KEYS: Replace assoc_array with rhashtable
Subsystems (9)
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerv5 cover KEYS: Replace assoc_array with rhashtable
The keyrings subsystem is the sole user of assoc_array. It has over 1700 lines of code, no test suite, and a long history of bugs, with LLMs now finding more.
This unfortunate outcome has evolved over time by large from the shortage of in-kernel callers, time bandwidth and 3rd party contributors.
What the keyrings subsystem needs is just a generic key-value store, which performs well with sparse key sets. Replace assoc_array with an rhashtable-backed keyring index and remove assoc_array from the kernel.
CHANGES
=======
v5:
- Eric Biggers: Include <linux/jhash.h> explicitly in keyring.c.
- Eric Biggers: Document why hashing type/domain_tag pointers with SipHash and truncating the digest to 32 bits are safe.
- Eric Biggers: Rework the commit message for "KEYS: Replace assoc_array with rhashtable", including behavioral and operational changes.
- Retry rhashtable_insert_fast() on transient -EBUSY in __key_link_begin().
v4:
- Eric Biggers: Correct the kerneldoc summary for keyring_is_empty().
- Eric Biggers: Truncate keyring_index_key hash to u32 and drop index_id.
- Eric Biggers, David Howells: Use a proper struct instead of a two-element array to pass the edits.
- Eric Biggers: __keyring_link(): Call key_put() in the rollback of rhashtable_replace_fast().
- Eric Biggers: Retract from using __free(kfree) in keyring_get_index().
- Eric Biggers: Reuse keyring_link_key() in keyring_obj_cmpfn().
- Eric Biggers: Document why keyring_index_free() uses queue_rcu_work().
- Eric Biggers: Fix the commit message for "KEYS: Replace assoc_array with rhashtable".
v3:
- Since David is away for the next week I decided to address the low hanging fruit that I reported myself.
- Unified and sanitized function and variable naming and removed unnecessary asymmetry e.g., by renaming keyring_remove_all_links as keyring_index_free, 'links' as 'index' and '_edit' as 'edit'.
- Flattened the implementation by refactoring out some useless wrappers and other constructs.
- Addressed continuation after triggered WARN_ON() on at the three sites that I've described in my email response to the previous patch set version.
- Reworked keyring_read() so that it triggers the scheduler between the iterations.
- Dropped "Assisted-by: LLM" tag because checkpatch.pl told me so.
v2:
- Tried to address all the issues pointed out by David and Eric. Tell me if something was ignored, as that would be an unintentional mishap.
- Updated and trimmed the source code comments.
- For assoc_array_edit I decided to go with two-element pointer array, which shifts a bit what David suggested.
- Dropped is_keyring flag. It was so obvious call so I mention it here just in case because too obvious maxes out my self-doubt ;-)
- Used cleanup.h primitives where I possibly could especially in order to make fallible initializations more bug-resistant.
- The already-ack'd bug fixes are included but will be dropped as soon as I've sent them over to Linus.
VERSIONS
========
- v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/[email protected]/
- v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/[email protected]/
- v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/[email protected]/
- v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/[email protected]/
Jarkko Sakkinen (3):
KEYS: Introduce keyring_is_empty()
KEYS: Replace assoc_array with rhashtable
lib: Remove assoc_array
Documentation/core-api/assoc_array.rst | 564 ------ Documentation/core-api/index.rst | 1 - .../zh_CN/core-api/assoc_array.rst | 473 ----- .../translations/zh_CN/core-api/index.rst | 1 - drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 2 +- fs/verity/signature.c | 2 +- include/keys/keyring-type.h | 1 - include/linux/assoc_array.h | 88 - include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h | 178 -- include/linux/key-type.h | 1 - include/linux/key.h | 29 +- kernel/bpf/keys.c | 2 +- lib/Kconfig | 14 - lib/Makefile | 1 - lib/assoc_array.c | 1724 ----------------- security/keys/Kconfig | 1 - security/keys/internal.h | 14 +- security/keys/key.c | 22 +- security/keys/keyring.c | 994 +++++----- security/keys/request_key.c | 8 +- .../dm-verity/test-dm-verity-keyring.sh | 2 +- 21 files changed, 479 insertions(+), 3643 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 Documentation/core-api/assoc_array.rst delete mode 100644 Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/assoc_array.rst delete mode 100644 include/linux/assoc_array.h delete mode 100644 include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h delete mode 100644 lib/assoc_array.c
--
2.47.3
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerPATCH v5 1/3 KEYS: Introduce keyring_is_empty()
Introduce keyring_is_empty() in order to decouple for BPF, dm-verity and fs-verity how keyring internally manages the keys.
--- drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 2 +- fs/verity/signature.c | 2 +- include/linux/key.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/keys.c | 2 +- security/keys/keyring.c | 10 ++++++++++ .../selftests/dm-verity/test-dm-verity-keyring.sh | 2 +- 6 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c +1 -1
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_len,if (ret != -ENOKEY && ret != -EKEYREJECTED )return ret; -if (dm_verity_keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree && +if (!keyring_is_empty (dm_verity_keyring) && dm_verity_keyring->restrict_link) ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(root_hash, root_hash_len, sig_data, sig_len,
fs/verity/signature.c +1 -1
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,return 0 ; } -if (fsverity_keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree ==0 ) { +if (keyring_is_empty (fsverity_keyring)) {/* * The ".fs-verity" keyring is empty, due to builtin signatures * being supported by the kernel but not actually being used.
include/linux/key.h +1 -0
@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ extern int restrict_link_reject(struct key *keyring, struct key *restriction_key);extern int keyring_clear (struct key *keyring); +bool keyring_is_empty (const struct key *keyring); extern key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring, struct key_type *type,
kernel/bpf/keys.c +1 -1
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_keyring(void)if (!bpf_keyring)return NULL ; -if (!READ_ONCE (bpf_keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree) || +if (keyring_is_empty (bpf_keyring) || !READ_ONCE (bpf_keyring->restrict_link))return NULL ;
security/keys/keyring.c +10 -0
@@ -443,6 +443,16 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)assoc_array_destroy (&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops); } +/** +* keyring_is_empty - Check whether a keyring is empty +* @keyring: The keyring to check. +*/ +bool keyring_is_empty (const struct key *keyring) +{ +return READ_ONCE (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree) ==0 ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (keyring_is_empty); +/* * Describe a keyring for /proc. */
tools/testing/selftests/dm-verity/test-dm-verity-keyring.sh +1 -1
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ test_keyring_inactive_when_empty() { log_info "TEST: Verify dm-verity keyring is inactive when sealed empty" # When keyring_unsealed=0, the keyring is sealed immediately while empty - # This means it should NOT be used for verification (nr_leaves_on_tree=0) + # An empty keyring should NOT be used for verification. log_info "Keyring state (should be empty and sealed):" list_keyring_keys
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerPATCH v5 2/3 KEYS: Replace assoc_array with rhashtable
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenThe keyrings subsystem is the sole user of assoc_array. It has over 1700 lines of code, no test suite, and a long history of bugs, with LLMs now finding more.
