ovl: fix mount setup failing when override_creds drops CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Subsystems (2)
Amir Goldstein
maintainerPATCH 1/1 ovl: fix mount setup failing when override_creds drops CAP_SYS_ADMIN
When a process drops CAP_SYS_ADMIN and calls fsconfig(FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG, "override_creds"), overlayfs saves those restricted credentials in ofs->creator_cred. ovl_fill_super() then wraps the entire mount setup in with_ovl_creds(), switching to those restricted credentials for the duration.
Mount setup calls clone_private_mount(), which checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN against current credentials. With restricted credentials active, this check fails with -EPERM even though the task issuing FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE is fully privileged.
Use the mounter's real credentials only for cloning the private layer mounts. Keep all other backing filesystem operations during mount setup under the stashed credentials.
--- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/overlayfs/super.c +16 -2
@@ -497,6 +497,20 @@ static int ovl_report_in_use(struct ovl_fs *ofs, const char *name) } } +/* +* clone_private_mount() checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN in current->cred. +* ovl_fill_super_creds() runs under the stashed creator cred, which +* override_creds may have dropped. +* The task that issued FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE is still current->real_cred, so +* use that only for the clone. creator_cred stays in effect for every other +* backing-fs operation. +*/ +static struct vfsmount *ovl_clone_private_mount (const struct path *path) +{ +scoped_with_creds (current_real_cred()) + return clone_private_mount(path); +} +static int ovl_get_upper (struct super_block *sb,struct ovl_fs *ofs,struct ovl_layer *upper_layer,const struct path *upperpath)
@@ -520,7 +534,7 @@ static int ovl_get_upper(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,if (err) goto out; - upper_mnt =clone_private_mount (upperpath); + upper_mnt =ovl_clone_private_mount (upperpath); err =PTR_ERR (upper_mnt);if (IS_ERR (upper_mnt)) {pr_err ("failed to clone upperpath\n" );
@@ -1093,7 +1107,7 @@ static int ovl_get_layers(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs, } } - mnt =clone_private_mount (&l->path); + mnt =ovl_clone_private_mount (&l->path); err =PTR_ERR (mnt);if (IS_ERR (mnt)) {pr_err ("failed to clone lowerpath\n" );
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Amir Goldstein
maintainerQuoted 68 lines · Amir Goldstein
When a process drops
CAP_SYS_ADMINand callsfsconfig(FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG, "override_creds"), overlayfs saves those restricted credentials inofs->creator_cred.ovl_fill_super()then wraps the entire mount setup inwith_ovl_creds(), switching to those restricted credentials for the duration.Mount setup calls
clone_private_mount(), which checksCAP_SYS_ADMINagainst current credentials. With restricted credentials active, this check fails with-EPERMeven though the task issuingFSCONFIG_CMD_CREATEis fully privileged.Use the mounter's real credentials only for cloning the private layer mounts. Keep all other backing filesystem operations during mount setup under the stashed credentials.
Reported-by Disha Goel <[email protected]>Fixes c28f922c9dcee ("clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns")Signed-off-by Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>--- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)fs/overlayfs/super.c +16
-3@@ -497,6 +497,20 @@ static int ovl_report_in_use(struct ovl_fs *ofs, const char *name) } } +/* +* clone_private_mount() checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN in current->cred. +* ovl_fill_super_creds() runs under the stashed creator cred, which +* override_creds may have dropped. +* The task that issued FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE is still current->real_cred, so +* use that only for the clone. creator_cred stays in effect for every other +* backing-fs operation. +*/ +static struct vfsmount *ovl_clone_private_mount (const struct path *path) +{ +scoped_with_creds (current_real_cred()) + return clone_private_mount(path); +} +static int ovl_get_upper (struct super_block *sb,struct ovl_fs *ofs,struct ovl_layer *upper_layer,const struct path *upperpath)@@ -520,7 +534,7 @@ static int ovl_get_upper(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,if (err) goto out; - upper_mnt =clone_private_mount (upperpath); + upper_mnt =ovl_clone_private_mount (upperpath); err =PTR_ERR (upper_mnt);if (IS_ERR (upper_mnt)) {pr_err ("failed to clone upperpath\n" );@@ -1093,7 +1107,7 @@ static int ovl_get_layers(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs, } } - mnt =clone_private_mount (&l->path); + mnt =ovl_clone_private_mount (&l->path); err =PTR_ERR (mnt);if (IS_ERR (mnt)) {pr_err ("failed to clone lowerpath\n" ); --
Quoted 2 lines
2.55.0
Christian,
Could you say if you agree with this solution.
Thanks,
Amir.
Quoted 15 lines · Amir Goldstein
When a process drops
CAP_SYS_ADMINand callsfsconfig(FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG, "override_creds"), overlayfs saves those restricted credentials inofs->creator_cred.ovl_fill_super()then wraps the entire mount setup inwith_ovl_creds(), switching to those restricted credentials for the duration.Mount setup calls
clone_private_mount(), which checksCAP_SYS_ADMINagainst current credentials. With restricted credentials active, this check fails with-EPERMeven though the task issuingFSCONFIG_CMD_CREATEis fully privileged.Use the mounter's real credentials only for cloning the private layer mounts. Keep all other backing filesystem operations during mount setup under the stashed credentials.
Quoted 5 lines
Reported-by Disha Goel <[email protected]>Fixes c28f922c9dcee ("clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns")Signed-off-by Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>---
Looks good to me. I like this solution: