Raise BPF program stack size to 2KiB
Subsystems (12)
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerv2 cover Raise BPF program stack size to 2KiB
BPF programs get 512 bytes of stack. This series raises that to 2 KiB on x86-64 and arm64. The budget covers a whole call chain, or each frame on a private stack, and a single function may use all of it. The interpreter, offloaded programs and the other JITs keep 512 bytes.
The x86-64 and arm64 JITs do not depend on 512-byte frames: both encode frame sizes in wide enough immediates, and on both a tail call pops the caller's frame and lands in the target's prologue before the target sets up its own.
The verifier needs several changes, however. Its bookkeeping assumes at most 64 slots per frame: the jump history and linked register records carry 6-bit slot indexes, backtracking and the scratched-slot log keep one u64 per frame, the id map is sized for 64 slots per frame, and liveness keeps three fixed 128-bit masks per instruction per frame. Growing all of this fourfold would make every program pay for stack limits that most program will not exercise. Therefore, some dynamicity is needed without blowing verifier memory usage out of proportion.
The series first removes these assumptions without changing what verifies (patches 1-8). The liveness masks become bitmaps as wide as the stack a frame actually uses, and the id scratch grows on demand. It then adds a per-program budget, bpf_prog_stack_limit(): 2 KiB when the program is JITed, not offloaded, and the JIT reports bpf_jit_supports_large_stack() along with tail calls from subprograms, and 512 bytes otherwise. Finally, it turns the budget on for x86-64 and arm64.
Tail calls need no separate limit. A tail call pops the frame that makes it, and the frames its callers leave behind are still limited to 256 bytes by the existing rule for tail calls from subprograms. Only the final program's frame in a tail call chain grows, from 512 bytes to 2 KiB, so the chain's worst-case kernel stack use grows from about 8.5 KiB to about 10 KiB. The budget does not depend on privilege: an unprivileged program cannot call other BPF functions, so its tail calls leave no frame behind and its worst case is a single 2 KiB frame.
Memory was measured as the peak kernel memory allocated during each BPF_PROG_LOAD, for all 5162 loadable selftest programs, against bpf-next at 24629aac43d2. "Total" is the sum of the per-program peaks. Two runs of one kernel agree to 0.01% in total; a handful of small programs differ by one 64 KiB allocation between runs, and those one-off jumps are left out of the per-program rows.
patches 1-8 whole series
total -0.72% -0.50%
5027 programs under 1 MiB -0.32% -0.13%
116 programs of 1-16 MiB -0.58% +0.26%
19 programs of 16 MiB or more -1.09% -1.05% median program 0.0% 0.0%
programs growing by more than 5% 11 59
largest increase +16% +19%
largest decrease -5.0% -5.0%
The savings come from liveness: a frame within 256 bytes needs 24 bytes of masks per instruction instead of 48. The largest are pyperf600 (-5.2 MiB, -2.0%), pyperf180 (-3.2 MiB, -2.8%), pyperf100 (-2.8 MiB, -3.1%) and test_verif_scale2 (-1.0 MiB, -5.0%).
The increases have two causes:
* history: the jump history entry grows from 16 to 20 bytes, which penalizes loop-heavy programs. This is already present in patches 1-8.
* masks: a frame read as a whole through a pointer of unknown offset keeps liveness masks as wide as the 2 KiB budget. This appears only once the budget is raised.
The largest absolute increases for the whole series (peak in MiB):
program before after MiB % cause loop1/nested_loops 17.6 19.2 +1.5 +9% history strobemeta_bpf_loop/on_event 10.5 11.8 +1.3 +12% masks verifier_loops1/jumps_out_rather_than_in 4.4 5.1 +0.7 +16% history pyperf600_bpf_loop/on_event 5.6 6.3 +0.7 +12% masks pyperf600_nounroll/on_event 80.3 80.9 +0.6 +1% history strobemeta_nounroll2/on_event 44.5 45.1 +0.6 +1% both strobemeta/on_event 201.8 202.4 +0.5 +0.3% history bpf_iter_tasks/dump_task_sleepable 8.2 8.6 +0.4 +5% both test_tcp_custom_syncookie 10.8 11.2 +0.4 +4% masks strobemeta_nounroll1/on_event 20.9 21.3 +0.4 +2% both
The largest relative increases are small programs whose frame is read as a whole, each growing by 50 to 110 KiB: verifier_bitfield_write +15 to 19%, test_tc_tunnel +13 to 15% and dynptr_success +12%.
No selftest program uses more than 512 bytes, so a few were rebuilt with a 1 KiB local array handed only to an empty asm statement and -mllvm -bpf-stack-size=2048, which puts every spill below fp-1024 while the verifier never touches the array. They verify with the states and instructions of their unpadded twins; what grows is the verifier state, which carries 88 bytes per stack slot up to the deepest one touched:
program slots insns states peak MiB pyperf600 37/165 258028/258030 16635/16635 208/905 strobemeta 61/189 164241/164243 4719/4719 202/870 test_cls_redirect 22/150 59764/59766 3893/3893 7/186 test_verif_scale2 3/131 779692/779694 3048/3048 12/169
(unpadded/padded; the two extra instructions are the asm barrier).
In terms of verification time, the changes are within margin of error.
For more details, please see the individual commits.
Changelog:
----------
v1 -> v2
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
* Rebase on bpf-next. Rewrite the new callx stack depth tests, which expect 608 bytes of stack to be rejected, to use call chains deeper than 2 KiB, so that they are rejected under both budgets.
* Size the liveness spill tracker by the deepest 8-byte access a subprog makes directly through R10 when that reaches past the 64 slots of a 512-byte frame, so that a pointer spilled below fp-512 keeps its identity when filled; add a test, and report programs that spill that deep in the cover letter. (Alexei)
* Return -ENOMEM from the iterator destroy path when the id stack cannot grow, and keep warning about any other release_reference() failure. (Sashiko)
* Read 248 instead of 264 bytes into the frame in the liveness merge test, so the precise pass is narrower than a 512-byte whole-frame read on 64-bit and the widening is exercised everywhere. (Sashiko)
* Convert the nfp offload driver's stack slot indexing to bpf_stack_slot(), note the address-based lookup in reg_to_target(), fetch each slot once in the functions the message names, and narrow the accessor patch's message accordingly. (BPF CI)
* Raise the verifier log's line buffer to 2 KiB so that a full 256-slot stack mask fits in one line. (BPF CI)
* Say in the stack size Q&A that the interpreter's 512 bytes apply per frame and to programs verified for it. (BPF CI)
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi (18):
bpf: Add accessors for verifier stack slots
bpf: Widen the stack slot index in the jump history
bpf: Store linked registers in the jump history as an array
bpf: Track backtracking stack slots with bitmaps
bpf: Track scratched stack slots with a bitmap
bpf: Treat unknown-size stack reads as reaching the frame top
bpf: Size liveness stack masks by the stack each frame uses
bpf: Grow the verifier id scratch on demand selftests/bpf: Cover the tail call caller stack depth limit selftests/bpf: Check that narrow stack stores define no slot selftests/bpf: Check liveness merge of masks with different widths
bpf: Size the per-frame verifier structures for a 2 KiB stack
bpf: Bound program stack use by a per-program limit selftests/bpf: Add load conditions on the program stack limit selftests/bpf: Give the 512-byte stack boundary tests a 2 KiB twin bpf, x86: Allow programs 2 KiB of stack
bpf, arm64: Allow programs 2 KiB of stack selftests/bpf: Test the 2 KiB stack budget
Documentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst | 11 +- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 5 + arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 12 + .../net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 205 +++---- include/linux/filter.h | 6 + kernel/bpf/backtrack.c | 101 ++-- kernel/bpf/core.c | 13 + kernel/bpf/diagnostics.c | 11 +- kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 516 ++++++++++++------ kernel/bpf/log.c | 13 +- kernel/bpf/states.c | 136 +++-- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 334 ++++++------ .../bpf/prog_tests/struct_ops_private_stack.c | 31 ++ .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tailcalls.c | 42 ++ .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c | 2 + .../selftests/bpf/progs/async_stack_depth.c | 75 +++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h | 3 + .../bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_fail.c | 47 +- .../progs/struct_ops_private_stack_large.c | 51 ++ .../bpf/progs/tailcall_large_stack.c | 62 +++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func1.c | 65 +++ .../bpf/progs/test_global_func_deep_stack.c | 33 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_callx.c | 61 ++- .../bpf/progs/verifier_callx_rodata.c | 53 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_large_stack.c | 377 +++++++++++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c | 104 +++- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_raw_stack.c | 21 + .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_ptr.c | 53 ++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_tailcall.c | 57 ++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_var_off.c | 32 ++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c | 24 + tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.c | 41 ++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.h | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 122 ++++- 35 files changed, 2152 insertions(+), 570 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_large.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tailcall_large_stack.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_large_stack.c
base-commit: 24629aac43d2884109ae47a993fd51b504e2b09b
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 1/18 bpf: Add accessors for verifier stack slots
The verifier indexes a frame's stack state directly through state->stack[spi] and computes the number of tracked slots as allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE in every file that touches stack slots, and so does the nfp offload driver. Route all of these through two helpers, bpf_stack_slot() and bpf_stack_nr_slots(), so the layout of the per-frame stack state is visible in one place. The one lookup that goes the other way, reg_to_target() in the diagnostics code, maps a register pointer back to its slot by address and now says that it relies on the slots forming one contiguous array. Both helpers take a const frame: the slot accessor returns the slot through the frame's stack pointer, so read-only code such as the state printer can use it without giving up its qualifiers. Functions that look up the same slot repeatedly now fetch it once.
No functional change.
--- .../net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 29 ++- kernel/bpf/backtrack.c | 18 +- kernel/bpf/diagnostics.c | 11 +- kernel/bpf/log.c | 13 +- kernel/bpf/states.c | 90 ++++----- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 172 ++++++++++-------- 7 files changed, 193 insertions(+), 142 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/bpf/verifier.c +1 -1
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static bool nfp_bpf_map_update_value_ok(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)unsigned int soff; soff = -(off + i) -1 ; - stack_entry = &state->stack[soff /BPF_REG_SIZE ]; + stack_entry =bpf_stack_slot (state, soff /BPF_REG_SIZE );if (stack_entry->slot_type[soff %BPF_REG_SIZE ] ==STACK_ZERO )continue ;
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +24 -5
@@ -529,12 +529,31 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state {u32 may_goto_depth; }; +/* Number of BPF_REG_SIZE stack slots tracked for the frame so far. */ +static inline u32 bpf_stack_nr_slots (const struct bpf_func_state *frame) +{ +return frame->allocated_stack /BPF_REG_SIZE ; +} + +/* +* Stack slot @spi of @frame, covering bytes [fp - (spi + 1) * 8, fp - spi * 8). +* The caller must ensure spi < bpf_stack_nr_slots(frame), see grow_stack_state(). +*/ +static inline struct bpf_stack_state *bpf_stack_slot (const struct bpf_func_state *frame,u32 spi) +{ +return &frame->stack[spi]; +} +static inline struct bpf_reg_state *bpf_get_spilled_reg (int slot,struct bpf_func_state *frame,u32 mask) { -if (slot < frame->allocated_stack /BPF_REG_SIZE && - (1 << frame->stack[slot].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE -1 ]) & mask) -return &frame->stack[slot].spilled_ptr; +struct bpf_stack_state *ss; + +if (slot >=bpf_stack_nr_slots (frame)) +return NULL ; + ss =bpf_stack_slot (frame, slot); +if ((1 << ss->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE -1 ]) & mask) +return &ss->spilled_ptr;return NULL ; }
@@ -550,7 +569,7 @@ bpf_get_spilled_stack_arg(int slot, struct bpf_func_state *frame)/* Iterate over 'frame', setting 'reg' to either NULL or a spilled register. */ #define bpf_for_each_spilled_reg (iter, frame, reg, mask) \ for (iter = 0, reg = bpf_get_spilled_reg(iter, frame, mask); \ - iter < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; \ + iter < bpf_stack_nr_slots(frame); \ iter++, reg = bpf_get_spilled_reg(iter, frame, mask))/* Iterate over 'frame', setting 'reg' to either NULL or a spilled stack arg. */
@@ -575,7 +594,7 @@ bpf_get_spilled_stack_arg(int slot, struct bpf_func_state *frame) bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(___j, __state, __reg, __mask) { \if (!__reg) \continue ; \ - __stack = &__state->stack[___j]; \ + __stack =bpf_stack_slot (__state, ___j); \ (void )(__expr); \ } \ __stack =NULL ; \
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c +11 -7
@@ -711,10 +711,12 @@ void bpf_mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, i, j); } } -for (j =0 ; j < func->allocated_stack /BPF_REG_SIZE ; j++) { -if (!bpf_is_spilled_reg (&func->stack[j])) +for (j =0 ; j <bpf_stack_nr_slots (func); j++) { +struct bpf_stack_state *ss =bpf_stack_slot (func, j); + +if (!bpf_is_spilled_reg (ss))continue ; - reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; + reg = &ss->spilled_ptr;if (reg->type !=SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise)continue ; reg->precise = true;
@@ -826,6 +828,7 @@ int bpf_mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int subseq_idx =-1 ;struct bpf_func_state *func;bool tmp, skip_first = true; +struct bpf_stack_state *ss;struct bpf_reg_state *reg;int i, fr, err;
@@ -950,16 +953,17 @@ int bpf_mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,bitmap_from_u64 (mask,bt_frame_stack_mask (bt, fr));for_each_set_bit (i, mask,64 ) { -if (verifier_bug_if (i >= func->allocated_stack /BPF_REG_SIZE , +if (verifier_bug_if (i >=bpf_stack_nr_slots (func), env,"stack slot %d, total slots %d" , - i, func->allocated_stack /BPF_REG_SIZE )) + i,bpf_stack_nr_slots (func)))return -EFAULT ; -if (!bpf_is_spilled_scalar_reg (&func->stack[i])) { + ss =bpf_stack_slot (func, i); +if (!bpf_is_spilled_scalar_reg (ss)) {bt_clear_frame_slot (bt, fr, i);continue ; } - reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; + reg = &ss->spilled_ptr;if (reg->precise) {bt_clear_frame_slot (bt, fr, i); }else {
kernel/bpf/diagnostics.c +8 -3
@@ -1600,9 +1600,9 @@ static struct bpf_reg_state *target_to_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return NULL ;return &state->stack_arg_regs[target->stack_arg];case BPF_DIAG_MOD_TARGET_STACK_SLOT : -if (target->spi >= state->allocated_stack /BPF_REG_SIZE ) +if (target->spi >=bpf_stack_nr_slots (state))return NULL ; -return &state->stack[target->spi].spilled_ptr; +return &bpf_stack_slot (state, target->spi)->spilled_ptr;default :return NULL ; }
@@ -1618,7 +1618,7 @@ static bool reg_to_target(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_reg_stafor (frame =0 ; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) {struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[frame];unsigned long start, end; -u32 nslots = state->allocated_stack /BPF_REG_SIZE ; +u32 nslots =bpf_stack_nr_slots (state);int spi; start = (unsigned long )state->regs;
@@ -1637,6 +1637,11 @@ static bool reg_to_target(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_reg_stareturn true; } +/* +* Map the pointer back to its slot by address, which relies on +* the slots forming one contiguous array as bpf_stack_slot() +* indexes it. +*/ start = (unsigned long )state->stack; end = (unsigned long )(state->stack + nslots);if (nslots && addr >= start && addr < end) {
kernel/bpf/log.c +7 -6
@@ -716,7 +716,8 @@ void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_verifieverbose (env,"=" );print_reg_state (env, state, reg); } -for (i =0 ; i < state->allocated_stack /BPF_REG_SIZE ; i++) { +for (i =0 ; i <bpf_stack_nr_slots (state); i++) { +struct bpf_stack_state *slot =bpf_stack_slot (state, i);char types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE +1 ];const char *sep ="" ;bool valid = false;
@@ -727,7 +728,7 @@ void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_verifiecontinue ;for (j =0 ; j <BPF_REG_SIZE ; j++) { - slot_type = state->stack[i].slot_type[j]; + slot_type = slot->slot_type[j];if (slot_type !=STACK_INVALID && slot_type !=STACK_POISON ) valid = true; types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[slot_type];
@@ -736,12 +737,12 @@ void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_verifieif (!valid)continue ; - reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; -switch (state->stack[i].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE -1 ]) { + reg = &slot->spilled_ptr; +switch (slot->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE -1 ]) {case STACK_SPILL :/* print MISC/ZERO/INVALID slots above subreg spill */ for (j =0 ; j <BPF_REG_SIZE ; j++) -if (state->stack[i].slot_type[j] ==STACK_SPILL ) +if (slot->slot_type[j] ==STACK_SPILL )break ; types_buf[j] ='\0' ;
@@ -751,7 +752,7 @@ void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_verifiecase STACK_DYNPTR :/* skip to main dynptr slot */ i +=BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS -1 ; - reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; + reg = &bpf_stack_slot (state, i)->spilled_ptr;verbose (env," fp%d" , (-i -1 ) *BPF_REG_SIZE );verbose (env,"=dynptr_%s(" ,dynptr_type_str (reg->dynptr.type));
kernel/bpf/states.c +48 -42
227 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +94 -78
491 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 2/18 bpf: Widen the stack slot index in the jump history
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediJump history entries record the stack slot touched by a spill or fill in a 6-bit field, which only fits the 64 slots of a 512-byte frame and is pinned to that size by a static_assert on MAX_BPF_STACK. Move the flags into the first word and give the slot index 12 bits of the second word instead, so the entry stays 16 bytes while frames of up to 32 KiB can be recorded.
