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apr-util: Fix CVE-2025-49506

PATCH Superseded Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) 2 participants 7 messages Oct 15 – Oct 29

v3 of 4 Superseded Latest is v4 →

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PATCH v3 1/5 apr-util: Fix CVE-2025-49506

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

Backport the upstream timing-safe comparison fix [1]. APR-util 1.6.4 identifies this issue as fixed [2].

[1] https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e

[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49506

---
Changes in v3:
- Drop the XLC-specific compatibility follow-up patch, as it is not required by OE-Core's GCC/Clang toolchains.

---
 .../apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506.patch         | 310 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb    |   6 +
 2 files changed, 316 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506.patch
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506.patch new file +310 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ab5cf0648
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+From f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Covener <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2026 12:10:13 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1936804 from aprutil 1.7.x:
+
+use timing safe comparison
+
+Submitted By: ylavic
+Reviewed By: ylavic, rpluem, covener
+
+
+
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr-util/branches/1.6.x@1936805 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-49506
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e]
+
+(cherry picked from commit f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ crypto/apr_crypto.c |  60 +++++++++++++++++---
+ crypto/apr_passwd.c | 135 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/apr_crypto.c b/crypto/apr_crypto.c
+index 9ba190ef..ca3f0887 100644
+--- a/crypto/apr_crypto.c
++++ b/crypto/apr_crypto.c
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+ #include "apu.h"
+ #include "apr_pools.h"
+ #include "apr_dso.h"
++#include "apr_version.h"
+ #include "apr_strings.h"
+ #include "apr_hash.h"
+ #include "apr_thread_mutex.h"
+@@ -173,19 +174,64 @@ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_crypto_memzero(void *buffer, apr_size_t size)
+     return APR_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ 
++/* Borrow this from APR-1.8 if not available */
++#if !APR_VERSION_AT_LEAST(1,8,0)
++
++/* A volatile variable which is always zero but allows to block the compiler
++ * from optimizing or eliding code using it. Volatile forces the compiler to
++ * emit a memory load for which no value can be assumed, so for instance an
++ * add/sub/xor/or with "optblocker" is a noop that will hide the result to
++ * the optimizer.
++ */
++static volatile const apr_uint32_t optblocker;
++
++/* Return whether x is not zero, with no branching controlled by x.
++ *
++ * Taken from the cryptoint library (public domain) by D. J. Bernstein,
++ * which provides timing attacks safe integer operations/primitives.
++ * Code:
++ *   https://lib.mceliece.org/libmceliece-20250507/cryptoint/crypto_uint32.h
++ * Paper:
++ *   https://cr.yp.to/papers/cryptoint-20250424.pdf
++ */
++#if __has_attribute(always_inline)
++__attribute__((always_inline))
++#endif
++static APR_INLINE int test_nonzero_timingsafe(apr_uint32_t x)
++{
++    x |= -x; /* sets the most significant bit unless x == 0 */
++
++    /* shift bit 31 (MSB) to bit 0 */
++    x >>= 32-6;      /* keep 6 bits */
++    x += optblocker; /* lose the optimizer */
++    x >>= 5;         /* keep the (original) MSB only */
++
++    /* x is now 0 or 1 */
++    return x & INT_MAX;
++}
++
++#endif /* !APR_VERSION_AT_LEAST(1,8,0) */
++
+ APU_DECLARE(int) apr_crypto_equals(const void *buf1, const void *buf2,
+                                    apr_size_t size)
+ {
+-    const unsigned char *p1 = buf1;
+-    const unsigned char *p2 = buf2;
+-    unsigned char diff = 0;
+-    apr_size_t i;
++#if APR_VERSION_AT_LEAST(1,8,0)
++    return apr_memeq_timingsafe(buf1, buf2, size);
++#else
++    apr_uint32_t diff = 0;
++    volatile apr_size_t count = size; /* prevent loop unrolling */
++    apr_size_t i = 0;
+ 
+-    for (i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
+-        diff |= p1[i] ^ p2[i];
++    for (; i < count; ++i) {
++        const unsigned char c1 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)buf1)[i];
++        const unsigned char c2 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)buf2)[i];
++
