arm64: return address signing
v2 cover arm64: return address signing
Hi,
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
This series is based on v5.4-rc8.
High-level changes since v1 [1] (detailed changes are listed in patches):
- Dropped patch "arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability" as pointed by Suzuki.
- Patch 4, 10, 12 and 14 are added newly added.
- Patch 12 adds support to block probe of authenticate ptrauth instructions.
- Patch 14 adds support for lkdtm to test ptrauth.
- In the last version if secondary cpus do have ptrauth and primary cpu do not then the secondary will silently disable ptrauth and keep running. This version creates panic in this case as suggested by Suzuki.
- Many suggestion from James implemented.
This series do not implement few things or have known limitations:
- kdump tool may need some rework to work with ptrauth.
- Generate/Get some randomness for ptrauth keys during kernel early booting.
Feedback welcome!
Thanks,
Amit Daniel
[1]: https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg761991.html
Amit Daniel Kachhap (7):
arm64: create macro to park cpu in an infinite loop
arm64: ptrauth: Add bootup/runtime flags for __cpu_setup
arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
arm64: __show_regs: strip PAC from lr in printk
arm64: suspend: restore the kernel ptrauth keys
arm64: kprobe: disable probe of ptrauth instruction
lkdtm: arm64: test kernel pointer authentication
Kristina Martsenko (6):
arm64: cpufeature: add pointer auth meta-capabilities
arm64: install user ptrauth keys at kernel exit time
arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
arm64: rename ptrauth key structures to be user-specific
arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys
arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
Mark Rutland (1):
arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 22 +++++++++- arch/arm64/Makefile | 6 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h | 17 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 4 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 +-- arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h | 13 +++--- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 57 +++++++++++-------------- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 3 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 10 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 16 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 30 +++++++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 6 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 47 +++++++++++++++------ arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c | 7 +--- arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 5 ++- arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 16 +++---- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 8 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 10 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c | 3 ++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 17 ++++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + 26 files changed, 345 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h
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2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v2 1/14 arm64: cpufeature: add pointer auth meta-capabilities
From: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
To enable pointer auth for the kernel, we're going to need to check for the presence of address auth and generic auth using alternative_if. We currently have two cpucaps for each, but alternative_if needs to check a single cpucap. So define meta-capabilities that are present when either of the current two capabilities is present.
Leave the existing four cpucaps in place, as they are still needed to check for mismatched systems where one CPU has the architected algorithm but another has the IMP DEF algorithm.
Note, the meta-capabilities were present before but were removed in commit a56005d32105 ("arm64: cpufeature: Reduce number of pointer auth CPU caps from 6 to 4") and commit 1e013d06120c ("arm64: cpufeature: Rework ptr auth hwcaps using multi_entry_cap_matches"), as they were not needed then. Note, unlike before, the current patch checks the cpucap values directly, instead of reading the CPU ID register value.
---
Changes since last version:
* Macro number.
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 4 +++- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 ++---- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +3 -1
@@ -54,7 +54,9 @@#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_1463225 44#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_TVM 45#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_PRFM 46 +#define ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH 47 +#define ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH 48 -#define ARM64_NCAPS 47 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 49#endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +2 -4
@@ -590,15 +590,13 @@ static inline bool system_supports_cnp(void)static inline bool system_supports_address_auth (void ) {return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) && - (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || -cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF )); +cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH ); }static inline bool system_supports_generic_auth (void ) {return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) && - (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || -cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF )); +cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH ); }static inline bool system_uses_irq_prio_masking (void )
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +24 -1
@@ -1248,6 +1248,20 @@ static void cpu_enable_address_auth(struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap)sysreg_clear_set (sctlr_el1,0 , SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB); } + +static bool has_address_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, +int __unused) +{ +return cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || +cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +} + +static bool has_generic_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, +int __unused) +{ +return cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || +cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +}#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI
@@ -1517,7 +1531,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCHITECTED, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, - .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_address_auth, }, { .desc = "Address authentication (IMP DEF algorithm)",
@@ -1528,6 +1541,11 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .matches = has_address_auth, .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_address_auth, }, {
@@ -1550,6 +1568,11 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .min_field_value = ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .matches = has_generic_auth, + },#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI {
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2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v2 2/14 arm64: install user ptrauth keys at kernel exit time
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
As we're going to enable pointer auth within the kernel and use a different APIAKey for the kernel itself, so move the user APIAKey switch to EL0 exception return.
The other 4 keys could remain switched during task switch, but are also moved to keep things consistent.
---
Changes since last version:
* Minor change in commit.
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 30 +-------------------- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 11 ++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c | 3 --- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 1 - 6 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h new file +45 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H +#define __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H + +#include <asm/alternative.h> +#include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/sysreg.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH + + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_USER + add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + b .Laddr_auth_skip_\@ +alternative_else_nop_endif + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APIA] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APIB] + msr_s SYS_APIBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APDA] + msr_s SYS_APDAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APDAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APDB] + msr_s SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 +.Laddr_auth_skip_\@: +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APGA] + msr_s SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 +alternative_else_nop_endif + .endm + +#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ + + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .endm + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ + +#endif /* __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +1 -29
@@ -43,26 +43,6 @@ static inline void ptrauth_keys_init(struct ptrauth_keys *keys)get_random_bytes (&keys->apga,sizeof (keys->apga)); } -#define __ptrauth_key_install (k, v) \ -do { \ - struct ptrauth_key __pki_v = (v); \ - write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.lo, SYS_ ## k ## KEYLO_EL1); \ - write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ -} while (0) - -static inline void ptrauth_keys_switch (struct ptrauth_keys *keys) -{ -if (system_supports_address_auth ()) { -__ptrauth_key_install (APIA , keys->apia); -__ptrauth_key_install (APIB , keys->apib); -__ptrauth_key_install (APDA , keys->apda); -__ptrauth_key_install (APDB , keys->apdb); - } - -if (system_supports_generic_auth ()) -__ptrauth_key_install (APGA , keys->apga); -} -extern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg);/*
@@ -78,20 +58,12 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr) }#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \ -do { \ - struct task_struct *__ptiu_tsk = (tsk); \ - ptrauth_keys_init(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ - ptrauth_keys_switch(&__ptiu_tsk->thread.keys_user); \ -} while (0) - -#define ptrauth_thread_switch (tsk) \ - ptrauth_keys_switch(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user) + ptrauth_keys_init(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)#define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr) (lr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) -#define ptrauth_thread_switch (tsk)#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +11 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ int main(void)#endif BLANK (); DEFINE(THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.cpu_context)); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH + DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user)); +#endif BLANK (); DEFINE(S_X0, offsetof(struct pt_regs, regs[0])); DEFINE(S_X2, offsetof(struct pt_regs, regs[2]));
@@ -127,5 +130,13 @@ int main(void)DEFINE (SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS , offsetof(struct sdei_registered_event , interrupted_regs));DEFINE (SDEI_EVENT_PRIORITY , offsetof(struct sdei_registered_event , priority));#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apia)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APIB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apib)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APDA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apda)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APDB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apdb)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APGA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apga)); +BLANK (); +#endif return 0 ; }
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +3 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/asm_pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/errno.h> #include <asm/esr.h>
@@ -341,6 +342,8 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif msr cntkctl_el1, x1 4: #endif + ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, x0, x1, x2 + apply_ssbd 0, x0, x1 .endif
arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c +0 -3
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)if (!arg) {ptrauth_keys_init (keys); -ptrauth_keys_switch (keys);return 0 ; }
@@ -41,7 +40,5 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)if (arg &PR_PAC_APGAKEY )get_random_bytes (&keys->apga,sizeof (keys->apga)); -ptrauth_keys_switch (keys); -return 0 ; }
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +0 -1
@@ -505,7 +505,6 @@ __notrace_funcgraph struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,contextidr_thread_switch (next);entry_task_switch (next);uao_thread_switch (next); -ptrauth_thread_switch (next);ssbs_thread_switch (next);/*
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2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v2 3/14 arm64: create macro to park cpu in an infinite loop
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapA macro early_park_cpu is added to park the faulted cpu in an infinite loop. Currently, this macro is substituted in two instances and is reused in the subsequent pointer authentication patch.
---
Changes since last:
* Added macro update_early_cpu_boot_status inside early_park_cpu.
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 25 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +13 -12
@@ -761,6 +761,17 @@ ENDPROC(__secondary_too_slow) .endm /* + * Macro to park the cpu in an infinite loop. + */ + .macro early_park_cpu status + update_early_cpu_boot_status \status | CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL, x1, x2 +.Lepc_\@: + wfe + wfi + b .Lepc_\@ + .endm + +/* * Enable the MMU. * * x0 = SCTLR_EL1 value for turning on the MMU.