Introduce MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS for the number of 8-byte slots a frame can have and use it for the static_assert and for BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE, so the verifier expresses per-frame capacity through one constant.
No functional change.
--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 21 ++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +14 -7
@@ -242,6 +242,14 @@ enum bpf_stack_slot_type {#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8/* size of eBPF register in bytes */ +/* +* Largest number of BPF_REG_SIZE stack slots a single frame can have. A frame +* may use any part of the MAX_BPF_STACK budget; check_max_stack_depth() +* enforces the bound on the combined depth of frames sharing the kernel stack +* and on each frame using a private stack. +*/ +#define MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS (MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) +/* 4-byte stack slot granularity for liveness analysis */ #define BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE 4#define STACK_SLOT_SZ 4
@@ -424,12 +432,11 @@ struct bpf_jmp_history_entry {/* insn idx can't be bigger than 1 million */ u32 idx : 20; u32 frame : 4; /* stack access frame number */ - u32 spi : 6; /* stack slot index (0..63) */ - u32 :2 ; - u32 prev_idx : 20;/* special INSN_F_xxx flags */ u32 flags : 4; - u32 :8 ; + u32 :4 ; + u32 prev_idx : 20; + u32 spi : 12; /* stack slot index *//* * additional registers that need precision tracking when this * jump is backtracked, vector of five 11-bit records
@@ -438,12 +445,12 @@ struct bpf_jmp_history_entry { };static_assert (MAX_CALL_FRAMES <= (1 <<4 )); -static_assert (MAX_BPF_STACK /8 <= (1 <<6 )); +static_assert (MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS <= (1 <<12 ));/* Maximum number of bpf_reg_state objects that can exist at once */ #define MAX_STACK_ARG_SLOTS (MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS - MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) -#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ((MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE + \ - MAX_STACK_ARG_SLOTS) * MAX_CALL_FRAMES) +#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ((MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS + MAX_STACK_ARG_SLOTS) * \ + MAX_CALL_FRAMES)struct bpf_verifier_state {/* call stack tracking */ struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES ];
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 3/18 bpf: Store linked registers in the jump history as an array
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediLinked scalar registers are recorded in the jump history packed into a u64 as five 11-bit entries, each naming a frame and a register or stack slot. The 6-bit slot field covers exactly the 64 slots of a 512-byte frame, so a spilled scalar in a deeper slot could not be linked and larger frames were ruled out by construction.
Store the linked registers as an array of five u16 entries plus a count instead, each entry holding the frame number, a register-or-slot bit and an 11-bit register or slot index, which covers frames of up to 16 KiB. Callers that record no linked registers pass NULL.
The history entry grows from 16 to 20 bytes, and the history is the one verifier structure whose size follows the number of instructions a loop iterates over rather than the state count. Measured over the 5075 selftest programs, peak verifier memory is unchanged for all but the loop-heavy ones, which grow by 8 to 16%: loop1/nested_loops from 17.6 to 19.2 MiB, verifier_loops1/jumps_out_rather_than_in from 4.4 to 5.1 MiB, strobemeta by 0.3% and pyperf600_nounroll by 0.8%. Verdicts, processed instructions and state counts stay the same everywhere.
No functional change.
--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 16 +++++-- kernel/bpf/backtrack.c | 18 +++++--- kernel/bpf/states.c | 2 +- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++-------------------- 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +12 -4
@@ -428,6 +428,9 @@ enum { INSN_F_STACK_ARG_ACCESS = BIT(3), }; +/* Registers linked to one jump condition that a history entry can record */ +#define BPF_LINKED_REGS_MAX 5 +struct bpf_jmp_history_entry {/* insn idx can't be bigger than 1 million */ u32 idx :20 ;
@@ -438,10 +441,14 @@ struct bpf_jmp_history_entry { u32 prev_idx : 20; u32 spi : 12; /* stack slot index *//* -* additional registers that need precision tracking when this -* jump is backtracked, vector of five 11-bit records +* Scalar registers and spilled scalars linked to the condition of +* this jump, which need precision tracking together when the jump is +* backtracked. Each is packed as 4 bits of frame number, one bit +* telling a register from a stack slot and 11 bits of register or +* slot index, see linked_regs_pack(). */ -u64 linked_regs; +u16 linked_regs[BPF_LINKED_REGS_MAX ]; +u8 linked_regs_cnt; };static_assert (MAX_CALL_FRAMES <= (1 <<4 ));
@@ -1288,7 +1295,8 @@ struct list_head *bpf_explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx);void bpf_free_verifier_state (struct bpf_verifier_state *state,bool free_self);void bpf_free_backedges (struct bpf_scc_visit *visit);int bpf_push_jmp_history (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, -int insn_flags,int spi,int frame,u64 linked_regs); +int insn_flags,int spi,int frame,const u16 *linked_regs, +u8 linked_regs_cnt);void bpf_bt_sync_linked_regs (struct backtrack_state *bt,struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist);void bpf_mark_reg_not_init (const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c +12 -6
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@/* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ int bpf_push_jmp_history (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, -int insn_flags,int spi,int frame,u64 linked_regs) +int insn_flags,int spi,int frame,const u16 *linked_regs, +u8 linked_regs_cnt) {u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt;struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *p;
@@ -27,10 +28,13 @@ int bpf_push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state env->cur_hist_ent->flags |= insn_flags; env->cur_hist_ent->spi = spi; env->cur_hist_ent->frame = frame; -verifier_bug_if (env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs !=0 , env, -"insn history: insn_idx %d linked_regs: %#llx" , - env->insn_idx, env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs); - env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs = linked_regs; +verifier_bug_if (env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs_cnt !=0 , env, +"insn history: insn_idx %d has %u linked regs" , + env->insn_idx, env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs_cnt); +if (linked_regs_cnt) +memcpy (env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs, linked_regs, + linked_regs_cnt *sizeof (*linked_regs)); + env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs_cnt = linked_regs_cnt;return 0 ; }
@@ -47,7 +51,9 @@ int bpf_push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state p->flags = insn_flags; p->spi = spi; p->frame = frame; - p->linked_regs = linked_regs; +if (linked_regs_cnt) +memcpy (p->linked_regs, linked_regs, linked_regs_cnt *sizeof (*linked_regs)); + p->linked_regs_cnt = linked_regs_cnt; cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; env->cur_hist_ent = p;
kernel/bpf/states.c +1 -1
@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@ int bpf_is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)*/ err =0 ;if (bpf_is_jmp_point (env, env->insn_idx)) - err =bpf_push_jmp_history (env, cur,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ); + err =bpf_push_jmp_history (env, cur,0 ,0 ,0 ,NULL ,0 ); err = err ? :propagate_precision (env, &sl->state, cur,NULL );if (err)return err;
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +37 -49
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Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 4/18 bpf: Track backtracking stack slots with bitmaps
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediPrecision backtracking keeps the stack slots that still need a precise mark in one u64 per frame, which ties it to frames of at most 64 slots. Turn the per-frame masks into bitmaps sized by MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS and use the bitmap helpers for setting, clearing, testing and iterating them. The formatting helper takes a bitmap and the leftover-slot bug reports print the formatted slot list instead of a hex mask.
mark_reg_stack_read() collected zero spills in a u64 of its own before handing it to the backtracker; it now counts them and revisits the range to mark each slot, which drops the only remaining mask-typed entry point.
No functional change.
--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 13 +++----- kernel/bpf/backtrack.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 15 ++++++--- 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +4 -9
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ struct backtrack_state {struct bpf_verifier_env *env;u32 frame;u32 reg_masks[MAX_CALL_FRAMES ]; -u64 stack_masks[MAX_CALL_FRAMES ]; +unsigned long stack_masks[MAX_CALL_FRAMES ][BITS_TO_LONGS (MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS )];u8 stack_arg_masks[MAX_CALL_FRAMES ]; };
@@ -1356,12 +1356,7 @@ static inline void bpf_bt_set_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, ustatic inline void bpf_bt_set_frame_slot (struct backtrack_state *bt,u32 frame,u32 slot) { - bt->stack_masks[frame] |=1ull << slot; -} - -static inline void bpf_bt_set_frame_slot_mask (struct backtrack_state *bt,u32 frame,u64 mask) -{ - bt->stack_masks[frame] |= mask; +__set_bit (slot, bt->stack_masks[frame]); }static inline void bt_set_frame_stack_arg_slot (struct backtrack_state *bt,u32 frame,u32 slot)
@@ -1376,7 +1371,7 @@ static inline bool bt_is_frame_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u3static inline bool bt_is_frame_slot_set (struct backtrack_state *bt,u32 frame,u32 slot) { -return bt->stack_masks[frame] & (1ull << slot); +return test_bit (slot, bt->stack_masks[frame]); }bool bpf_map_is_rdonly (const struct bpf_map *map);
@@ -1577,7 +1572,7 @@ struct bpf_subprog_info *bpf_find_containing_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *enconst char *bpf_subprog_name (const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int subprog);int bpf_jmp_offset (struct bpf_insn *insn);struct bpf_iarray *bpf_insn_successors (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u32 idx); -void bpf_fmt_stack_mask (char *buf,ssize_t buf_sz,u64 stack_mask); +void bpf_fmt_stack_mask (char *buf,ssize_t buf_sz,const unsigned long *stack_mask);bool bpf_subprog_is_global (const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int subprog);/* Kinds of member a by-value struct or union may be composed of. */
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c +40 -25
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kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10 -5
@@ -3931,10 +3931,9 @@ static int mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, {struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; -u64 zero_spill_mask =0 ;int i, slot, spi;u8 *stype; -int zeros =0 ; +int zeros =0 , zero_spills =0 ;for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { slot = -i -1 ;
@@ -3947,7 +3946,7 @@ static int mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, }if (stype[slot %BPF_REG_SIZE ] ==STACK_SPILL &&bpf_register_is_null (&bpf_stack_slot (ptr_state, spi)->spilled_ptr)) { - zero_spill_mask |=1ull << spi; + zero_spills++; zeros++;continue ; }
@@ -3958,8 +3957,14 @@ static int mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,* so the whole register == const_zero. */ __mark_reg_const_zero (env, &state->regs[dst_regno]); -if (zero_spill_mask) { -bpf_bt_set_frame_slot_mask (&env->bt, ptr_state->frameno, zero_spill_mask); +if (zero_spills) { +for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { + slot = -i -1 ; + spi = slot /BPF_REG_SIZE ; + stype =bpf_stack_slot (ptr_state, spi)->slot_type; +if (stype[slot %BPF_REG_SIZE ] ==STACK_SPILL ) +bpf_bt_set_frame_slot (&env->bt, ptr_state->frameno, spi); + }return mark_chain_precision_batch (env, env->cur_state); } }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 5/18 bpf: Track scratched stack slots with a bitmap
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediThe set of stack slots touched since the verifier state was last printed lives in a u64, so the log could only ever mark the first 64 slots of a frame as scratched. Make it a bitmap sized by MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS and go through the bitmap helpers for setting, testing, clearing and filling it.
No functional change.
--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +8 -7
@@ -1090,7 +1090,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {*/ u32 scratched_regs;/* Same as scratched_regs but for stack slots */ -u64 scratched_stack_slots; +DECLARE_BITMAP (scratched_stack_slots,MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS );u64 prev_log_pos, prev_insn_print_pos;/* buffer used to temporary hold constants as scalar registers */ struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg[1 ];
@@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ static inline void mark_reg_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno)static inline void mark_stack_slot_scratched (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u32 spi) { - env->scratched_stack_slots |=1ULL << spi; +__set_bit (spi, env->scratched_stack_slots); }static inline bool reg_scratched (const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u32 regno)
@@ -1517,27 +1517,28 @@ static inline bool reg_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno)return (env->scratched_regs >> regno) &1 ; } -static inline bool stack_slot_scratched (const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u64 regno) +static inline bool stack_slot_scratched (const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u32 spi) { -return (env->scratched_stack_slots >> regno) &1 ; +return test_bit (spi, env->scratched_stack_slots); }static inline bool verifier_state_scratched (const struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { -return env->scratched_regs || env->scratched_stack_slots; +return env->scratched_regs || + !bitmap_empty (env->scratched_stack_slots,MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS ); }static inline void mark_verifier_state_clean (struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { env->scratched_regs =0U ; - env->scratched_stack_slots =0ULL ; +bitmap_zero (env->scratched_stack_slots,MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS ); }/* Used for printing the entire verifier state. */ static inline void mark_verifier_state_scratched (struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { env->scratched_regs = ~0U ; - env->scratched_stack_slots = ~0ULL ; +bitmap_fill (env->scratched_stack_slots,MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS ); }static inline bool bpf_stack_narrow_access_ok (int off,int fill_size,int spill_size)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 6/18 bpf: Treat unknown-size stack reads as reaching the frame top
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediWhen the size of a helper or kfunc memory argument is not a constant on the path, the stack liveness analysis is told the call reads MAX_BPF_STACK bytes starting at the pointer's offset. Clipped at the top of the frame this covers everything from the offset upwards, which is the intent, but only as long as no frame is deeper than MAX_BPF_STACK bytes.
Return the "unknown" marker instead, which the liveness analysis already turns into a read of every slot between the offset and the frame top, independent of how deep the frame is.
No functional change.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +4 -3
@@ -14352,11 +14352,11 @@ s64 bpf_helper_stack_access_bytes(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn }/* * Size arg is const on each path but differs across merged -* paths. MAX_BPF_STACK is a safe upper bound for reads. +* paths. Reads may extend anywhere up to the frame top. */ if (full_write)return 0 ; -return MAX_BPF_STACK ; +return S64_MIN ; }return S64_MIN ;case ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR :
@@ -14442,7 +14442,8 @@ s64 bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn * size = (s64 )aux->const_reg_vals[size_reg]; goto out; } -return MAX_BPF_STACK ; +/* Unknown size: the read may extend anywhere up to the frame top. */ +return S64_MIN ; }/* fixed-size pointed-to type: resolve via BTF */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 7/18 bpf: Size liveness stack masks by the stack each frame uses
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediStack liveness tracks three masks of 4-byte stack slots - may_read, must_write and live_before - for every instruction of every frame of every function instance. Each mask used to be a fixed 128-bit spis_t, wide enough for the deepest frame MAX_BPF_STACK allows, so an instruction paid 48 bytes per frame no matter how little stack the frame actually touched. These per instruction arrays are the largest liveness
allocation: a 40k instruction program spends ~2 MiB on each frame array. Sizing them for a larger stack budget would multiply that cost for every program, while most frames use a fraction of the budget.
