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RDMA/rxe: bound the WQE opcode before indexing rxe_wr_opcode_info[]

PATCH Applied Youngsung Ahn 4 participants 4 messages Oct 2 – Oct 15

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 RDMA/rxe: bound the WQE opcode before indexing rxe_wr_opcode_info[]

wr_opcode_mask() indexes the global rxe_wr_opcode_info[] array with a caller-supplied opcode and no bounds check. For a user QP the WQE comes from an mmap'd SQ ring, so wqe->wr.opcode is an attacker-controlled __u32 read back by the requester (req_next_wqe() -> rxe_requester()); rxe_post_send() takes the qp->is_user branch and never runs validate_send_wr(), whose only opcode check is itself !wr_opcode_mask() (it indexes before it checks). rxe_wr_opcode_info[] has entries only up to IB_WR_REG_MR, so an out-of-range opcode reads out of bounds and the result is used as a mask and dereferenced; observed as a KASAN global-out-of-bounds "Read of size 4" and a wild-pointer oops.

Return a zero mask for an out-of-range opcode, matching how validate_send_wr() already treats a zero mask (an invalid WR), so no path indexes the array out of bounds.

Fixes 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Assisted-by LLM

---
Notes (not part of the commit):
v3: no code change. Sent as a standalone message rather than as a reply to the v2 posting, and dropped the Cc: [email protected] trailer, both as asked on-list.

On the question about req_retry(): req_retry() does not reject the WQE itself, it only re-posts it. A zero mask makes every "mask & WR_*" test there false, so an out-of-range opcode yields iova = 0, the dma cursor reset, and neither retry_first_write_send() nor the read fix-up; the WQE is left in wqe_state_posted. Once the requester dispatches it, wqe->mask stays 0 so WR_LOCAL_OP_MASK is not taken, and next_opcode() matches no case for an out-of-range wqe->wr.opcode and returns -EINVAL, so rxe_requester() sets wqe->status = IB_WC_LOC_QP_OP_ERR and takes the err path, which moves the QP to IB_QPS_ERR and lets the completer post the completion.

wr_opcode_mask() is the single choke point all three callers (validate_send_wr(), req_next_wqe(), req_retry()) funnel through, and only validate_send_wr() rejects the WQE on a zero mask. In req_retry() wr_opcode_mask() is called at the top of the loop body, before the wqe_state_posted / wqe_state_done checks, so the out-of-bounds read happens even for WQEs the loop then skips.

ARRAY_SIZE() is not usable here: rxe_opcode.h only declares "extern struct rxe_wr_opcode_info rxe_wr_opcode_info[]". IB_WR_REG_MR (32) is the highest index initialised in rxe_opcode.c, and on x86-64 the object is 1320 bytes with a 40-byte stride, i.e. 33 elements, so valid indices are 0..32.

The bug was reproduced on an unpatched KASAN x86-64 build of 7.3-rc4, with the reproducer run as uid 1000 (the splat itself is attributed to the rxe_wq kworker, since that is where the WQE is consumed): KASAN global-out-of-bounds read of size 4 at rxe_wr_opcode_info, and an Oops or GPF for larger opcodes. Present unchanged in mainline 551c722f4080 (2026-09-29). This patch itself is only compile-tested (KASAN + CONFIG_RDMA_RXE). I am posting the reproducer on-list in reply to the v2 discussion of this patch.

 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_loc.h | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_loc.h +3 -0
index 64d636bf80fd..dcc0788db90a 100644
@@ -184,6 +184,9 @@ void rxe_comp_queue_pkt(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct sk_buff *skb);
 
 static inline unsigned int wr_opcode_mask(int opcode, struct rxe_qp *qp)
 {
+	if (unlikely(opcode < 0 || opcode > IB_WR_REG_MR))
+		return 0;
+
 	return rxe_wr_opcode_info[opcode].mask[qp->ibqp.qp_type];
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#1 lore raw
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!
Quoted 12 lines

wr_opcode_mask() indexes the global rxe_wr_opcode_info[] array with a caller-supplied opcode and no bounds check. For a user QP the WQE comes from an mmap'd SQ ring, so wqe->wr.opcode is an attacker-controlled __u32 read back by the requester (req_next_wqe() -> rxe_requester()); rxe_post_send() takes the qp->is_user branch and never runs validate_send_wr(), whose only opcode check is itself !wr_opcode_mask() (it indexes before it checks). rxe_wr_opcode_info[] has entries only up to IB_WR_REG_MR, so an out-of-range opcode reads out of bounds and the result is used as a mask and dereferenced; observed as a KASAN global-out-of-bounds "Read of size 4" and a wild-pointer oops.

Quoted 6 lines

Return a zero mask for an out-of-range opcode, matching how validate_send_wr() already treats a zero mask (an invalid WR), so no path indexes the array out of bounds.

Fixes 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!

Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Reviewed-by on v3 1/1
#2 lore raw
In reply to Youngsung Ahn
Quoted 12 lines · Youngsung Ahn

wr_opcode_mask() indexes the global rxe_wr_opcode_info[] array with a caller-supplied opcode and no bounds check. For a user QP the WQE comes from an mmap'd SQ ring, so wqe->wr.opcode is an attacker-controlled __u32 read back by the requester (req_next_wqe() -> rxe_requester()); rxe_post_send() takes the qp->is_user branch and never runs validate_send_wr(), whose only opcode check is itself !wr_opcode_mask() (it indexes before it checks). rxe_wr_opcode_info[] has entries only up to IB_WR_REG_MR, so an out-of-range opcode reads out of bounds and the result is used as a mask and dereferenced; observed as a KASAN global-out-of-bounds "Read of size 4" and a wild-pointer oops.

Quoted 6 lines

Return a zero mask for an out-of-range opcode, matching how validate_send_wr() already treats a zero mask (an invalid WR), so no path indexes the array out of bounds.

Fixes 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")

I checked this code snippet. The wr_opcode_mask() function is called in three places,

and this change does not introduce any problems in those call sites.

The logs also indicate that this change fixes the reported problem.

Zhu Yanjun

Quoted 57 lines
Assisted-by LLM

---
Notes (not part of the commit):
v3: no code change. Sent as a standalone message rather than as a reply to the v2 posting, and dropped the Cc: [email protected] trailer, both as asked on-list.

On the question about req_retry(): req_retry() does not reject the WQE itself, it only re-posts it. A zero mask makes every "mask & WR_*" test there false, so an out-of-range opcode yields iova = 0, the dma cursor reset, and neither retry_first_write_send() nor the read fix-up; the WQE is left in wqe_state_posted. Once the requester dispatches it, wqe->mask stays 0 so WR_LOCAL_OP_MASK is not taken, and next_opcode() matches no case for an out-of-range wqe->wr.opcode and returns -EINVAL, so rxe_requester() sets wqe->status = IB_WC_LOC_QP_OP_ERR and takes the err path, which moves the QP to IB_QPS_ERR and lets the completer post the completion.

wr_opcode_mask() is the single choke point all three callers (validate_send_wr(), req_next_wqe(), req_retry()) funnel through, and only validate_send_wr() rejects the WQE on a zero mask. In req_retry() wr_opcode_mask() is called at the top of the loop body, before the wqe_state_posted / wqe_state_done checks, so the out-of-bounds read happens even for WQEs the loop then skips.

ARRAY_SIZE() is not usable here: rxe_opcode.h only declares "extern struct rxe_wr_opcode_info rxe_wr_opcode_info[]". IB_WR_REG_MR (32) is the highest index initialised in rxe_opcode.c, and on x86-64 the object is 1320 bytes with a 40-byte stride, i.e. 33 elements, so valid indices are 0..32.

The bug was reproduced on an unpatched KASAN x86-64 build of 7.3-rc4, with the reproducer run as uid 1000 (the splat itself is attributed to the rxe_wq kworker, since that is where the WQE is consumed): KASAN global-out-of-bounds read of size 4 at rxe_wr_opcode_info, and an Oops or GPF for larger opcodes. Present unchanged in mainline 551c722f4080 (2026-09-29). This patch itself is only compile-tested (KASAN + CONFIG_RDMA_RXE). I am posting the reproducer on-list in reply to the v2 discussion of this patch.

  drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_loc.h | 3 +++
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_loc.h +3 -0
index 64d636bf80fd..dcc0788db90a 100644
@@ -184,6 +184,9 @@ void rxe_comp_queue_pkt(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct sk_buff *skb);
 
  static inline unsigned int wr_opcode_mask(int opcode, struct rxe_qp *qp)
  {
+	if (unlikely(opcode < 0 || opcode > IB_WR_REG_MR))
+		return 0;
+
  	return rxe_wr_opcode_info[opcode].mask[qp->ibqp.qp_type];
  }
 
Signature · 2 lines
Best Regards,
Yanjun.Zhu
#3 lore raw
In reply to Youngsung Ahn
Quoted 12 lines · Youngsung Ahn

wr_opcode_mask() indexes the global rxe_wr_opcode_info[] array with a caller-supplied opcode and no bounds check. For a user QP the WQE comes from an mmap'd SQ ring, so wqe->wr.opcode is an attacker-controlled __u32 read back by the requester (req_next_wqe() -> rxe_requester()); rxe_post_send() takes the qp->is_user branch and never runs validate_send_wr(), whose only opcode check is itself !wr_opcode_mask() (it indexes before it checks). rxe_wr_opcode_info[] has entries only up to IB_WR_REG_MR, so an out-of-range opcode reads out of bounds and the result is used as a mask and dereferenced; observed as a KASAN global-out-of-bounds "Read of size 4" and a wild-pointer oops.

Quoted 1 line

[...]

Applied, thanks!

[1/1] RDMA/rxe: bound the WQE opcode before indexing rxe_wr_opcode_info[]

      https://git.kernel.org/rdma/rdma/c/c887e53e1c852b

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>