This unfortunate outcome has evolved over time by large from the shortage of in-kernel callers, time bandwidth and 3rd party contributors.
What the keyrings needs is just a generic key-value store, which performs well with sparse key sets.
Replace struct assoc_array in struct key with struct keyring_index:
- keyring_index: holds an rhashtable for direct lookups, an RCU-protected list of keyring_link entries for stable walks, the active link count, and an rcu_work item for deferred teardown.
- keyring_link: links a key into a keyring's hash table and list, caching its 32-bit SipHash digest rehashed with jhash by rhashtable.
Correspondingly, struct assoc_array_edit is replaced by struct keyring_edit for delivering transient state across link operations.
Other behavioral changes:
- KEYCTL_READ and sibling-keyring searches follow list order instead of hash order: keyrings are prepended, other keys are appended, and replacing a matching key retains its position.
- key_unlink(), keyring_clear(), keyring_revoke(), and keyring_gc() no longer allocate memory.
- keyring_index_free() uses queue_rcu_work() instead of call_rcu() because rhashtable_destroy() may sleep.
--- include/keys/keyring-type.h | 1 - include/linux/key-type.h | 1 - include/linux/key.h | 28 +- security/keys/Kconfig | 1 - security/keys/internal.h | 14 +- security/keys/key.c | 22 +- security/keys/keyring.c | 986 ++++++++++++++++-------------------- security/keys/request_key.c | 8 +- 8 files changed, 465 insertions(+), 596 deletions(-)
include/keys/keyring-type.h +0 -1
@@ -9,6 +9,5 @@#define _KEYS_KEYRING_TYPE_H#include <linux/key.h> -#include <linux/assoc_array.h> #endif /* _KEYS_KEYRING_TYPE_H */
include/linux/key-type.h +0 -1
@@ -161,7 +161,6 @@ struct key_type { const void *in, const void *in2);/* internal fields */ -atomic64_t index_id;/* Opaque keyring index ID */ struct list_head link;/* link in types list */ struct lock_class_key lock_class;/* key->sem lock class */ } __randomize_layout;
include/linux/key.h +6 -22
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@#include <linux/sysctl.h> #include <linux/rwsem.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> -#include <linux/assoc_array.h> #include <linux/refcount.h> #include <linux/time64.h>
@@ -107,34 +106,21 @@ struct key_owner;struct key_tag ;struct keyring_list ;struct keyring_name ; +struct keyring_index ;struct key_tag {struct rcu_head rcu; -atomic64_t index_id;/* Opaque keyring index ID */ refcount_t usage;bool removed;/* T when subject removed */ };struct keyring_index_key {/* [!] If this structure is altered, the union in struct key must change too! */ -unsigned long hash;/* Hash value */ -union { -struct { -#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN/* Put desc_len at the LSB of x */ -u16 desc_len; -char desc[sizeof (long ) -2 ];/* First few chars of description */ -#else -char desc[sizeof (long ) -2 ];/* First few chars of description */ -u16 desc_len; -#endif - }; -unsigned long x; - }; +u32 hash;/* Hash value */ +unsigned int desc_len;struct key_type *type;struct key_tag *domain_tag;/* Domain of operation */ const char *description; -u64 type_id;/* Cached index IDs */ -u64 domain_id; };union key_payload {
@@ -252,13 +238,11 @@ struct key {union {struct keyring_index_key index_key;struct { -unsigned long hash; -unsigned long len_desc; +u32 hash; +unsigned int desc_len;struct key_type *type;/* type of key */ struct key_tag *domain_tag;/* Domain of operation */ char *description; -u64 type_id; -u64 domain_id; }; };
@@ -271,7 +255,7 @@ struct key {struct {/* Keyring bits */ struct list_head name_link; -struct assoc_array keys; +struct keyring_index __rcu *index; }; };
security/keys/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ menuconfig KEYS bool "Enable access key retention support" - select ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY help This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and access keys in the kernel.
