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openssh: Fix CVE-2026-106586

PATCH In review Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) 2 participants 9 messages Nov 5 – Nov 18

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-106586

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.6p1 backport for CVE-2026-106586. The fix is referenced in [1] and the advisory in [2].

The upstream test follow-ups in [3] and [4] update the existing authentication-option tests for the preserved restricted flag.

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/991f1f31dde2797416acaf4319dbebe764446c6f
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106586
[3] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/ded92bffa2e2f2db9b83245c5061812791bfa47f
[4] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/a30bafcbbd44dc4dc91916240c32ecabff899338

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106586_p1.patch  |  38 +++++++
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106586_p2.patch  | 100 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106586_p3.patch  |  37 +++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |   3 +
 4 files changed, 178 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106586_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106586_p2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106586_p3.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106586_p1.patch new file +38 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..398fe315cd
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 991f1f31dde2797416acaf4319dbebe764446c6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 00:33:44 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Propagate authorized_keys "resrict" keyword
+
+The "restrict" keyword was not pervasively being applied to TunnelForwarding
+connections (which are administratively disabled by default). This is a
+separate problem to the one fixed in openssh-10.5
+
+reported by several people; ok markus, deraadt
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8c36c31dc2bdbc0c432d1056496b2f1ce93198d1
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-106586
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/991f1f31dde2797416acaf4319dbebe764446c6f]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD RCS revision-only hunk and retained the
+  OpenSSH 9.6p1 revision identifier.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 991f1f31dde2797416acaf4319dbebe764446c6f)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ auth-options.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
+index c89b1ee..0f11269 100644
+--- a/auth-options.c
++++ b/auth-options.c
+@@ -606,6 +606,7 @@ sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary,
+ 	OPTFLAG_AND(no_require_user_presence);
+ 	/* Restrictive flags are logical-OR (i.e. must be set in either) */
+ 	OPTFLAG_OR(require_verify);
++	OPTFLAG_OR(restricted);
+ #undef OPTFLAG_AND
+ 
+ 	/* Earliest expiry time should win */
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106586_p2.patch new file +100 -0

100 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106586_p3.patch new file +37 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da8642ac24
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From a30bafcbbd44dc4dc91916240c32ecabff899338 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 04:56:12 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: simpler
+
+OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c7f30b865abd0b3e0e5514f861509c32e352a760
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-106586
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/a30bafcbbd44dc4dc91916240c32ecabff899338]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted the upstream tests.c OpenBSD RCS revision-only hunk and
+  retained the OpenSSH 9.6p1 revision identifier.
+
+(cherry picked from commit a30bafcbbd44dc4dc91916240c32ecabff899338)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c b/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c
+index f86423d..63f97ff 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c
+@@ -423,9 +423,10 @@ test_merge(void)
+ 	    rflag, var, val) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		PREPARE(keybase " " label, keyname, keywords); \
+-		expected = rflag ? default_authkey_restrict_opts() : \
+-		    (mostly_off ? sshauthopt_new() : default_authkey_opts()); \
++		expected = mostly_off ? \
++		    sshauthopt_new() : default_authkey_opts(); \
+ 		ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL); \
++		expected->restricted = rflag; \
+ 		expected->var = val; \
+ 		CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
+ 		TEST_DONE(); \
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +3 -0
index 04595e706f..4266f05dd4 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-60001.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-60002.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-60000.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-106586_p1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-106586_p2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-106586_p3.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73283.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73282.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73281.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-106585

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.6p1 backport for CVE-2026-106585. The fix is referenced in [1] and the advisory in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e0f85d83ccc15b1b218fa8a000fc29a2e3d2defd
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106585

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106585.patch     | 40 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106585.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106585.patch new file +40 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..32335237ba
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From e0f85d83ccc15b1b218fa8a000fc29a2e3d2defd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2026 22:51:43 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Check that compressed payloads don't inflate beyond
+ the
+
+maximum payload length
+
+From a report by Oleh Konko (1seal)
+
+OK djm@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0d3e7aa432777c28bfe23e5447ac117d6c151d9
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-106585
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e0f85d83ccc15b1b218fa8a000fc29a2e3d2defd]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD RCS revision-only hunk and retained the
+  OpenSSH 9.6p1 revision identifier.
+
+(cherry picked from commit e0f85d83ccc15b1b218fa8a000fc29a2e3d2defd)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ packet.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index aeab98c..e8852d3 100644
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
+@@ -800,6 +800,8 @@ uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
+ 			if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
+ 			    ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
+ 				return r;
++			if (sshbuf_len(out) >= PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
++				return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 			break;
+ 		case Z_BUF_ERROR:
+ 			/*
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index 4266f05dd4..1e00522d16 100644
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-106586_p1.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-106586_p2.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-106586_p3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-106585.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73283.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73282.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73281.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-106584