@@ -808,24 +819,14 @@ ENTRY(__cpu_secondary_check52bitva) and x0, x0, #(0xf << ID_AA64MMFR2_LVA_SHIFT) cbnz x0, 2f - update_early_cpu_boot_status \ - CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL | CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA, x0, x1 -1: wfe - wfi - b 1b - + early_park_cpu CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA #endif 2: ret ENDPROC(__cpu_secondary_check52bitva) __no_granule_support: /* Indicate that this CPU can't boot and is stuck in the kernel */ - update_early_cpu_boot_status \ - CPU_STUCK_IN_KERNEL | CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN, x1, x2 -1: - wfe - wfi - b 1b + early_park_cpu CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN ENDPROC(__no_granule_support) #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
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2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v2 4/14 arm64: ptrauth: Add bootup/runtime flags for __cpu_setup
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis patch allows __cpu_setup to be invoked with one of these flags, ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY, ARM64_CPU_BOOT_LATE or ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME. This is required as some cpufeatures need different handling during different scenarios.
The input parameter in x0 is preserved till the end to be used inside this function.
There should be no functional change with this patch and is useful for the subsequent ptrauth patch which utilizes it. Some upcoming arm cpufeatures can also utilize these flags.
---
Changes since last version:
* This is a new patch and is added as suggested by James[1].
[1]: https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg763622.html
arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 ++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h +5 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA (UL(1) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT)#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN (UL(2) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT) +/* Options for __cpu_setup */ +#define ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY (1) +#define ARM64_CPU_BOOT_LATE (2) +#define ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME (3) +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__#include <asm/percpu.h>
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +2 -0
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ ENTRY(stext) * On return, the CPU will be ready for the MMU to be turned on and * the TCR will have been set. */ + mov x0, #ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY bl __cpu_setup // initialise processor b __primary_switch ENDPROC(stext)
@@ -712,6 +713,7 @@ secondary_startup: * Common entry point for secondary CPUs. */ bl __cpu_secondary_check52bitva + mov x0, #ARM64_CPU_BOOT_LATE bl __cpu_setup // initialise processor adrp x1, swapper_pg_dir bl __enable_mmu
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +2 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> +#include <asm/smp.h> .text /*
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ ENDPROC(__cpu_suspend_enter) .pushsection ".idmap.text", "awx" ENTRY(cpu_resume) bl el2_setup // if in EL2 drop to EL1 cleanly + mov x0, #ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME bl __cpu_setup /* enable the MMU early - so we can access sleep_save_stash by va */ adrp x1, swapper_pg_dir
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +15 -11
@@ -400,21 +400,25 @@ ENDPROC(idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings) /* * __cpu_setup * - * Initialise the processor for turning the MMU on. Return in x0 the - * value of the SCTLR_EL1 register. + * Initialise the processor for turning the MMU on. + * + * Input: + * x0 with a flag ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY/ARM64_CPU_BOOT_LATE/ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME. + * Output: + * Return in x0 the value of the SCTLR_EL1 register. */ .pushsection ".idmap.text", "awx" ENTRY(__cpu_setup) tlbi vmalle1 // Invalidate local TLB dsb nsh - mov x0, #3 << 20 - msr cpacr_el1, x0 // Enable FP/ASIMD - mov x0, #1 << 12 // Reset mdscr_el1 and disable - msr mdscr_el1, x0 // access to the DCC from EL0 + mov x1, #3 << 20 + msr cpacr_el1, x1 // Enable FP/ASIMD + mov x1, #1 << 12 // Reset mdscr_el1 and disable + msr mdscr_el1, x1 // access to the DCC from EL0 isb // Unmask debug exceptions now, enable_dbg // since this is per-cpu - reset_pmuserenr_el0 x0 // Disable PMU access from EL0 + reset_pmuserenr_el0 x1 // Disable PMU access from EL0 /* * Memory region attributes for LPAE: *
@@ -435,10 +439,6 @@ ENTRY(__cpu_setup) MAIR(0xbb, MT_NORMAL_WT) msr mair_el1, x5 /* - * Prepare SCTLR - */ - mov_q x0, SCTLR_EL1_SET - /* * Set/prepare TCR and TTBR. We use 512GB (39-bit) address range for * both user and kernel. */
@@ -474,5 +474,9 @@ ENTRY(__cpu_setup) 1: #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM */ msr tcr_el1, x10 + /* + * Prepare SCTLR + */ + mov_q x0, SCTLR_EL1_SET ret // return to head.S ENDPROC(__cpu_setup)
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2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v2 5/14 arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
When the kernel is compiled with pointer auth instructions, the boot CPU needs to start using address auth very early, so change the cpucap to account for this.
Pointer auth must be enabled before we call C functions, because it is not possible to enter a function with pointer auth disabled and exit it with pointer auth enabled. Note, mismatches between architected and IMPDEF algorithms will still be caught by the cpufeature framework (the separate *_ARCH and *_IMP_DEF cpucaps).
Note the change in behavior: if the boot CPU has address auth and a late CPU does not, then we park the late CPU very early in booting. Also, if the boot CPU does not have address auth and the late CPU has then system panic will occur little later from inside the C code. Until now we would have just disabled address auth in this case.
Leave generic authentication as a "system scope" cpucap for now, since initially the kernel will only use address authentication.
---
Changes since last version:
* Added a check __cpu_secondary_checkptrauth for secondary cores which do not have ptrauth. [James]
* Moved ptrauth setup inside __cpu_setup. [James]
* Now if secondary cpus do not have ptrauth and primary has then this will cause system panic. [Suzuki]
Link to above discussions: https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg761993.html
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 13 +++---------- arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 2 ++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +5 -0
@@ -1436,6 +1436,11 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH be enabled. However, KVM guest also require VHE mode and hence CONFIG_ARM64_VHE=y option to use this feature. + If the feature is present on the primary CPU but not a secondary CPU, + then the secondary CPU will be parked. Also, if the boot CPU does not + have address auth and the late CPU has then system panic will occur. + On such a system, this option should not be selected. + endmenu config ARM64_SVE
arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h +1 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_52_BIT_VA (UL(1) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT)#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN (UL(2) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT) +#define CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH (UL(4) << CPU_STUCK_REASON_SHIFT)/* Options for __cpu_setup */ #define ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY (1)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +3 -10
@@ -1243,12 +1243,6 @@ static void cpu_clear_disr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_RAS_EXTN */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH -static void cpu_enable_address_auth (struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap) -{ -sysreg_clear_set (sctlr_el1,0 , SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | - SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB); -} -static bool has_address_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,int __unused) {
@@ -1525,7 +1519,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc = "Address authentication (architected algorithm)", .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH, - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU, .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT,
@@ -1535,7 +1529,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc = "Address authentication (IMP DEF algorithm)", .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF, - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU, .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT,
@@ -1544,9 +1538,8 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { }, { .capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH, - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU, .matches = has_address_auth, - .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_address_auth, }, { .desc = "Generic authentication (architected algorithm)",
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +20 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/irqchip/arm-gic-v3.h> +#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/boot.h> #include <asm/ptrace.h>
@@ -713,6 +714,7 @@ secondary_startup: * Common entry point for secondary CPUs. */ bl __cpu_secondary_check52bitva + bl __cpu_secondary_checkptrauth mov x0, #ARM64_CPU_BOOT_LATE bl __cpu_setup // initialise processor adrp x1, swapper_pg_dir
@@ -831,6 +833,24 @@ __no_granule_support: early_park_cpu CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN ENDPROC(__no_granule_support) +ENTRY(__cpu_secondary_checkptrauth) +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH + /* Check if the CPU supports ptrauth */ + mrs x2, id_aa64isar1_el1 + ubfx x2, x2, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8 + cbnz x2, 1f +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + mov x3, 1 +alternative_else + mov x3, 0 +alternative_endif + cbz x3, 1f + /* Park the mismatched secondary CPU */ + early_park_cpu CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH +#endif +1: ret +ENDPROC(__cpu_secondary_checkptrauth) + #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE __relocate_kernel: /*
arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +2 -0
@@ -162,6 +162,8 @@ int __cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)pr_crit ("CPU%u: does not support 52-bit VAs\n" , cpu);if (status &CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_GRAN )pr_crit ("CPU%u: does not support %luK granule \n" , cpu,PAGE_SIZE /SZ_1K ); +if (status &CPU_STUCK_REASON_NO_PTRAUTH ) +pr_crit ("CPU%u: does not support pointer authentication\n" , cpu); cpus_stuck_in_kernel++;break ;case CPU_PANIC_KERNEL :
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +31 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/alternative.h> +#include <asm/smp.h> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_64K_PAGES #define TCR_TG_FLAGS TCR_TG0_64K | TCR_TG1_64K
@@ -474,9 +475,39 @@ ENTRY(__cpu_setup) 1: #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM */ msr tcr_el1, x10 + mov x1, x0 /* * Prepare SCTLR */ mov_q x0, SCTLR_EL1_SET + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH + /* No ptrauth setup for run time cpus */ + cmp x1, #ARM64_CPU_RUNTIME + b.eq 3f + + /* Check if the CPU supports ptrauth */ + mrs x2, id_aa64isar1_el1 + ubfx x2, x2, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8 + cbz x2, 3f + + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, xzr + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, xzr + + /* Just enable ptrauth for primary cpu */ + cmp x1, #ARM64_CPU_BOOT_PRIMARY + b.eq 2f + + /* if !system_supports_address_auth() then skip enable */ +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + b 3f +alternative_else_nop_endif + +2: /* Enable ptrauth instructions */ + ldr x2, =SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | \ + SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB + orr x0, x0, x2 +3: +#endif ret // return to head.S ENDPROC(__cpu_setup)
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v2 6/14 arm64: rename ptrauth key structures to be user-specific
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
We currently enable ptrauth for userspace, but do not use it within the kernel. We're going to enable it for the kernel, and will need to manage a separate set of ptrauth keys for the kernel.