++        diff |= c1 ^ c2; /* sets diff to non-zero whenever c1 != c2 */
+     }
+ 
+-    return 1 & ((diff - 1) >> 8);
++    /* (diff == 0) <=> (diff != 0) ^ 1 */
++    return test_nonzero_timingsafe(diff) ^ 1;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_crypto_get_driver(
+diff --git a/crypto/apr_passwd.c b/crypto/apr_passwd.c
+index c961de2b..74b5fc17 100644
+--- a/crypto/apr_passwd.c
++++ b/crypto/apr_passwd.c
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+  * limitations under the License.
+  */
+ 
++#include "apr_version.h"
+ #include "apr_strings.h"
+ #include "apr_md5.h"
+ #include "apr_lib.h"
+@@ -39,6 +40,111 @@
+ 
+ static const char * const apr1_id = "$apr1$";
+ 
++#if APR_VERSION_AT_LEAST(1,8,0)
++
++#define streq_timingsafe    apr_streq_timingsafe
++#define strneq_timingsafe   apr_strneq_timingsafe
++
++#else /* borrow code from APR-1.8 if not available */
++
++/* A volatile variable which is always zero but allows to block the compiler
++ * from optimizing or eliding code using it. Volatile forces the compiler to
++ * emit a memory load for which no value can be assumed, so for instance an
++ * add/sub/xor/or with "optblocker" is a noop that will hide the result to
++ * the optimizer.
++ */
++static volatile const apr_uint32_t optblocker;
++
++/* Return whether x is not zero, with no branching controlled by x.
++ *
++ * Taken from the cryptoint library (public domain) by D. J. Bernstein,
++ * which provides timing attacks safe integer operations/primitives.
++ * Code:
++ *   https://lib.mceliece.org/libmceliece-20250507/cryptoint/crypto_uint32.h
++ * Paper:
++ *   https://cr.yp.to/papers/cryptoint-20250424.pdf
++ */
++#if __has_attribute(always_inline)
++__attribute__((always_inline))
++#endif
++static APR_INLINE int test_nonzero_timingsafe(apr_uint32_t x)
++{
++    x |= -x; /* sets the most significant bit unless x == 0 */
++
++    /* shift bit 31 (MSB) to bit 0 */
++    x >>= 32-6;      /* keep 6 bits */
++    x += optblocker; /* lose the optimizer */
++    x >>= 5;         /* keep the (original) MSB only */
++
++    /* x is now 0 or 1 */
++    return x & INT_MAX;
++}
++
++static int streq_timingsafe(const char *sec1, const char *str2)
++{
++    apr_uint32_t diff = 0;
++    apr_size_t i1 = 0, i2 = 0;
++
++    for (;; ++i2) {
++        const unsigned char c1 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)sec1)[i1];
++        const unsigned char c2 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)str2)[i2];
++
++        diff |= c1 ^ c2; /* sets diff to non-zero whenever c1 != c2 */
++
++        /* Not a shortest/longest match because an attacker would usually know
++         * one of the strings and could then determine the length of the other.
++         * So assume only sec1 and its length are secret and stop the loop at
++         * the end of str2. If sec1 is shorter than str2 the loop will continue
++         * by comparing the rest of str2 with the trailing NUL byte of sec1.
++         * In any case since the diff above is computed up to and including a
++         * NUL byte, only the same content and length will raise match.
++         */
++        if (!c2) {
++            break;
++        }
++
++        /* Don't go above sec1's NUL byte */
++        i1 += test_nonzero_timingsafe(c1);
++    }
++
++    /* (diff == 0) <=> (diff != 0) ^ 1 */
++    return test_nonzero_timingsafe(diff) ^ 1;
++}
++
++static int strneq_timingsafe(const char *sec1, const char *str2, apr_size_t n)
++{
++    apr_uint32_t diff = 0;
++    volatile apr_size_t count = n; /* prevent loop unrolling */
++    apr_size_t i1 = 0, i2 = 0;
++
++    for (; i2 < count; ++i2) {
++        const unsigned char c1 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)sec1)[i1];
++        const unsigned char c2 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)str2)[i2];
++
++        diff |= c1 ^ c2; /* sets diff to non-zero whenever c1 != c2 */
++
++        /* Not a shortest/longest match because an attacker would usually know
++         * one of the strings and could then determine the length of the other.
++         * So assume only sec1 and its length are secret and stop the loop at
++         * the end of str2. If sec1 is shorter than str2 the loop will continue
++         * by comparing the rest of str2 with the trailing NUL byte of sec1.
++         * In any case since the diff above is computed up to and including a
++         * NUL byte, only the same content and length will raise match.
++         */
++        if (!c2) {
++            break;
++        }
++
++        /* Don't go above sec1's NUL byte */
++        i1 += test_nonzero_timingsafe(c1);
++    }
