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vhost/vsock: annotate lockless accesses to guest_cid

PATCH In review Nguyen Dinh Phi 3 participants 3 messages Nov 18 – Nov 19

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 vhost/vsock: annotate lockless accesses to guest_cid

vhost_vsock.guest_cid is written by vhost_vsock_set_cid() under vhost_vsock_mutex, but It is also read without that mutex in vhost_vsock_handle_tx_kick(), and vhost_vsock_get().

KCSAN will report data-race if we issue VHOST_VSOCK_SET_GUEST_CID ioctl while the device has TX traffic. For example:

write to 0xffff88810f1596ac of 4 bytes by task 7914 on cpu 1:

   vhost_vsock_dev_ioctl+0x25f/0x720
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc2/0x110
   x64_sys_call+0x299/0x20a0
   do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x510
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

read to 0xffff88810f1596ac of 4 bytes by task 7910 on cpu 3:

   vhost_vsock_handle_tx_kick+0x41b/0x740
   vhost_run_work_list+0x97/0xc0
   vhost_task_fn+0x98/0x1f0
   ret_from_fork+0x2e2/0x3c0
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

value changed: 0x0000004d -> 0x00000032

Both readers load the CID once and works correctly with either the old or the new value.

Mark the store with WRITE_ONCE() and the two lockless loads with READ_ONCE(), so KCSAN knows the race is intentional.

Fixes 433fc58e6bf2 ("VSOCK: Introduce vhost_vsock.ko")
---
 drivers/vhost/vsock.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/vhost/vsock.c +3 -3
index 88a310390eb0..f26c59013075 100644
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static struct vhost_vsock *vhost_vsock_get(u32 guest_cid, struct net *net)
 
 	hash_for_each_possible_rcu(vhost_vsock_hash, vsock, hash, guest_cid,
 				   lockdep_is_held(&vhost_vsock_mutex)) {
-		u32 other_cid = vsock->guest_cid;
+		u32 other_cid = READ_ONCE(vsock->guest_cid);
 
 		/* Skip instances that have no CID yet */
 		if (other_cid == 0)
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static void vhost_vsock_handle_tx_kick(struct vhost_work *work)
 		hdr = virtio_vsock_hdr(skb);
 
 		/* Only accept correctly addressed packets */
-		if (le64_to_cpu(hdr->src_cid) == vsock->guest_cid &&
+		if (le64_to_cpu(hdr->src_cid) == READ_ONCE(vsock->guest_cid) &&
 		    le64_to_cpu(hdr->dst_cid) ==
 		    vhost_transport_get_local_cid())
 			virtio_transport_recv_pkt(&vhost_transport, skb,
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static int vhost_vsock_set_cid(struct vhost_vsock *vsock, u64 guest_cid)
 	if (vsock->guest_cid)
 		hash_del_rcu(&vsock->hash);
 
-	vsock->guest_cid = guest_cid;
+	WRITE_ONCE(vsock->guest_cid, guest_cid);
 	hash_add_rcu(vhost_vsock_hash, &vsock->hash, vsock->guest_cid);
 	mutex_unlock(&vhost_vsock_mutex);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 21 lines · Nguyen Dinh Phi

vhost_vsock.guest_cid is written by vhost_vsock_set_cid() under vhost_vsock_mutex, but It is also read without that mutex in vhost_vsock_handle_tx_kick(), and vhost_vsock_get().

KCSAN will report data-race if we issue VHOST_VSOCK_SET_GUEST_CID ioctl while the device has TX traffic. For example:

write to 0xffff88810f1596ac of 4 bytes by task 7914 on cpu 1:

   vhost_vsock_dev_ioctl+0x25f/0x720
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc2/0x110
   x64_sys_call+0x299/0x20a0
   do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x510
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

read to 0xffff88810f1596ac of 4 bytes by task 7910 on cpu 3:

   vhost_vsock_handle_tx_kick+0x41b/0x740
   vhost_run_work_list+0x97/0xc0
   vhost_task_fn+0x98/0x1f0
   ret_from_fork+0x2e2/0x3c0
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Quoted 7 lines

value changed: 0x0000004d -> 0x00000032

Both readers load the CID once and works correctly with either the old or the new value.

Mark the store with WRITE_ONCE() and the two lockless loads with READ_ONCE(), so KCSAN knows the race is intentional.

You make it sounds like it is just KCSAN false positive. Is it?
if yes, this should be data_race. If no, document why.

Quoted 21 lines
Fixes 433fc58e6bf2 ("VSOCK: Introduce vhost_vsock.ko")
---
 drivers/vhost/vsock.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/vhost/vsock.c +1 -1
index 88a310390eb0..f26c59013075 100644
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static struct vhost_vsock *vhost_vsock_get(u32 guest_cid, struct net *net)
 
 	hash_for_each_possible_rcu(vhost_vsock_hash, vsock, hash, guest_cid,
 				   lockdep_is_held(&vhost_vsock_mutex)) {
-		u32 other_cid = vsock->guest_cid;
+		u32 other_cid = READ_ONCE(vsock->guest_cid);
 
 		/* Skip instances that have no CID yet */
 		if (other_cid == 0)

drivers/vhost/vsock.c static void vhost_vsock_handle_tx_kick(struct vhost_work *work) · line 578

Quoted 8 lines
drivers/vhost/vsock.c +1 -1
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static void vhost_vsock_handle_tx_kick(struct vhost_work *work)
 		hdr = virtio_vsock_hdr(skb);
 
 		/* Only accept correctly addressed packets */
-		if (le64_to_cpu(hdr->src_cid) == vsock->guest_cid &&
+		if (le64_to_cpu(hdr->src_cid) == READ_ONCE(vsock->guest_cid) &&
 		    le64_to_cpu(hdr->dst_cid) ==
 		    vhost_transport_get_local_cid())
 			virtio_transport_recv_pkt(&vhost_transport, skb,

Will prevent compiler from hoisting the reads out of the loops. Does it matter?

Quoted 11 lines
drivers/vhost/vsock.c +1 -1
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static int vhost_vsock_set_cid(struct vhost_vsock *vsock, u64 guest_cid)
 	if (vsock->guest_cid)
 		hash_del_rcu(&vsock->hash);
 
-	vsock->guest_cid = guest_cid;
+	WRITE_ONCE(vsock->guest_cid, guest_cid);
 	hash_add_rcu(vhost_vsock_hash, &vsock->hash, vsock->guest_cid);
 	mutex_unlock(&vhost_vsock_mutex);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
#2 lore raw
In reply to Nguyen Dinh Phi
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found no new issues in this patch, but noticed 1 related pre-existing issue it does not introduce: - [High] vhost/vsock: hlist_node reuse in…

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found no new issues in this patch, but noticed 1 related pre-existing issue it does not introduce:
- [High] vhost/vsock: hlist_node reuse in vhost_vsock_set_cid() breaks RCU readers [1]
--

commit acdb8244e7111ba9c993f9a479a6926d4b658392
Author: Nguyen Dinh Phi <[email protected]>

vhost/vsock: annotate lockless accesses to guest_cid

This commit annotates the write to vhost_vsock.guest_cid in vhost_vsock_set_cid() with WRITE_ONCE() and the lockless reads in vhost_vsock_get() and vhost_vsock_handle_tx_kick() with READ_ONCE() to avoid KCSAN data-race reports.

Quoted 4 lines
drivers/vhost/vsock.c +0 -0
index 88a310390eb0a..f26c590130759 100644

[ ... ]

drivers/vhost/vsock.c static int vhost_vsock_set_cid(struct vhost_vsock *vsock, u64 guest_cid) · line 864

Quoted 8 lines
drivers/vhost/vsock.c +1 -1
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static int vhost_vsock_set_cid(struct vhost_vsock *vsock, u64 guest_cid)
 	if (vsock->guest_cid)
 		hash_del_rcu(&vsock->hash);
 
-	vsock->guest_cid = guest_cid;
+	WRITE_ONCE(vsock->guest_cid, guest_cid);
 	hash_add_rcu(vhost_vsock_hash, &vsock->hash, vsock->guest_cid);
 	mutex_unlock(&vhost_vsock_mutex);

[Severity: High]
This problem wasn't introduced by this patch, but can reusing vsock->hash here without waiting for an RCU grace period break concurrent RCU readers [1]?

When VHOST_VSOCK_SET_GUEST_CID changes an existing CID, hash_del_rcu() unlinks vsock->hash from the old bucket and hash_add_rcu() immediately overwrites vsock->hash.next to insert it into the new bucket. A concurrent vhost_vsock_get() traversing the old bucket via hash_for_each_possible_rcu() can follow the updated next pointer into the wrong bucket, skipping the rest of the original chain (causing CID lookup failures and dropped packets) or looping indefinitely if the node is re-added to the same bucket.

[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/bug/linux-0431a358-6215-4016-8a71-f047effc16b0

Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1