We currently keep all 5 keys in struct ptrauth_keys. However, as the kernel will only need to use 1 key, it is a bit wasteful to allocate a whole ptrauth_keys struct for every thread.
Therefore, a subsequent patch will define a separate struct, with only 1 key, for the kernel. In preparation for that, rename the existing struct (and associated macros and functions) to reflect that they are specific to userspace.
---
Changes since last version:
* None
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 10 +++++----- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 6 +++--- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 10 +++++----- arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +5 -5
@@ -15,21 +15,21 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH b .Laddr_auth_skip_\@ alternative_else_nop_endif - ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APIA] + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIA] msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 - ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APIB] + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIB] msr_s SYS_APIBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 msr_s SYS_APIBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 - ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APDA] + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDA] msr_s SYS_APDAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 msr_s SYS_APDAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 - ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APDB] + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDB] msr_s SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 msr_s SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 .Laddr_auth_skip_\@: alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH - ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APGA] + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APGA] msr_s SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 msr_s SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 alternative_else_nop_endif
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +3 -3
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ struct ptrauth_key {* We give each process its own keys, which are shared by all threads. The keys * are inherited upon fork(), and reinitialised upon exec*(). */ -struct ptrauth_keys { +struct ptrauth_keys_user {struct ptrauth_key apia;struct ptrauth_key apib;struct ptrauth_key apda;
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct ptrauth_keys {struct ptrauth_key apga; }; -static inline void ptrauth_keys_init (struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ()) {get_random_bytes (&keys->apia,sizeof (keys->apia));
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr) }#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \ - ptrauth_keys_init(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user) + ptrauth_keys_init_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ struct thread_struct {unsigned long fault_code;/* ESR_EL1 value */ struct debug_info debug;/* debugging */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH -struct ptrauth_keys keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_user keys_user;#endif };
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +5 -5
@@ -131,11 +131,11 @@ int main(void)DEFINE (SDEI_EVENT_PRIORITY , offsetof(struct sdei_registered_event , priority));#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH -DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apia)); -DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APIB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apib)); -DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APDA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apda)); -DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APDB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apdb)); -DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APGA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apga)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apia)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apib)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apda)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apdb)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APGA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apga));BLANK ();#endif return 0 ;
arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c +2 -2
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg) { -struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &tsk->thread.keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &tsk->thread.keys_user;unsigned long addr_key_mask =PR_PAC_APIAKEY |PR_PAC_APIBKEY |PR_PAC_APDAKEY |PR_PAC_APDBKEY ;unsigned long key_mask = addr_key_mask |PR_PAC_APGAKEY ;
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)return -EINVAL ;if (!arg) { -ptrauth_keys_init (keys); +ptrauth_keys_init_user (keys);return 0 ; }
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +8 -8
@@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ static struct ptrauth_key pac_key_from_user(__uint128_t ukey) }static void pac_address_keys_to_user (struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys, -const struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +const struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) { ukeys->apiakey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apia); ukeys->apibkey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apib);
@@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ static void pac_address_keys_to_user(struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys, ukeys->apdbkey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apdb); } -static void pac_address_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys *keys, +static void pac_address_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys,const struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys) { keys->apia =pac_key_from_user (ukeys->apiakey);
@@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ static int pac_address_keys_get(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_address_keys user_keys;if (!system_supports_address_auth ())
@@ -1025,7 +1025,7 @@ static int pac_address_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_address_keys user_keys;int ret;
@@ -1043,12 +1043,12 @@ static int pac_address_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, }static void pac_generic_keys_to_user (struct user_pac_generic_keys *ukeys, -const struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +const struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) { ukeys->apgakey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apga); } -static void pac_generic_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys *keys, +static void pac_generic_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys,const struct user_pac_generic_keys *ukeys) { keys->apga =pac_key_from_user (ukeys->apgakey);
@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ static int pac_generic_keys_get(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_generic_keys user_keys;if (!system_supports_generic_auth ())
@@ -1076,7 +1076,7 @@ static int pac_generic_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_generic_keys user_keys;int ret;
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v2 06/14] arm64: rename ptrauth key structures to be user-specific
Quoted 11 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
We currently enable ptrauth for userspace, but do not use it within the kernel. We're going to enable it for the kernel, and will need to manage a separate set of ptrauth keys for the kernel.
We currently keep all 5 keys in struct
ptrauth_keys. However, as the kernel will only need to use 1 key, it is a bit wasteful to allocate a wholeptrauth_keysstruct for every thread.
Quoted 7 lines
Therefore, a subsequent patch will define a separate struct, with only 1 key, for the kernel. In preparation for that, rename the existing struct (and associated macros and functions) to reflect that they are specific to userspace.
Signed-off-by Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>
Could we combine this patch with #2 somehow? You are modifying lots of code that you just introduced there.
Quoted 204 lines
---
Changes since last version:
* Nonearch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 10 +++++----- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 6 +++--- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 10 +++++----- arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +5
-5@@ -15,21 +15,21 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH b .Laddr_auth_skip_\@ alternative_else_nop_endif - ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APIA] + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIA] msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 - ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APIB] + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIB] msr_s SYS_APIBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 msr_s SYS_APIBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 - ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APDA] + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDA] msr_s SYS_APDAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 msr_s SYS_APDAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 - ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APDB] + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDB] msr_s SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 msr_s SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 .Laddr_auth_skip_\@: alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH - ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APGA] + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APGA] msr_s SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 msr_s SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 alternative_else_nop_endifarch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +3
-3@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ struct ptrauth_key {* We give each process its own keys, which are shared by all threads. The keys * are inherited upon fork(), and reinitialised upon exec*(). */ -struct ptrauth_keys { +struct ptrauth_keys_user {struct ptrauth_key apia;struct ptrauth_key apib;struct ptrauth_key apda;@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct ptrauth_keys {struct ptrauth_key apga; }; -static inline void ptrauth_keys_init (struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ()) {get_random_bytes (&keys->apia,sizeof (keys->apia));@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr) }#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \ - ptrauth_keys_init(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user) + ptrauth_keys_init_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1
-1@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ struct thread_struct {unsigned long fault_code;/* ESR_EL1 value */ struct debug_info debug;/* debugging */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH -struct ptrauth_keys keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_user keys_user;#endif };arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +5
-5@@ -131,11 +131,11 @@ int main(void)DEFINE (SDEI_EVENT_PRIORITY , offsetof(struct sdei_registered_event , priority));#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH -DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apia)); -DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APIB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apib)); -DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APDA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apda)); -DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APDB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apdb)); -DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KEY_APGA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys , apga)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apia)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apib)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apda)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apdb)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APGA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apga));BLANK ();#endif return 0 ;arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c +2
-2@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg) { -struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &tsk->thread.keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &tsk->thread.keys_user;unsigned long addr_key_mask =PR_PAC_APIAKEY |PR_PAC_APIBKEY |PR_PAC_APDAKEY |PR_PAC_APDBKEY ;unsigned long key_mask = addr_key_mask |PR_PAC_APGAKEY ;@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)return -EINVAL ;if (!arg) { -ptrauth_keys_init (keys); +ptrauth_keys_init_user (keys);return 0 ; }arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +8
-9@@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ static struct ptrauth_key pac_key_from_user(__uint128_t ukey) }static void pac_address_keys_to_user (struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys, -const struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +const struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) { ukeys->apiakey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apia); ukeys->apibkey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apib);@@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ static void pac_address_keys_to_user(struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys, ukeys->apdbkey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apdb); } -static void pac_address_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys *keys, +static void pac_address_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys,const struct user_pac_address_keys *ukeys) { keys->apia =pac_key_from_user (ukeys->apiakey);@@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ static int pac_address_keys_get(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_address_keys user_keys;if (!system_supports_address_auth ())@@ -1025,7 +1025,7 @@ static int pac_address_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_address_keys user_keys;int ret;@@ -1043,12 +1043,12 @@ static int pac_address_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, }static void pac_generic_keys_to_user (struct user_pac_generic_keys *ukeys, -const struct ptrauth_keys *keys) +const struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) { ukeys->apgakey =pac_key_to_user (&keys->apga); } -static void pac_generic_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys *keys, +static void pac_generic_keys_from_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys,const struct user_pac_generic_keys *ukeys) { keys->apga =pac_key_from_user (ukeys->apgakey);@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ static int pac_generic_keys_get(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_generic_keys user_keys;if (!system_supports_generic_auth ())@@ -1076,7 +1076,7 @@ static int pac_generic_keys_set(struct task_struct *target, unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf) { - struct ptrauth_keys *keys = &target->thread.keys_user; + struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys = &target->thread.keys_user;struct user_pac_generic_keys user_keys;int ret; --
Quoted 2 lines
2.7.4
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v2 06/14] arm64: rename ptrauth key structures to be user-specific
Quoted 17 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 16 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
From: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
We currently enable ptrauth for userspace, but do not use it within the kernel. We're going to enable it for the kernel, and will need to manage a separate set of ptrauth keys for the kernel.