++
++    /* (diff == 0) <=> (diff != 0) ^ 1 */
++    return test_nonzero_timingsafe(diff) ^ 1;
++}
++
++#endif /* APR_VERSION_AT_LEAST(1,8,0) */
++
+ #if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(BEOS) && !defined(NETWARE)
+ #if defined(APU_CRYPT_THREADSAFE) || !APR_HAS_THREADS || \
+     defined(CRYPT_R_CRYPTD) || defined(CRYPT_R_STRUCT_CRYPT_DATA)
+@@ -86,28 +192,33 @@ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_password_validate(const char *passwd,
+ #if !CRYPT_MISSING
+     char *crypt_pw;
+ #endif
+-    if (hash[0] == '$'
+-        && hash[1] == '2'
+-        && (hash[2] == 'a' || hash[2] == 'y')
+-        && hash[3] == '$') {
++
++    if ((strneq_timingsafe(hash, "$2a$", 4) | /* test both */
++         strneq_timingsafe(hash, "$2y$", 4))) {
++        /*
++         * The hash was created using [apr_]bcrypt encoding.
++         */
+         if (_crypt_blowfish_rn(passwd, hash, sample, sizeof(sample)) == NULL)
+             return APR_FROM_OS_ERROR(errno);
+     }
+-    else if (!strncmp(hash, apr1_id, strlen(apr1_id))) {
++    else if (strneq_timingsafe(hash, apr1_id, strlen(apr1_id))) {
+         /*
+          * The hash was created using our custom algorithm.
+          */
+         apr_md5_encode(passwd, hash, sample, sizeof(sample));
+     }
+-    else if (!strncmp(hash, APR_SHA1PW_ID, APR_SHA1PW_IDLEN)) {
+-         apr_sha1_base64(passwd, (int)strlen(passwd), sample);
++    else if (strneq_timingsafe(hash, APR_SHA1PW_ID, APR_SHA1PW_IDLEN)) {
++        /*
++         * The hash is a (naked) SHA1.
++         */
++        apr_sha1_base64(passwd, (int)strlen(passwd), sample);
+     }
+     else {
+         /*
+          * It's not our algorithm, so feed it to crypt() if possible.
+          */
+ #if CRYPT_MISSING
+-        return (strcmp(passwd, hash) == 0) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH;
++        return streq_timingsafe(hash, passwd) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH;
+ #elif defined(CRYPT_R_CRYPTD)
+         apr_status_t rv;
+         CRYPTD *buffer = malloc(sizeof(*buffer));
+@@ -118,7 +229,7 @@ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_password_validate(const char *passwd,
+         if (!crypt_pw)
+             rv = APR_EMISMATCH;
+         else
+-            rv = (strcmp(crypt_pw, hash) == 0) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH;
++            rv = streq_timingsafe(hash, crypt_pw) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH;
+         free(buffer);
+         return rv;
+ #elif defined(CRYPT_R_STRUCT_CRYPT_DATA)
+@@ -149,7 +260,7 @@ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_password_validate(const char *passwd,
+         if (!crypt_pw)
+             rv = APR_EMISMATCH;
+         else
+-            rv = (strcmp(crypt_pw, hash) == 0) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH;
++            rv = streq_timingsafe(hash, crypt_pw) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH;
+         free(buffer);
+         return rv;
+ #else
+@@ -173,14 +284,14 @@ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_password_validate(const char *passwd,
+                 rv = APR_EMISMATCH;
+             }
+             else {
+-                rv = (strcmp(crypt_pw, hash) == 0) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH;
++                rv = streq_timingsafe(hash, crypt_pw) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH;
+             }
+             crypt_mutex_unlock();
+             return rv;
+         }
+ #endif
+     }
+-    return (strcmp(sample, hash) == 0) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH;
++    return streq_timingsafe(hash, sample) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH;
+ }
+ 
+ static const char * const bcrypt_id = "$2y$";
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb +6 -0
index 3a5f52d250..19f8e59ca5 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@ SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://configfix.patch \
            file://configure_fixes.patch \
 	   file://0001-test_transformation-Check-if-transform-is-supported-.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-49506.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32327-dependent.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32327.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-34501.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-34502_p1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-34502_p2.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
            "
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/5 apr-util: Fix CVE-2026-32327