security/keys/internal.h +10 -4
@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@#include <linux/vmalloc.h> struct iovec ; +struct keyring_link ; + +struct keyring_edit { +struct keyring_link *new; +struct keyring_link *old; +};#ifdef __KDEBUG#define kenter (FMT , ...) \
@@ -98,13 +104,13 @@ extern int __key_move_lock(struct key *l_keyring, struct key *u_keyring, const struct keyring_index_key *index_key);extern int __key_link_begin (struct key *keyring,const struct keyring_index_key *index_key, -struct assoc_array_edit **_edit); +struct keyring_edit *edit);extern int __key_link_check_live_key (struct key *keyring,struct key *key);extern void __key_link (struct key *keyring,struct key *key, -struct assoc_array_edit **_edit); +struct keyring_edit *edit);extern void __key_link_end (struct key *keyring,const struct keyring_index_key *index_key, -struct assoc_array_edit *edit); +struct keyring_edit *edit);extern key_ref_t find_key_to_update (key_ref_t keyring_ref,const struct keyring_index_key *index_key);
@@ -122,7 +128,7 @@ struct keyring_search_context {#define KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED 0x0020/* Ignore expired keys (intention to replace) */ #define KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE 0x0040/* Search child keyrings also */ -int (*iterator)(const void *object,void *iterator_data); +int (*iterator)(const struct key *key,void *iterator_data);/* Internal stuff */ int skipped_ret;
security/keys/key.c +11 -11
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, struct key *keyring, struct key *authkey, - struct assoc_array_edit **_edit) + struct keyring_edit *edit) { int ret, awaken;
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,if (test_bit (KEY_FLAG_KEEP , &keyring->flags))set_bit (KEY_FLAG_KEEP , &key->flags); -__key_link (keyring, key, _edit); +__key_link (keyring, key, edit); }/* disable the authorisation key */
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, struct key *authkey) {struct key_preparsed_payload prep; -struct assoc_array_edit *edit =NULL ; +struct keyring_edit edit = {};int ret;memset (&prep,0 ,sizeof (prep));
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, error_link_end:if (keyring) -__key_link_end (keyring, &key->index_key, edit); +__key_link_end (keyring, &key->index_key, &edit); error:if (key->type->preparse)
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,struct key *keyring, struct key *authkey) { - struct assoc_array_edit *edit = NULL; + struct keyring_edit edit = {};int ret, awaken, link_ret =0 ;key_check (key);
@@ -599,12 +599,12 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,* concurrent restriction install. */ if (keyring->restrict_link) { -__key_link_end (keyring, &key->index_key, edit); +__key_link_end (keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);return -EPERM ; } link_ret =__key_link_begin (keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);if (link_ret <0 ) -__key_link_end (keyring, &key->index_key, edit); +__key_link_end (keyring, &key->index_key, &edit); } }
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,mutex_unlock (&key_construction_mutex);if (keyring && link_ret ==0 ) -__key_link_end (keyring, &key->index_key, edit); +__key_link_end (keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */ if (awaken)
@@ -825,7 +825,7 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, .description = description, };struct key_preparsed_payload prep; -struct assoc_array_edit *edit =NULL ; +struct keyring_edit edit = {};const struct cred *cred =current_cred ();struct key *keyring, *key =NULL ;key_ref_t key_ref;
@@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref =make_key_ref (key,is_key_possessed (keyring_ref)); error_link_end: -__key_link_end (keyring, &index_key, edit); +__key_link_end (keyring, &index_key, &edit); error_free_prep:if (index_key.type->preparse) index_key.type->free_preparse (&prep);
@@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,/* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned */ -__key_link_end (keyring, &index_key, edit); +__key_link_end (keyring, &index_key, &edit); key =key_ref_to_ptr (key_ref);if (test_bit (KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT , &key->flags)) {
security/keys/keyring.c +434 -552
1,370 lines not on this page · raw message
security/keys/request_key.c +4 -4
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,struct key_user *user, struct key **_key) { - struct assoc_array_edit *edit = NULL; + struct keyring_edit edit = {};struct key *key;key_perm_t perm;key_ref_t key_ref;
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,mutex_unlock (&key_construction_mutex);if (dest_keyring) -__key_link_end (dest_keyring, &key->index_key, edit); +__key_link_end (dest_keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);mutex_unlock (&user->cons_lock); *_key = key;kleave (" = 0 [%d]" ,key_serial (key));
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, ret =__key_link_check_live_key (dest_keyring, key);if (ret ==0 )__key_link (dest_keyring, key, &edit); -__key_link_end (dest_keyring, &key->index_key, edit); +__key_link_end (dest_keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);if (ret <0 ) goto link_check_failed; }
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, link_alloc_failed:mutex_unlock (&key_construction_mutex); link_alloc_failed_unlocked: -__key_link_end (dest_keyring, &key->index_key, edit); +__key_link_end (dest_keyring, &key->index_key, &edit); link_lock_failed:mutex_unlock (&user->cons_lock);key_put (key);
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
Quoted 35 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
The keyrings subsystem is the sole user of
assoc_array. It has over 1700 lines of code, no test suite, and a long history of bugs, with LLMs now finding more.This unfortunate outcome has evolved over time by large from the shortage of in-kernel callers, time bandwidth and 3rd party contributors.
What the keyrings needs is just a generic key-value store, which performs well with sparse key sets.
Replace struct
assoc_arrayin struct key with structkeyring_index:-
keyring_index: holds an rhashtable for direct lookups, an RCU-protected list ofkeyring_linkentries for stable walks, the active link count, and anrcu_workitem for deferred teardown.
-keyring_link: links a key into a keyring's hash table and list, caching its 32-bit SipHash digest rehashed with jhash by rhashtable.Correspondingly, struct
assoc_array_editis replaced by structkeyring_editfor delivering transient state across link operations.Other behavioral changes:
-
KEYCTL_READand sibling-keyring searches follow list order instead of hash order: keyrings are prepended, other keys are appended, and replacing a matching key retains its position.
-key_unlink(),keyring_clear(),keyring_revoke(), andkeyring_gc()no longer allocate memory.
-keyring_index_free()usesqueue_rcu_work()instead ofcall_rcu()becauserhashtable_destroy()may sleep.Suggested-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Quoted 11 lines
--- include/keys/keyring-type.h | 1 - include/linux/key-type.h | 1 - include/linux/key.h | 28 +- security/keys/Kconfig | 1 - security/keys/internal.h | 14 +- security/keys/key.c | 22 +- security/keys/keyring.c | 986 ++++++++++++++++-------------------- security/keys/request_key.c | 8 +- 8 files changed, 465 insertions(+), 596 deletions(-)
While I am pretty much in favour with this approach, is there a specific reason why siphash has been chosen?
Would there be a chance to make this configurable?
I do see slight complications when running in secure environments (ie FIPS-certified environments) where most of the hash functions might not be available ...
Cheers,
Hannes
Signature · 4 lines
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect [email protected] +49 911 74053 688 SUSE Software Solutions GmbH, Frankenstr. 146, 90461 Nürnberg HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: I. Totev, A. McDonald, W. Knoblich
Eric Biggers
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Hannes Reinecke
While I am pretty much in favour with this approach, is there a specific reason why siphash has been chosen?
SipHash is the preferred choice for secure hash tables. It is secure, performs well on short inputs, and doesn't require special instructions. See Documentation/security/siphash.rst
Quoted 4 lines
Would there be a chance to make this configurable?
I do see slight complications when running in secure environments (ie FIPS-certified environments) where most of the hash functions might not be available ...