We currently keep all 5 keys in struct
ptrauth_keys. However, as the kernel will only need to use 1 key, it is a bit wasteful to allocate a wholeptrauth_keysstruct for every thread.Therefore, a subsequent patch will define a separate struct, with only 1 key, for the kernel. In preparation for that, rename the existing struct (and associated macros and functions) to reflect that they are specific to userspace.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>Could we combine this patch with #2 somehow? You are modifying lots of code that you just introduced there.
Yes sure.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
---
Changes since last version:
* None
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 10 +++++----- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 6 +++--- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 10 +++++----- arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
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PATCH v2 7/14 arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Set up keys to use pointer authentication within the kernel. The kernel will be compiled with APIAKey instructions, the other keys are currently unused. Each task is given its own APIAKey, which is initialized during fork. The key is changed during context switch and on kernel entry from EL0.
The keys for idle threads need to be set before calling any C functions, because it is not possible to enter and exit a function with different keys.
---
Changes since last version:
* Used "struct ptrauth_keys_kernel" instead of 2 unsigned longs. [James]
* Check secondary data validity for slow cpus. [James]
Link to above discussion: https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg763623.html
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 8 ++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 13 +++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +14 -0
@@ -35,11 +35,25 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH alternative_else_nop_endif .endm + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL + add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + isb +alternative_else_nop_endif + .endm + #else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 .endm + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .endm + #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +13 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ struct ptrauth_keys_user {struct ptrauth_key apga; }; +struct ptrauth_keys_kernel { +struct ptrauth_key apia; +}; +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ()) {
@@ -43,6 +47,12 @@ static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_user(struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys)get_random_bytes (&keys->apga,sizeof (keys->apga)); } +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel (struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) +{ +if (system_supports_address_auth ()) +get_random_bytes (&keys->apia,sizeof (keys->apia)); +} +extern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg);/*
@@ -59,11 +69,14 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \ ptrauth_keys_init_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user) +#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk) \ + ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)#define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr) (lr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) +#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk)#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -0
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ struct thread_struct {struct debug_info debug;/* debugging */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH struct ptrauth_keys_user keys_user; +struct ptrauth_keys_kernel keys_kernel;#endif };
arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h +4 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@#include <linux/threads.h> #include <linux/cpumask.h> #include <linux/thread_info.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY (int, cpu_number);
@@ -93,6 +94,9 @@ asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void);struct secondary_data {void *stack;struct task_struct *task; +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +struct ptrauth_keys_kernel ptrauth_key; +#endif long status; };
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +5 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ int main(void) DEFINE(THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.cpu_context));#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user)); + DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_kernel));#endif BLANK (); DEFINE(S_X0, offsetof(struct pt_regs, regs[0]));
@@ -90,6 +91,9 @@ int main(void)BLANK ();DEFINE (CPU_BOOT_STACK , offsetof(struct secondary_data , stack));DEFINE (CPU_BOOT_TASK , offsetof(struct secondary_data , task)); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH +DEFINE (CPU_BOOT_PTRAUTH_KEY , offsetof(struct secondary_data , ptrauth_key)); +#endif BLANK ();#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_ARM_HOST DEFINE(VCPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.ctxt));
@@ -136,6 +140,7 @@ int main(void)DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apda));DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apdb));DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APGA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apga)); +DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel , apia));BLANK ();#endif return 0 ;
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +3 -0
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ alternative_cb_end apply_ssbd 1, x22, x23 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, x20, x22, x23 .else add x21, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE get_current_task tsk
@@ -342,6 +343,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif msr cntkctl_el1, x1 4: #endif + /* No kernel C function calls after this as user keys are set. */ ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, x0, x1, x2 apply_ssbd 0, x0, x1
@@ -1158,6 +1160,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_switch_to) ldr lr, [x8] mov sp, x9 msr sp_el0, x1 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x8, x9, x10 ret ENDPROC(cpu_switch_to) NOKPROBE(cpu_switch_to)
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +2 -0
@@ -376,6 +376,8 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,*/ fpsimd_flush_task_state (p); +ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (p); +if (likely (!(p->flags &PF_KTHREAD ))) { *childregs = *current_pt_regs (); childregs->regs[0 ] =0 ;
arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +8 -0
@@ -110,6 +110,10 @@ int __cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)*/ secondary_data.task = idle; secondary_data.stack =task_stack_page (idle) +THREAD_SIZE ; +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.lo = idle->thread.keys_kernel.apia.lo; + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.hi = idle->thread.keys_kernel.apia.hi; +#endif update_cpu_boot_status (CPU_MMU_OFF );__flush_dcache_area (&secondary_data,sizeof (secondary_data));
@@ -136,6 +140,10 @@ int __cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle) secondary_data.task =NULL ; secondary_data.stack =NULL ; +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.lo =0 ; + secondary_data.ptrauth_key.apia.hi =0 ; +#endif __flush_dcache_area (&secondary_data,sizeof (secondary_data)); status =READ_ONCE (secondary_data.status);if (ret && status) {
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +13 -0
@@ -491,6 +491,11 @@ ENTRY(__cpu_setup) ubfx x2, x2, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8 cbz x2, 3f + /* + * TODO: The primary cpu keys are reset here and may be + * re-initialised with values passed from bootloader or + * some other way. + */ msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, xzr msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, xzr
@@ -503,6 +508,14 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH b 3f alternative_else_nop_endif + /* Install ptrauth key for secondary cpus */ + adr_l x2, secondary_data + ldr x3, [x2, #CPU_BOOT_TASK] // get secondary_data.task + cbz x3, 2f // check for slow booting cpus + ldp x3, x4, [x2, #CPU_BOOT_PTRAUTH_KEY] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, x3 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, x4 + 2: /* Enable ptrauth instructions */ ldr x2, =SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | \ SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB
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Re: [PATCH v2 07/14] arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys
Quoted 6 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +0
-0@@ -35,11 +35,25 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH alternative_else_nop_endif .endm
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH · line 47
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +10
-0+ .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL + add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + isb +alternative_else_nop_endif + .endm
Any reason you didn't put the first two insns in the alternative?
You could have re-used tmp1 instead of requiring tmp3, but at no point are we lacking tmp registers so it doesn't matter.
r~
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Re: [PATCH v2 07/14] arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys
Quoted 7 lines · Richard Henderson
Quoted 6 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +0
-0@@ -35,11 +35,25 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH alternative_else_nop_endif .endm
Quoted 12 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH · line 47
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +10
-0+ .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL + add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + isb +alternative_else_nop_endif + .endmAny reason you didn't put the first two insns in the alternative?
Yes these 2 instructions can be moved below. Thanks for the catch.
Quoted 7 lines
You could have re-used tmp1 instead of requiring tmp3, but at no point are we lacking tmp registers so it doesn't matter.
r~
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Re: [PATCH v2 07/14] arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys
Quoted 24 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 7 lines · Richard Henderson
Quoted 6 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +0
-0@@ -35,11 +35,25 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH alternative_else_nop_endif .endmQuoted 12 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH · line 47
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +10
-0+ .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL + add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + isb +alternative_else_nop_endif + .endmAny reason you didn't put the first two insns in the alternative?
Quoted 2 lines
Yes these 2 instructions can be moved below. Thanks for the catch.
Do you even need them? Isn't it possible to do
ldp \tmp1, \tmp2, [\tsk, #(THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL + PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA)]
? Or is the range for the offset insufficient?
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
You could have re-used tmp1 instead of requiring tmp3, but at no point are we lacking tmp registers so it doesn't matter.
