x86/bugs: Keep BHI mitigation when only user->kernel is mitigated
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 x86/bugs: Keep BHI mitigation when only user->kernel is mitigated
The BHI mitigation selection is inconsistent with the documentation (attack_vector_controls.rst), which lists BHI under both the user->kernel and guest->host attack vectors. bhi_select_mitigation() only enables it when CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST is set; otherwise it selects BHI_MITIGATION_OFF, even if CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL is set.
As a result, a kernel compiled with KVM disabled gets BHI automatically disabled, since CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST defaults to off without KVM. This is a bug, given that CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL still needs it: on affected Intel CPUs these kernels lose BHI_DIS_S or the BHB clearing loop by default. Booting with mitigations=auto,no_guest_host has the same effect.
Select BHI_MITIGATION_ON whenever user->kernel is mitigated, and keep BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY for the guest->host-only case.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +5 -7
@@ -2088,14 +2088,12 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)if (bhi_mitigation !=BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO )return ; -if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST )) { -if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL )) - bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; -else - bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ; - }else { +if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL )) + bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; +else if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST )) + bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ; +else bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ; - } }static void __init bhi_update_mitigation (void )
---
base-commit: 6d0933ae9d46674a6ea63a87e9e9ab4e662670c9
change-id: 20261029-bhi-attack-vector-c36ea6854904
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
AMD General
Quoted 73 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2026 9:45 AM
To: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>; Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>; Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>; Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>; Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>; Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>; Dave Hansen <[email protected]>; [email protected]; H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>; Kaplan, David <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Keep BHI mitigation when onlyuser->kernelis mitigated[You don't often get email from [email protected]. Learn why this is important at https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification ]
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The BHI mitigation selection is inconsistent with the documentation (
attack_vector_controls.rst), which lists BHI under both theuser->kernelandguest->hostattack vectors.bhi_select_mitigation()only enables it whenCPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOSTis set; otherwise it selectsBHI_MITIGATION_OFF, even ifCPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNELis set.As a result, a kernel compiled with KVM disabled gets BHI automatically disabled, since
CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOSTdefaults to off without KVM. This is a bug, given thatCPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNELstill needs it: on affected Intel CPUs these kernels loseBHI_DIS_Sor the BHB clearing loop by default. Booting with mitigations=auto,no_guest_host has the same effect.Select
BHI_MITIGATION_ONwheneveruser->kernelis mitigated, and keepBHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLYfor the guest->host-only case.Fixes ddcd4d3cb37c ("x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHI")Cc David Kaplan <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Breno Leitao <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +5
-8@@ -2088,14 +2088,12 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)if (bhi_mitigation !=BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO )return ; -if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST )) { -if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL )) - bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; -else - bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ; - }else { +if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL )) + bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; +else if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST )) + bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ; +else bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ; - } }static void __init bhi_update_mitigation (void ) ---base-commit:
6d0933ae9d46674a6ea63a87e9e9ab4e662670c9
change-id: 20261029-bhi-attack-vector-c36ea6854904
Quoted 3 lines
Best regards,
--
Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Looks like I had done this correctly up through v5 of my attack vector series but the final version messed it up when I tried to simplify it. Fix looks good to me.
--David Kaplan
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 16 lines · Breno Leitao
The BHI mitigation selection is inconsistent with the documentation (
attack_vector_controls.rst), which lists BHI under both theuser->kernelandguest->hostattack vectors.bhi_select_mitigation()only enables it whenCPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOSTis set; otherwise it selectsBHI_MITIGATION_OFF, even ifCPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNELis set.As a result, a kernel compiled with KVM disabled gets BHI automatically disabled, since
CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOSTdefaults to off without KVM. This is a bug, given thatCPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNELstill needs it: on affected Intel CPUs these kernels loseBHI_DIS_Sor the BHB clearing loop by default. Booting with mitigations=auto,no_guest_host has the same effect.Select
BHI_MITIGATION_ONwheneveruser->kernelis mitigated, and keepBHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLYfor the guest->host-only case.
Quoted 6 lines
Fixes ddcd4d3cb37c ("x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHI")Cc David Kaplan <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Breno Leitao <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Queued, thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette[tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Select the BHI mitigation based on the attack vector properly
In reply to Breno LeitaoThe following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 3457b3bcd344005af894876cab4e634cabdcbb62 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/3457b3bcd344005af894876cab4e634cabdcbb62 Author: Breno Leitao <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Thu, 29 Oct 2026 07:45:03 -07:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Sun, 01 Nov 2026 17:32:45 -08:00
x86/bugs: Select the BHI mitigation based on the attack vector properly
The BHI mitigation selection is inconsistent with the documentation (attack_vector_controls.rst), which lists BHI under both the user->kernel and guest->host attack vectors. bhi_select_mitigation() only enables it when CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST is set; otherwise it selects BHI_MITIGATION_OFF, even if CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL is set.
As a result, a kernel compiled with KVM disabled gets BHI automatically disabled, since CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST defaults to off without KVM. This is a bug, given that CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL still needs it: on affected Intel CPUs these kernels lose BHI_DIS_S or the BHB clearing loop by default. Booting with mitigations=auto,no_guest_host has the same effect.
Select BHI_MITIGATION_ON whenever user->kernel is mitigated, and keep BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY for the guest->host-only case.
[ bp: Clarify commit title. ]
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +5 -7
@@ -2088,14 +2088,12 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)if (bhi_mitigation !=BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO )return ; -if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST )) { -if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL )) - bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; -else - bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ; - }else { +if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL )) + bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; +else if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST )) + bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ; +else bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ; - } }static void __init bhi_update_mitigation (void )