ptr(struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv, u32 response,*/ switch (msg_type) {case 1 : +if (DCPU_MSG_RAM_START + offset +DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR + +sizeof (u32) > priv->regs_size) + goto bad_offset; ptr = priv->regs +DCPU_MSG_RAM_START + offset;break ;case 0 : +if (offset +DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR +sizeof (u32) > priv->dmem_size) + goto bad_offset; ptr = priv->dmem + offset;break ;default :@@ -415,6 +422,12 @@ static void __iomem *get_msg_ptr(struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv, u32 response, }return ptr; + +bad_offset: +dev_err (priv->dev,"DCPU returned out-of-range offset %#x\n" , offset); +if (buf && size) + *size =sprintf (buf,"ERROR: DCPU offset out of range\n" ); +return NULL ; }static void __finalize_command (struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv)@@ -858,6 +871,7 @@ static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) {struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv; +struct resource *res;int ret; priv =devm_kzalloc (dev,sizeof (*priv),GFP_KERNEL );@@ -869,17 +883,21 @@ static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)mutex_init (&priv->lock);platform_set_drvdata (pdev, priv);Quoted 5 lines
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c static int brcmstb_dpfe_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) · line 886
Quoted 2 lines
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c +1
-1- priv->regs =devm_platform_ioremap_resource_byname (pdev,"dpfe-cpu" ); + res =platform_get_resource_byname (pdev,IORESOURCE_MEM ,"dpfe-cpu" );You cannot use
devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource()? Are the 'reg' entries flexible/random?Quoted 3 lines
IIRC the names and indexes are stable so we could do a positional index resource lookup, but maybe what we want is to introduce a
devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource_by_name()?If the bindings enforces strict order, that could be a way, but I do not want to push towards new
devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource_by_name()because that could lead to long patchset with bikeshedding about how many wrappers we need...Approach is fine then. New wrapper can be brought on top.
Best regards,
Krzysztof
PATCH 2/2 memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Bounds check DCPU-supplied MSG_ARG_COUNT
In reply to Danesh PetigaraFrom: Justin Chen <[email protected]>
A compromised or buggy DCPU coprocessor can make any user who reads world-readable /sys/devices/.../dpfe_info|dpfe_dram trigger a kernel stack out-of-bounds read of arbitrary extent. This bounds checks chksum_idx against MSG_FIELD_MAX after reading the response from DCPU message RAM.
--- drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c +2 -0
@@ -503,6 +503,8 @@ static int __send_command(struct brcmstb_dpfe_priv *priv, unsigned int cmd,for (i =0 ; i <MSG_FIELD_MAX ; i++) result[i] =readl_relaxed (regs +DCPU_MSG_RAM (i)); chksum_idx = result[MSG_ARG_COUNT ] +MSG_ARG_COUNT +1 ; +if (chksum_idx >=MSG_FIELD_MAX ) + ret = -EINVAL ; }/* Tell DCPU we are done */
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Re: [PATCH 2/2] memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Bounds check DCPU-supplied MSG_ARG_COUNT
Quoted 8 lines · Danesh Petigara
From: Justin Chen <[email protected]>
A compromised or buggy DCPU coprocessor can make any user who reads world-readable /sys/devices/.../dpfe_info|dpfe_dram trigger a kernel stack out-of-bounds read of arbitrary extent. This bounds checks
chksum_idxagainstMSG_FIELD_MAXafter reading the response from DCPU message RAM.
Quoted 5 lines
Fixes 5d06f53d9509 ("memory: brcmstb: dpfe: Compute checksum at __send_command() time")Signed-off-by Justin Chen <[email protected]>Assisted-by Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview cursorSigned-off-by Danesh Petigara <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
Florian
Quoted 8 lines · Danesh Petigara
This patch series hardens the Broadcom STB DPFE driver against potential exploitation through a buggy or compromised DCPU coprocessor.
The DPFE driver exchanges messages with the DCPU over shared memory-mapped regions and currently trusts DCPU supplied values without bounds checking them before use.
[...]
Applied, thanks!
[1/2] memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Fix out-of-bounds access due to DCPU offset
https://git.kernel.org/krzk/linux-mem-ctrl/c/7c0b82d087908765c6c7daeb06943e21b78d523e [2/2] memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Bounds check DCPU-supplied MSG_ARG_COUNT https://git.kernel.org/krzk/linux-mem-ctrl/c/6b07f8c06caca015a0db69e3f323b5186469bc66
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>