Replace the fixed masks with a variable width bitmap array per (instance, frame). struct frame_masks holds the width shared by all of its masks in @words plus a flat unsigned long array, where mask @kind of the instruction at relative index @i lives at
&bits[(i * FM_MASK_CNT + kind) * words]. An array starts at the width the first recorded half-slot needs (minimum one word, that is 256 bytes of stack with 64-bit words) and is reallocated into a wider stride once a deeper half-slot shows up. Only the marking functions widen an array, and they all run during the static analysis before do_check(), so no verification time path can move one.
The marking API now takes an inclusive half-slot range, which is what record_stack_access_off() computed anyway, and clamps the upper end to the deepest half-slot a frame can have. An access below the stack bound is rejected by the main verifier pass later; liveness only has to stay inside the masks. A range that covers no whole half-slot, as a byte store at fp-1 produces, marks nothing.
A "read everything" mark, used for calls that are neither helpers nor kfuncs and for pointers whose offset or frame identity was lost, widens the array to the maximum width and sets every bit: recorded at a narrower width it would lose the half-slots a later widening adds, and no write can cancel it as no write covers the whole frame. A half-slot past the width of the masks was never read by the frame and is never live.
merge_instances() may see a different width on each side, so it widens dst to cover src and counts a word only dst has as zero on the src side, which unions into may_read as a no-op and intersects must_write to empty, never claiming a write that did not happen.
The rest is mechanical: update_insn() propagates live_before word by word over the array's width (all instructions of one array share it, hence so do an instruction's successors), is_live_before() answers false past the width, and the use:/def: log printing iterates up to the width.
Liveness results are unchanged. A half-slot only ever gets a bit from a recorded access and recording one widens the array to cover it, so every bit the fixed masks could hold still fits. Frames whose deepest recorded half-slot fits in a single word now cost 24 bytes per instruction per frame instead of 48.
The spill tracker that feeds the analysis had the same limit built in: it followed 64 slots, fp-8 to fp-512, per subprog, and a fill from a deeper slot returned an imprecise pointer, so every later access through it counted as a read of the whole stack of every frame. Let it follow the deepest 8-byte access a subprog makes directly through R10 when that reaches past those 64 slots, which is how spills and fills are compiled, and keep the count with the per-callsite snapshot a callee uses to fill from its caller's frame. Programs within 512 bytes are tracked exactly as before; a program spilling deeper stays precise.
--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 50 +--- kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 499 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 340 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +2 -48
@@ -253,52 +253,6 @@ enum bpf_stack_slot_type {/* 4-byte stack slot granularity for liveness analysis */ #define BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE 4#define STACK_SLOT_SZ 4 -#define STACK_SLOTS (MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE)/* 128 */ - -typedef struct { -u64 v[2 ]; -}spis_t ; - -#define SPIS_ZERO ((spis_t){}) -#define SPIS_ALL ((spis_t){{ U64_MAX, U64_MAX }}) - -static inline bool spis_is_zero (spis_t s) -{ -return s.v[0 ] ==0 && s.v[1 ] ==0 ; -} - -static inline bool spis_equal (spis_t a,spis_t b) -{ -return a.v[0 ] == b.v[0 ] && a.v[1 ] == b.v[1 ]; -} - -static inline spis_t spis_or (spis_t a,spis_t b) -{ -return (spis_t ){{ a.v[0 ] | b.v[0 ], a.v[1 ] | b.v[1 ] }}; -} - -static inline spis_t spis_and (spis_t a,spis_t b) -{ -return (spis_t ){{ a.v[0 ] & b.v[0 ], a.v[1 ] & b.v[1 ] }}; -} - -static inline spis_t spis_not (spis_t s) -{ -return (spis_t ){{ ~s.v[0 ], ~s.v[1 ] }}; -} - -static inline bool spis_test_bit (spis_t s,u32 slot) -{ -return s.v[slot /64 ] &BIT_ULL (slot %64 ); -} - -static inline void spis_or_range (spis_t *mask,u32 lo,u32 hi) -{ -u32 w; - -for (w = lo; w <= hi && w <STACK_SLOTS ; w++) - mask->v[w /64 ] |=BIT_ULL (w %64 ); -}#define BPF_REGMASK_ARGS ((1 << BPF_REG_1) | (1 << BPF_REG_2) | \ (1 << BPF_REG_3) | (1 << BPF_REG_4) | \
@@ -1045,8 +999,8 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env { } cfg;struct backtrack_state bt;struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *cur_hist_ent; -/* Per-callsite copy of parent's converged at_stack_in for cross-frame fills. */ -struct arg_track **callsite_at_stack; +/* Per-callsite snapshot of the parent's tracked spill slots for cross-frame fills. */ +struct spill_snapshot **callsite_at_stack;u32 pass_cnt;/* number of times do_check() was called */ u32 subprog_cnt;/* number of instructions analyzed by the verifier */
kernel/bpf/liveness.c +338 -161
908 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 07/18] bpf: Size liveness stack masks by the stack each frame uses
kernel/bpf/liveness.c static int compute_subprog_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 1811
Quoted 2 lines · Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
kernel/bpf/liveness.c +1
-1- at_stack_in =kvmalloc_objs (*at_stack_in, len,GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ); + at_stack_in =kvmalloc_objs (*at_stack_in, (size_t )len * nslots,GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT );
at_stack_in is now len * nslots * sizeof(struct arg_track). One 8-byte store at fp-2048 makes nslots 256, so the subprog pays 2560 bytes per insn instead of 640.
A subprog with 900K insns and one such store asks kvmalloc for more than 2G and hits WARN_ON_ONCE(size > INT_MAX) in __kvmalloc_node_noprof().
Should we clamp it somehow?
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 8/18 bpf: Grow the verifier id scratch on demand
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediThe id map used to compare the ids of two states, which also serves as the id stack of release_reference() and as the id set of bpf_clear_singular_ids(), is a fixed array embedded in struct bpf_verifier_env and sized for the most registers and stack slots a state can possibly hold: 1312 entries, 10 KiB, for 512-byte frames, and four times that once frames may reach 2 KiB, which pushes the env allocation from 64 KiB to 128 KiB for every program verified. States compare a few dozen ids in practice.
Turn the map and the set into arrays grown on demand, starting at 64 entries and doubling, and free them with the env. A map that cannot grow treats the states as different, an id set that cannot grow keeps the id, and the id stack reports -ENOMEM, which release_reference() hands to its callers. The iterator destroy path used to warn on any failure of release_reference(), which could only come from a bug while the id stack could not run out of room; it now returns -ENOMEM and keeps warning about anything else. An allocation failure thus fails the load and is never unsafe. This removes the last structure whose size scaled with the stack bound and shrinks the env by 10 KiB.
--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 29 ++++++++++++++---------- kernel/bpf/states.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 30 +++++++++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +17 -12
@@ -408,10 +408,7 @@ struct bpf_jmp_history_entry {static_assert (MAX_CALL_FRAMES <= (1 <<4 ));static_assert (MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS <= (1 <<12 )); -/* Maximum number of bpf_reg_state objects that can exist at once */ #define MAX_STACK_ARG_SLOTS (MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS - MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) -#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ((MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS + MAX_STACK_ARG_SLOTS) * \ - MAX_CALL_FRAMES)struct bpf_verifier_state {/* call stack tracking */ struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES ];
@@ -861,18 +858,27 @@ struct bpf_id_pair {u32 cur; }; +/* +* Scratch map from the ids of one verifier state to those of another, also +* used as a stack of ids. Grown on demand by bpf_id_scratch_reserve(). +*/ struct bpf_idmap {u32 tmp_id_gen;u32 cnt; -struct bpf_id_pair map[BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ]; +u32 cap; +struct bpf_id_pair *map; }; +struct bpf_idset_entry { +u32 id; +u32 cnt; +}; + +/* Scratch set of ids with a use count each, grown on demand */ struct bpf_idset {u32 num_ids; -struct { -u32 id; -u32 cnt; - } entries[BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ]; +u32 cap; +struct bpf_idset_entry *entries; };/* see verifier.c:compute_scc_callchain() */
@@ -981,10 +987,8 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {* via callx. Allocated when the first such edge is recorded. */ unsigned long *callx_edges; -union { -struct bpf_idmap idmap_scratch; -struct bpf_idset idset_scratch; - }; +struct bpf_idmap idmap_scratch; +struct bpf_idset idset_scratch;struct {int *insn_state;int *insn_stack;
@@ -1248,6 +1252,7 @@ int bpf_copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,struct list_head *bpf_explored_state (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int idx);void bpf_free_verifier_state (struct bpf_verifier_state *state,bool free_self);void bpf_free_backedges (struct bpf_scc_visit *visit); +bool bpf_id_scratch_reserve (void **arr,u32 *cap,u32 cnt,size_t elem_size);int bpf_push_jmp_history (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_verifier_state *cur,int insn_flags,int spi,int frame,const u16 *linked_regs,u8 linked_regs_cnt);
kernel/bpf/states.c +31 -13
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kernel/bpf/verifier.c +19 -11
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ static int unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) {struct bpf_func_state *state =bpf_func (env, reg); -int spi, i, j; +int spi, i, j, err; spi =iter_get_spi (env, reg, nr_slots);if (spi <0 )
@@ -1051,8 +1051,12 @@ static int unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_stack_state *slot =bpf_stack_slot (state, spi - i);struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; -if (i ==0 ) -WARN_ON_ONCE (release_reference (env, st->id)); +if (i ==0 ) { + err =release_reference (env, st->id); +if (err == -ENOMEM ) +return err; +WARN_ON_ONCE (err); + }bpf_mark_reg_not_init (env, st);
@@ -10506,8 +10510,9 @@ static int idstack_push(struct bpf_idmap *idmap, u32 id)if (idmap->map[i].old == id)return 0 ; -if (WARN_ON_ONCE (idmap->cnt >=BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE )) -return -EFAULT ; +if (!bpf_id_scratch_reserve ((void **)&idmap->map, &idmap->cap, idmap->cnt, +sizeof (*idmap->map))) +return -ENOMEM ; idmap->map[idmap->cnt++].old = id;return 0 ;
@@ -18898,12 +18903,13 @@ static void idset_cnt_inc(struct bpf_idset *idset, u32 id)return ; } } -/* New id */ -if (idset->num_ids <BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ) { - idset->entries[idset->num_ids].id = id; - idset->entries[idset->num_ids].cnt =1 ; - idset->num_ids++; - } +/* New id; one that cannot be recorded counts as shared and is kept */ +if (!bpf_id_scratch_reserve ((void **)&idset->entries, &idset->cap, idset->num_ids, +sizeof (*idset->entries))) +return ; + idset->entries[idset->num_ids].id = id; + idset->entries[idset->num_ids].cnt =1 ; + idset->num_ids++; }/* Find id in idset and return its count, or 0 if not found */
@@ -22612,6 +22618,8 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr,kvfree (env->gotox_tmp_buf);kvfree (env->callx_edges);kvfree (env->func_ptrs); +kfree (env->idmap_scratch.map); +kfree (env->idset_scratch.entries);bpf_diag_free (env);kvfree (env);return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 08/18] bpf: Grow the verifier id scratch on demand
The comment says "one that cannot be recorded counts as shared and is kept". With the old fixed array, once num_ids reached BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE, that was permanent -- every subsequent new id failed to…
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0
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kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
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kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-4@@ -18898,12 +18903,13 @@ static void idset_cnt_inc(struct bpf_idset *idset, u32 id)return ; } } -/* New id */ -if (idset->num_ids <BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ) { - idset->entries[idset->num_ids].id = id; - idset->entries[idset->num_ids].cnt =1 ;
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static void idset_cnt_inc(struct bpf_idset *idset, u32 id) · line 18913
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7
-2- idset->num_ids++; - } +/* New id; one that cannot be recorded counts as shared and is kept */ +if (!bpf_id_scratch_reserve ((void **)&idset->entries, &idset->cap, idset->num_ids, +sizeof (*idset->entries))) +return ; + idset->entries[idset->num_ids].id = id; + idset->entries[idset->num_ids].cnt =1 ; + idset->num_ids++; }
The comment says "one that cannot be recorded counts as shared and is kept". With the old fixed array, once num_ids reached BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE, that was permanent -- every subsequent new id failed to be recorded. But krealloc_array() failure is transient, and bpf_id_scratch_reserve() leaves cap unchanged after a failure, so the next call retries the same allocation and can succeed.
Consider a scalar id X held by exactly two registers, with num_ids == cap when X first appears in the idset_cnt_inc() pass of bpf_clear_singular_ids():
1st occurrence of X: reserve fails -> X not recorded
(a later new id Y: reserve succeeds -> cap doubles)
2nd occurrence of X: not found -> reserve succeeds -> entries[] = {X, cnt = 1}
X now has cnt == 1 even though two registers share it. The second pass then runs clear_scalar_id() on both registers. This is sound, because the cleared state is cur, which keeps being explored, and forgetting a relation only widens the abstraction.
It does silently drop a real scalar link, though: sync_linked_regs() no longer refines the second register, so a valid program can be rejected with an ordinary verifier error instead of failing with -ENOMEM. The outcome also depends on allocation timing.
Would it be better to remember that a reservation failed during this pass (for example a flag in struct bpf_idset) and then skip the clearing pass entirely? That would make "is kept" true in every case.
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/35976322553
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 08/18] bpf: Grow the verifier id scratch on demand
Quoted 52 lines · bot+bpf-ci
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-4@@ -18898,12 +18903,13 @@ static void idset_cnt_inc(struct bpf_idset *idset, u32 id)return ; } } -/* New id */ -if (idset->num_ids <BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ) { - idset->entries[idset->num_ids].id = id; - idset->entries[idset->num_ids].cnt =1 ;kernel/bpf/verifier.c static void idset_cnt_inc(struct bpf_idset *idset, u32 id) · line 18913
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7
-2- idset->num_ids++; - } +/* New id; one that cannot be recorded counts as shared and is kept */ +if (!bpf_id_scratch_reserve ((void **)&idset->entries, &idset->cap, idset->num_ids, +sizeof (*idset->entries))) +return ; + idset->entries[idset->num_ids].id = id; + idset->entries[idset->num_ids].cnt =1 ; + idset->num_ids++; }The comment says "one that cannot be recorded counts as shared and is kept". With the old fixed array, once
num_idsreachedBPF_ID_MAP_SIZE, that was permanent -- every subsequent new id failed to be recorded. Butkrealloc_array()failure is transient, andbpf_id_scratch_reserve()leaves cap unchanged after a failure, so the next call retries the same allocation and can succeed.Consider a scalar id X held by exactly two registers, with
num_ids== cap when X first appears in theidset_cnt_inc()pass ofbpf_clear_singular_ids():1st occurrence of X: reserve fails -> X not recorded
(a later new id Y: reserve succeeds -> cap doubles)
2nd occurrence of X: not found -> reserve succeeds -> entries[] = {X, cnt = 1}X now has cnt == 1 even though two registers share it. The second pass then runs
clear_scalar_id()on both registers. This is sound, because the cleared state is cur, which keeps being explored, and forgetting a relation only widens the abstraction.
Quoted 9 lines
It does silently drop a real scalar link, though:
sync_linked_regs()no longer refines the second register, so a valid program can be rejected with an ordinary verifier error instead of failing with-ENOMEM. The outcome also depends on allocation timing.Would it be better to remember that a reservation failed during this pass (for example a flag in struct
bpf_idset) and then skip the clearing pass entirely? That would make "is kept" true in every case.
Fixed for v3: when the id set cannot record an id its counts are incomplete, so bpf_clear_singular_ids() now keeps every id instead of clearing any.
Quoted 6 lines
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.mdCI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/35976322553
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 9/18 selftests/bpf: Cover the tail call caller stack depth limit
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediA tail call from a subprog only unwinds that subprog's frame, so the verifier refuses tail calls once the frames of the callers add up to 256 bytes or more. Nothing exercised that rule. Add a pair of tests with a caller using 240 and 256 bytes of stack respectively, the latter expecting the "tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is 256 bytes" rejection.
--- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_tailcall.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_tailcall.c +57 -0
@@ -28,4 +28,61 @@ __naked void invalid_map_for_tail_call(void) : __clobber_all); } +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY); + __uint(max_entries, 1); + __uint(key_size, sizeof(__u32)); + __uint(value_size, sizeof(__u32)); +} jmp_table SEC(".maps"); + +__used __naked +static int subprog_tail_call (void ) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r2 = %[jmp_table] ll; \ +r3 = 0; \ +call %[bpf_tail_call]; \ +r0 = 0; \ +exit; \ +" : + : __imm(bpf_tail_call), +__imm_addr (jmp_table) + : __clobber_all); +} + +/* +* A tail call unwinds only the frame of the subprog doing it, so the +* frames of its callers stay on the stack. With up to 33 tail calls in +* a chain the verifier caps the stack those frames may add up to at +* 256 bytes. +*/ +SEC("tc") +__description("tail call from subprog with 240 bytes of caller stack") +__success +__naked void tail_call_caller_stack_ok (void ) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r2 = 42; \ +*(u64 *)(r10 - 240) = r2; \ +call subprog_tail_call; \ +r0 = 0; \ +exit; \ +" ::: __clobber_all); +} + +SEC("tc") +__description("tail call from subprog with 256 bytes of caller stack") +__failure +__msg("tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is 256 bytes. Too large") +__naked void tail_call_caller_stack_too_large(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r2 = 42; \ +*(u64 *)(r10 - 256) = r2; \ +call subprog_tail_call; \ +r0 = 0; \ +exit; \ +" ::: __clobber_all); +} + char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 10/18 selftests/bpf: Check that narrow stack stores define no slot
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediThe stack liveness analysis records a store as a "def" only for the 4-byte half-slots it covers completely, so a one or two byte store near the top of the frame must not define anything. Add a test that reads fp-8, stores one byte at fp-1 and two bytes at fp-4, and reads fp-8 again, expecting no def mark on either store and the second read to still use fp-8.
--- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c +22 -0
@@ -2839,3 +2839,25 @@ static __used __naked void imprecise_dst_spill_join_sub(void) :: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32) : __clobber_all); } + +/* +* A store that does not fully cover a 4-byte half-slot defines nothing, so a +* narrow store at the top of the frame must not turn any slot into a "def", +* least of all every slot of the frame: the earlier data at fp-8 stays live. +*/ +SEC("socket") +__log_level(2) +__msg("0: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) ; use: fp0-8") +__msg("1: (73) *(u8 *)(r10 -1) = r0{{$}}") +__msg("2: (6b) *(u16 *)(r10 -4) = r0{{$}}") +__msg("3: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) ; use: fp0-8") +__naked void narrow_store_defines_nothing (void ) +{ + asmvolatile ( +"r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);" +"*(u8 *)(r10 - 1) = r0;" +"*(u16 *)(r10 - 4) = r0;" +"r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);" +"exit;" + ::: __clobber_all); +}
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 11/18 selftests/bpf: Check liveness merge of masks with different widths
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediThe liveness masks of a function instance are as wide as the deepest half-slot the instance was seen to access. When the same instance is analyzed again through another call site, the new pass may have settled on a different width, and merge_instances() has to widen the original before combining the two. Add a test where the first pass of a callee reads through a pointer 248 bytes into the main frame and the second one through a pointer of unknown offset, which reads the whole frame, and check that the merged result keeps the whole-frame read. The precise read stays within the first mask word on 64-bit, so the whole-frame pass is wider under every stack budget and the merge has to widen the masks; a deeper read would need two words already, which is all a 512-byte whole-frame read needs on 64-bit, and the widening would go untested there.
--- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c +51 -0
@@ -2861,3 +2861,54 @@ __naked void narrow_store_defines_nothing(void)"exit;" ::: __clobber_all); } + +/* +* The same callee instance is analyzed twice: the call sites are visited in +* postorder, so the second one goes first with a precise pointer 248 bytes +* into the main frame, and the first one then passes a pointer of unknown +* offset, which reads the whole frame. The precise pass stays within the +* first word of the masks on 64-bit, so the whole-frame pass is wider under +* every stack budget and merging the second into the first has to widen the +* masks while keeping the whole-frame read. +*/ +SEC("socket") +__log_level(2) +__msg("stack use/def subprog#{{[0-9]+}} merge_read_all_callee (d2,cs{{[0-9]+}}):") +__msg("(79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0){{.*}}; use: fp0-8..-512") +__naked void merge_keeps_whole_frame_read (void ) +{ + asmvolatile ( +"r1 = 0;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r1;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 248) = r1;" +"call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];" +"r0 &= 8;" +"r1 = r10;" +"r1 += -16;" +"r1 += r0;" +"call merge_read_all_mid;" +"r1 = r10;" +"r1 += -248;" +"call merge_read_all_mid;" +"r0 = 0;" +"exit;" + :: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32) + : __clobber_all); +} + +static __used __naked void merge_read_all_mid (void ) +{ + asmvolatile ( +"call merge_read_all_callee;" +"exit;" + ::: __clobber_all); +} + +static __used __naked void merge_read_all_callee (void ) +{ + asmvolatile ( +"r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);" +"exit;" + ::: __clobber_all); +}
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 12/18 bpf: Size the per-frame verifier structures for a 2 KiB stack
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediThe verifier keeps a few structures whose size follows the deepest frame a program may have: the backtracking and scratched-slot bitmaps, the jump history slot index and the clamp of the liveness masks. They are all expressed through MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS, which derives from MAX_BPF_STACK, the frame size of the interpreter.
Introduce MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT, the stack budget a program may get on a JIT that can lay out frames of any size, and derive those structures from it so that a frame may be as deep as that budget. Nothing grants the budget yet, so no program verifies differently; the only visible change is that the liveness log prints a whole-frame read up to the new depth, so the three selftests matching such reads are updated.
The backtracking and scratched-slot bitmaps grow from one to four words per frame, a fixed few hundred bytes per verifier environment. tmp_str_buf, which formats a frame's slot list for the log, grows from 320 to 1408 bytes so that all 256 slots still fit, and the log's line buffer from 1 to 2 KiB so that a line built from it is not cut; the environment stays within its 64 KiB allocation. The liveness masks are only as wide as the stack a frame uses, so most frames cost the same as before; a frame that is read as a whole, through a pointer of unknown offset or by bpf_loop() with two callbacks, now carries masks of eight words, 192 bytes per instruction per frame instead of 48. Measured over the 5075 selftest programs, that is 0.2% of the total peak verifier
memory: strobemeta_bpf_loop and pyperf600_bpf_loop grow by 11% (1.2 MiB and 0.6 MiB), a few dozen small programs by 40 to 100 KiB each, everything else is unchanged. The next patch bounds such reads by the program's budget, so this cost is only paid once a JIT grants it.
--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 26 ++++++++++++------- include/linux/filter.h | 5 ++++ kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c | 6 ++--- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +16 -10
@@ -19,11 +19,12 @@* that converting umax_value to int cannot overflow. */ #define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ (1 << 29) -/* size of tmp_str_buf in bpf_verifier. -* we need at least 306 bytes to fit full stack mask representation -* (in the "-8,-16,...,-512" form) +/* +* size of tmp_str_buf in bpf_verifier. +* we need at least 1399 bytes to fit full stack mask representation +* (in the "-8,-16,...,-2048" form) */ -#define TMP_STR_BUF_LEN 320 +#define TMP_STR_BUF_LEN 1408/* Patch buffer size */ #define INSN_BUF_SIZE 32
@@ -243,12 +244,13 @@ enum bpf_stack_slot_type {#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8/* size of eBPF register in bytes */ /* -* Largest number of BPF_REG_SIZE stack slots a single frame can have. A frame -* may use any part of the MAX_BPF_STACK budget; check_max_stack_depth() -* enforces the bound on the combined depth of frames sharing the kernel stack -* and on each frame using a private stack. +* Largest number of BPF_REG_SIZE stack slots a single frame can have, sized +* for the largest stack budget any JIT supports. A frame may use any part of +* its program's budget; check_max_stack_depth() enforces the budget on the +* combined depth of frames sharing the kernel stack and on each frame using +* a private stack. */ -#define MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS (MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) +#define MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS (MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT / BPF_REG_SIZE)/* 4-byte stack slot granularity for liveness analysis */ #define BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE 4
@@ -717,7 +719,11 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64/* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */ #define MAX_USED_BTFS 64/* max number of BTFs accessed by one BPF program */ -#define BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE 1024 +/* +* Longest line the verifier log can carry: a full stack mask of +* MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS slots, see TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, plus its prefix. +*/ +#define BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE 2048struct bpf_verifier_log {/* Logical start and end positions of a "log window" of the verifier log.
include/linux/filter.h +5 -0
@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ struct ctl_table_header;/* BPF program can access up to 512 bytes of stack space. */ #define MAX_BPF_STACK 512 +/* +* Stack budget of a program on a JIT that lays out frames of that size. +* The interpreter and JITs without such support keep MAX_BPF_STACK. +*/ +#define MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT 2048/* Helper macros for filter block array initializers. */
kernel/bpf/liveness.c +1 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@* Half-slot 0 covers [fp-4, fp), half-slot 1 covers [fp-8, fp-4), and so on, * hence FRAME_HALF_SPIS - 1 is the deepest half-slot a frame can have. */ -#define FRAME_HALF_SPIS (MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE) +#define FRAME_HALF_SPIS (MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT / BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE)#define FRAME_MAX_WORDS BITS_TO_LONGS(FRAME_HALF_SPIS)/* Masks tracked for each instruction of a frame */
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c +3 -3
@@ -1953,7 +1953,7 @@ static __used __naked void fwd_parent_key_to_helper(void) SEC("socket") __log_level(2) __success -__msg("call bpf_map_update_elem{{.*}}; use: fp1-8..-512 fp0-8") +__msg("call bpf_map_update_elem{{.*}}; use: fp1-8..-2048 fp0-8") __naked void helper_arg_fallback_keeps_scanning(void) { asm volatile (
@@ -2267,7 +2267,7 @@ static __used __naked void merge_leaf_read(void) SEC("socket") __log_level(2) __success -__msg("call bpf_loop#181 ; use: fp2-8..-512 fp1-8..-512 fp0-8..-512") +__msg("call bpf_loop#181 ; use: fp2-8..-2048 fp1-8..-2048 fp0-8..-2048") __naked void bpf_loop_two_callbacks(void) { asm volatile (
@@ -2874,7 +2874,7 @@ __naked void narrow_store_defines_nothing(void) SEC("socket") __log_level(2) __msg("stack use/def subprog#{{[0-9]+}} merge_read_all_callee (d2,cs{{[0-9]+}}):") -__msg("(79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0){{.*}}; use: fp0-8..-512") +__msg("(79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0){{.*}}; use: fp0-8..-2048")__naked void merge_keeps_whole_frame_read (void ) { asm volatile (
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 12/18] bpf: Size the per-frame verifier structures for a 2 KiB stack
Can raising MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS to 256 cause an allocation overflow in the arg tracker?
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-2@@ -243,12 +244,13 @@ enum bpf_stack_slot_type {#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8/* size of eBPF register in bytes */ /* -* Largest number of BPF_REG_SIZE stack slots a single frame can have. A frame -* may use any part of the MAX_BPF_STACK budget; check_max_stack_depth()
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h enum bpf_stack_slot_type { · line 253
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +6
-3-* enforces the bound on the combined depth of frames sharing the kernel stack -* and on each frame using a private stack. +* Largest number of BPF_REG_SIZE stack slots a single frame can have, sized +* for the largest stack budget any JIT supports. A frame may use any part of +* its program's budget; check_max_stack_depth() enforces the budget on the +* combined depth of frames sharing the kernel stack and on each frame using +* a private stack. */ -#define MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS (MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) +#define MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS (MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT / BPF_REG_SIZE)
Can raising MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS to 256 cause an allocation overflow in the arg tracker?
This change affects subprog_spill_slots() in kernel/bpf/liveness.c, which sizes the per-instruction stack tracking:
kernel/bpf/liveness.c:subprog_spill_slots() {
return clamp_t(u32, DIV_ROUND_UP(deepest, 8),
MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE, MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS);
}Before this patch that was clamp(x, 64, 64), always returning 64. Now any BPF_DW instruction with base R10 and a negative offset can push nslots up to 256. The value feeds compute_subprog_args():
kernel/bpf/liveness.c:compute_subprog_args() {
at_stack_in = kvmalloc_objs(*at_stack_in, (size_t)len * nslots,
GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
}
with sizeof(struct arg_track) == 10.
This runs from bpf_compute_live_registers() before do_check_main(). The instruction checks in check_and_resolve_insns() and check_insn_fields() do not validate R10 offsets, so an instruction such as
'*(u64 *)(r10 - 2048) = 0' in a program the main pass would later reject still reaches this allocation with nslots == 256.
A bpf_capable loader may submit up to BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS (1,000,000) instructions. For a single subprog with len >= 838,861 and nslots == 256, or len == 1,000,000 and offset <= -1713 (nslots >= 215), the size becomes len * nslots * 10 > INT_MAX.
The kvmalloc path checks this:
mm/util.c:__kvmalloc_node_noprof() {
if (unlikely(size > INT_MAX)) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(flags & __GFP_NOWARN));
return NULL;
}
}GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT has no __GFP_NOWARN, so userspace can trigger a kernel WARN (a panic with panic_on_warn). The load then fails with -ENOMEM instead of the expected -EACCES or -EINVAL. The old worst case was 1,000,000 * 64 * 10 = 640 MB, below INT_MAX.
Even below the WARN threshold, the arg tracker now allocates and iterates up to 4x more stack state (up to about 2 GB) for programs that will be rejected at the 512-byte budget anyway.
Could the clamp bound nslots by the program's stack budget instead of MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS, to match what the main pass will eventually allow?
[ ... ]
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/35976322553
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 12/18] bpf: Size the per-frame verifier structures for a 2 KiB stack
Quoted 71 lines · bot+bpf-ci
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-2@@ -243,12 +244,13 @@ enum bpf_stack_slot_type {#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8/* size of eBPF register in bytes */ /* -* Largest number of BPF_REG_SIZE stack slots a single frame can have. A frame -* may use any part of the MAX_BPF_STACK budget; check_max_stack_depth() include/linux/bpf_verifier.h enum bpf_stack_slot_type { · line 253
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +6
-3-* enforces the bound on the combined depth of frames sharing the kernel stack -* and on each frame using a private stack. +* Largest number of BPF_REG_SIZE stack slots a single frame can have, sized +* for the largest stack budget any JIT supports. A frame may use any part of +* its program's budget; check_max_stack_depth() enforces the budget on the +* combined depth of frames sharing the kernel stack and on each frame using +* a private stack. */ -#define MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS (MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) +#define MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS (MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT / BPF_REG_SIZE)Can raising
MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTSto 256 cause an allocation overflow in the arg tracker?This change affects
subprog_spill_slots()inkernel/bpf/liveness.c, which sizes the per-instruction stack tracking:kernel/bpf/liveness.c:subprog_spill_slots() { return clamp_t(u32, DIV_ROUND_UP(deepest, 8), MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE, MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS); }Before this patch that was
clamp(x, 64, 64), always returning 64. Now anyBPF_DWinstruction with base R10 and a negative offset can push nslots up to 256. The value feedscompute_subprog_args():kernel/bpf/liveness.c:compute_subprog_args() {
at_stack_in= kvmalloc_objs(*at_stack_in, (size_t)len * nslots,
GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
}with
sizeof(struct arg_track)== 10.This runs from
bpf_compute_live_registers()beforedo_check_main(). The instruction checks incheck_and_resolve_insns()andcheck_insn_fields()do not validate R10 offsets, so an instruction such as
'*(u64 *)(r10 - 2048) = 0' in a program the main pass would later reject still reaches this allocation with nslots == 256.A
bpf_capableloader may submit up toBPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS(1,000,000) instructions. For a single subprog with len >= 838,861 and nslots == 256, or len == 1,000,000 and offset <= -1713 (nslots >= 215), the size becomes len * nslots * 10 >INT_MAX.The kvmalloc path checks this:
mm/util.c:__kvmalloc_node_noprof() { if (unlikely(size > INT_MAX)) { WARN_ON_ONCE(!(flags & __GFP_NOWARN)); return NULL; } }
GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNThas no__GFP_NOWARN, so userspace can trigger a kernel WARN (a panic withpanic_on_warn). The load then fails with-ENOMEMinstead of the expected-EACCESor-EINVAL. The old worst case was 1,000,000 * 64 * 10 = 640 MB, belowINT_MAX.
