KVM: arm64: Sync HCR_EL2.VSE back to the host vCPU under pKVM
Fuad Tabba
reviewerPATCH 1/2 KVM: arm64: Sync HCR_EL2.VSE back to the host vCPU under pKVM
flush_hyp_vcpu() copies HCR_EL2.VSE from the host vCPU into the hyp vCPU on every entry, and nothing copies it back. Once the guest takes the vSError the hyp vCPU's copy clears with the hardware bit while the host's stays set, so the next entry pends the same SError again, KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS keeps reporting it, and kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable() never lets the vCPU block in WFI.
Reflect VSE back on every exit, which the flush-side comment already promises.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +4 -0
@@ -276,6 +276,10 @@ static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) host_vcpu->arch.iflags = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.iflags; +/* Cleared by hardware once the guest takes the vSError. */ + host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 &= ~HCR_VSE ; + host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |= hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 &HCR_VSE ; +sync_hyp_vgic_state (hyp_vcpu); }
base-commit: aa8e5dc6a7a2a1141ab40706a51010adcd0e57d2
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Fuad Tabba
reviewerPATCH 2/2 KVM: arm64: selftests: Check SError is not pending after delivery
test_serror() never looks at the vCPU after the SError is delivered, so a stale pending SError goes unnoticed. Read the vCPU events back and check the SError is no longer pending.
--- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/external_aborts.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/external_aborts.c +6 -0
@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ static void test_serror_guest(void)static void test_serror (void ) { +struct kvm_vcpu_events events;struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;struct kvm_vm *vm =vm_create_with_dabt_handler (&vcpu, test_serror_guest, unexpected_dabt_handler);
@@ -247,6 +248,11 @@ static void test_serror(void)vcpu_inject_serror (vcpu);vcpu_run_expect_done (vcpu); + +vcpu_events_get (vcpu, &events); +TEST_ASSERT (!events.exception.serror_pending, +"SError still pending after the guest took it" ); +kvm_vm_free (vm); }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] pKVM unconditionally leaks and overwrites protected guest context (including general purpose registers, system registers, and trap configuration) to and from the untrusted host on every guest entry/exit. --
commit 4f524814ed8b14fca5b29ea5c6eacae85dfdeb56
Author: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
KVM: arm64: Sync HCR_EL2.VSE back to the host vCPU under pKVM
This commit ensures that the HCR_EL2.VSE bit is synchronized from the hyp vCPU back to the host vCPU on guest exit under pKVM. It prevents the same virtual SError from being pended repeatedly.
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 282
Quoted 12 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +4
-0@@ -276,6 +276,10 @@ static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) host_vcpu->arch.iflags = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.iflags; +/* Cleared by hardware once the guest takes the vSError. */ + host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 &= ~HCR_VSE ; + host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |= hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 &HCR_VSE ; +
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this code unconditionally leak and overwrite protected guest context to and from the untrusted host on every guest entry and exit?
In sync_hyp_vcpu(), just above the lines added here, the code copies the confidential guest context back into host memory:
if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu)) {
host_vcpu->arch.ctxt = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt;This appears to leak protected guest register state to the host on each exit.
Additionally, on the entry path in flush_hyp_vcpu(), the untrusted host context completely overwrites the protected guest's context:
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt = host_vcpu->arch.ctxt;
It also seems to allow the host to inject its own debug trap configuration:
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2;
Could this allow the untrusted host EL1 to read and write all protected guest registers and inject debug traps, breaking the pKVM threat model guarantee that host EL1 cannot read or modify protected-VM memory or register state?
Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +0
-0sync_hyp_vgic_state (hyp_vcpu); }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Fuad Tabba
reviewerQuoted 5 lines · On Sat, 29 Aug 2026 at 08:21, <[email protected]> wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] pKVM unconditionally leaks and overwrites protected guest context (including general purpose registers, system registers, and trap configuration) to and from the untrusted host on every guest entry/exit.
Coming soon Sashiko, I promise. This is in preparation for that.
Cheers,
/fuad
PS. I've been preparing for you...
Quoted 56 lines
--
commit
4f524814ed8b14fca5b29ea5c6eacae85dfdeb56
Author: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>KVM: arm64: Sync HCR_EL2.VSE back to the host vCPU under pKVM
This commit ensures that the HCR_EL2.VSE bit is synchronized from the hyp vCPU back to the host vCPU on guest exit under pKVM. It prevents the same virtual SError from being pended repeatedly.
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 282
Quoted 12 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +4
-0@@ -276,6 +276,10 @@ static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) host_vcpu->arch.iflags = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.iflags; +/* Cleared by hardware once the guest takes the vSError. */ + host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 &= ~HCR_VSE ; + host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |= hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 &HCR_VSE ; +[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this code unconditionally leak and overwrite protected guest context to and from the untrusted host on every guest entry and exit?In
sync_hyp_vcpu(), just above the lines added here, the code copies the confidential guest context back into host memory:if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu)) { host_vcpu->arch.ctxt = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt;This appears to leak protected guest register state to the host on each exit.
Additionally, on the entry path in
flush_hyp_vcpu(), the untrusted host context completely overwrites the protected guest's context:hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt = host_vcpu->arch.ctxt;It also seems to allow the host to inject its own debug trap configuration:
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2;Could this allow the untrusted host EL1 to read and write all protected guest registers and inject debug traps, breaking the pKVM threat model guarantee that host EL1 cannot read or modify protected-VM memory or register state?
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 284
Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +0
-0sync_hyp_vgic_state (hyp_vcpu); }--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1