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

Backport the upstream test compatibility prerequisite [1], which is required by the regression tests included with the XML nesting-depth fix [2]. The fix addresses CVE-2026-32327 as described by the advisory [3].

[1] https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/dba5d434dba0547478f411d6fa068766455446ce
[2] https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/414e12e427c89f135d8ee66ab1203feffd3e2bd8
[3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32327

# Conflicts:
# meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb

# Conflicts:
# meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb

---
 .../apr-util/CVE-2026-32327-dependent.patch   |   34 +
 .../apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-32327.patch         | 2162 +++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb    |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 2197 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-32327-dependent.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-32327.patch
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-32327-dependent.patch new file +34 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c3c570f407
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From dba5d434dba0547478f411d6fa068766455446ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Joe Orton <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2023 11:20:33 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1914772 from 1.7.x:
+
+* test/testutil.h: Define APR_ASSERT_SUCCESS for compatibility
+  with apr trunk.
+
+
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr-util/branches/1.6.x@1914774 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-32327
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/dba5d434dba0547478f411d6fa068766455446ce]
+
+(cherry picked from commit dba5d434dba0547478f411d6fa068766455446ce)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ test/testutil.h | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/test/testutil.h b/test/testutil.h
+index eaa7e759..4c5e30b8 100644
+--- a/test/testutil.h
++++ b/test/testutil.h
+@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ extern apr_pool_t *p;
+ /* Assert that RV is an APR_SUCCESS value; else fail giving strerror
+  * for RV and CONTEXT message. */
+ void apr_assert_success(abts_case* tc, const char *context, apr_status_t rv);
++#define APR_ASSERT_SUCCESS(tc, ctxt, rv) \
++             apr_assert_success(tc, ctxt, rv)
+ 
+ void apr_assert_failure(abts_case* tc, const char *context,
+                         apr_status_t rv, int lineno);
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-32327.patch new file +2162 -0

2,162 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb +1 -1
index 19f8e59ca5..c721d35f61 100644
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=158aa0b1efe0c12f23d4b007ddb9a5db \
 SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://configfix.patch \
            file://configure_fixes.patch \
-	   file://0001-test_transformation-Check-if-transform-is-supported-.patch \
+	       file://0001-test_transformation-Check-if-transform-is-supported-.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-49506.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-32327-dependent.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-32327.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#2 lore raw

PATCH v3 3/5 apr-util: Mark CVE-2026-34191 not applicable

In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

CVE-2026-34191 affects only the apr_dbd_oracle provider [1]. The apr-util recipe does not enable --with-oracle, so configure keeps apu_have_oracle=0 [2]. Hence mark the CVE not applicable to this build.