Quoted 7 lines
Even below the WARN threshold, the arg tracker now allocates and iterates up to 4x more stack state (up to about 2 GB) for programs that will be rejected at the 512-byte budget anyway.
Could the clamp bound nslots by the program's stack budget instead of
MAX_BPF_STACK_SLOTS, to match what the main pass will eventually allow?
Fixed for v3: the tracker is bounded by the program's stack budget, so a 512-byte program is back to the old 64-slot worst case, and the allocation uses __GFP_NOWARN so the remaining pathological 2 KiB case fails the load with -ENOMEM instead of warning.
Quoted 8 lines
[ ... ]
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.mdCI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/35976322553
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 13/18 bpf: Bound program stack use by a per-program limit
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediThe verifier checks every stack access and the combined depth of a call chain against MAX_BPF_STACK, which is also the frame size of the interpreter and the frame that JITs without subprogram tail call support set up for tail-call targets. A JIT that lays out frames of any size and lets a tail-called program set up its own frame does not need that limit; it only needs the verifier to bound how much stack a program uses in total.
Add bpf_jit_supports_large_stack() for a JIT to claim that, and give each program its budget through bpf_prog_stack_limit(): MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT when the JIT is requested, the program is not offloaded and the JIT supports large stacks as well as tail calls from subprograms, MAX_BPF_STACK otherwise. The latter is what lets a tail-called program set up its own frame: without it, do_misc_fixups() gives every program with tail calls a MAX_BPF_STACK frame, which a deeper frame verified against the larger budget would overrun. The verifier keeps the budget in env->stack_limit and uses it for the bounds of fixed and variable offset stack accesses, for unprivileged stack pointer arithmetic and its speculation limit, and for the combined and private stack depth checks. A frame may use any part of its program's budget. The interpreter paths keep MAX_BPF_STACK: a program whose main frame is deeper falls back to the JIT-required path of bpf_prog_select_runtime() and one with deeper subprogram frames is rejected when patching calls for the interpreter. The extra stack that may_goto and the timed may_goto instrumentation add below a frame is, as before, not counted against the budget of a JITed program and rejected past MAX_BPF_STACK for an interpreted one.
Stack liveness treats a read through a pointer of unknown offset, or a call passing a frame pointer to a subprogram, as reaching the whole frame, and widens the masks of that frame to the deepest half-slot such a read can cover. Bound that by the program's budget too: no access past it is accepted, so a program kept at MAX_BPF_STACK carries masks of two words for such frames, as before, instead of the eight that MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT needs. The three selftests matching a whole-frame read in the liveness log accept either depth.
The capability is a boolean and the budget a single constant, in the style of the other bpf_jit_supports_*() queries, rather than a per JIT
size: the budget is meant to be the same everywhere it is raised, so that programs verify identically across those architectures.
No JIT declares support yet, so every program keeps its 512-byte budget.
--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 20 ++++++++++ include/linux/filter.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/core.c | 13 +++++++ kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 39 +++++++++++-------- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 24 +++++++----- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c | 6 +-- 6 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +20 -0
@@ -1019,6 +1019,8 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {u32 prev_jmps_processed, jmps_processed;/* maximum combined stack depth */ u32 max_stack_depth; +/* stack budget of the program, see bpf_prog_stack_limit() */ +u32 stack_limit;/* total verification time */ u64 verification_time;/* maximum number of verifier states kept in 'branching' instructions */
@@ -1278,6 +1280,24 @@ static inline int bpf_get_spi(s32 off)return (-off -1 ) /BPF_REG_SIZE ; } +/* +* Stack a program may use in total: combined over the frames of a call +* chain on the kernel stack, or per frame on a private stack. Any single +* frame may reach that deep. Only a JIT that lays out such frames may go +* beyond MAX_BPF_STACK, the interpreter's frame size, and only one whose +* tail calls let the target set up its own frame: without subprogram +* tail calls, do_misc_fixups() gives every program with tail calls a +* MAX_BPF_STACK frame, which a deeper frame would overrun. +*/ +static inline u32 bpf_prog_stack_limit (const struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ +/* an offloaded program never runs on the host JIT, whatever it supports */ +if (prog->jit_requested && !bpf_prog_is_offloaded (prog->aux) && +bpf_jit_supports_large_stack () &&bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls ()) +return MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT ; +return MAX_BPF_STACK ; +} +static inline struct bpf_func_state *bpf_func (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) {
include/linux/filter.h +1 -0
@@ -1252,6 +1252,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg(void);bool bpf_jit_supports_arena (void );bool bpf_jit_supports_insn (struct bpf_insn *insn,bool in_arena);bool bpf_jit_supports_private_stack (void ); +bool bpf_jit_supports_large_stack (void );bool bpf_jit_supports_timed_may_goto (void );bool bpf_jit_supports_fsession (void );
kernel/bpf/core.c +13 -0
@@ -3483,6 +3483,19 @@ bool __weak bpf_jit_supports_private_stack(void)return false; } +/* +* Return TRUE if the JIT lays out frames of up to MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT bytes. +* Its prologue, epilogue and tail call sequences must encode such frame +* sizes and a private stack must be sized from the program's depth. The +* budget is only granted alongside bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(), +* whose tail calls land before the target sets up its own frame; see +* bpf_prog_stack_limit(). +*/ +bool __weak bpf_jit_supports_large_stack (void ) +{ +return false; +} +void __weak arch_bpf_stack_walk (bool (*consume_fn)(void *cookie,u64 ip,u64 sp,u64 bp),void *cookie) { }
kernel/bpf/liveness.c +22 -17
@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ enum {* relative index @i is at &bits[(i * FM_MASK_CNT + kind) * words]. A * half-slot at or past @words * BITS_PER_LONG is never read by this frame, * hence never live. An instruction that may read the whole frame, such as a -* call passing a frame pointer to another subprog, widens the array to -* FRAME_MAX_WORDS, so that the read cannot lose half-slots to a later -* widening. +* call passing a frame pointer to another subprog, widens the array to the +* program's stack budget, the deepest an accepted program can reach, so +* that the read cannot lose half-slots to a later widening. */ struct frame_masks {u32 words;
@@ -264,12 +264,16 @@ static int mark_stack_write(struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_/* * Mark every half-slot of @frame as possibly read by @insn_idx. This widens -* the masks to the maximum width: a full read recorded at a narrower width -* would leave the bits added by a later widening clear and lose part of it. +* the masks to the program's stack budget: a full read recorded at a narrower +* width would leave the bits added by a later widening clear and lose part of +* it, and an access past the budget is rejected by the main pass later, so no +* widening of an accepted program goes further. */ -static int mark_stack_read_all (struct func_instance *instance,u32 frame,u32 insn_idx) +static int mark_stack_read_all (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct func_instance *instance, +u32 frame,u32 insn_idx) { -return mark_stack_read (instance, frame, insn_idx,0 ,FRAME_HALF_SPIS -1 ); +return mark_stack_read (instance, frame, insn_idx,0 , + env->stack_limit /BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE -1 ); }/* Accumulate @src, a mask @src_words wide, into may_read of @frame at @insn_idx */
@@ -1443,7 +1447,7 @@ static int record_stack_access_off(struct func_instance *instance, s64 fp_off,* 'arg' is FP-derived argument to helper/kfunc or load/store that * reads (positive) or writes (negative) 'access_bytes' into 'use' or 'def'. */ -static int record_stack_access (struct func_instance *instance, +static int record_stack_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct func_instance *instance,const struct arg_track *arg,s64 access_bytes,u32 frame,u32 insn_idx) {
@@ -1453,7 +1457,7 @@ static int record_stack_access(struct func_instance *instance,return 0 ;if (arg->off_cnt ==0 ) {if (access_bytes >0 || access_bytes ==S64_MIN ) -return mark_stack_read_all (instance, frame, insn_idx); +return mark_stack_read_all (env, instance, frame, insn_idx);return 0 ; }if (access_bytes !=S64_MIN && access_bytes <0 && arg->off_cnt !=1 )
@@ -1472,7 +1476,8 @@ static int record_stack_access(struct func_instance *instance,* When a pointer is ARG_IMPRECISE, conservatively mark every frame in * the bitmask as fully used. */ -static int record_imprecise (struct func_instance *instance,u32 mask,u32 insn_idx) +static int record_imprecise (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct func_instance *instance, +u32 mask,u32 insn_idx) {int depth = instance->depth;int f, err;
@@ -1481,7 +1486,7 @@ static int record_imprecise(struct func_instance *instance, u32 mask, u32 insn_iif (!(mask &1 ))continue ;if (f <= depth) { - err =mark_stack_read_all (instance, f, insn_idx); + err =mark_stack_read_all (env, instance, f, insn_idx);if (err)return err; }
@@ -1550,9 +1555,9 @@ static int record_load_store_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, }if (ptr->frame >=0 && ptr->frame <= depth) -return record_stack_access (instance, ptr, sz, ptr->frame, insn_idx); +return record_stack_access (env, instance, ptr, sz, ptr->frame, insn_idx);if (ptr->frame ==ARG_IMPRECISE ) -return record_imprecise (instance, ptr->mask, insn_idx); +return record_imprecise (env, instance, ptr->mask, insn_idx);/* ARG_NONE: not derived from any frame pointer, skip */ return 0 ; }
@@ -1577,7 +1582,7 @@ static int record_arg_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bytes =bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes (env, insn, arg_idx, insn_idx); }else {for (int f =0 ; f <= depth; f++) { - err =mark_stack_read_all (instance, f, insn_idx); + err =mark_stack_read_all (env, instance, f, insn_idx);if (err)return err; }
@@ -1587,9 +1592,9 @@ static int record_arg_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return 0 ;if (frame >=0 && frame <= depth) - err =record_stack_access (instance, at, bytes, frame, insn_idx); + err =record_stack_access (env, instance, at, bytes, frame, insn_idx);else if (frame ==ARG_IMPRECISE ) - err =record_imprecise (instance, at->mask, insn_idx); + err =record_imprecise (env, instance, at->mask, insn_idx);return err; }
@@ -2111,7 +2116,7 @@ static int analyze_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,if (info[subprog].at_in[j][caller_reg].frame ==ARG_NONE )continue ;for (int f =0 ; f <= depth; f++) { - err =mark_stack_read_all (instance, f, idx); + err =mark_stack_read_all (env, instance, f, idx);if (err) goto out_free; }
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +14 -10
@@ -3665,7 +3665,8 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int hist_spi = spi, hist_frame = state->frameno;struct bpf_stack_state *ss =bpf_stack_slot (state, spi); -/* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, +/* +* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -env->stack_limit <= off < 0, * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits */ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
@@ -5524,7 +5525,7 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,if (subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode ==PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE ) {if (subprog_depth > env->max_stack_depth) env->max_stack_depth = subprog_depth; -if (subprog_depth >MAX_BPF_STACK ) { +if (subprog_depth > env->stack_limit) {verbose (env,"stack size of subprog %d is %d. Too large\n" , idx, subprog_depth);return -EACCES ;
@@ -5533,7 +5534,7 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, depth += subprog_depth;if (depth > env->max_stack_depth) env->max_stack_depth = depth; -if (depth >MAX_BPF_STACK ) { +if (depth > env->stack_limit) { total =0 ;for (tmp = idx; tmp >=0 ; tmp = dinfo[tmp].caller) total++;
@@ -6534,10 +6535,11 @@ static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return 0 ; } -/* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The +/* +* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The * maximum valid offset is -1. * -* The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and +* The minimum valid offset is -env->stack_limit for writes, and * -state->allocated_stack for reads. */ static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
@@ -6548,7 +6550,7 @@ static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int min_valid_off;if (t ==BPF_WRITE || env->allow_uninit_stack) - min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK ; + min_valid_off = -(int )env->stack_limit;else min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack;
@@ -15190,7 +15192,8 @@ enum { REASON_STACK = -5, }; -static int retrieve_ptr_limit (const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, +static int retrieve_ptr_limit (const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, +const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,u32 *alu_limit,bool mask_to_left) {u32 max =0 , ptr_limit =0 ;
@@ -15202,7 +15205,7 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,* offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is * currently prohibited for unprivileged. */ - max =MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left; + max = env->stack_limit + mask_to_left; ptr_limit = -ptr_reg->var_off.value;break ;case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE :
@@ -15322,7 +15325,7 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, (opcode ==BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); } - err =retrieve_ptr_limit (ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left); + err =retrieve_ptr_limit (env, ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left);if (err <0 )return err;
@@ -15452,7 +15455,7 @@ static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(return -EACCES ; } -if (off >=0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK ) { +if (off >=0 || off < -(int )env->stack_limit) {verbose (env,"R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n" , regno, off);return -EACCES ;
@@ -22295,6 +22298,7 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, env->bt.env = env; env->prog = *prog; env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; + env->stack_limit =bpf_prog_stack_limit (env->prog); env->allow_ptr_leaks =bpf_allow_ptr_leaks (env->prog->aux->token); env->allow_uninit_stack =bpf_allow_uninit_stack (env->prog->aux->token);
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c +3 -3
@@ -1953,7 +1953,7 @@ static __used __naked void fwd_parent_key_to_helper(void) SEC("socket") __log_level(2) __success -__msg("call bpf_map_update_elem{{.*}}; use: fp1-8..-2048 fp0-8") +__msg("call bpf_map_update_elem{{.*}}; use: fp1-8..-{{(512|2048)}} fp0-8") __naked void helper_arg_fallback_keeps_scanning(void) { asm volatile (
@@ -2267,7 +2267,7 @@ static __used __naked void merge_leaf_read(void) SEC("socket") __log_level(2) __success -__msg("call bpf_loop#181 ; use: fp2-8..-2048 fp1-8..-2048 fp0-8..-2048") +__msg("call bpf_loop#181 ; use: fp2-8..-{{(512|2048)}} fp1-8..-{{(512|2048)}} fp0-8..-{{(512|2048)}}") __naked void bpf_loop_two_callbacks(void) { asm volatile (
@@ -2874,7 +2874,7 @@ __naked void narrow_store_defines_nothing(void) SEC("socket") __log_level(2) __msg("stack use/def subprog#{{[0-9]+}} merge_read_all_callee (d2,cs{{[0-9]+}}):") -__msg("(79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0){{.*}}; use: fp0-8..-2048") +__msg("(79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0){{.*}}; use: fp0-8..-{{(512|2048)}}")__naked void merge_keeps_whole_frame_read (void ) { asm volatile (
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 13/18] bpf: Bound program stack use by a per-program limit
The new comment on mark_stack_read_all() says "an access past the budget is rejected by the main pass later, so no widening of an accepted program goes further." Can that claim hold in all cases?