In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.6p1 backport for CVE-2026-106584. The fix is referenced in [1] and the advisory in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/aef20dfe30e68a469911a229b9117e7134766311
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106584

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106584.patch     | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106584.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106584.patch new file +39 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..69840fe880
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From aef20dfe30e68a469911a229b9117e7134766311 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 08:31:46 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Correct handling of DST when converting dates
+
+Timestamps conversion was ignoring Daylight Savings Time (DST) causing
+date conversions to be +/-1 hour under some circumstances.
+
+bz4004; from Khush Patel, ok deraadt
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd5eb2603c04d4b5072b0e593b137a98ef75b731
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-106584
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/aef20dfe30e68a469911a229b9117e7134766311]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD RCS revision-only hunk and retained the
+  OpenSSH 9.6p1 revision identifier.
+- Kept the 9.6p1 mktime error check; this version has no tm_wday
+  sentinel. The added tm_isdst assignment is unchanged.
+
+(cherry picked from commit aef20dfe30e68a469911a229b9117e7134766311)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ misc.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index cac246b..55906d4 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -2476,6 +2476,7 @@ parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp)
+ 		if ((tt = timegm(&tm)) < 0)
+ 			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 	} else {
++		tm.tm_isdst = -1;	/* mktime decides DST */
+ 		if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
+ 			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 	}
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index 1e00522d16..5fe975180e 100644
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-106586_p2.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-106586_p3.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-106585.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-106584.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73283.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73282.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73281.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-106583

In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.6p1 backport for CVE-2026-106583. The fix is referenced in [1] and the advisory in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/0c4c9a7b320bd7ff61c4a2dc345cb2e27e9663b2
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106583

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106583.patch     | 46 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106583.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106583.patch new file +46 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c813754d27
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 0c4c9a7b320bd7ff61c4a2dc345cb2e27e9663b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 06:03:40 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Further restrict the characters allowed in a
+ command-line
+
+supplied user name, disallowing '$' and '\'. Reported by SecBuddyF KeenLab
+Tencent (CodeBuddy Security).
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13671c178f492af63b5c1296f284818c7809ed9a
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-106583
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/0c4c9a7b320bd7ff61c4a2dc345cb2e27e9663b2]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Applied the username validation change to ssh.c:valid_ruser(), where
+  the equivalent validator resides in OpenSSH 9.6p1. Upstream changes
+  readconf.c:ssh_valid_ruser().
+- Omitted the upstream readconf.c OpenBSD RCS revision-only hunk.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0c4c9a7b320bd7ff61c4a2dc345cb2e27e9663b2)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ ssh.c | 5 +----
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 2d2837d..91f7109 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -631,14 +631,11 @@ valid_ruser(const char *s)
+ 	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+ 		if (iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
+ 			return 0;
+-		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
++		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}$\\", s[i]) != NULL)
+ 			return 0;
+ 		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
+ 		if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
+ 			return 0;
+-		/* Disallow \ in last position */
+-		if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
+-			return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	return 1;
+ }
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index 5fe975180e..ce60645b01 100644
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-106586_p3.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-106585.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-106584.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-106583.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73283.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73282.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73281.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-106582

In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.6p1 backport for CVE-2026-106582. The fix is referenced in [1] and the advisory in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1d5340fce24526719e32aebc4c721fc228182ace
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106582

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106582.patch     | 100 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |   1 +
 2 files changed, 101 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106582.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106582.patch new file +100 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a5c3882a78
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+From 1d5340fce24526719e32aebc4c721fc228182ace Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2026 04:38:09 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Disable LZ77 dictionary coder to avoid a potential
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+side-channel leak
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+A chosen-plaintext attack method exists which makes use of
+dictionary-based compression to recover secrets from one channel by
+interacting with the SSH session's shared compression dictionary through
+another channel.
+
+Attacker-controlled input can recognizably reflect into the total length
+of transmitted ciphertexts by virtue of LZ77 replacing repeated strings
+with back-references into the SSH session's encoder search buffer,
+which is shared across all channels. For this reason, the documentation
+already recommended against enabling compression for connections that
+share trusted and untrusted traffic.
+
+As an extra precaution, use only Huffman coding when compressing
+plaintexts, as this algorithm does not use a dictionary. But, this
+results in a reduction of compression effectiveness.
+
+Inspired by "Crossing the Streams: SSH Plaintext Recovery via a Common
+Compression Context in Multiplexed Channels." by Fabian Bäumer and
+Marcus Brinkmann, preprint https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.07709 (2026)
+
+OK djm@ dtucker@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 839e5e53ad76786d0e90bed530304e4e13acbba0
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-106582
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1d5340fce24526719e32aebc4c721fc228182ace]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD RCS revision-only hunk and retained the
+  OpenSSH 9.6p1 revision identifier.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 1d5340fce24526719e32aebc4c721fc228182ace)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ packet.c | 15 +++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index e8852d3..7f98cc2 100644
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
+@@ -691,14 +691,13 @@ ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+ static int
+-start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
++start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+-	if (level < 1 || level > 9)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level);
++	debug("Enabling compression.");
+ 	if (ssh->state->compression_out_started == 1)
+ 		deflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream);
+-	switch (deflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, level)) {
++	switch (deflateInit2(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream,
++	    Z_BEST_SPEED, Z_DEFLATED, 15, 8, Z_HUFFMAN_ONLY)) {
+ 	case Z_OK:
+ 		ssh->state->compression_out_started = 1;
+ 		break;
+@@ -826,7 +825,7 @@ uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
+ #else	/* WITH_ZLIB */
+ 
+ static int
+-start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
++start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+@@ -931,7 +930,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
+ 		if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) < 0)
+ 			return r;
+ 		if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
+-			if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
++			if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh)) != 0)
+ 				return r;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
+@@ -1039,7 +1038,7 @@ ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0)
+ 				return r;
+ 			if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
+-				if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
++				if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh)) != 0)
+ 					return r;
+ 			} else {
+ 				if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index ce60645b01..4078c2665c 100644
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-106585.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-106584.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-106583.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-106582.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73283.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73282.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73281.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/8 openssh: Ignore CVE-2026-106555

In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

The vulnerable GSSAPI implementation is compiled only when OpenSSH is built with Kerberos support. The default PACKAGECONFIG excludes kerberos and passes --without-kerberos5.

Set not-applicable-config only for builds without kerberos. Keep kerberos-enabled configurations marked unpatched. The upstream fix and advisory are referenced in [1] and [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/670510d1e190b0f4e47066f24498c04ada1da0f0
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106555

---
 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index 4078c2665c..dd49cdf977 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2008-3844] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to some distr
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-51767] = "upstream-wontfix: It was demonstrated on modified sshd and does not exist in upstream openssh https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3656#c1."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-3497] = "not-applicable-platform: Only affects GSSAPI Key Exchange patches used by some Linux distributions and does not exist in upstream openssh."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-59998] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'kerberos', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSSAPI/Kerberos support is disabled in the default OpenSSH configuration', d)}"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-106555] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'kerberos', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSSAPI/Kerberos support is not built without PACKAGECONFIG kerberos', d)}"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-55653] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to RHEL FIPS patches."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-55654] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to RHEL patches."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-55655] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to RHEL patches."
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/8 openssh: Ignore CVE-2026-106553

In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

The vulnerable GSSAPI implementation is compiled only when OpenSSH is built with Kerberos support. The default PACKAGECONFIG excludes kerberos and passes --without-kerberos5.

Set not-applicable-config only for builds without kerberos. Keep kerberos-enabled configurations marked unpatched. The upstream fix and advisory are referenced in [1] and [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/6f9cd19af05aa828d7778cfb047faaed1679e8b7
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106553

---
 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index dd49cdf977..54cb2628f1 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2008-3844] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to some distr
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-51767] = "upstream-wontfix: It was demonstrated on modified sshd and does not exist in upstream openssh https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3656#c1."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-3497] = "not-applicable-platform: Only affects GSSAPI Key Exchange patches used by some Linux distributions and does not exist in upstream openssh."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-59998] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'kerberos', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSSAPI/Kerberos support is disabled in the default OpenSSH configuration', d)}"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-106553] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'kerberos', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSSAPI/Kerberos support is not built without PACKAGECONFIG kerberos', d)}"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-106555] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'kerberos', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSSAPI/Kerberos support is not built without PACKAGECONFIG kerberos', d)}"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-55653] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to RHEL FIPS patches."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-55654] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to RHEL patches."
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#7 lore raw

Re: [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 7/8] openssh: Ignore CVE-2026-106553

Quoted 23 lines · On Thu Nov 5, 2026 at 6:31 AM CET, Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS…

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

The vulnerable GSSAPI implementation is compiled only when OpenSSH is built with Kerberos support. The default PACKAGECONFIG excludes kerberos and passes --without-kerberos5.