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34191
[2] https://github.com/apache/apr-util/blob/1.6.3/build/dbd.m4

---
 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb +2 -0
index c721d35f61..4d5d4b8fe0 100644
@@ -104,3 +104,5 @@ do_install_ptest() {
 
 # Add CVE_PRODUCT to match the NVD CPE product name
 CVE_PRODUCT = "apache:apr-util apache:portable_runtime_utility"
+
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-34191] = "not-applicable-config: apr_dbd_oracle is not built because --with-oracle is not enabled"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#3 lore raw

PATCH v3 4/5 apr-util: Fix CVE-2026-34501

In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

Backport the upstream Redis response-length and error-checking fix [1] to address CVE-2026-34501 [2].

[1] https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/e8f36bd5f1cc1c82bed1ae52d5699a4c610251c2
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34501

# Conflicts:
# meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb

---
 .../apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-34501.patch         | 128 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb    |   2 -
 2 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-34501.patch
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-34501.patch new file +128 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0056e62171
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+From e8f36bd5f1cc1c82bed1ae52d5699a4c610251c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Covener <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2026 12:28:37 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1936809 from aprutil 1.7.x:
+
+Merge r1936808 from apr trunk:
+
+apr_redis error checking
+
+Submitted By: jfclere
+Reviewed By: jfclere, jorton, covener
+
+
+
+
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr-util/branches/1.6.x@1936810 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-34501
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/e8f36bd5f1cc1c82bed1ae52d5699a4c610251c2]
+
+(cherry picked from commit e8f36bd5f1cc1c82bed1ae52d5699a4c610251c2)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ redis/apr_redis.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/redis/apr_redis.c b/redis/apr_redis.c
+index 8d01fdd6..e7fe2071 100644
+--- a/redis/apr_redis.c
++++ b/redis/apr_redis.c
+@@ -853,26 +853,42 @@ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_redis_setex(apr_redis_t *rc,
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
++/* Redis upstream default is 512Mb. This code will try to read the entire
++ * response into a brigade, and then copy that into a pool, so impose
++ * some reasonable limit since RAM consumption will be double this.
++ * https://redis.io/docs/latest/develop/reference/protocol-spec/#bulk-strings
++ */
++#ifndef APR_REDIS_MAX_BULK_LEN
++#define APR_REDIS_MAX_BULK_LEN (64 * 1024 * 1024)
++#endif
++
+ static apr_status_t grab_bulk_resp(apr_redis_server_t *rs, apr_redis_t *rc,
+                                    apr_redis_conn_t *conn, apr_pool_t *p,
+                                    char **baton, apr_size_t *new_length)
+ {
+-    char *length;
++    /* conn->buffer contains "$<length>\r\n" */
++    char *length = conn->buffer + 1;
+     char *last;
+     apr_status_t rv;
+     apr_size_t len = 0;
++    long val;
++
+     *new_length = 0;
++    *baton = NULL;
+ 
+-    length = apr_strtok(conn->buffer + 1, " ", &last);
+-    if (length) {
+-        len = strtol(length, (char **) NULL, 10);
++    errno = 0;
++    last = NULL;
++    val = strtol(length, &last, 10);
++    if (errno || last == NULL || last == length || *last != '\r'
++        || val < 0 || val > APR_REDIS_MAX_BULK_LEN) {
++        rs_bad_conn(rs, conn);
++        if (rc)
++            apr_redis_disable_server(rc, rs);
++        return val > APR_REDIS_MAX_BULK_LEN ? APR_ENOSPC : APR_EGENERAL;
+     }
++    len = (apr_size_t)val;
+ 
+-    if (len == 0) {
+-        *new_length = 0;
+-        *baton = NULL;
+-    }
+-    else {
++    if (len) {
+         apr_bucket_brigade *bbb;
+         apr_bucket *e;
+ 
+@@ -907,6 +923,11 @@ static apr_status_t grab_bulk_resp(apr_redis_server_t *rs, apr_redis_t *rc,
+ 
+         conn->bb = bbb;
+ 
++        if (len < 2) {
++            *baton = NULL;
++            *new_length = 0;
++            return APR_EGENERAL;
++        }
+         *new_length = len - 2;
+         (*baton)[*new_length] = '\0';
+     }
+@@ -992,6 +1013,10 @@ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_redis_getp(apr_redis_t *rc,
+     }
+     else if (strncmp(RS_TYPE_STRING, conn->buffer, RS_TYPE_STRING_LEN) == 0) {
+         rv = grab_bulk_resp(rs, rc, conn, p, baton, new_length);
++        if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
++            /* grab_bulk_resp already called rs_bad_conn; do not also release */
++            return rv;
++        }
+     }
+     else {
+         rv = APR_EGENERAL;
+@@ -1172,12 +1197,19 @@ apr_redis_info(apr_redis_server_t *rs, apr_pool_t *p, char **baton)
+         return rv;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (strncmp(RS_TYPE_STRING, conn->buffer, RS_TYPE_STRING_LEN) == 0) {
++    if (strncmp(RS_NOT_FOUND_GET, conn->buffer, RS_NOT_FOUND_GET_LEN) == 0) {
++        rv = APR_NOTFOUND;
++    }
++    else if (strncmp(RS_TYPE_STRING, conn->buffer, RS_TYPE_STRING_LEN) == 0) {
+         apr_size_t nl;
+         rv = grab_bulk_resp(rs, NULL, conn, p, baton, &nl);
++        if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
++            /* grab_bulk_resp already called rs_bad_conn; do not also release */
++            return rv;
++        }
+     } else {
+         rs_bad_conn(rs, conn);
+-        rv = APR_EGENERAL;
++        return APR_EGENERAL;
+     }
+ 
+     rs_release_conn(rs, conn);
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb +0 -2
index 4d5d4b8fe0..f87f3d9929 100644
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2026-32327-dependent.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-32327.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-34501.patch \
-           file://CVE-2026-34502_p1.patch \
-           file://CVE-2026-34502_p2.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
            "
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#4 lore raw