SipHash support is available even when the kernel is booted with fips=1, so there's no issue there. It's already widely used in the kernel for hash tables, and that hasn't blocked FIPS certifications either.
Side note: fips=1 actually has little do with security, and in some cases it actually decreases security. See for example
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/[email protected]/
where I'm fixing a vulnerability caused by fips=1.
- Eric
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 2 lines · Hannes Reinecke
While I am pretty much in favour with this approach, is there a specific reason why siphash has been chosen?
SipHash is the preferred choice for secure hash tables. It is secure, performs well on short inputs, and doesn't require special instructions. See
Documentation/security/siphash.rst
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Would there be a chance to make this configurable?
I do see slight complications when running in secure environments (ie FIPS-certified environments) where most of the hash functions might not be available ...SipHash support is available even when the kernel is booted with fips=1, so there's no issue there. It's already widely used in the kernel for hash tables, and that hasn't blocked FIPS certifications either.
Ah, right. Thanks for the information. Just wanted to cross-check here.
Quoted 5 lines
Side note: fips=1 actually has little do with security, and in some cases it actually decreases security. See for example
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/[email protected]/
where I'm fixing a vulnerability caused by fips=1.
Oh, I am fully aware. FIPS is more a rubber-stamp than anything else. Unfortunately, a pretty powerful one.
Cheers,
Hannes
Signature · 4 lines
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect [email protected] +49 911 74053 688 SUSE Software Solutions GmbH, Frankenstr. 146, 90461 Nürnberg HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: I. Totev, A. McDonald, W. Knoblich
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerQuoted 20 lines · Hannes Reinecke
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 2 lines · Hannes Reinecke
While I am pretty much in favour with this approach, is there a specific reason why siphash has been chosen?
SipHash is the preferred choice for secure hash tables. It is secure, performs well on short inputs, and doesn't require special instructions. See
Documentation/security/siphash.rstQuoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Would there be a chance to make this configurable?
I do see slight complications when running in secure environments (ie FIPS-certified environments) where most of the hash functions might not be available ...SipHash support is available even when the kernel is booted with fips=1, so there's no issue there. It's already widely used in the kernel for hash tables, and that hasn't blocked FIPS certifications either.
Ah, right. Thanks for the information. Just wanted to cross-check here.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Side note: fips=1 actually has little do with security, and in some cases it actually decreases security. See for example
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/[email protected]/
where I'm fixing a vulnerability caused by fips=1.Oh, I am fully aware. FIPS is more a rubber-stamp than anything else. Unfortunately, a pretty powerful one.
Just representing this as an option but in the current mainline indices are used instead of addresses, and thus it would be also an option to just jhash across the board, if that part is retained (now it is being removed).
On plus side, any security bugs in cryptography would not be a concern of keyrings.
Br, Jarkko
Eric Biggers
maintainerQuoted 29 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 20 lines · Hannes Reinecke
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 2 lines · Hannes Reinecke
While I am pretty much in favour with this approach, is there a specific reason why siphash has been chosen?
SipHash is the preferred choice for secure hash tables. It is secure, performs well on short inputs, and doesn't require special instructions. See
Documentation/security/siphash.rstQuoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Would there be a chance to make this configurable?
I do see slight complications when running in secure environments (ie FIPS-certified environments) where most of the hash functions might not be available ...SipHash support is available even when the kernel is booted with fips=1, so there's no issue there. It's already widely used in the kernel for hash tables, and that hasn't blocked FIPS certifications either.
Ah, right. Thanks for the information. Just wanted to cross-check here.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Side note: fips=1 actually has little do with security, and in some cases it actually decreases security. See for example
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/[email protected]/
where I'm fixing a vulnerability caused by fips=1.Oh, I am fully aware. FIPS is more a rubber-stamp than anything else. Unfortunately, a pretty powerful one.
Quoted 7 lines
Just representing this as an option but in the current mainline indices are used instead of addresses, and thus it would be also an option to just jhash across the board, if that part is retained (now it is being removed).
On plus side, any security bugs in cryptography would not be a concern of keyrings.
SipHash is also useful for resistance against denial-of-service attacks, where a user puts all their keys in one hash bucket.
As I mentioned, it's already used for secure hash tables elsewhere in the kernel. That is what it's for; see Documentation/security/siphash.rst. It's very fast as well, so if you are thinking of cryptography as being something very slow and hard to use, that is not what this is (or ever needed to be).
Let's just use it and not over-complicate things.
- Eric
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerQuoted 41 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 29 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 20 lines · Hannes Reinecke
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 2 lines · Hannes Reinecke
While I am pretty much in favour with this approach, is there a specific reason why siphash has been chosen?
SipHash is the preferred choice for secure hash tables. It is secure, performs well on short inputs, and doesn't require special instructions. See
Documentation/security/siphash.rstQuoted 9 lines
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Would there be a chance to make this configurable?
I do see slight complications when running in secure environments (ie FIPS-certified environments) where most of the hash functions might not be available ...SipHash support is available even when the kernel is booted with fips=1, so there's no issue there. It's already widely used in the kernel for hash tables, and that hasn't blocked FIPS certifications either.
Ah, right. Thanks for the information. Just wanted to cross-check here.
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Side note: fips=1 actually has little do with security, and in some cases it actually decreases security. See for example
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/[email protected]/
where I'm fixing a vulnerability caused by fips=1.Oh, I am fully aware. FIPS is more a rubber-stamp than anything else. Unfortunately, a pretty powerful one.
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Just representing this as an option but in the current mainline indices are used instead of addresses, and thus it would be also an option to just jhash across the board, if that part is retained (now it is being removed).
On plus side, any security bugs in cryptography would not be a concern of keyrings.
SipHash is also useful for resistance against denial-of-service attacks, where a user puts all their keys in one hash bucket.
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As I mentioned, it's already used for secure hash tables elsewhere in the kernel. That is what it's for; see
Documentation/security/siphash.rst. It's very fast as well, so if you are thinking of cryptography as being something very slow and hard to use, that is not what this is (or ever needed to be).Let's just use it and not over-complicate things.
I'm pretty much non-opionated when it comes to this detail. I just merely represent all the possible if anything comes up to mind. DoS protection that you explained was not something I did even consider so that seals it for me.