I think we should fix it nonetheless.
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Re: [PATCH v2 07/14] arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys
Quoted 25 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 24 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 19 lines · Richard Henderson
Quoted 6 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +0
-0@@ -35,11 +35,25 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH alternative_else_nop_endif .endmarch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH · line 47
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +10
-0+ .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL + add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + isb +alternative_else_nop_endif + .endmAny reason you didn't put the first two insns in the alternative?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Yes these 2 instructions can be moved below. Thanks for the catch.
Do you even need them? Isn't it possible to do
ldp \tmp1, \tmp2, [\tsk, #(THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL +
PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA)]? Or is the range for the offset insufficient?
Yes the offset exceeds the maximum range so done this way.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
You could have re-used tmp1 instead of requiring tmp3, but at no point are we lacking tmp registers so it doesn't matter.
I think we should fix it nonetheless.
yes.
Quoted 1 line
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PATCH v2 8/14 arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis patch redefines __builtin_return_address to mask pac bits when Pointer Authentication is enabled. As __builtin_return_address is used mostly used to refer to the caller function symbol address so masking runtime generated pac bits will help to find the match.
This change fixes the utilities like cat /proc/vmallocinfo to now show the correct logs.
---
Change since last version:
* Comment modified.
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE + select HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +17 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H +#define __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) + +/* As TBI1 is disabled currently, so bits 63:56 also has PAC */ +#define __builtin_return_address (val) \ + (void *)((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(val) | \ + (GENMASK_ULL(63, 56) | GENMASK_ULL(54, VA_BITS))) +#endif + +#endif + +#endif /* __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H */
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Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
Quoted 44 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch redefines
__builtin_return_addressto mask pac bits when Pointer Authentication is enabled. As__builtin_return_addressis used mostly used to refer to the caller function symbol address so masking runtime generated pac bits will help to find the match.This change fixes the utilities like cat
/proc/vmallocinfoto now show the correct logs.Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Change since last version:
* Comment modified.arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.harch/arm64/Kconfig +1
-0@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE + select HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVEarch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +7
-0@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H +#define __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH )
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h line 17
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +10
-0+ +/* As TBI1 is disabled currently, so bits 63:56 also has PAC */ +#define __builtin_return_address (val) \ + (void *)((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(val) | \ + (GENMASK_ULL(63, 56) | GENMASK_ULL(54, VA_BITS))) +#endif + +#endif + +#endif /* __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H */
It seems to me like we are accumulating a lot of cruft for khwasan as well as PAC to convert address into their untagged format.
Are there are untagging helpers we can already reuse? If not, can we introduce something that can be shared between all these use cases?
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Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
Quoted 59 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 44 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch redefines
__builtin_return_addressto mask pac bits when Pointer Authentication is enabled. As__builtin_return_addressis used mostly used to refer to the caller function symbol address so masking runtime generated pac bits will help to find the match.This change fixes the utilities like cat
/proc/vmallocinfoto now show the correct logs.Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Change since last version:
* Comment modified.arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.harch/arm64/Kconfig +1
-0@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE + select HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVEarch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +7
-0@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H +#define __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH )arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h line 17
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +10
-0+ +/* As TBI1 is disabled currently, so bits 63:56 also has PAC */ +#define __builtin_return_address (val) \ + (void *)((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(val) | \ + (GENMASK_ULL(63, 56) | GENMASK_ULL(54, VA_BITS))) +#endif + +#endif + +#endif /* __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H */ It seems to me like we are accumulating a lot of cruft for khwasan as well as PAC to convert address into their untagged format.
Quoted 2 lines
Are there are untagging helpers we can already reuse? If not, can we introduce something that can be shared between all these use cases?
xpaci will strip the pac from an instruction pointer, but requires the instruction set to be enabled, so you'd have to fiddle with alternatives. You *could* force the use of lr as input/output and use xpaclri, which is a nop if the instruction set is not enabled.
Also, this definition of is not correct, because bit 55 needs to be propagated to all of the bits being masked out here, so that you get a large negative number for kernel space addresses.
r~
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Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
Quoted 64 lines · Richard Henderson
Quoted 59 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 44 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch redefines
__builtin_return_addressto mask pac bits when Pointer Authentication is enabled. As__builtin_return_addressis used mostly used to refer to the caller function symbol address so masking runtime generated pac bits will help to find the match.This change fixes the utilities like cat
/proc/vmallocinfoto now show the correct logs.Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Change since last version:
* Comment modified.arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.harch/arm64/Kconfig +1
-0@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE + select HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVEarch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +7
-0@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H +#define __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH )arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h line 17
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +10
-0+ +/* As TBI1 is disabled currently, so bits 63:56 also has PAC */ +#define __builtin_return_address (val) \ + (void *)((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(val) | \ + (GENMASK_ULL(63, 56) | GENMASK_ULL(54, VA_BITS))) +#endif + +#endif + +#endif /* __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H */ It seems to me like we are accumulating a lot of cruft for khwasan as well as PAC to convert address into their untagged format.
Quoted 2 lines
Are there are untagging helpers we can already reuse? If not, can we introduce something that can be shared between all these use cases?
Quoted 9 lines
xpaci will strip the pac from an instruction pointer, but requires the instruction set to be enabled, so you'd have to fiddle with alternatives. You *could* force the use of lr as input/output and use xpaclri, which is a nop if the instruction set is not enabled.
Also, this definition of is not correct, because bit 55 needs to be propagated to all of the bits being masked out here, so that you get a large negative number for kernel space addresses.
Indeed. Even though bit 55 is generally guaranteed to be set, it would be better to simply reuse ptrauth_strip_insn_pac() that you introduce in the next patch.
Also, please use __ASM_COMPILER_H as the header guard (which is more idiomatic), and drop the unnecessary 'ifndef __ASSEMBLY__'.
Finally, could you add a comment that this header is transitively included (via include/compiler_types.h) on the compiler command line, so it is guaranteed to be loaded by users of this macro, and so there is no risk of the wrong version being used.
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Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
Hi,
Quoted 71 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 69 lines · Richard Henderson
Quoted 59 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 44 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch redefines
__builtin_return_addressto mask pac bits when Pointer Authentication is enabled. As__builtin_return_addressis used mostly used to refer to the caller function symbol address so masking runtime generated pac bits will help to find the match.This change fixes the utilities like cat
/proc/vmallocinfoto now show the correct logs.Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Change since last version:
* Comment modified.arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)create mode 100644
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.harch/arm64/Kconfig +1
-0@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE + select HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVEarch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +7
-0@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H +#define __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH )arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h line 17
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +10
-0+ +/* As TBI1 is disabled currently, so bits 63:56 also has PAC */ +#define __builtin_return_address (val) \ + (void *)((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(val) | \ + (GENMASK_ULL(63, 56) | GENMASK_ULL(54, VA_BITS))) +#endif + +#endif + +#endif /* __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H */ It seems to me like we are accumulating a lot of cruft for khwasan as well as PAC to convert address into their untagged format.
Quoted 2 lines
Are there are untagging helpers we can already reuse? If not, can we introduce something that can be shared between all these use cases?
xpaci will strip the pac from an instruction pointer, but requires the instruction set to be enabled, so you'd have to fiddle with alternatives. You *could* force the use of lr as input/output and use xpaclri, which is a nop if the instruction set is not enabled.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Also, this definition of is not correct, because bit 55 needs to be propagated to all of the bits being masked out here, so that you get a large negative number for kernel space addresses.
Indeed. Even though bit 55 is generally guaranteed to be set, it would be better to simply reuse
ptrauth_strip_insn_pac()that you introduce in the next patch.
Earlier I tried re-using but it produces lot of header inclusion error. I will check if it can be fixed.
Quoted 3 lines
Also, please use
__ASM_COMPILER_Has the header guard (which is more idiomatic), and drop the unnecessary 'ifndef__ASSEMBLY__'.
Yes. sure.
Quoted 5 lines
Finally, could you add a comment that this header is transitively included (via
include/compiler_types.h) on the compiler command line, so it is guaranteed to be loaded by users of this macro, and so there is no risk of the wrong version being used.
Yes sure.
Quoted 1 line
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Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
In reply to Richard HendersonHi,
Quoted 60 lines · Richard Henderson
Quoted 59 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 44 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch redefines
__builtin_return_addressto mask pac bits when Pointer Authentication is enabled. As__builtin_return_addressis used mostly used to refer to the caller function symbol address so masking runtime generated pac bits will help to find the match.This change fixes the utilities like cat
/proc/vmallocinfoto now show the correct logs.Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Change since last version:
* Comment modified.arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)create mode 100644
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.harch/arm64/Kconfig +1
-0@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE + select HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVEarch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +7
-0@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H +#define __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH )arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h line 17
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +10
-0+ +/* As TBI1 is disabled currently, so bits 63:56 also has PAC */ +#define __builtin_return_address (val) \ + (void *)((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(val) | \ + (GENMASK_ULL(63, 56) | GENMASK_ULL(54, VA_BITS))) +#endif + +#endif + +#endif /* __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H */ It seems to me like we are accumulating a lot of cruft for khwasan as well as PAC to convert address into their untagged format.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Are there are untagging helpers we can already reuse? If not, can we introduce something that can be shared between all these use cases?
xpaci will strip the pac from an instruction pointer, but requires the instruction set to be enabled, so you'd have to fiddle with alternatives. You *could* force the use of lr as input/output and use xpaclri, which is a nop if the instruction set is not enabled.
xpaclri instruction seems easy to implement as including any header here "alternative.h" creates lot of header inclusion error. Thanks for the suggestion.
Quoted 4 lines
Also, this definition of is not correct, because bit 55 needs to be propagated to all of the bits being masked out here, so that you get a large negative number for kernel space addresses.
Yes agree.
Regards,
Amit D
Quoted 4 lines
r~
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Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelHi Ard,
Quoted 50 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 49 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch redefines
__builtin_return_addressto mask pac bits when Pointer Authentication is enabled. As__builtin_return_addressis used mostly used to refer to the caller function symbol address so masking runtime generated pac bits will help to find the match.This change fixes the utilities like cat
/proc/vmallocinfoto now show the correct logs.Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Change since last version:
* Comment modified.arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)create mode 100644
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.harch/arm64/Kconfig +1
-0@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE + select HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVEarch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +12
-0@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H +#define __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) + +/* As TBI1 is disabled currently, so bits 63:56 also has PAC */ +#define __builtin_return_address (val) \ + (void *)((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(val) | \ + (GENMASK_ULL(63, 56) | GENMASK_ULL(54, VA_BITS)))
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h line 17
Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h new file +5
-0+#endif + +#endif + +#endif /* __ASM_ARM_COMPILER_H */ It seems to me like we are accumulating a lot of cruft for khwasan as well as PAC to convert address into their untagged format.
ok
Quoted 3 lines
Are there are untagging helpers we can already reuse? If not, can we introduce something that can be shared between all these use cases?
I tried to include <asm/pointer_auth.h> here but it produced lot of header inclusion error as include/linux/compiler_types.h which includes it is a very sensitive header. I will check to add some kind of header or at least write proper commit logs.
Regards,
Amit D
Quoted 1 line
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PATCH v2 9/14 arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
When we enable pointer authentication in the kernel, LR values saved to the stack will have a PAC which we must strip in order to retrieve the real return address.
Strip PACs when unwinding the stack in order to account for this.
---
Changes since last version:
* Reposition ptrauth_strip_insn_pac. [James]
* Added more comments for stripping PAC at EL1. [James]
Link to above discussion: https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg763624.html
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 16 +++++++++++----- arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +11 -5
@@ -56,15 +56,21 @@ static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys)extern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg);/* -* The EL0 pointer bits used by a pointer authentication code. -* This is dependent on TBI0 being enabled, or bits 63:56 would also apply. +* The EL0/EL1 pointer bits used by a pointer authentication code. +* This is dependent on TBI0/TBI1 being enabled, or bits 63:56 would also apply. */ -#define ptrauth_user_pac_mask () GENMASK(54, vabits_actual) +#define ptrauth_user_pac_mask () GENMASK_ULL(54, vabits_actual) +/* As TBI1 is disabled currently, so bits 63:56 also has PAC */ +#define ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask () \ + (GENMASK_ULL(63, 56) | GENMASK_ULL(54, VA_BITS)) -/* Only valid for EL0 TTBR0 instruction pointers */ +/* Valid for EL0 TTBR0 and EL1 TTBR1 instruction pointers */ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (unsigned long ptr) { -return ptr & ~ptrauth_user_pac_mask (); +if (ptr &BIT_ULL (55 )) +return ptr |ptrauth_kernel_pac_mask (); +else +return ptr & ~ptrauth_user_pac_mask (); }#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c +3 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/irq.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/stack_pointer.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
@@ -101,6 +102,8 @@ int notrace unwind_frame(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stackframe *frame) }#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER */ + frame->pc =ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (frame->pc); +/* * Frames created upon entry from EL0 have NULL FP and PC values, so * don't bother reporting these. Frames created by __noreturn functions
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PATCH v2 10/14 arm64: __show_regs: strip PAC from lr in printk
In reply to Amit Daniel Kachhaplr is printed with %pS which will try to find an entry in kallsyms. After enabling pointer authentication, this match will fail due to PAC present in the lr.
Strip PAC from the lr to display the correct symbol name.
---
Change since last version:
* New patch
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +1 -1
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)if (!user_mode (regs)) {printk ("pc : %pS\n" , (void *)regs->pc); -printk ("lr : %pS\n" , (void *)lr); +printk ("lr : %pS\n" , (void *)ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr)); }else {printk ("pc : %016llx\n" , regs->pc);printk ("lr : %016llx\n" , lr);
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PATCH v2 11/14 arm64: suspend: restore the kernel ptrauth keys
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis patch restores the kernel keys from current task during cpu resume after the mmu is turned on and ptrauth is enabled.
---
Change since last version:
* None
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +6 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> +#include <asm/asm_pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/smp.h>
@@ -139,6 +140,11 @@ ENTRY(_cpu_resume) bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH + get_current_task x1 + ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x2, x3, x4 +#endif + ldp x19, x20, [x29, #16] ldp x21, x22, [x29, #32] ldp x23, x24, [x29, #48]
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PATCH v2 12/14 arm64: kprobe: disable probe of ptrauth instruction
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis patch disables the probing of authenticate ptrauth instruction which falls under the hint instructions region. This is done to disallow probe of instruction which may lead to ptrauth faults.
The corresponding append pac ptrauth instruction is not disabled as they are typically the first instruction in the function so disabling them will be disabling the function probe itself. Also, appending pac do not cause any exception in itself.
---
Change since last version:
* New patch
arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h | 13 +++++++------ arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h +7 -6
@@ -40,12 +40,13 @@ enum aarch64_insn_encoding_class { };enum aarch64_insn_hint_op { -AARCH64_INSN_HINT_NOP =0x0 <<5 , -AARCH64_INSN_HINT_YIELD =0x1 <<5 , -AARCH64_INSN_HINT_WFE =0x2 <<5 , -AARCH64_INSN_HINT_WFI =0x3 <<5 , -AARCH64_INSN_HINT_SEV =0x4 <<5 , -AARCH64_INSN_HINT_SEVL =0x5 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_NOP =0x0 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_YIELD =0x1 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_WFE =0x2 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_WFI =0x3 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_SEV =0x4 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_SEVL =0x5 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_AUTIASP = (0x3 <<8 ) | (0x5 <<5 ), };enum aarch64_insn_imm_type {
arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c +1 -0
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ bool __kprobes aarch64_insn_is_nop(u32 insn)case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_WFI :case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_SEV :case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_SEVL : +case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_AUTIASP :return false;default :return true;
arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c +1 -1
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static bool __kprobes aarch64_insn_is_steppable(u32 insn) != AARCH64_INSN_SPCLREG_DAIF;/* -* The HINT instruction is is problematic when single-stepping, +* The HINT instruction is problematic when single-stepping, * except for the NOP case. */ if (aarch64_insn_is_hint (insn))
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PATCH v2 13/14 arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapFrom: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Compile all functions with two ptrauth instructions: PACIASP in the prologue to sign the return address, and AUTIASP in the epilogue to authenticate the return address (from the stack). If authentication fails, the return will cause an instruction abort to be taken, followed by an oops and killing the task.
This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming. As ptrauth protects the return address, it can also serve as a replacement for CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR, although note that it does not protect other parts of the stack.
The new instructions are in the HINT encoding space, so on a system without ptrauth they execute as NOPs.
CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH now not only enables ptrauth for userspace and KVM guests, but also automatically builds the kernel with ptrauth instructions if the compiler supports it. If there is no compiler support, we do not warn that the kernel was built without ptrauth instructions.
GCC 7 and 8 support the -msign-return-address option, while GCC 9 deprecates that option and replaces it with -mbranch-protection. Support both options.
---
Change since last version:
* Comments for different behaviour while booting secondary cores.
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 16 +++++++++++++++- arch/arm64/Makefile | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +15 -1
@@ -1427,11 +1427,17 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH and other attacks. This option enables these instructions at EL0 (i.e. for userspace). - Choosing this option will cause the kernel to initialise secret keys for each process at exec() time, with these keys being context-switched along with the process. + If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or + -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option + will also cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address + protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to + support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be + disabled with minimal loss of protection. + The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it be enabled. However, KVM guest also require VHE mode and hence
@@ -1442,6 +1448,14 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH have address auth and the late CPU has then system panic will occur. On such a system, this option should not be selected. +config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET + # GCC 9 or later + def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf) + +config CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS + # GCC 7, 8 + def_bool $(cc-option,-msign-return-address=all) + endmenu config ARM64_SVE
arch/arm64/Makefile +6 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,12 @@ stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 include/generated/asm-offsets.h)) endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) +pac-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all +pac-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(pac-flags-y) +endif + ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN), y) KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -mbig-endian CHECKFLAGS += -D__AARCH64EB__
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Re: [PATCH v2 13/14] arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
arch/arm64/Kconfig config ARM64_PTR_AUTH · line 1453
Quoted 3 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/Kconfig +3
-0+config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET + # GCC 9 or later + def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf)
clang also supports this option, as of clang-8 I think.
arch/arm64/Makefile stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 · line 79
Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/Makefile +5
-0+ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) +pac-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all +pac-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(pac-flags-y) +endif
This is going to be a bit annoying with BTI as we need to set -mbranch-protection=bti too. This means we end up with type bti+pac-ret+leaf which is annoying to arrange. There is the convenient branch protection type standard which does enable both in one option but that only enables non-leaf pac-ret so you need to explicitly spell out pac-ret so you can turn on leaf as well. I'm not sure I can think of anything much better than adding another case for BTI at the top so we end up with something along the lines of:
ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_BTI_KERNEL),y) branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_BTI) := -mbranch-protection=bti+pac-ret+leaf else ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf endifKBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y)
with a separate section for the signed return address bit. It would be helpful to avoid the immediate refactoring when adding BTI by splitting things up with a more generic name.
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Re: [PATCH v2 13/14] arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
Hi Mark,
Quoted 7 lines · Mark Brown
arch/arm64/Kconfig config ARM64_PTR_AUTH · line 1453
Quoted 3 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/Kconfig +3
-0+config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET + # GCC 9 or later + def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf)clang also supports this option, as of clang-8 I think.
ok. I will test and update the comment here.
Quoted 15 lines
arch/arm64/Makefile stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 · line 79
Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm64/Makefile +5
-0+ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) +pac-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all +pac-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(pac-flags-y) +endifThis is going to be a bit annoying with BTI as we need to set -mbranch-protection=bti too. This means we end up with type bti+pac-ret+leaf which is annoying to arrange. There is the convenient branch protection type standard which does enable both in one option but that only enables non-leaf pac-ret so you need to explicitly spell out pac-ret so you can turn on leaf as well. I'm not sure I can think of anything much better than adding another case for BTI at the top so we end up with something along the lines of:
Yes. The reason for keeping pac-ret+leaf is to cover all functions in the earlier offline discussions. As you pointed out I can add CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET_LEAF config name to make it more meaningful
Quoted 11 lines
ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_BTI_KERNEL),y) branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_BTI) := -mbranch-protection=bti+pac-ret+leaf else ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf endif
KBUILD_CFLAGS+= $(branch-prot-flags-y)with a separate section for the signed return address bit. It would be helpful to avoid the immediate refactoring when adding BTI by splitting things up with a more generic name.
I agree with your concern for separate section when BTI support is added. I will do it in my next iteration.
//Amit
Quoted 1 line
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Re: [PATCH v2 13/14] arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
In reply to Amit Daniel Kachhaparch/arm64/Kconfig config ARM64_PTR_AUTH · line 1453
Quoted 3 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
arch/arm64/Kconfig +3
-0+config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET + # GCC 9 or later + def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf)
This breaks the build for me with CC=clang-9:
CC arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/vgettimeofday.o/tmp/vgettimeofday-1a520b.s: Assembler messages:/tmp/vgettimeofday-1a520b.s:25: Error: selected processor does not support paciasp' /tmp/vgettimeofday-1a520b.s:26: Error: unknown pseudo-op: .cfi_negate_ra_state' /tmp/vgettimeofday-1a520b.s:120: Error: selected processor does not support `autiasp'
(and various other errors with the assembler not understanding stuff). This happens because clang is using the system assembler (that from Debian stable in my case, 2.31.1) and it requires additional options to enable newer instructions. We need to pass -mcpu=all or similar to the assembler (eg, with -Wa,-mcpu=all in CC). This'd be fine if the cc-option check detected the assembler issues but sadly it doesn't get that far.
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PATCH v2 14/14 lkdtm: arm64: test kernel pointer authentication
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis test is specific for arm64. When in-kernel Pointer Authentication config is enabled, the return address stored in the stack is signed. This feature helps in ROP kind of attack. If the matching signature is corrupted then this will fail in authentication and lead to abort.
e.g.
echo CORRUPT_PAC > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
[ 13.118166] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_PAC [ 13.118298] lkdtm: Clearing PAC from the return address [ 13.118466] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address bfff8000108648ec [ 13.118626] Mem abort info: [ 13.118666] ESR = 0x86000004 [ 13.118866] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 13.118966] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 13.119117] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
---
Change since last version:
* New patch
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +17 -0
@@ -337,3 +337,20 @@ void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP(void)pr_err ("FAIL: this test is x86_64-only\n" );#endif } + +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC (void ) +{ +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) +u64 ret; + +pr_info ("Clearing PAC from the return address\n" ); +/* +* __builtin_return_address masks the PAC bits of return +* address, so set the same again. +*/ + ret = (u64 )__builtin_return_address (0 ); + asmvolatile ("str %0, [sp, 8]" : :"r" (ret) :"memory" ); +#else +pr_err ("FAIL: For arm64 pointer authentication capable systems only\n" ); +#endif +}
drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c +1 -0
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {CRASHTYPE (STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING ),CRASHTYPE (STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING ),CRASHTYPE (UNSET_SMEP ), +CRASHTYPE (CORRUPT_PAC ),CRASHTYPE (UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE ),CRASHTYPE (OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION ), CRASHTYPE(WRITE_AFTER_FREE),
drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h +1 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void);void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING (void );void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING (void );void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP (void ); +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC (void );/* lkdtm_heap.c */ void __init lkdtm_heap_init (void );
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Re: [PATCH v2 14/14] lkdtm: arm64: test kernel pointer authentication
Quoted 40 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This test is specific for arm64. When in-kernel Pointer Authentication config is enabled, the return address stored in the stack is signed. This feature helps in ROP kind of attack. If the matching signature is corrupted then this will fail in authentication and lead to abort.
e.g.
echoCORRUPT_PAC>/sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT[ 13.118166] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_PAC [ 13.118298] lkdtm: Clearing PAC from the return address [ 13.118466] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address bfff8000108648ec [ 13.118626] Mem abort info: [ 13.118666] ESR = 0x86000004 [ 13.118866] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 13.118966] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 13.119117] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Change since last version:
* New patchdrivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+)drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +3
-0@@ -337,3 +337,20 @@ void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP(void)pr_err ("FAIL: this test is x86_64-only\n" );#endif } + +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC (void ) +{
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP(void) · line 352
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +10
-0+#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) +u64 ret; + +pr_info ("Clearing PAC from the return address\n" ); +/* +* __builtin_return_address masks the PAC bits of return +* address, so set the same again. +*/ + ret = (u64 )__builtin_return_address (0 ); + asmvolatile ("str %0, [sp, 8]" : :"r" (ret) :"memory" );
This looks a bit fragile to me. You are making assumptions about the location of the return address in the stack frame which are not guaranteed to hold.
Couldn't you do this test simply by changing the key?
Quoted 29 lines
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +4
-0+#else +pr_err ("FAIL: For arm64 pointer authentication capable systems only\n" ); +#endif +}drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c +1
-0@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {CRASHTYPE (STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING ),CRASHTYPE (STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING ),CRASHTYPE (UNSET_SMEP ), +CRASHTYPE (CORRUPT_PAC ),CRASHTYPE (UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE ),CRASHTYPE (OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION ), CRASHTYPE(WRITE_AFTER_FREE),drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h +1
-1@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void);void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING (void );void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING (void );void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP (void ); +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC (void );/* lkdtm_heap.c */ void __init lkdtm_heap_init (void ); --
Quoted 2 lines
2.7.4
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Re: [PATCH v2 14/14] lkdtm: arm64: test kernel pointer authentication
Quoted 47 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 46 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This test is specific for arm64. When in-kernel Pointer Authentication config is enabled, the return address stored in the stack is signed. This feature helps in ROP kind of attack. If the matching signature is corrupted then this will fail in authentication and lead to abort.
e.g.
echoCORRUPT_PAC>/sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT[ 13.118166] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_PAC [ 13.118298] lkdtm: Clearing PAC from the return address [ 13.118466] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address bfff8000108648ec [ 13.118626] Mem abort info: [ 13.118666] ESR = 0x86000004 [ 13.118866] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 13.118966] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 13.119117] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Change since last version:
* New patchdrivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+)drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +9
-0@@ -337,3 +337,20 @@ void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP(void)pr_err ("FAIL: this test is x86_64-only\n" );#endif } + +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC (void ) +{ +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) +u64 ret; + +pr_info ("Clearing PAC from the return address\n" ); +/* +* __builtin_return_address masks the PAC bits of return
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP(void) · line 352
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +4
-0+* address, so set the same again. +*/ + ret = (u64 )__builtin_return_address (0 ); + asmvolatile ("str %0, [sp, 8]" : :"r" (ret) :"memory" );This looks a bit fragile to me. You are making assumptions about the location of the return address in the stack frame which are not guaranteed to hold.
Indeed.
Quoted 1 line
Couldn't you do this test simply by changing the key?
That, at least, means you don't have to know the stack frame layout. However, there's a chance (1/32767, I think, for the 48-bit vma case w/o TBI) that changing the key will result in the same hash.
Even when the stack frame happens to be layed out as Amit guesses, the result is akin to changing the key, such that hash(key, salt, ptr) == 0.
While testing this in qemu, I iterate until I find a <key, salt, ptr> tuple that definitely produces a different hash. Usually this loop iterates just once, but the occasional failures that I got without iterating were annoying (with TBI enabled in userspace, the chance drops to 1/127, so much more frequent).
r~
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Re: [PATCH v2 14/14] lkdtm: arm64: test kernel pointer authentication
Quoted 65 lines · Richard Henderson
Quoted 47 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 46 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This test is specific for arm64. When in-kernel Pointer Authentication config is enabled, the return address stored in the stack is signed. This feature helps in ROP kind of attack. If the matching signature is corrupted then this will fail in authentication and lead to abort.
e.g.
echoCORRUPT_PAC>/sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT[ 13.118166] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_PAC [ 13.118298] lkdtm: Clearing PAC from the return address [ 13.118466] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address bfff8000108648ec [ 13.118626] Mem abort info: [ 13.118666] ESR = 0x86000004 [ 13.118866] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 13.118966] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 13.119117] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Change since last version:
* New patchdrivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+)drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +9
-0@@ -337,3 +337,20 @@ void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP(void)pr_err ("FAIL: this test is x86_64-only\n" );#endif } + +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC (void ) +{ +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) +u64 ret; + +pr_info ("Clearing PAC from the return address\n" ); +/* +* __builtin_return_address masks the PAC bits of return Quoted 8 lines
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP(void) · line 352
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +4
-0+* address, so set the same again. +*/ + ret = (u64 )__builtin_return_address (0 ); + asmvolatile ("str %0, [sp, 8]" : :"r" (ret) :"memory" );This looks a bit fragile to me. You are making assumptions about the location of the return address in the stack frame which are not guaranteed to hold.
Indeed.
Quoted 1 line
Couldn't you do this test simply by changing the key?
That, at least, means you don't have to know the stack frame layout. However, there's a chance (1/32767, I think, for the 48-bit vma case w/o TBI) that changing the key will result in the same hash.
Quoted 7 lines
Even when the stack frame happens to be layed out as Amit guesses, the result is akin to changing the key, such that
hash(key, salt, ptr)== 0.While testing this in qemu, I iterate until I find a <key, salt, ptr> tuple that definitely produces a different hash. Usually this loop iterates just once, but the occasional failures that I got without iterating were annoying (with TBI enabled in userspace, the chance drops to 1/127, so much more frequent).
Nice suggestion. I will check doing it this way in the next iteration.
Quoted 4 lines
r~
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Re: [PATCH v2 14/14] lkdtm: arm64: test kernel pointer authentication
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelHi,
Quoted 47 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 46 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This test is specific for arm64. When in-kernel Pointer Authentication config is enabled, the return address stored in the stack is signed. This feature helps in ROP kind of attack. If the matching signature is corrupted then this will fail in authentication and lead to abort.
e.g.
echoCORRUPT_PAC>/sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT[ 13.118166] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_PAC [ 13.118298] lkdtm: Clearing PAC from the return address [ 13.118466] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address bfff8000108648ec [ 13.118626] Mem abort info: [ 13.118666] ESR = 0x86000004 [ 13.118866] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 13.118966] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 13.119117] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
Change since last version:
* New patchdrivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+)drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +9
-0@@ -337,3 +337,20 @@ void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP(void)pr_err ("FAIL: this test is x86_64-only\n" );#endif } + +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC (void ) +{ +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ) +u64 ret; + +pr_info ("Clearing PAC from the return address\n" ); +/* +* __builtin_return_address masks the PAC bits of return
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP(void) · line 352
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +4
-0+* address, so set the same again. +*/ + ret = (u64 )__builtin_return_address (0 ); + asmvolatile ("str %0, [sp, 8]" : :"r" (ret) :"memory" );This looks a bit fragile to me. You are making assumptions about the location of the return address in the stack frame which are not guaranteed to hold.
Yes agreed.
Quoted 2 lines
Couldn't you do this test simply by changing the key?
Yes it should be possible. I will update it in my next iteration.
Regards,
Amit D
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 27 lines
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +4
-0+#else +pr_err ("FAIL: For arm64 pointer authentication capable systems only\n" ); +#endif +}drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c +1
-0@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {CRASHTYPE (STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING ),CRASHTYPE (STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING ),CRASHTYPE (UNSET_SMEP ), +CRASHTYPE (CORRUPT_PAC ),CRASHTYPE (UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE ),CRASHTYPE (OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION ), CRASHTYPE(WRITE_AFTER_FREE),drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h +1
-0@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void);void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING (void );void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING (void );void lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP (void ); +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC (void );
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h +0
-1/* lkdtm_heap.c */ void __init lkdtm_heap_init (void ); --2.7.4
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Quoted 21 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
Hi,
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
This series is based on v5.4-rc8.
High-level changes since v1 [1] (detailed changes are listed in patches):
- Dropped patch "arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability" as pointed by Suzuki.
- Patch 4, 10, 12 and 14 are added newly added.
- Patch 12 adds support to block probe of authenticate ptrauth instructions.
- Patch 14 adds support for lkdtm to test ptrauth.
- In the last version if secondary cpus do have ptrauth and primary cpu do not then the secondary will silently disable ptrauth and keep running. This version creates panic in this case as suggested by Suzuki.
- Many suggestion from James implemented.
Quoted 4 lines
This series do not implement few things or have known limitations:
- kdump tool may need some rework to work with ptrauth.
- Generate/Get some randomness for ptrauth keys during kernel early booting.
Hello Amit,
As we discussed off line, we still need some place to initialize the PAC keys for the boot CPU.
We should follow the same approach as boot_init_stack_canary() is currently taking: it is called from start_kernel(), never returns, and it is marked as __always_inline, which means it does not set up a stack frame and so its return address will not get signed with the wrong key.
Something like the below should be acceptable for a generic header file, and we can wire up kernel PAC in the arm64 version of the stackprotector.h header whichever way we like.
Signature · 1 line
Ard.
include/linux/stackprotector.h +1 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/random.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR +#if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR ) || defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH )# include <asm/stackprotector.h> #else static inline void boot_init_stack_canary (void )
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Hi Ard,
Quoted 38 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 21 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
Hi,
This series improves function return address protection for the arm64 kernel, by compiling the kernel with ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication instructions (referred ptrauth hereafter). This should help protect the kernel against attacks using return-oriented programming.
This series is based on v5.4-rc8.
High-level changes since v1 [1] (detailed changes are listed in patches):
- Dropped patch "arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability" as pointed by Suzuki.
- Patch 4, 10, 12 and 14 are added newly added.
- Patch 12 adds support to block probe of authenticate ptrauth instructions.
- Patch 14 adds support for lkdtm to test ptrauth.
- In the last version if secondary cpus do have ptrauth and primary cpu do not then the secondary will silently disable ptrauth and keep running. This version creates panic in this case as suggested by Suzuki.
- Many suggestion from James implemented.Quoted 4 lines
This series do not implement few things or have known limitations:
- kdump tool may need some rework to work with ptrauth.
- Generate/Get some randomness for ptrauth keys during kernel early booting.Hello Amit,
As we discussed off line, we still need some place to initialize the PAC keys for the boot CPU.
We should follow the same approach as
boot_init_stack_canary()is currently taking: it is called fromstart_kernel(), never returns, and it is marked as__always_inline, which means it does not set up a stack frame and so its return address will not get signed with the wrong key.
Quoted 4 lines
Something like the below should be acceptable for a generic header file, and we can wire up kernel PAC in the arm64 version of the
stackprotector.hheader whichever way we like.
This seems to be a practical approach. I tested in my local system and
it works fine. For few functions before boot_init_stack_canary, it can afford to run without keys as randomization driver is not initialised. Thanks for the pointer.
Regards,
Amit Daniel
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