PATCH v3 5/5 apr-util: Fix CVE-2026-34502

In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

Backport the upstream memcache validation fix [1] and its follow-up parsing correction [2] to address CVE-2026-34502 [3].

[1] https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/f1c98dd0847c43375daf3789c936685adbc6d872
[2] https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/997c02ce5b9db44083c580e3e47095f5ac4524ae
[3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34502

---
 .../apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-34502_p1.patch      | 106 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-34502_p2.patch      |  38 +++++++
 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb    |   2 +
 3 files changed, 146 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-34502_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-34502_p2.patch
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-34502_p1.patch new file +106 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d4c6cb39b4
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+From f1c98dd0847c43375daf3789c936685adbc6d872 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Covener <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2026 12:33:18 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1936812 from aprutil 1.7.x:
+
+Merge r1936811 from apr trunk:
+
+apr_memcache: error checking
+
+Reviewed By: covener, jorton, jfclere
+
+
+
+
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr-util/branches/1.6.x@1936813 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-34502
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/f1c98dd0847c43375daf3789c936685adbc6d872]
+
+(cherry picked from commit f1c98dd0847c43375daf3789c936685adbc6d872)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ memcache/apr_memcache.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/memcache/apr_memcache.c b/memcache/apr_memcache.c
+index 2c7bd1de..137be778 100644
+--- a/memcache/apr_memcache.c
++++ b/memcache/apr_memcache.c
+@@ -595,6 +595,11 @@ static apr_status_t get_server_line(apr_memcache_conn_t *conn)
+     conn->blen = bsize;
+     conn->buffer[bsize] = '\0';
+ 
++    /* Validate CRLF line termination to prevent integer underflow attacks */
++    if (bsize < 2 || conn->buffer[bsize-2] != '\r' || conn->buffer[bsize-1] != '\n') {
++        return APR_EGENERAL;
++    }
++
+     return apr_brigade_cleanup(conn->tb);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1087,9 +1092,14 @@ apr_memcache_version(apr_memcache_server_t *ms,
+     }
+ 
+     if (strncmp(MS_VERSION, conn->buffer, MS_VERSION_LEN) == 0) {
+-        *baton = apr_pstrmemdup(p, conn->buffer+MS_VERSION_LEN+1, 
+-                                conn->blen - MS_VERSION_LEN - 2);
+-        rv = APR_SUCCESS;
++        if (conn->blen < MS_VERSION_LEN + 2) {
++            rv = APR_EGENERAL;
++        }
++        else {
++            *baton = apr_pstrmemdup(p, conn->buffer+MS_VERSION_LEN+1, 
++                                    conn->blen - MS_VERSION_LEN - 2);
++            rv = APR_SUCCESS;
++       } 
+     }
+     else {
+         rv = APR_EGENERAL;
+@@ -1555,23 +1565,35 @@ apr_memcache_multgetp(apr_memcache_t *mc,
+ static const char *stat_read_string(apr_pool_t *p, char *buf, apr_size_t len)
+ {
+     /* remove trailing \r\n and null char */