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- Eric
Br, Jarkko
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 9 lines
SipHash is also useful for resistance against denial-of-service attacks, where a user puts all their keys in one hash bucket.
As I mentioned, it's already used for secure hash tables elsewhere in the kernel. That is what it's for; see
Documentation/security/siphash.rst. It's very fast as well, so if you are thinking of cryptography as being something very slow and hard to use, that is not what this is (or ever needed to be).
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Let's just use it and not over-complicate things.
I'm pretty much non-opionated when it comes to this detail. I just merely represent all the possible if anything comes up to mind. DoS protection that you explained was not something I did even consider so that seals it for me.
I'm cutting hairs now but indices + siphash adds to defence in depth as it only takes DoS protection from SipHash while not protecting a secret. Not sure if this has that much pratical meaning tho :-)
Br, Jarkko
Quoted 4 lines · On Fri, 6 Nov 2026 01:05:16 -0800 Eric Biggers <[email protected]> wrote:
Side note: fips=1 actually has little do with security, and in some cases it actually decreases security. See for example
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/[email protected]/
where I'm fixing a vulnerability caused by fips=1.
Then there is the 'fips compliant' server we used for routing 911 calls between TDM and VoIP.
Any kind of PCIe error gets routed out the the motherboard management module which then proceeds to inform the kernel with an NMI.
At which point Linux crashes.
The NMI is too late to stop the kernel having to handle the ~0 from a read. And even happens when there is no driver using that device.
David
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Hannes Reinecke
reason why siphash has been chosen?
Would there be a chance to make this configurable?
I do see slight complications when running in secure environments (ie FIPS-certified environments) where most of the hash functions might not be available ...
SipHash came originall along with [1].
If we retracted back a step back i.e., use the assigned indices then the security properties of SipHash would not be relevant.
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Cheers,
Hannes
Signature · 4 lines
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect [email protected] +49 911 74053 688 SUSE Software Solutions GmbH, Frankenstr. 146, 90461 Nürnberg HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: I. Totev, A. McDonald, W. Knoblich
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/[email protected]/
Br, Jarkko
Quoted 31 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
The keyrings subsystem is the sole user of
assoc_array. It has over 1700 lines of code, no test suite, and a long history of bugs, with LLMs now finding more.This unfortunate outcome has evolved over time by large from the shortage of in-kernel callers, time bandwidth and 3rd party contributors.
What the keyrings needs is just a generic key-value store, which performs well with sparse key sets.
Replace struct
assoc_arrayin struct key with structkeyring_index:-
keyring_index: holds an rhashtable for direct lookups, an RCU-protected list ofkeyring_linkentries for stable walks, the active link count, and anrcu_workitem for deferred teardown.
-keyring_link: links a key into a keyring's hash table and list, caching its 32-bit SipHash digest rehashed with jhash by rhashtable.Correspondingly, struct
assoc_array_editis replaced by structkeyring_editfor delivering transient state across link operations.Other behavioral changes:
-
KEYCTL_READand sibling-keyring searches follow list order instead of hash order: keyrings are prepended, other keys are appended, and replacing a matching key retains its position.
-key_unlink(),keyring_clear(),keyring_revoke(), andkeyring_gc()no longer allocate memory.
-keyring_index_free()usesqueue_rcu_work()instead ofcall_rcu()becauserhashtable_destroy()may sleep.
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Suggested-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
But one comment below.
security/keys/keyring.c int __key_move_lock(struct key *l_keyring, struct key *u_keyring, · line 1238
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security/keys/keyring.c +11
-0+do { + ret =rhashtable_insert_fast (&links->ht, &link->node, + keyring_link_params); +if (ret == -EBUSY ) +fsleep (100 ); + }while (ret == -EBUSY ); +if (ret <0 ) { +key_payload_reserve (keyring, + keyring->datalen -KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES ); + goto error; + }
I don't think the retry loop is actually sufficient or desirable here (though it would be very rare for it to be reached). It gets reached when there are too many elements in one rhashtable chain. However, we're already pre-hashing with SipHash, and the rhashtable level hash is passed only the 32-bit SipHash. Suppose we reach this case because the SipHash values collided: then rhashtable's rehashing would never reduce the chain length, and the -EBUSY would last forever.
I think the right solution is to just set '.insecure_elasticity = true' in the rhashtable_params, to disable the chain length checks. Those checks make no sense when we're using SipHash anyway.
Then the retry loop would not be needed.
(And even for rhashtable users who aren't using SipHash, like fs/verity/, hard-failing insertions if the hash chains gets too long seems wrong. I mean, imagine if the kernel started refusing to do file operations if one of the hash chains in the VFS hash tables happened to get too long... But I guess rhashtable was designed for towards networking users who are able to just drop the data without much issue. Plus it predates SipHash existing.)
- Eric
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · Eric Biggers
I don't think the retry loop is actually sufficient or desirable here (though it would be very rare for it to be reached). It gets reached when there are too many elements in one rhashtable chain. However, we're already pre-hashing with SipHash, and the rhashtable level hash is passed only the 32-bit SipHash. Suppose we reach this case because the SipHash values collided: then rhashtable's rehashing would never reduce the chain length, and the
-EBUSYwould last forever.I think the right solution is to just set '.insecure_elasticity = true' in the
rhashtable_params, to disable the chain length checks. Those checks make no sense when we're using SipHash anyway.
Thanks, this is a valid suggestion. I was thinking about having maximum retries but this is much better idea. I'll address this as you proposed.
Quoted 11 lines
Then the retry loop would not be needed.
(And even for rhashtable users who aren't using SipHash, like
fs/verity/, hard-failing insertions if the hash chains gets too long seems wrong. I mean, imagine if the kernel started refusing to do file operations if one of the hash chains in the VFS hash tables happened to get too long... But I guess rhashtable was designed for towards networking users who are able to just drop the data without much issue. Plus it predates SipHash existing.)
Quoted 1 line
- Eric
Br, Jarkko
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerPATCH v5 3/3 lib: Remove assoc_array
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenAs assoc_array has no longer in-kernel users, remove assoc_array implementation, includes and documentation.
