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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ovl: fix mount setup failing when override_creds drops" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

PATCH [email protected] 1 participant 1 message Nov 4

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The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 333ad304d4794d6384087ea7fc16e58ab642809b
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026110404-hamlet-circling-4092@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' 'HEAD^..'

Possible dependencies:

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 333ad304d4794d6384087ea7fc16e58ab642809b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 17 Oct 2026 18:43:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ovl: fix mount setup failing when override_creds drops
CAP_SYS_ADMIN

When a process drops CAP_SYS_ADMIN and calls fsconfig(FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG, "override_creds"), overlayfs saves those restricted credentials in ofs->creator_cred. ovl_fill_super() then wraps the entire mount setup in with_ovl_creds(), switching to those restricted credentials for the duration.

Mount setup calls clone_private_mount(), which checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN against current credentials. With restricted credentials active, this check fails with -EPERM even though the task issuing FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE is fully privileged.

Use the mounter's real credentials only for cloning the private layer mounts. Keep all other backing filesystem operations during mount setup under the stashed credentials.

Fixes c28f922c9dcee ("clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns")
fs/overlayfs/super.c +16 -2
index cc4b0959faf6..b452b8c5f641 100644
@@ -503,6 +503,20 @@ static int ovl_report_in_use(struct ovl_fs *ofs, const char *name)
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * clone_private_mount() checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN in current->cred.
+ * ovl_fill_super_creds() runs under the stashed creator cred, which
+ * override_creds may have dropped.
+ * The task that issued FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE is still current->real_cred, so
+ * use that only for the clone. creator_cred stays in effect for every other
+ * backing-fs operation.
+ */
+static struct vfsmount *ovl_clone_private_mount(const struct path *path)
+{
+	scoped_with_creds(current_real_cred())
+		return clone_private_mount(path);
+}
+
 static int ovl_get_upper(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,
 			 struct ovl_layer *upper_layer,
 			 const struct path *upperpath)
@@ -526,7 +540,7 @@ static int ovl_get_upper(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	upper_mnt = clone_private_mount(upperpath);
+	upper_mnt = ovl_clone_private_mount(upperpath);
 	err = PTR_ERR(upper_mnt);
 	if (IS_ERR(upper_mnt)) {
 		pr_err("failed to clone upperpath\n");
@@ -1104,7 +1118,7 @@ static int ovl_get_layers(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,
 			}
 		}
 
-		mnt = clone_private_mount(&l->path);
+		mnt = ovl_clone_private_mount(&l->path);
 		err = PTR_ERR(mnt);
 		if (IS_ERR(mnt)) {
 			pr_err("failed to clone lowerpath\n");