++    if (len < 2) {
++        return apr_pstrdup(p, "");
++    }
+     return apr_pstrmemdup(p, buf, len-2);
+ }
+ 
+ static apr_uint32_t stat_read_uint32(apr_pool_t *p, char *buf, apr_size_t  len)
+ {
++    if (len < 2) {
++        return 0;
++    }
+     buf[len-2] = '\0';
+     return atoi(buf);
+ }
+ 
+ static apr_uint64_t stat_read_uint64(apr_pool_t *p, char *buf, apr_size_t  len)
+ {
++    if (len < 2) {
++        return 0;
++    }
+     buf[len-2] = '\0';
+     return apr_atoi64(buf);
+ }
+ 
+ static apr_time_t stat_read_time(apr_pool_t *p, char *buf, apr_size_t  len)
+ {
++    if (len < 2) {
++        return 0;
++    }
+     buf[len-2] = '\0';
+     return apr_time_from_sec(atoi(buf));
+ }
+@@ -1583,6 +1605,9 @@ static apr_time_t stat_read_rtime(apr_pool_t *p, char *buf, apr_size_t  len)
+     char *usecs;
+     const char *sep = ":.";
+ 
++    if (len < 2) {
++        return apr_time_make(0, 0);
++    }
+     buf[len-2] = '\0';
+ 
+     secs = apr_strtok(buf, sep, &tok);
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2026-34502_p2.patch new file +38 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..844ad8109d
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 997c02ce5b9db44083c580e3e47095f5ac4524ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Covener <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2026 14:23:29 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] fix memcache version parsing
+
+partial port of 1936966 from trunk
+
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr-util/branches/1.6.x@1936975 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-34502
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/997c02ce5b9db44083c580e3e47095f5ac4524ae]
+
+(cherry picked from commit 997c02ce5b9db44083c580e3e47095f5ac4524ae)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ memcache/apr_memcache.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/memcache/apr_memcache.c b/memcache/apr_memcache.c
+index 137be778..74146712 100644
+--- a/memcache/apr_memcache.c
++++ b/memcache/apr_memcache.c
+@@ -1092,12 +1092,12 @@ apr_memcache_version(apr_memcache_server_t *ms,
+     }
+ 
+     if (strncmp(MS_VERSION, conn->buffer, MS_VERSION_LEN) == 0) {
+-        if (conn->blen < MS_VERSION_LEN + 2) {
++        if (conn->blen < MS_VERSION_LEN + 4) {
+             rv = APR_EGENERAL;
+         }
+         else {
+             *baton = apr_pstrmemdup(p, conn->buffer+MS_VERSION_LEN+1, 
+-                                    conn->blen - MS_VERSION_LEN - 2);
++                                    conn->blen - MS_VERSION_LEN - 3);
+             rv = APR_SUCCESS;
+        } 
+     }
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb +2 -0
index f87f3d9929..4d5d4b8fe0 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2026-32327-dependent.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-32327.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-34501.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-34502_p1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-34502_p2.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
            "
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#5 lore raw
In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)
Quoted 57 lines · On Thu Oct 15, 2026 at 2:27 PM CEST, Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS…