--- Documentation/core-api/assoc_array.rst | 564 ------ Documentation/core-api/index.rst | 1 - .../zh_CN/core-api/assoc_array.rst | 473 ----- .../translations/zh_CN/core-api/index.rst | 1 - include/linux/assoc_array.h | 88 - include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h | 178 -- lib/Kconfig | 14 - lib/Makefile | 1 - lib/assoc_array.c | 1724 ----------------- 9 files changed, 3044 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 Documentation/core-api/assoc_array.rst delete mode 100644 Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/assoc_array.rst delete mode 100644 include/linux/assoc_array.h delete mode 100644 include/linux/assoc_array_priv.h delete mode 100644 lib/assoc_array.c
Documentation/core-api/assoc_array.rst deleted +0 -564
@@ -1,564 +0,0 @@ -======================================== -Generic Associative Array Implementation -======================================== - -Overview -======== - -This associative array implementation is an object container with the following -properties: - -1. Objects are opaque pointers. The implementation does not care where they - point (if anywhere) or what they point to (if anything). - - .. note:: - - Pointers to objects _must_ be zero in the least significant bit. - -2. Objects do not need to contain linkage blocks for use by the array. This - permits an object to be located in multiple arrays simultaneously. - Rather, the array is made up of metadata blocks that point to objects. - -3. Objects require index keys to locate them within the array. - -4. Index keys must be unique. Inserting an object with the same key as one - already in the array will replace the old object. - -5. Index keys can be of any length and can be of different lengths. - -6. Index keys should encode the length early on, before any variation due to - length is seen. - -7. Index keys can include a hash to scatter objects throughout the array. - -8. The array can iterated over. The objects will not necessarily come out in - key order. - -9. The array can be iterated over while it is being modified, provided the - RCU readlock is being held by the iterator. Note, however, under these - circumstances, some objects may be seen more than once. If this is a - problem, the iterator should lock against modification. Objects will not - be missed, however, unless deleted. - -10. Objects in the array can be looked up by means of their index key. - -11. Objects can be looked up while the array is being modified, provided the - RCU readlock is being held by the thread doing the look up. - -The implementation uses a tree of 16-pointer nodes internally that are indexed -on each level by nibbles from the index key in the same manner as in a radix -tree. To improve memory efficiency, shortcuts can be emplaced to skip over -what would otherwise be a series of single-occupancy nodes. Further, nodes -pack leaf object pointers into spare space in the node rather than making an -extra branch until as such time an object needs to be added to a full node. - - -The Public API -============== - -The public API can be found in ``<linux/assoc_array.h>``. The associative -array is rooted on the following structure:: - - struct assoc_array { - ... - }; - -The code is selected by enabling ``CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY`` with:: - - ./script/config -e ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY - - -Edit Script ------------ - -The insertion and deletion functions produce an 'edit script' that can later be -applied to effect the changes without risking ``ENOMEM``. This retains the -preallocated metadata blocks that will be installed in the internal tree and -keeps track of the metadata blocks that will be removed from the tree when the -script is applied. - -This is also used to keep track of dead blocks and dead objects after the -script has been applied so that they can be freed later. The freeing is done -after an RCU grace period has passed - thus allowing access functions to -proceed under the RCU read lock. - -The script appears as outside of the API as a pointer of the type:: - - struct assoc_array_edit; - -There are two functions for dealing with the script: - -1. Apply an edit script:: - - void assoc_array_apply_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit); - - This will perform the edit functions, interpolating various write barriers - to permit accesses under the RCU read lock to continue. The edit script - will then be passed to ``call_rcu()`` to free it and any dead stuff it - points to. - -2. Cancel an edit script:: - - void assoc_array_cancel_edit(struct assoc_array_edit *edit); - - This frees the edit script and all preallocated memory immediately. If - this was for insertion, the new object is *not* released by this function, - but must rather be released by the caller. - -These functions are guaranteed not to fail. - - -Operations Table ----------------- - -Various functions take a table of operations:: - - struct assoc_array_ops { - ... - }; - -This points to a number of methods, all of which need to be provided: - -1. Get a chunk of index key from caller data:: - - unsigned long (*get_key_chunk)(const void *index_key, int level); - - This should return a chunk of caller-supplied index key starting at the - *bit* position given by the level argument. The level argument will be a - multiple of ``ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE`` and the function should return - ``ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE bits``. No error is possible. - - -2. Get a chunk of an object's index key:: - - unsigned long (*get_object_key_chunk)(const void *object, int level); - - As the previous function, but gets its data from an object in the array - rather than from a caller-supplied index key. - - -3. See if this is the object we're looking for:: - - bool (*compare_object)(const void *object, const void *index_key); - - Compare the object against an index key and return ``true`` if it matches - and ``false`` if it doesn't. - - -4. Diff the index keys of two objects:: - - int (*diff_objects)(const void *object, const void *index_key); - - Return the bit position at which the index key of the specified object - differs from the given index key or -1 if they are the same. - - -5. Free an object:: - - void (*free_object)(void *object); - - Free the specified object. Note that this may be called an RCU grace period - after ``assoc_array_apply_edit()`` was called, so ``synchronize_rcu()`` may - be necessary on module unloading. - - -Manipulation Functions ----------------------- - -There are a number of functions for manipulating an associative array: - -1. Initialise an associative array:: - - void assoc_array_init(struct assoc_array *array); - - This initialises the base structure for an associative array. It can't fail. - - -2. Insert/replace an object in an associative array:: - - struct assoc_array_edit * - assoc_array_insert(struct assoc_array *array, - const struct assoc_array_ops *ops, - const void *index_key, - void *object); - - This inserts the given object into the array. Note that the least - significant bit of the pointer must be zero as it's used to type-mark - pointers internally. - - If an object already exists for that key then it will be replaced with the - new object and the old one will be freed automatically. - - The ``index_key`` argument should hold index key information and is - passed to the methods in the ops table when they are called. - - This function makes no alteration