Set not-applicable-config only for builds without kerberos. Keep kerberos-enabled configurations marked unpatched. The upstream fix and advisory are referenced in [1] and [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/6f9cd19af05aa828d7778cfb047faaed1679e8b7
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106553

---
 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +0 -0
index dd49cdf977..54cb2628f1 100644

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb CVE_STATUS[CVE-2008-3844] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to some distr · line 75

Quoted 7 lines
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2008-3844] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to some distr
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-51767] = "upstream-wontfix: It was demonstrated on modified sshd and does not exist in upstream openssh https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3656#c1."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-3497] = "not-applicable-platform: Only affects GSSAPI Key Exchange patches used by some Linux distributions and does not exist in upstream openssh."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-59998] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'kerberos', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSSAPI/Kerberos support is disabled in the default OpenSSH configuration', d)}"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-106553] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'kerberos', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSSAPI/Kerberos support is not built without PACKAGECONFIG kerberos', d)}"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-106555] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'kerberos', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSSAPI/Kerberos support is not built without PACKAGECONFIG kerberos', d)}"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-55653] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to RHEL FIPS patches."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-55654] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to RHEL patches."

Hi Hetvi,

I discard this one (Ignore CVE-2026-106553), and the next one (Ignore CVE-2026-106553) because we already receive a fix few days before yours. So I'll go for the fix instead the ignore way, it will be more consistent with the fix you already sent for Wrynose.

However, the backport for Blacksail are still missing. Can you take a look so I can validate your scarthgap and wrynose series ?

Signature · 2 lines
Fabien Thomas
Smile
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-106552

In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.6p1 backport for CVE-2026-106552. The fix is referenced in [1] and the advisory in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/c07ea2180adebd6019a6ebdd89becb9d9f4b4897
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106552

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106552.patch     | 64 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106552.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-106552.patch new file +64 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3f54702383
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From c07ea2180adebd6019a6ebdd89becb9d9f4b4897 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2026 03:11:49 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: sftp: be stricter in accepting paths returned by
+ the
+
+server for SSH_FXP_REALPATH or SSH2_FXP_READDIR replies, as these can be used
+in some situations to decide the destination path for recursive transfers.
+
+Report and patch from Junghoon Cho
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ad357002a1b75c87113f01086a9f0c12c36082d8
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-106552
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/c07ea2180adebd6019a6ebdd89becb9d9f4b4897]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD RCS revision-only hunks and retained the
+  OpenSSH 9.6p1 revision identifiers.
+- Added the complete destination normalization block after basename();
+  9.6p1 lacks the existing special case for ".." replaced upstream.
+
+(cherry picked from commit c07ea2180adebd6019a6ebdd89becb9d9f4b4897)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ sftp-client.c |  3 ++-
+ sftp.c        | 10 ++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
+index 5cc8bb5..20d4e41 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.c
++++ b/sftp-client.c
+@@ -806,7 +806,8 @@ sftp_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,
+ 			 * These can be used to attack recursive ops
+ 			 * (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd')
+ 			 */
+-			if (strpbrk(filename, SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS) != NULL) {
++			if (*filename == '\0' ||
++			    strpbrk(filename, SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS) != NULL) {
+ 				error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" "
+ 				    "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path);
+ 			} else if (dir) {
+diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+index 487e539..a37c105 100644
+--- a/sftp.c
++++ b/sftp.c
+@@ -685,6 +685,16 @@ process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 
++		/*
++		 * Special handling for destinations of '..' and remote roots.
++		 * In particular, never select the local root as an implicit
++		 * destination for a remote root.
++		 */
++		if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0 ||
++		    (filename[0] != '\0' &&
++		    filename[strspn(filename, "/")] == '\0'))
++			filename = ".";
++
+ 		if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) {
+ 			if (local_is_dir(dst)) {
+ 				abs_dst = sftp_path_append(dst, filename);
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index 54cb2628f1..2056c2f3e8 100644
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-106584.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-106583.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-106582.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-106552.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73283.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73282.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73281.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6