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

Backport the upstream timing-safe comparison fix [1]. APR-util 1.6.4 identifies this issue as fixed [2].

[1] https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e

[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49506

---
Changes in v3:
- Drop the XLC-specific compatibility follow-up patch, as it is not required by OE-Core's GCC/Clang toolchains.

---
 .../apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506.patch         | 310 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb    |   6 +
 2 files changed, 316 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506.patch
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506.patch new file +25 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ab5cf0648
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+From f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Covener <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2026 12:10:13 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1936804 from aprutil 1.7.x:
+
+use timing safe comparison
+
+Submitted By: ylavic
+Reviewed By: ylavic, rpluem, covener
+
+
+
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr-util/branches/1.6.x@1936805 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-49506
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e]
+
+(cherry picked from commit f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ crypto/apr_crypto.c |  60 +++++++++++++++++---
+ crypto/apr_passwd.c | 135 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
[...]
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb +0 -0
index 3a5f52d250..19f8e59ca5 100644

meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \ · line 21

Quoted 9 lines
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb +6 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@ SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://configfix.patch \
            file://configure_fixes.patch \
 	   file://0001-test_transformation-Check-if-transform-is-supported-.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-49506.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32327-dependent.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32327.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-34501.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-34502_p1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-34502_p2.patch \

This patch adds all the patches files of the series to SRC_URI in 1/5. Please add each patch to SRC_URI in each commit.

Thanks!

Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS
#6 lore raw

Hi Yoann,
Apologies for the mistake, and thanks for pointing it out.
I have addressed the review comments and submitted the updated patch series.
Could you please take another look when you have a chance?
Regards,
Hetvi
________________________________
From: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2026 18:33
To: Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: xe-linux-external (Internal Group) <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH v3 1/5] apr-util: Fix CVE-2025-49506

Quoted 57 lines · On Thu Oct 15, 2026 at 2:27 PM CEST, Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS…

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

Backport the upstream timing-safe comparison fix [1]. APR-util 1.6.4 identifies this issue as fixed [2].

[1] https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e

[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49506

---
Changes in v3:
- Drop the XLC-specific compatibility follow-up patch, as it is not required by OE-Core's GCC/Clang toolchains.

---
 .../apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506.patch         | 310 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb    |   6 +
 2 files changed, 316 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506.patch
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506.patch new file +25 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ab5cf0648
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+From f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Covener <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2026 12:10:13 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1936804 from aprutil 1.7.x:
+
+use timing safe comparison
+
+Submitted By: ylavic
+Reviewed By: ylavic, rpluem, covener
+
+
+
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr-util/branches/1.6.x@1936805 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-49506
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e]
+
+(cherry picked from commit f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ crypto/apr_crypto.c |  60 +++++++++++++++++---
+ crypto/apr_passwd.c | 135 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
[...]
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb +0 -0
index 3a5f52d250..19f8e59ca5 100644

meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \ · line 21

Quoted 9 lines
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb +6 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@ SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://configfix.patch \
            file://configure_fixes.patch \
          file://0001-test_transformation-Check-if-transform-is-supported-.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-49506.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32327-dependent.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32327.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-34501.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-34502_p1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-34502_p2.patch \

This patch adds all the patches files of the series to SRC_URI in 1/5. Please add each patch to SRC_URI in each commit.

Thanks!
--
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS