fsverity: Explicitly require FMODE_READ to retrieve hashes
Subsystems (5)
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH 1/1 fsverity: Explicitly require FMODE_READ to retrieve hashes
The comment in fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(), which justifies not checking for FMODE_READ, doesn't consider that the nonstandard access mode 3 (ioctl-only) exists.
Opening an ioctl-only fd generally requires read (and write) permission. However, there are gaps with certain LSMs: an ioctl-only fd requests read (and write) permission via security_inode_permission, but not security_file_open. With certain LSMs relying on the latter, such as Landlock and AppArmor, an ioctl-only fd can be opened without the LSM granting read (and write) permission.
Since FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA returns hashes of file contents blocks, it should require read permission. This also applies to FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY, which returns a hash for the whole file.
Meanwhile, ioctl-only fds are a rarely-used feature, not known to be used with either ioctl.
Therefore, just disallow these ioctls on ioctl-only file descriptors, similar to what was already done with FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.
More specifically, explicitly check for FMODE_READ. This also covers write-only fds to non-verity files which otherwise would have failed with ENODATA. This change in error code for write-only fds should be fine too, as these ioctls cannot be usefully used with write-only fds anyway, but it's worth noting as another technicality.
--- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 3 +++ fs/verity/measure.c | 10 ++++++++++ fs/verity/read_metadata.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +3 -0
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ fatal signal), no changes are made to the file. FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY can fail with the following errors: - ``EACCES``: the process does not have write access to the file +- ``EBADF``: the file descriptor is not open for reading - ``EBADMSG``: the builtin signature is malformed - ``EBUSY``: this ioctl is already running on the file - ``EEXIST``: the file already has verity enabled
@@ -232,6 +233,7 @@ regardless of the size of the file. FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY can fail with the following errors: +- ``EBADF``: the file descriptor is not open for reading - ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory - ``ENODATA``: the file is not a verity file - ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity
@@ -310,6 +312,7 @@ blocks from disk without actually verifying the path to the root node. FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA can fail with the following errors: +- ``EBADF``: the file descriptor is not open for reading - ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory - ``EINTR``: the ioctl was interrupted before any data was read - ``EINVAL``: reserved fields were set, or ``offset + length``
fs/verity/measure.c +10 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,16 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg;struct fsverity_digest arg; +/* +* This ioctl returns a hash of the file contents, so it should require +* read permission. Disallow it on ioctl-only (i.e., nonstandard access +* mode 3) fds, which can in some cases be acquired without passing all +* LSM read-permission checks. Also disallow write-only fds, which can +* refer only to non-verity files which would fail with ENODATA anyway. +*/ +if (!(filp->f_mode &FMODE_READ )) +return -EBADF ; + vi =fsverity_get_info (inode);if (!vi)return -ENODATA ;/* not a verity file */
fs/verity/read_metadata.c +10 -4
@@ -166,13 +166,19 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)int length;void __user *buf; +/* +* This ioctl returns file contents block hashes, so it should require +* read permission. Disallow it on ioctl-only (i.e., nonstandard access +* mode 3) fds, which can in some cases be acquired without passing all +* LSM read-permission checks. Also disallow write-only fds, which can +* refer only to non-verity files which would fail with ENODATA anyway. +*/ +if (!(filp->f_mode &FMODE_READ )) +return -EBADF ; + vi =fsverity_get_info (inode);if (!vi)return -ENODATA ;/* not a verity file */ -/* -* Note that we don't have to explicitly check that the file is open for -* reading, since verity files can only be opened for reading. -*/ if (copy_from_user (&arg, uarg,sizeof (arg)))return -EFAULT ;
base-commit: 7be4bc52fd9e0e55dc9a2e0232b89427d2c4b614
Signature · 1 line
2.56.0.307.g5fe7bd680c-goog
[email protected]
AI reviewSashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
Quoted 15 lines
The comment in
fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(), which justifies not checking forFMODE_READ, doesn't consider that the nonstandard access mode 3 (ioctl-only) exists.Opening an ioctl-only fd generally requires read (and write) permission. However, there are gaps with certain LSMs: an ioctl-only fd requests read (and write) permission via
security_inode_permission, but notsecurity_file_open. With certain LSMs relying on the latter, such as Landlock and AppArmor, an ioctl-only fd can be opened without the LSM granting read (and write) permission.Since
FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATAreturns hashes of file contents blocks, it should require read permission. This also applies toFS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY, which returns a hash for the whole file.
Quoted 6 lines
[ ... ]
Fixes 4dd893d832cf ("fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl")Fixes e17fe6579de0 ("fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl")Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Quoted 27 lines · Eric Biggers
The comment in
fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(), which justifies not checking forFMODE_READ, doesn't consider that the nonstandard access mode 3 (ioctl-only) exists.Opening an ioctl-only fd generally requires read (and write) permission. However, there are gaps with certain LSMs: an ioctl-only fd requests read (and write) permission via
security_inode_permission, but notsecurity_file_open. With certain LSMs relying on the latter, such as Landlock and AppArmor, an ioctl-only fd can be opened without the LSM granting read (and write) permission.Since
FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATAreturns hashes of file contents blocks, it should require read permission. This also applies toFS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY, which returns a hash for the whole file.Meanwhile, ioctl-only fds are a rarely-used feature, not known to be used with either ioctl.
Therefore, just disallow these ioctls on ioctl-only file descriptors, similar to what was already done with
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.More specifically, explicitly check for
FMODE_READ. This also covers write-only fds to non-verity files which otherwise would have failed with ENODATA. This change in error code for write-only fds should be fine too, as these ioctls cannot be usefully used with write-only fds anyway, but it's worth noting as another technicality.
Quoted 4 lines
Fixes 4dd893d832cf ("fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl")Fixes e17fe6579de0 ("fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl")Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Looks good too
Signature · 1 line
- Andrey
Quoted 2 lines · Eric Biggers
Therefore, just disallow these ioctls on ioctl-only file descriptors, similar to what was already done with
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.
Applied to https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fsverity/linux.git/log/?h=for-current
Acks from the LSM maintainers would be appreciated as well, given that this patch fixes the interaction with certain LSMs.
- Eric