Quoted 26 lines
kernel/bpf/liveness.c +6
-5@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ enum {* relative index @i is at &bits[(i * FM_MASK_CNT + kind) * words]. A * half-slot at or past @words * BITS_PER_LONG is never read by this frame, * hence never live. An instruction that may read the whole frame, such as a -* call passing a frame pointer to another subprog, widens the array to -* FRAME_MAX_WORDS, so that the read cannot lose half-slots to a later -* widening. +* call passing a frame pointer to another subprog, widens the array to the +* program's stack budget, the deepest an accepted program can reach, so +* that the read cannot lose half-slots to a later widening. */ struct frame_masks {u32 words;@@ -264,12 +264,16 @@ static int mark_stack_write(struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_/* * Mark every half-slot of @frame as possibly read by @insn_idx. This widens -* the masks to the maximum width: a full read recorded at a narrower width -* would leave the bits added by a later widening clear and lose part of it. +* the masks to the program's stack budget: a full read recorded at a narrower +* width would leave the bits added by a later widening clear and lose part of +* it, and an access past the budget is rejected by the main pass later, so no
kernel/bpf/liveness.c static int mark_stack_write(struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_ · line 277
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/liveness.c +5
-2+* widening of an accepted program goes further. */ -static int mark_stack_read_all (struct func_instance *instance,u32 frame,u32 insn_idx) +static int mark_stack_read_all (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct func_instance *instance, +u32 frame,u32 insn_idx) { -return mark_stack_read (instance, frame, insn_idx,0 ,FRAME_HALF_SPIS -1 ); +return mark_stack_read (instance, frame, insn_idx,0 , + env->stack_limit /BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE -1 ); }
The new comment on mark_stack_read_all() says "an access past the budget is rejected by the main pass later, so no widening of an accepted program goes further." Can that claim hold in all cases?
bpf_compute_subprog_arg_access() records accesses on every instruction the CFG can reach, but do_check() only explores feasible paths. In check_cond_jmp_op(), when is_branch_taken() returns 0 or 1, the other branch is pushed only if !env->bypass_spec_v1.
For a privileged load, a branch that is provably dead but not constant-folded is never verified. Looking at something like this:
call bpf_get_prandom_u32
r0 &= 15
if r0 > 20 goto L
r0 = 0
exit
L:
*(u64 *)(r10 - 1024) = r0The program is accepted with stack_limit == 512. The liveness pass still calls mark_stack_write() for half-slots 254..255, and widen_frame_masks() grows that frame past the budget, to 4 words.
There is no functional impact. widen_frame_masks() keeps all old bits, and liveness is only queried from __clean_func_state() for half-slots below 2 * allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE. allocated_stack only grows through grow_stack_state() after check_stack_access_within_bounds() has enforced -env->stack_limit. So bits past the budget are never read, and a read-all up to stack_limit / BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE - 1 covers every half-slot the verifier can query.
Could the comments state that invariant (verifier states never hold slots past env->stack_limit), rather than claiming that accepted programs never record accesses past the budget? As written, a later change could rely on masks never being wider than the budget, for example to size a buffer from stack_limit instead of FRAME_MAX_WORDS, and that would be unsafe.
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/35976322553
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 13/18] bpf: Bound program stack use by a per-program limit
Quoted 69 lines · bot+bpf-ci
Quoted 26 lines
kernel/bpf/liveness.c +6
-5@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ enum {* relative index @i is at &bits[(i * FM_MASK_CNT + kind) * words]. A * half-slot at or past @words * BITS_PER_LONG is never read by this frame, * hence never live. An instruction that may read the whole frame, such as a -* call passing a frame pointer to another subprog, widens the array to -* FRAME_MAX_WORDS, so that the read cannot lose half-slots to a later -* widening. +* call passing a frame pointer to another subprog, widens the array to the +* program's stack budget, the deepest an accepted program can reach, so +* that the read cannot lose half-slots to a later widening. */ struct frame_masks {u32 words;@@ -264,12 +264,16 @@ static int mark_stack_write(struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_/* * Mark every half-slot of @frame as possibly read by @insn_idx. This widens -* the masks to the maximum width: a full read recorded at a narrower width -* would leave the bits added by a later widening clear and lose part of it. +* the masks to the program's stack budget: a full read recorded at a narrower +* width would leave the bits added by a later widening clear and lose part of +* it, and an access past the budget is rejected by the main pass later, so no kernel/bpf/liveness.c static int mark_stack_write(struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_ · line 277
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/liveness.c +5
-2+* widening of an accepted program goes further. */ -static int mark_stack_read_all (struct func_instance *instance,u32 frame,u32 insn_idx) +static int mark_stack_read_all (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct func_instance *instance, +u32 frame,u32 insn_idx) { -return mark_stack_read (instance, frame, insn_idx,0 ,FRAME_HALF_SPIS -1 ); +return mark_stack_read (instance, frame, insn_idx,0 , + env->stack_limit /BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE -1 ); }The new comment on
mark_stack_read_all()says "an access past the budget is rejected by the main pass later, so no widening of an accepted program goes further." Can that claim hold in all cases?
bpf_compute_subprog_arg_access()records accesses on every instruction the CFG can reach, butdo_check()only explores feasible paths. Incheck_cond_jmp_op(), whenis_branch_taken()returns 0 or 1, the other branch is pushed only if !env->bypass_spec_v1.For a privileged load, a branch that is provably dead but not constant-folded is never verified. Looking at something like this:
call bpf_get_prandom_u32 r0 &= 15 if r0 > 20 goto L r0 = 0 exit L: *(u64 *)(r10 - 1024) = r0The program is accepted with
stack_limit== 512. The liveness pass still callsmark_stack_write()for half-slots 254..255, andwiden_frame_masks()grows that frame past the budget, to 4 words.There is no functional impact.
widen_frame_masks()keeps all old bits, and liveness is only queried from__clean_func_state()for half-slots below 2 *allocated_stack/BPF_REG_SIZE.allocated_stackonly grows throughgrow_stack_state()aftercheck_stack_access_within_bounds()has enforced -env->stack_limit. So bits past the budget are never read, and a read-all up tostack_limit/BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE- 1 covers every half-slot the verifier can query.
Quoted 6 lines
Could the comments state that invariant (verifier states never hold slots past
env->stack_limit), rather than claiming that accepted programs never record accesses past the budget? As written, a later change could rely on masks never being wider than the budget, for example to size a buffer fromstack_limitinstead ofFRAME_MAX_WORDS, and that would be unsafe.
Reworded for v3: the comment now states the invariant that verifier states never hold slots past the budget, and notes that unreachable code may still widen the masks harmlessly.
Quoted 6 lines
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.mdCI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/35976322553
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 14/18 selftests/bpf: Add load conditions on the program stack limit
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediThe stack a program may use will depend on the JIT: 2 KiB where the JIT declares support for large stacks, 512 bytes elsewhere and for interpreted programs. Tests that probe the limit therefore need to know which one is in force. Add __load_if_large_stack() and __load_if_no_large_stack() to test_loader, analogous to the JIT load conditions, backed by a one-time probe that loads a program storing at fp-2048. The probe caches only the verifier's verdict on that store: a load that fails for another reason, such as a missing capability, is reported and probed again on the next call.
--- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h | 3 ++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c | 24 +++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 69 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_misc.h +3 -0
@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@#define __prepare_priv __test_tag("test_prepare_priv")#define __load_if_JITed () __test_tag("load_mode=jited")#define __load_if_no_JITed () __test_tag("load_mode=no_jited") +/* Whether programs may use more than 512 bytes of stack on this kernel and JIT */ +#define __load_if_large_stack () __test_tag("stack_mode=large") +#define __load_if_no_large_stack () __test_tag("stack_mode=small")#define __stderr (msg) __test_tag("test_expect_stderr=" msg)#define __stderr_unpriv (msg) __test_tag("test_expect_stderr_unpriv=" msg)#define __stdout (msg) __test_tag("test_expect_stdout=" msg)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c +24 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,11 @@ enum load_mode { NO_JITED = 1 << 1, }; +enum stack_mode { +LARGE_STACK =1 <<0 , +SMALL_STACK =1 <<1 , +}; +struct test_subspec {char *name;char *description;
@@ -70,6 +75,7 @@ struct test_spec {int mode_mask;int arch_mask;int load_mask; +int stack_mask;int linear_sz;const char *skip_reason;bool prepare_priv;
@@ -425,6 +431,7 @@ static int parse_test_spec(struct test_loader *tester,int err =0 ;u32 arch_mask =0 ;u32 load_mask =0 ; +u32 stack_mask =0 ;struct btf *btf;enum arch arch;
@@ -620,6 +627,16 @@ static int parse_test_spec(struct test_loader *tester, err = -EINVAL ; goto cleanup; } + }else if ((val =str_has_pfx (s,"stack_mode=" ))) { +if (strcmp (val,"large" ) ==0 ) { + stack_mask =LARGE_STACK ; + }else if (strcmp (val,"small" ) ==0 ) { + stack_mask =SMALL_STACK ; + }else { +PRINT_FAIL ("bad stack spec: '%s'" , val); + err = -EINVAL ; + goto cleanup; + } }else if ((msg =str_has_pfx (s,"test_expect_stderr=" ))) { err =push_disasm_msg (msg, &stderr_on_next_line, &spec->priv.stderr);
@@ -659,6 +676,7 @@ static int parse_test_spec(struct test_loader *tester, spec->arch_mask = arch_mask ?:-1 ; spec->load_mask = load_mask ?: (JITED |NO_JITED ); + spec->stack_mask = stack_mask ?: (LARGE_STACK |SMALL_STACK );if (spec->mode_mask ==0 ) spec->mode_mask =PRIV ;
@@ -1331,6 +1349,7 @@ void run_subtest(struct test_loader *tester, {struct test_subspec *subspec = unpriv ? &spec->unpriv : &spec->priv;int current_runtime =is_jit_enabled () ?JITED :NO_JITED ; +int current_stack =is_large_stack_supported () ?LARGE_STACK :SMALL_STACK ;struct bpf_program *tprog =NULL , *tprog_iter;struct bpf_link *link, *links[32 ] = {};struct test_spec *spec_iter;
@@ -1360,6 +1379,11 @@ void run_subtest(struct test_loader *tester,return ; } +if ((current_stack & spec->stack_mask) ==0 ) { +test__skip (); +return ; + } +if (unpriv) {if (!can_execute_unpriv (tester, spec)) {test__skip ();
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.c +41 -0
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tools/testing/selftests/bpf/testing_helpers.h +1 -0
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct bpf_insn;int get_xlated_program (int fd_prog,struct bpf_insn **buf,__u32 *cnt);int testing_prog_flags (void );bool is_jit_enabled (void ); +bool is_large_stack_supported (void );int stack_mprotect (void );/* Runs diff(1) on mismatch */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 15/18 selftests/bpf: Give the 512-byte stack boundary tests a 2 KiB twin
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediA number of tests pin the 512-byte stack limit: accesses just past it, call chains that add up to more than it, private stack frames and async callbacks that exceed it. Once a JIT raises the budget to 2 KiB those programs load, so mark them __load_if_no_large_stack() and add a counterpart at the 2 KiB boundary under __load_if_large_stack(), so that each kernel runs the pair that matches its budget. The combined-depth tests that were built from frames of a few hundred bytes now chain five 480-byte frames, which exceeds both budgets and keeps them valid on every architecture; the number of frames reported in the error then differs, so those messages match any count. The C tests are limited to 512 bytes per function by the compiler, hence the chains. The callx stack depth tests, whose callee frames add up to 608 bytes, chain four 480-byte frames behind the callx target for the same reason.
No kernel grants the larger budget yet, so the 512-byte tests still run everywhere and the 2 KiB twins are skipped.
--- .../selftests/bpf/progs/async_stack_depth.c | 75 +++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_fail.c | 47 ++++++- .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func1.c | 65 ++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/test_global_func_deep_stack.c | 33 ++++- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_callx.c | 61 +++++++-- .../bpf/progs/verifier_callx_rodata.c | 53 +++++++- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_raw_stack.c | 21 +++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_ptr.c | 53 ++++++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_var_off.c | 32 +++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 122 ++++++++++++++---- 11 files changed, 523 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/async_stack_depth.c +75 -0
@@ -29,7 +29,49 @@ static int bad_timer_cb(void *map, int *key, struct bpf_timer *timer)return buf[255 ] +timer_cb (NULL ,NULL ,NULL ); } +/* +* The same shapes scaled to the 2 KiB budget of JITs with large stacks. The +* compiler caps a single function at 512 bytes, so the depth comes from a +* chain of 480-byte frames. +*/ +__attribute__((noinline)) +static int timer_cb_large_0 (void *map,int *key,struct bpf_timer *timer) +{ +volatile char buf[480 ] = {}; +return buf[69 ]; +} + +__attribute__((noinline)) +static int timer_cb_large_1 (void *map,int *key,struct bpf_timer *timer) +{ +volatile char buf[480 ] = {}; +return buf[69 ] +timer_cb_large_0 (map, key, timer); +} + +__attribute__((noinline)) +static int timer_cb_large_2 (void *map,int *key,struct bpf_timer *timer) +{ +volatile char buf[480 ] = {}; +return buf[69 ] +timer_cb_large_1 (map, key, timer); +} + +__attribute__((noinline)) +static int timer_cb_large_3 (void *map,int *key,struct bpf_timer *timer) +{ +volatile char buf[480 ] = {}; +return buf[69 ] +timer_cb_large_2 (map, key, timer); +} + +/* 5 * 480 = 2400 bytes on its own */ +__attribute__((noinline)) +static int bad_timer_cb_large (void *map,int *key,struct bpf_timer *timer) +{ +volatile char buf[480 ] = {}; +return buf[255 ] +timer_cb_large_3 (map, key, timer); +} + SEC("tc") +__load_if_no_large_stack() __failure __msg("combined stack size of 2 calls is") int pseudo_call_check(struct __sk_buff *ctx) {
@@ -44,7 +86,25 @@ int pseudo_call_check(struct __sk_buff *ctx)return bpf_timer_set_callback (&elem->timer, timer_cb) + buf[0 ]; } +/* main plus the four frames under timer_cb_large_3: 2400 bytes */ SEC("tc") +__load_if_large_stack() +__failure __msg("combined stack size of 5 calls is") +int pseudo_call_check_large(struct __sk_buff *ctx) +{ +struct hmap_elem *elem; +volatile char buf[480 ] = {}; + + elem =bpf_map_lookup_elem (&hmap, &(int ){0 }); +if (!elem) +return 0 ; + +timer_cb_large_3 (NULL ,NULL ,NULL ); +return bpf_timer_set_callback (&elem->timer, timer_cb_large_3) + buf[0 ]; +} + +SEC("tc") +__load_if_no_large_stack() __failure __msg("combined stack size of 2 calls is") int async_call_root_check(struct __sk_buff *ctx) {
@@ -58,4 +118,19 @@ int async_call_root_check(struct __sk_buff *ctx)return bpf_timer_set_callback (&elem->timer, bad_timer_cb) + buf[0 ]; } +SEC("tc") +__load_if_large_stack() +__failure __msg("combined stack size of 5 calls is") +int async_call_root_check_large(struct __sk_buff *ctx) +{ +struct hmap_elem *elem; +volatile char buf[480 ] = {}; + + elem =bpf_map_lookup_elem (&hmap, &(int ){0 }); +if (!elem) +return 0 ; + +return bpf_timer_set_callback (&elem->timer, bad_timer_cb_large) + buf[0 ]; +} + char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_fail.c +44 -3
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tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func1.c +65 -0
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tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func_deep_stack.c +32 -1
@@ -67,12 +67,30 @@ int XCAT(f, n)(unsigned long a) \#define F_31 F_30 FN(31, 30)#define F_32 F_31 FN(32, 31) +/* Same, with a 480-byte frame, to exceed the 2 KiB budget of large stacks. */ +#define FNB (n, prev) \ +__attribute__((noinline)) \ +int XCAT(f, n)(unsigned long a) \ +{ \ + volatile char buf[480] = {}; \ + volatile long b = XCAT(f, prev)(a - 1); \ + if (!b) \ + return 0; \ + return b + buf[479] + 1; \ +} + +#define F_33 F_32 FNB(33, 32) +#define F_34 F_33 FNB(34, 33) +#define F_35 F_34 FNB(35, 34) +#define F_36 F_35 FNB(36, 35) +#define F_37 F_36 FNB(37, 36) +#define CAT2 (a, b) a ## b#define XCAT2 (a, b) CAT2(a, b)#define F (n) XCAT2(F_, n) -F (32 ) +F (37 ) /* Ensure that even 32 levels deep, the function verifies. */SEC ("syscall" )
@@ -88,8 +106,21 @@ int global_func_deep_stack_success(struct __sk_buff *skb)* the size. */ SEC("syscall") +__load_if_no_large_stack() __failure __msg("combined stack size of 34 calls") int global_func_deep_stack_fail(struct __sk_buff *skb) {return f32 (123 ); } + +/* +* Five 480-byte frames on top of the chain: 5 * 480 + 33 * 16 = 2928 bytes, +* more than the 2 KiB budget of JITs with large stacks, and more than 512 +* bytes after the second frame everywhere else. +*/ +SEC("syscall") +__failure __msg("combined stack size of {{[0-9]+}} calls") +int global_func_deep_stack_fail_large(struct __sk_buff *skb) +{ +return f37 (123 ); +}
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_callx.c +53 -8
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tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_callx_rodata.c +49 -4
73 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c +2 -2
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ struct { } map_array SEC(".maps"); SEC("socket") -__failure __msg("invalid read from stack R2 off=-1024 size=8") +__failure __msg("invalid read from stack R2 off=-4096 size=8")__flag (BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ) __naked unsigned long caller_stack_write_tail_call(void) {
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ __naked unsigned long caller_stack_write_tail_call(void)"if r0 != 42 goto 1f;" "goto 2f;" "1:" -"*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = -1024;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = -4096;" "2:" "r1 = r6;" "r2 = r10;"
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_raw_stack.c +21 -0
@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ __naked void load_bytes_spilled_regs_data(void) SEC("tc") __description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 1") +__load_if_no_large_stack() __failure __msg("invalid write to stack R3 off=-513 size=8")__naked void load_bytes_invalid_access_1 (void ) {
@@ -257,6 +258,26 @@ __naked void load_bytes_invalid_access_1(void) : __clobber_all); } +SEC("tc") +__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 1, large stack") +__load_if_large_stack() +__failure __msg("invalid write to stack R3 off=-2049 size=8") +__naked void load_bytes_invalid_access_1_large(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r2 = 4; \ +r6 = r10; \ +r6 += -2049; \ +r3 = r6; \ +r4 = 8; \ +call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \ +r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \ +exit; \ +" : + : __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes) + : __clobber_all); +} + SEC("tc") __description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 2") __failure __msg("invalid write to stack R3 off=-1 size=8")
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_ptr.c +53 -0
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tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_var_off.c +32 -0
@@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ __naked void zero_sized_access_max_out_of_bound(void) SEC("lwt_in") __description("indirect variable-offset stack access, min out of bound") +__load_if_no_large_stack() __failure __msg("invalid variable-offset read from stack R2") __naked void access_min_out_of_bound(void) {
@@ -433,6 +434,37 @@ __naked void access_min_out_of_bound(void) : __clobber_all); } +SEC("lwt_in") +__description("indirect variable-offset stack access, min out of bound, large stack") +__load_if_large_stack() +__failure __msg("invalid variable-offset read from stack R2") +__naked void access_min_out_of_bound_large(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +/* Fill the top 8 bytes of the stack */ \ +r2 = 0; \ +*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r2; \ +/* Get an unknown value */ \ +r2 = *(u32*)(r1 + 0); \ +/* Make it small and 4-byte aligned */ \ +r2 &= 4; \ +r2 -= 2052; \ +/* \ +* add it to fp. We now have either fp-2052 or fp-2048, but\ +* we don't know which \ +*/ \ +r2 += r10; \ +/* dereference it indirectly */ \ +r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \ +call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ +r0 = 0; \ +exit; \ +" : + : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem), +__imm_addr (map_hash_8b) + : __clobber_all); +} + SEC("cgroup/skb")__description ("indirect variable-offset stack access, min_off < min_initialized" ) __success
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c +97 -25
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Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 15/18] selftests/bpf: Give the 512-byte stack boundary tests a 2 KiB twin
This isn't a bug, but now that callx_rodata_stack_depth() and callx_rodata_callback_stack_depth() both use the use_stack_480_* chain, is use_stack_304() still needed in this file?
Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_callx_rodata.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 65 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_callx_rodata.c +47
-2@@ -589,13 +589,58 @@ static unsigned long use_stack_304(void) ); } + +/* Four 480-byte frames, deeper than any budget together with their caller */ +__naked __noinline __used +static unsigned long use_stack_480_0(void) +{ + asmvolatile ( +"r0 = 0;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 480) = r0;" +"exit;" + ); +} + +__naked __noinline __used +static unsigned long use_stack_480_1(void) +{ + asmvolatile ( +"r0 = 0;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 480) = r0;" +"call use_stack_480_0;" +"exit;" + ); +} + +__naked __noinline __used +static unsigned long use_stack_480_2(void) +{ + asmvolatile ( +"r0 = 0;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 480) = r0;" +"call use_stack_480_1;" +"exit;" + ); +} + +__naked __noinline __used +static unsigned long use_stack_480_3(void) +{ + asmvolatile ( +"r0 = 0;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 480) = r0;" +"call use_stack_480_2;" +"exit;" + ); +} +/* stack of all possible callees is accounted */ SEC("socket") -__failure __msg("combined stack size of 2 calls is") +__failure __msg("combined stack size of {{[0-9]+}} calls is") __naked void callx_rodata_stack_depth(void) { asmvolatile ( - FUNC_TABLE2(tbl, ret0, use_stack_304) + FUNC_TABLE2(tbl, ret0, use_stack_480_3)"r0 = 0;" "*(u64 *)(r10 - 304) = r0;" "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"@@ -613,11 +658,11 @@ __naked void callx_rodata_stack_depth(void)/* stack of a callback that is read from the data is accounted too */ SEC ("socket" )
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_callx_rodata.c __naked void callx_rodata_stack_depth(void) · line 668
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_callx_rodata.c +2
-2-__failure __msg("combined stack size of 2 calls is") +__failure __msg("combined stack size of {{[0-9]+}} calls is")__naked void callx_rodata_callback_stack_depth (void ) { asmvolatile ( - FUNC_TABLE2(tbl, use_stack_304, ret0) + FUNC_TABLE2(tbl, use_stack_480_3, ret0)"r0 = 0;" "*(u64 *)(r10 - 304) = r0;" "r6 = tbl_%= ll;"
This isn't a bug, but now that callx_rodata_stack_depth() and callx_rodata_callback_stack_depth() both use the use_stack_480_* chain, is use_stack_304() still needed in this file?
In verifier_callx.c the function is still used by callx_stack_depth_ok(), but in verifier_callx_rodata.c nothing references it anymore. Could it be removed along with the extra blank line after it?
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/35976322553
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 15/18] selftests/bpf: Give the 512-byte stack boundary tests a 2 KiB twin
Quoted 87 lines · bot+bpf-ci
Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_callx_rodata.c +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 65 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_callx_rodata.c +47
-2@@ -589,13 +589,58 @@ static unsigned long use_stack_304(void) ); } + +/* Four 480-byte frames, deeper than any budget together with their caller */ +__naked __noinline __used +static unsigned long use_stack_480_0(void) +{ + asmvolatile ( +"r0 = 0;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 480) = r0;" +"exit;" + ); +} + +__naked __noinline __used +static unsigned long use_stack_480_1(void) +{ + asmvolatile ( +"r0 = 0;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 480) = r0;" +"call use_stack_480_0;" +"exit;" + ); +} + +__naked __noinline __used +static unsigned long use_stack_480_2(void) +{ + asmvolatile ( +"r0 = 0;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 480) = r0;" +"call use_stack_480_1;" +"exit;" + ); +} + +__naked __noinline __used +static unsigned long use_stack_480_3(void) +{ + asmvolatile ( +"r0 = 0;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 480) = r0;" +"call use_stack_480_2;" +"exit;" + ); +} +/* stack of all possible callees is accounted */ SEC("socket") -__failure __msg("combined stack size of 2 calls is") +__failure __msg("combined stack size of {{[0-9]+}} calls is") __naked void callx_rodata_stack_depth(void) { asmvolatile ( - FUNC_TABLE2(tbl, ret0, use_stack_304) + FUNC_TABLE2(tbl, ret0, use_stack_480_3)"r0 = 0;" "*(u64 *)(r10 - 304) = r0;" "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"@@ -613,11 +658,11 @@ __naked void callx_rodata_stack_depth(void)/* stack of a callback that is read from the data is accounted too */ SEC ("socket" )tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_callx_rodata.c __naked void callx_rodata_stack_depth(void) · line 668
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_callx_rodata.c +2
-2-__failure __msg("combined stack size of 2 calls is") +__failure __msg("combined stack size of {{[0-9]+}} calls is")__naked void callx_rodata_callback_stack_depth (void ) { asmvolatile ( - FUNC_TABLE2(tbl, use_stack_304, ret0) + FUNC_TABLE2(tbl, use_stack_480_3, ret0)"r0 = 0;" "*(u64 *)(r10 - 304) = r0;" "r6 = tbl_%= ll;"This isn't a bug, but now that
callx_rodata_stack_depth()andcallx_rodata_callback_stack_depth()both use the use_stack_480_* chain, isuse_stack_304()still needed in this file?
Quoted 4 lines
In
verifier_callx.cthe function is still used bycallx_stack_depth_ok(), but inverifier_callx_rodata.cnothing references it anymore. Could it be removed along with the extra blank line after it?
Dropped the unused use_stack_304() from verifier_callx_rodata.c for v3.
Quoted 6 lines
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.mdCI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/35976322553
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 16/18 bpf, x86: Allow programs 2 KiB of stack
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediThe x86-64 JIT encodes frame sizes as 32-bit immediates in its prologue, epilogue and tail call sequences, a tail call pops the frame of the program making it and lands in the target's prologue before the target allocates its own frame, and private stacks are allocated from each program's depth, so nothing in it depends on frames staying within 512 bytes. Report bpf_jit_supports_large_stack(), which raises the budget of JITed programs to MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT: 2 KiB combined over a call chain, or per frame on a private stack, with no separate limit on a single frame. Interpreted programs keep 512 bytes.
The worst case kernel stack use of a chain of tail calls grows
accordingly: the callers of a tail call may still leave at most 256 bytes on the stack, so 33 programs can accumulate 8 KiB of dead frames below the last one, which may now use 2 KiB instead of 512 bytes, for a little over 10 KiB in total on a 16 KiB kernel stack. The per-cpu memory behind a private stack grows in proportion to the frames a program asks for, up to 2 KiB plus guards per frame.
The budget does not depend on the privileges of the loader: an unprivileged program cannot call other BPF functions, so a tail call from one leaves no frame behind and its worst case is a single 2 KiB frame. Programs nested through helpers or attach points, such as a tracing program entered from a helper of a networking program, are not accounted against each other before or after this change; each level of nesting may now add up to 1.5 KiB more.
The verifier state of a frame grows with the stack it uses, up to four times as many stack slots as before; the allocation is on demand, so only programs using deep frames pay for them.
--- Documentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst | 10 +++++++--- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst +7 -3
@@ -221,9 +221,13 @@ newer kernels. BPF programs need to change accordingly when this happens. Q: How much stack space a BPF program uses? ------------------------------------------- -A: Currently all program types are limited to 512 bytes of stack -space, but the verifier computes the actual amount of stack used -and both interpreter and most JITed code consume necessary amount. +A: A program may use up to 2 KiB of stack, combined over its call +chain, when the JIT of the architecture reports support for large +stacks (currently x86-64); a single function may use all of it, and +every frame of a program running on a private stack gets the whole +amount. Elsewhere, and whenever the interpreter is used, the limit is +512 bytes. The verifier computes the actual amount of stack used and +both interpreter and most JITed code consume necessary amount. Q: Can BPF be offloaded to HW? ------------------------------
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +12 -0
@@ -4520,6 +4520,18 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(void)return true; } +/* +* Frame sizes are 32-bit immediates in the prologue, epilogue and tail call +* sequences, a tail call pops the caller's frame and lands in the target's +* prologue before the target allocates its own, and private stacks are +* allocated from the program's own depth, so MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT frames need +* nothing special. +*/ +bool bpf_jit_supports_large_stack (void ) +{ +return true; +} +bool bpf_jit_supports_percpu_insn (void ) {return true;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 16/18] bpf, x86: Allow programs 2 KiB of stack
Can a sched_cls or lwt_xmit program overflow the kernel stack through bpf_clone_redirect() recursion?
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +2
-0@@ -4520,6 +4520,18 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(void)return true; } +/* +* Frame sizes are 32-bit immediates in the prologue, epilogue and tail call
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c bool bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(void) · line 4534
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +10
-0+* sequences, a tail call pops the caller's frame and lands in the target's +* prologue before the target allocates its own, and private stacks are +* allocated from the program's own depth, so MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT frames need +* nothing special. +*/ +bool bpf_jit_supports_large_stack (void ) +{ +return true; +} +
Can a sched_cls or lwt_xmit program overflow the kernel stack through bpf_clone_redirect() recursion?
A TC egress program on device X that calls bpf_clone_redirect(skb, X_ifindex, 0) redirects the packet back to itself. The redirect happens while the calling program's frame is on the stack:
bpf_clone_redirect()
__bpf_redirect()
__bpf_redirect_common()
__bpf_tx_skb()
dev_queue_xmit()
__dev_queue_xmit()
sch_handle_egress()
tcx_run()
bpf_prog_run() -> (same or another tc egress program)The guard in __bpf_tx_skb() (net/core/filter.c) only fails when the counter exceeds XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT (8):
if (dev_xmit_recursion()) {
net_crit_ratelimited("bpf: recursion limit reached on datapath, buggy bpf program?\n");
kfree_skb(skb);
return -ENETDOWN;
}So dev_xmit_recursion() allows values 0 through 8 before it fails, which means the program runs at nesting levels 0 through 9. That puts ten of its frames on the stack at once.
sched_cls programs never get a private stack:
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:bpf_enable_priv_stack() returns NO_PRIV_STACK for them
so their frames live on the task or IRQ stack. On x86-64 without KASAN that stack is 16 KiB (THREAD_SIZE_ORDER = IRQ_STACK_ORDER = 2).
With this patch, a single 2048-byte frame is accepted. The BPF frames alone then take 10 x 2048 = 20 KiB, before any kernel frames in each round. That exceeds 16 KiB, so the stack overflows.
Before this patch the same program was capped at 10 x 512 = 5 KiB of BPF frames, which fit. The recursion limit was meant to stop a buggy program from crashing the kernel.
The commit message says nested programs "are not accounted against each other before or after this change; each level of nesting may now add up to 1.5 KiB more." It does not bound how many levels there can be. Here the kernel allows up to 10, which adds about 15 KiB compared to before.
The same construction works through lwt_xmit programs, which also get bpf_clone_redirect(). Triggering the overflow needs CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach.
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Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 16/18] bpf, x86: Allow programs 2 KiB of stack
Quoted 74 lines · bot+bpf-ci
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +2
-0@@ -4520,6 +4520,18 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(void)return true; } +/* +* Frame sizes are 32-bit immediates in the prologue, epilogue and tail call arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c bool bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(void) · line 4534
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +10
-0+* sequences, a tail call pops the caller's frame and lands in the target's +* prologue before the target allocates its own, and private stacks are +* allocated from the program's own depth, so MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT frames need +* nothing special. +*/ +bool bpf_jit_supports_large_stack (void ) +{ +return true; +} +Can a
sched_clsorlwt_xmitprogram overflow the kernel stack throughbpf_clone_redirect()recursion?A TC egress program on device X that calls
bpf_clone_redirect(skb, X_ifindex, 0)redirects the packet back to itself. The redirect happens while the calling program's frame is on the stack:
bpf_clone_redirect()__bpf_redirect() __bpf_redirect_common() __bpf_tx_skb() dev_queue_xmit() __dev_queue_xmit() sch_handle_egress() tcx_run() bpf_prog_run() -> (same or another tc egress program)The guard in
__bpf_tx_skb()(net/core/filter.c) only fails when the counter exceedsXMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT(8):if (dev_xmit_recursion()) { net_crit_ratelimited("bpf: recursion limit reached on datapath, buggy bpf program?\n"); kfree_skb(skb); return -ENETDOWN; }So
dev_xmit_recursion()allows values 0 through 8 before it fails, which means the program runs at nesting levels 0 through 9. That puts ten of its frames on the stack at once.
sched_clsprograms never get a private stack:kernel/bpf/verifier.c:bpf_enable_priv_stack() returns
NO_PRIV_STACKfor themso their frames live on the task or IRQ stack. On x86-64 without KASAN that stack is 16 KiB (
THREAD_SIZE_ORDER=IRQ_STACK_ORDER= 2).With this patch, a single 2048-byte frame is accepted. The BPF frames alone then take 10 x 2048 = 20 KiB, before any kernel frames in each round. That exceeds 16 KiB, so the stack overflows.
Before this patch the same program was capped at 10 x 512 = 5 KiB of BPF frames, which fit. The recursion limit was meant to stop a buggy program from crashing the kernel.
Quoted 10 lines
The commit message says nested programs "are not accounted against each other before or after this change; each level of nesting may now add up to 1.5 KiB more." It does not bound how many levels there can be. Here the kernel allows up to 10, which adds about 15 KiB compared to before.
The same construction works through
lwt_xmitprograms, which also getbpf_clone_redirect(). Triggering the overflow needsCAP_BPFandCAP_NET_ADMINto attach.
Right, thanks; for v3 a program that calls bpf_clone_redirect() keeps the 512-byte budget, since it can run ten frames deep through the datapath's recursion limit, and tests cover both bpf_clone_redirect() and bpf_redirect().
Quoted 5 lines
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Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 17/18 bpf, arm64: Allow programs 2 KiB of stack
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediThe arm64 JIT sets up a frame with an add/sub immediate, which encodes up to 4 KiB directly, addresses the BPF stack relative to SP or the private stack pointer with offsets that fall back to a scratch register when they do not fit the load/store immediate, and a tail call pops the current frame and lands in the target's prologue before the target sets up its own. The exception callback reuses the frame record of the main program and does not depend on its size. Report bpf_jit_supports_large_stack() to give JITed programs the same 2 KiB budget as on x86-64.
Tested on an emulated arm64 guest with programs loaded and run through the raw bpf() syscall: a 2 KiB frame, a 2 KiB frame with may_goto, a chain of four 512-byte frames, and a tail call from a program with a 2 KiB frame into another one; a 2056-byte frame and five 512-byte frames are rejected. The selftest suite was not run on arm64.
--- Documentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst | 11 ++++++----- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst +6 -5
@@ -223,11 +223,12 @@ Q: How much stack space a BPF program uses? ------------------------------------------- A: A program may use up to 2 KiB of stack, combined over its call chain, when the JIT of the architecture reports support for large -stacks (currently x86-64); a single function may use all of it, and -every frame of a program running on a private stack gets the whole -amount. Elsewhere, and whenever the interpreter is used, the limit is -512 bytes. The verifier computes the actual amount of stack used and -both interpreter and most JITed code consume necessary amount. +stacks (currently x86-64 and arm64); a single function may use all of +it, and every frame of a program running on a private stack gets the +whole amount. Elsewhere, and for programs verified for the interpreter, +the limit is 512 bytes; the interpreter itself never runs a frame +larger than that. The verifier computes the actual amount of stack +used and both interpreter and most JITed code consume necessary amount. Q: Can BPF be offloaded to HW? ------------------------------
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +5 -0
@@ -2501,6 +2501,11 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_callx(void)return true; } +bool bpf_jit_supports_large_stack (void ) +{ +return true; +} +static void invoke_bpf_prog (struct jit_ctx *ctx,struct bpf_tramp_node *node,int bargs_off,int retval_off,int run_ctx_off,bool save_ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 17/18] bpf, arm64: Allow programs 2 KiB of stack
This isn't a bug, but the interpreter sentence changes meaning here, not just the architecture list. The old sentence said "whenever the interpreter is used, the limit is 512 bytes" while the new…
Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst +0
-1@@ -223,11 +223,12 @@ Q: How much stack space a BPF program uses? ------------------------------------------- A: A program may use up to 2 KiB of stack, combined over its call chain, when the JIT of the architecture reports support for large -stacks (currently x86-64); a single function may use all of it, and
Documentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst Q: How much stack space a BPF program uses? · line 231
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst +6
-4-every frame of a program running on a private stack gets the whole -amount. Elsewhere, and whenever the interpreter is used, the limit is -512 bytes. The verifier computes the actual amount of stack used and -both interpreter and most JITed code consume necessary amount. +stacks (currently x86-64 and arm64); a single function may use all of +it, and every frame of a program running on a private stack gets the +whole amount. Elsewhere, and for programs verified for the interpreter, +the limit is 512 bytes; the interpreter itself never runs a frame +larger than that. The verifier computes the actual amount of stack +used and both interpreter and most JITed code consume necessary amount.
This isn't a bug, but the interpreter sentence changes meaning here, not just the architecture list. The old sentence said "whenever the interpreter is used, the limit is 512 bytes" while the new one says "for programs verified for the interpreter, the limit is 512 bytes; the interpreter itself never runs a frame larger than that."
Would this correction fit better in the x86 patch that first added the paragraph, or could the changelog say why it changes?
[ ... ]
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AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
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CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/35976322553
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 17/18] bpf, arm64: Allow programs 2 KiB of stack
Quoted 26 lines · bot+bpf-ci
Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst +0
-1@@ -223,11 +223,12 @@ Q: How much stack space a BPF program uses? ------------------------------------------- A: A program may use up to 2 KiB of stack, combined over its call chain, when the JIT of the architecture reports support for large -stacks (currently x86-64); a single function may use all of it, andDocumentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst Q: How much stack space a BPF program uses? · line 231
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/bpf/bpf_design_QA.rst +6
-4-every frame of a program running on a private stack gets the whole -amount. Elsewhere, and whenever the interpreter is used, the limit is -512 bytes. The verifier computes the actual amount of stack used and -both interpreter and most JITed code consume necessary amount. +stacks (currently x86-64 and arm64); a single function may use all of +it, and every frame of a program running on a private stack gets the +whole amount. Elsewhere, and for programs verified for the interpreter, +the limit is 512 bytes; the interpreter itself never runs a frame +larger than that. The verifier computes the actual amount of stack +used and both interpreter and most JITed code consume necessary amount.This isn't a bug, but the interpreter sentence changes meaning here, not just the architecture list. The old sentence said "whenever the interpreter is used, the limit is 512 bytes" while the new one says "for programs verified for the interpreter, the limit is 512 bytes; the interpreter itself never runs a frame larger than that."
Quoted 3 lines
Would this correction fit better in the x86 patch that first added the paragraph, or could the changelog say why it changes?
Not a bug; the sentence was corrected in the patch that adds arm64 because that is where the wording was revisited, and it stays here.
Quoted 8 lines
[ ... ]
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.mdCI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/35976322553
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH v2 18/18 selftests/bpf: Test the 2 KiB stack budget
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediAdd tests for the stack budget of JITs with large stack support: a single 2 KiB frame, with and without may_goto, four 512-byte frames that fit the budget and five that do not, a 512-byte frame calling a 1536-byte static subprog, global subprog or bpf_loop() callback and the same with eight bytes too many, variable offset writes reaching exactly the budget and past it, a tail call made from a 1 KiB frame, and two 2 KiB frames on a private stack, where each frame gets the whole budget. A program with a 2 KiB frame is checked to be rejected wherever the budget is 512 bytes.
Two tests run such programs: a tail call made from a subprog with a 1536-byte frame under a 240-byte caller into a program with a 2 KiB frame, and a struct_ops program on a private stack calling a subprog when both frames are 2 KiB.
--- .../bpf/prog_tests/struct_ops_private_stack.c | 31 ++ .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tailcalls.c | 42 ++ .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c | 2 + .../progs/struct_ops_private_stack_large.c | 51 +++ .../bpf/progs/tailcall_large_stack.c | 62 +++ .../bpf/progs/verifier_large_stack.c | 377 ++++++++++++++++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c | 23 ++ 7 files changed, 588 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_large.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tailcall_large_stack.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_large_stack.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/struct_ops_private_stack.c +31 -0
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@#include "struct_ops_private_stack.skel.h" #include "struct_ops_private_stack_fail.skel.h" #include "struct_ops_private_stack_recur.skel.h" +#include "struct_ops_private_stack_large.skel.h" #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__powerpc64__)static void test_private_stack (void )
@@ -78,6 +79,34 @@ static void test_private_stack_recur(void)struct_ops_private_stack_recur__destroy (skel); } +/* Two frames of 2 KiB each on the private stack */ +static void test_private_stack_large (void ) +{ +struct struct_ops_private_stack_large *skel; +struct bpf_link *link; + +if (!is_large_stack_supported ()) { +test__skip (); +return ; + } + + skel =struct_ops_private_stack_large__open_and_load (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"struct_ops_private_stack_large__open_and_load" )) +return ; + + link =bpf_map__attach_struct_ops (skel->maps.testmod_1); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (link,"attach_struct_ops" )) + goto cleanup; + +ASSERT_OK (trigger_module_test_read (256 ),"trigger_read" ); + +ASSERT_EQ (skel->bss->val,100 +30 +12 ,"val" ); + +bpf_link__destroy (link); +cleanup: +struct_ops_private_stack_large__destroy (skel); +} +static void __test_struct_ops_private_stack (void ) {if (test__start_subtest ("private_stack" ))
@@ -86,6 +115,8 @@ static void __test_struct_ops_private_stack(void)test_private_stack_fail ();if (test__start_subtest ("private_stack_recur" ))test_private_stack_recur (); +if (test__start_subtest ("private_stack_large" )) + test_private_stack_large(); }#else static void __test_struct_ops_private_stack (void )
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tailcalls.c +42 -0
58 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c +2 -0
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@#include "verifier_kfunc_uninit.skel.h" #include "verifier_kfunc_uninit_multi.skel.h" #include "verifier_ld_ind.skel.h" +#include "verifier_large_stack.skel.h" #include "verifier_ldsx.skel.h" #include "verifier_leak_ptr.skel.h" #include "verifier_linked_scalars.skel.h"
@@ -244,6 +245,7 @@ void test_verifier_kfunc_uninit(void) { RUN_TESTS(verifier_kfunc_uninit)void test_verifier_kfunc_uninit_multi (void ) {RUN_TESTS (verifier_kfunc_uninit_multi); }void test_verifier_load_acquire (void ) {RUN (verifier_load_acquire); }void test_verifier_ld_ind (void ) {RUN (verifier_ld_ind); } +void test_verifier_large_stack (void ) {RUN (verifier_large_stack); }void test_verifier_ldsx (void ) {RUN (verifier_ldsx); }void test_verifier_leak_ptr (void ) {RUN (verifier_leak_ptr); }void test_verifier_linked_scalars (void ) {RUN (verifier_linked_scalars); }
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/struct_ops_private_stack_large.c new file +51 -0
51 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/tailcall_large_stack.c new file +62 -0
62 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_large_stack.c new file +377 -0
377 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c +23 -0
@@ -2912,3 +2912,26 @@ static __used __naked void merge_read_all_callee(void)"exit;" ::: __clobber_all); } + +/* +* A frame pointer spilled below fp-512 is a spill like any other: the fill +* restores its identity, and a load through it reads only the slot it names +* instead of the whole frame. +*/ +SEC("socket") +__log_level(2) +__load_if_large_stack() +__msg("(79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0){{.*}}; use: fp0-8{{$}}") +__naked void spill_below_512_stays_precise (void ) +{ + asmvolatile ( +"r1 = 0;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;" +"r1 = r10;" +"r1 += -8;" +"*(u64 *)(r10 - 520) = r1;" +"r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 520);" +"r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);" +"exit;" + ::: __clobber_all); +}
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 18/18] selftests/bpf: Test the 2 KiB stack budget
Does the single_frame_2048_no_large_stack test body match its expected failure message?
Quoted 35 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_large_stack.c new file +29
-0@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h> +#include "bpf_misc.h" + +/* +* Programs may use MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT (2 KiB) of stack on JITs that support +* large stacks, combined over a call chain, with no separate limit on a +* single frame. Interpreted programs and other JITs keep 512 bytes. +*/ + +SEC("socket") +__description("single frame of 2048 bytes") +__load_if_large_stack() +__success __success_unpriv __retval(42) +__naked void single_frame_2048(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r1 = r10; \ +r1 += -2048; \ +r0 = 42; \ +*(u64*)(r1 + 0) = r0; \ +r0 = *(u64*)(r1 + 0); \ +exit; \ +" ::: __clobber_all); +} + +SEC ("socket" )
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_large_stack.c line 39
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_large_stack.c new file +10
-0+__description("single frame of 2048 bytes without large stack support") +__load_if_no_large_stack() +__failure __msg("invalid write to stack R1 off=-2048 size=8") +__naked void single_frame_2048_no_large_stack(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r0 = 0; \ +exit; \ +" ::: __clobber_all); +}
Does the single_frame_2048_no_large_stack test body match its expected failure message?
This test is meant to verify that a 2 KiB frame is rejected on systems without large stack support (the interpreter, bpf_jit_enable=0, and JITs without bpf_jit_supports_large_stack() like s390x, riscv64, loongarch, and powerpc).
The test is marked __failure with the expected message "invalid write to stack R1 off=-2048 size=8", but the test body is:
r0 = 0;
exit;This 2-instruction program never touches fp-2048, so it verifies fine on all configurations. The __failure annotation then causes ASSERT_ERR(err, "unexpected_load_success") to trip in run_subtest() in test_loader.c, failing the test on every configuration it targets.
Looking at single_frame_2048 above, the expected error message matches this sequence:
r1 = r10;
r1 += -2048;
r0 = 42;
*(u64*)(r1 + 0) = r0;Should single_frame_2048_no_large_stack repeat that write sequence so the verifier rejects it with the expected message on systems without large stack support?
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AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
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Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 18/18] selftests/bpf: Test the 2 KiB stack budget
Quoted 68 lines · bot+bpf-ci
Quoted 35 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_large_stack.c new file +29
-0@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h> +#include "bpf_misc.h" + +/* +* Programs may use MAX_BPF_STACK_JIT (2 KiB) of stack on JITs that support +* large stacks, combined over a call chain, with no separate limit on a +* single frame. Interpreted programs and other JITs keep 512 bytes. +*/ + +SEC("socket") +__description("single frame of 2048 bytes") +__load_if_large_stack() +__success __success_unpriv __retval(42) +__naked void single_frame_2048(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r1 = r10; \ +r1 += -2048; \ +r0 = 42; \ +*(u64*)(r1 + 0) = r0; \ +r0 = *(u64*)(r1 + 0); \ +exit; \ +" ::: __clobber_all); +} + +SEC ("socket" )tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_large_stack.c line 39
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_large_stack.c new file +10
-0+__description("single frame of 2048 bytes without large stack support") +__load_if_no_large_stack() +__failure __msg("invalid write to stack R1 off=-2048 size=8") +__naked void single_frame_2048_no_large_stack(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r0 = 0; \ +exit; \ +" ::: __clobber_all); +}Does the
single_frame_2048_no_large_stacktest body match its expected failure message?This test is meant to verify that a 2 KiB frame is rejected on systems without large stack support (the interpreter, bpf_jit_enable=0, and JITs without
bpf_jit_supports_large_stack()like s390x, riscv64, loongarch, and powerpc).The test is marked
__failurewith the expected message "invalid write to stack R1 off=-2048 size=8", but the test body is:r0 = 0; exit;This 2-instruction program never touches fp-2048, so it verifies fine on all configurations. The
__failureannotation then causesASSERT_ERR(err, "unexpected_load_success")to trip inrun_subtest()intest_loader.c, failing the test on every configuration it targets.Looking at
single_frame_2048above, the expected error message matches this sequence:
Quoted 9 lines
r1 = r10; r1 += -2048; r0 = 42; *(u64*)(r1 + 0) = r0;Should
single_frame_2048_no_large_stackrepeat that write sequence so the verifier rejects it with the expected message on systems without large stack support?
Not a bug: single_frame_2048_no_large_stack does store through r1 = r10 - 2048; the quoted two-instruction body is not in the patch.
Quoted 6 lines
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AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
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