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syscalls/cma: Require root for process_vm tests

PATCH Superseded Andrea Cervesato 2 participants 2 messages Oct 14

v1 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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PATCH 1/1 syscalls/cma: Require root for process_vm tests

From: Andrea Cervesato <[email protected]>

When security modules like Yama LSM are active (e.g. ptrace_scope >= 1), process_vm_readv() and process_vm_writev() fail with EPERM for unprivileged sibling processes due to missing CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability.

Require root so tests can reliably execute across different security configurations.

---
The cma testing suite started to fail on modern systems enabling YAMA. Unfortunately, using CAP_PTRACE capability for users is not enough to avoid an EPERM. For this reason, it's better to require root and fix the whole suite in one shot.

---
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/cma/process_vm_readv02.c  | 5 +++++
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/cma/process_vm_readv03.c  | 5 +++++
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/cma/process_vm_writev02.c | 5 +++++
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
testcases/kernel/syscalls/cma/process_vm_readv02.c +5 -0
index 1e2ac38fa..d985bdad9 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
  * then the other one calls process_vm_readv and reads from the same
  * memory location, it then verifies if process_vm_readv returns
  * correct data.
+ *
+ * Requires root for ``CAP_SYS_PTRACE`` to access the address space of
+ * another process when security policies such as Yama LSM (ptrace_scope)
+ * are enabled.
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -116,6 +120,7 @@ static struct tst_test test = {
 	.test_all = run,
 	.setup = setup,
 	.cleanup = cleanup,
+	.needs_root = 1,
 	.forks_child = 1,
 	.needs_checkpoints = 1,
 };
testcases/kernel/syscalls/cma/process_vm_readv03.c +5 -0
index 95d35c422..2b533ca56 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@
  * locations and the local iovecs initialized to randomly sized and
  * allocated local memory locations. The second child then verifies
  * that the data is copied correctly.
+ *
+ * Requires root for ``CAP_SYS_PTRACE`` to access the address space of
+ * another process when security policies such as Yama LSM (ptrace_scope)
+ * are enabled.
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -189,6 +193,7 @@ static struct tst_test test = {
 	.test = run,
 	.setup = setup,
 	.cleanup = cleanup,
+	.needs_root = 1,
 	.forks_child = 1,
 	.needs_checkpoints = 1,
 	.tcnt = ARRAY_SIZE(testcases),
testcases/kernel/syscalls/cma/process_vm_writev02.c +5 -0
index 15bd66a44..e9edc4a6f 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
  * Fork two children, the first one allocates a chunk of memory and the
  * other one call process_vm_writev to write known data into the first
  * child. Then first child verifies that the data is as expected.
+ *
+ * Requires root for ``CAP_SYS_PTRACE`` to access the address space of
+ * another process when security policies such as Yama LSM (ptrace_scope)
+ * are enabled.
  */
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -122,6 +126,7 @@ static struct tst_test test = {
 	.test_all = run,
 	.setup = setup,
 	.cleanup = cleanup,
+	.needs_root = 1,
 	.forks_child = 1,
 	.needs_checkpoints = 1,
 	.options =

---
base-commit: c082253808608e57a4fba3e7f3787a9f5c377638
change-id: 20261014-fix_process_vm_writev_permissions-6fca6598d9fb

Best regards,

Signature · 5 lines
Andrea Cervesato <[email protected]>


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#1 lore raw

Hi Andrea,

testcases/kernel/syscalls/cma/process_vm_readv02.c static struct tst_test test = { · line 125

Quoted 10 lines · Andrea Cervesato

syscalls/cma: Require root for process_vm tests

testcases/kernel/syscalls/cma/process_vm_readv02.c +1 -0
@@ -116,6 +120,7 @@ static struct tst_test test = {
 	.test_all = run,
 	.setup = setup,
 	.cleanup = cleanup,
+	.needs_root = 1,
 	.forks_child = 1,
 	.needs_checkpoints = 1,

Across all three tests, this skips valid non-root runs when Yama is disabled or ptrace_scope=0, yet UID 0 without CAP_SYS_PTRACE still passes the framework's geteuid() check and gets EPERM under modes 1/2. For mode 1, have the target call prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, getppid(), ...) before signalling readiness to authorize the parent and its descendants, including the sibling.
Preserve unprivileged execution where allowed and use tst_cap_action() with TST_CAP_REQ when CAP_SYS_PTRACE is actually needed, so missing capabilities produce TCONF.

Verdict - Needs revision

---
Note:

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Regards,
LTP AI Reviewer

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