to the array itself, but rather returns - an edit script that must be applied. ``-ENOMEM`` is returned in the case of - an out-of-memory error. - - The caller should lock exclusively against other modifiers of the array. - - -3. Delete an object from an associative array:: - - struct assoc_array_edit * - assoc_array_delete(struct assoc_array *array, - const struct assoc_array_ops *ops, - const void *index_key); - - This deletes an object that matches the specified data from the array. - - The ``index_key`` argument should hold index key information and is - passed to the methods in the ops table when they are called. - - This function makes no alteration to the array itself, but rather returns - an edit script that must be applied. ``-ENOMEM`` is returned in the case of - an out-of-memory error. ``NULL`` will be returned if the specified object - is not found within the array. - -The caller should lock exclusively against other modifiers of the array. - - -4. Delete all objects from an associative array:: - - struct assoc_array_edit * - assoc_array_clear(struct assoc_array *array, - const struct assoc_array_ops *ops); - - This deletes all the objects from an associative array and leaves it - completely empty. - - This function makes no alteration to the array itself, but rather returns - an edit script that must be applied. ``-ENOMEM`` is returned in the case of - an out-of-memory error. - - The caller should lock exclusively against other modifiers of the array. - - -5. Destroy an associative array, deleting all objects:: - - void assoc_array_destroy(struct assoc_array *array, - const struct assoc_array_ops *ops); - - This destroys the contents of the associative array and leaves it - completely empty. It is not permitted for another thread to be traversing - the array under the RCU read lock at the same time as this function is - destroying it as no RCU deferral is performed on memory release - - something that would require memory to be allocated. - - The caller should lock exclusively against other modifiers and accessors - of the array. - - -6. Garbage collect an associative array:: - - int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *array, - const struct assoc_array_ops *ops, - bool (*iterator)(void *object, void *iterator_data), - void *iterator_data); - - This iterates over the objects in an associative array and passes each one - to ``iterator()``. If ``iterator()`` returns ``true``, the object is kept. - If it returns ``false``, the object will be freed. If the ``iterator()`` - function returns ``true``, it must perform any appropriate refcount - incrementing on the object before returning. - - The internal tree will be packed down if possible as part of the iteration - to reduce the number of nodes in it. - - The ``iterator_data`` is passed directly to ``iterator()`` and is otherwise - ignored by the function. - - The function will return ``0`` if successful and ``-ENOMEM`` if there wasn't - enough memory. - - It is possible for other threads to iterate over or search the array under - the RCU read lock while this function is in progress. The caller should - lock exclusively against other modifiers of the array. - - -Access Functions ----------------- - -There are two functions for accessing an associative array: - -1. Iterate over all the objects in an associative array:: - - int assoc_array_iterate(const struct assoc_array *array, - int (*iterator)(const void *object, - void *iterator_data), - void *iterator_data); - - This passes each object in the array to the iterator callback function. - ``iterator_data`` is private data for that function. - - This may be used on an array at the same time as the array is being - modified, provided the RCU read lock is held. Under such circumstances, - it is possible for the iteration function to see some objects twice. If - this is a problem, then modification should be locked against. The - iteration algorithm should not, however, miss any objects. - - The function will return ``0`` if no objects were in the array or else it - will return the result of the last iterator function called. Iteration - stops immediately if any call to the iteration function results in a - non-zero return. - - -2. Find an object in an associative array:: - - void *assoc_array_find(const struct assoc_array *array, - const struct assoc_array_ops *ops, - const void *index_key); - - This walks through the array's internal tree directly to the object - specified by the index key. - - This may be used on an array at the same time as the array is being - modified, provided the RCU read lock is held. - - The function will return the object if found (and set ``*_type`` to the - object type) or will return ``NULL`` if the object was not found. - - -Index Key Form --------------- - -The index key can be of any form, but since the algorithms aren't told how long -the key is, it is strongly recommended that the index key includes its length -very early on before any variation due to the length would have an effect on -comparisons. - -This will cause leaves with different length keys to scatter away from each -other - and those with the same length keys to cluster together. - -It is also recommended that the index key begin with a hash of the rest of the -key to maximise scattering throughout keyspace. - -The better the scattering, the wider and lower the internal tree will be. - -Poor scattering isn't too much of a problem as there are shortcuts and nodes -can contain mixtures of leaves and metadata pointers. - -The index key is read in chunks of machine word. Each chunk is subdivided into -one nibble (4 bits) per level, so on a 32-bit CPU this is good for 8 levels and -on a 64-bit CPU, 16 levels. Unless the scattering is really poor, it is -unlikely that more than one word of any particular index key will have to be -used. - - -Internal Workings -================= - -The associative array data structure has an internal tree. This tree is -constructed of two types of metadata blocks: nodes and shortcuts. - -A node is an array of slots. Each slot can contain one of four things: - -* A NULL pointer, indicating that the slot is empty. -* A pointer to an object (a leaf). -* A pointer to a node at the next level. -* A pointer to a shortcut. - - -Basic Internal Tree Layout --------------------------- - -Ignoring shortcuts for the moment, the nodes form a multilevel tree. The index -key space is strictly subdivided by the nodes in the tree and nodes occur on -fixed levels. For example:: - - Level: 0 1 2 3 - =============== =============== =============== =============== - NODE D - NODE B NODE C +------>+---+ - +------>+---+ +------>+---+ | | 0 | - NODE A | | 0 | | | 0 | | +---+ - +---+ | +---+ | +---+ | : : - | 0 | | : : | : : | +---+ - +---+ | +---+ | +---+ | | f | - | 1 |---+ | 3 |---+ | 7 |---+ +---+ - +---+ +---+ +---+ - : : : : | 8 |---+ - +---+ +---+ +---+ | NODE E - | e |---+ | f | : : +------>+---+ - +---+ | +---+ +---+ | 0 | - | f | | | f | +---+ - +---+ | +---+ : : - | NODE F +---+ - +------>+---+ | f | - | 0 | NODE G +---+ - +---+ +------>+---+ - : : | | 0 | - +---+ | +---+ - | 6 |---+ : : - +---+ +---+ - : : | f | - +---+ +---+ - | f | - +---+ - -In the above example, there are 7 nodes (A-G), each with 16 slots (0-f). -Assuming no other meta data nodes in the tree, the key space is divided -thusly: - - =========== ==== - KEY PREFIX NODE - =========== ==== - 137* D - 138* E - 13[0-69-f]* C - 1[0-24-f]* B - e6* G - e[0-57-f]* F - [02-df]* A - =========== ==== - -So, for instance, keys with the following example index keys will be found in -the appropriate nodes: - - =============== ======= ==== - INDEX KEY PREFIX NODE - =============== ======= ==== - 13694892892489 13 C - 13795289025897 137 D - 13889dde88793 138 E - 138bbb89003093 138 E - 1394879524789 12 C - 1458952489 1 B - 9431809de993ba \- A - b4542910809cd \- A - e5284310def98 e F - e68428974237 e6 G - e7fffcbd443 e F - f3842239082 \- A - =============== ======= ==== - -To save memory, if a node can hold all the leaves in its portion of keyspace, -then the node will have all those leaves in it and will not have any metadata -pointers - even if some of those leaves would like to be in the same slot. - -A node can contain a heterogeneous mix of leaves and metadata pointers. -Metadata pointers must be in the slots that match their subdivisions of key -space. The leaves can be in any slot not occupied by a metadata pointer. It -is guaranteed that none of the leaves in a node will match a slot occupied by a -metadata pointer. If the metadata pointer is there, any leaf whose key matches -the metadata key prefix must be in the subtree that the metadata pointer points -to. - -In the above example list of index keys, node A will contain: - - ==== =============== ================== - SLOT CONTENT INDEX KEY (PREFIX) - ==== =============== ================== - 1 PTR TO NODE B 1* - any LEAF 9431809de993ba - any LEAF b4542910809cd - e PTR TO NODE F e* - any LEAF f3842239082 - ==== =============== ================== - -and node B: - - ==== =============== ================== - SLOT CONTENT INDEX KEY (PREFIX) - ==== =============== ================== - 3 PTR TO NODE C 13* - any LEAF 1458952489 - ==== =============== ================== - - -Shortcuts ---------- - -Shortcuts are metadata records that jump over a piece of keyspace. A shortcut -is a replacement for a series of single-occupancy nodes ascending through the -levels. Shortcuts exist to save memory and to speed up traversal. - -It is possible for the root of the tree to be a shortcut - say, for example, -the tree contains at least 17 nodes all with key prefix ``1111``. The -insertion algorithm will insert a shortcut to skip over the ``1111`` keyspace -in a single bound and get to the fourth level where these actually become -different. - - -Splitting And Collapsing Nodes ------------------------------- - -Each node has a maximum capacity of 16 leaves and metadata pointers. If the -insertion algorithm finds that it is trying to insert a 17th object into a -node, that node will be split such that at least two leaves that have a common -key segment at that level end up in a separate node rooted on that slot for -that common key segment. - -If the leaves in a full node and the leaf that is being inserted are -sufficiently similar, then a shortcut will be inserted into the tree. - -When the number of objects in the subtree rooted at a node falls to 16 or -fewer, then the subtree will be collapsed down to a single node - and this will -ripple towards the root if possible. - - -Non-Recursive Iteration ------------------------ - -Each node and shortcut contains a back pointer to its parent and the number of -slot in that parent that points to it. None-recursive iteration uses these to -proceed rootwards through the tree, going to the parent node, slot N + 1 to -make sure progress is made without the need for a stack. - -The backpointers, however, make simultaneous alteration and iteration tricky. - - -Simultaneous Alteration And Iteration -------------------------------------- - -There are a number of cases to consider: - -1. Simple insert/replace. This involves simply replacing a NULL or old - matching leaf pointer with the pointer to the new leaf after a barrier. - The metadata blocks don't change otherwise. An old leaf won't be freed - until after the RCU grace period. - -2. Simple delete. This involves just clearing an old matching leaf. The - metadata blocks don't change otherwise. The old leaf won't be freed until - after the RCU grace period. - -3. Insertion replacing part of a subtree that we haven't yet entered. This - may involve replacement of part of that subtree - but that won't affect - the iteration as we won't have reached the pointer to it yet and the - ancestry blocks are not replaced (the layout of those does not change). - -4. Insertion replacing nodes that we're actively processing. This isn't a - problem as we've passed the anchoring pointer and won't switch onto the - new layout until we follow the back pointers - at which point we've - already examined the leaves in the replaced node (we iterate over all the - leaves in a node before following any of its metadata pointers). - - We might, however, re-see some leaves that have been split out into a new - branch that's in a slot further along than we were at. - -5. Insertion replacing nodes that we're processing a dependent branch of. - This won't affect us until we follow the back pointers. Similar to (4). - -6. Deletion collapsing a branch under us. This doesn't affect us because the - back pointers will get us back to the parent of the new node before we - could see the new node. The entire collapsed subtree is thrown away - unchanged - and will still be rooted on the same slot, so we shouldn't - process it a second time as we'll go back to slot + 1. - -.. note:: - - Under some circumstances, we need to simultaneously change the parent - pointer and the parent slot pointer on a node (say, for example, we - inserted another node before it and moved it up a level). We cannot do - this without locking against a read - so we have to replace that node too. - - However, when we're changing a shortcut into a node this isn't a problem - as shortcuts only have one slot and so the parent slot number isn't used - when traversing backwards over one. This means that it's okay to change - the slot number first - provided suitable barriers are used to make sure - the parent slot number is read after the back pointer. - -Obsolete blocks and leaves are freed up after an RCU grace period has passed, -so as long as anyone doing walking or iteration holds the RCU read lock, the -old superstructure should not go away on them.
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@@ -349,20 +349,6 @@ config XARRAY_MULTI Support entries which occupy multiple consecutive indices in the XArray. -config ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY - bool - help - Generic associative array. Can be searched and iterated over whilst - it is being modified. It is also reasonably quick to search and - modify. The algorithms are non-recursive, and the trees are highly - capacious. - - See: - - Documentation/core-api/assoc_array.rst - - for more information. - config CLOSURES bool
lib/Makefile +0 -1
@@ -141,7 +141,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_HWEIGHT) += hweight.o obj-$(CONFIG_BTREE) += btree.o obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE) += interval_tree.o -obj-$(CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY) += assoc_array.o obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) += smp_processor_id.o obj-$(CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED) += list_debug.o obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS) += debugobjects.o
lib/assoc_array.c deleted +0 -1724
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Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
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