Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Subsystems (12)
v2 cover Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Currently access to perf_events, i915_perf and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel is open for a privileged process [1] with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability enabled in the process effective set [2].
This patch set introduces CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to meet the demand to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations in security sensitive, restricted, production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute environments) where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to mass users of a system because of security considerations.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes [2].
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [2] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged with respect to the introduced CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
The patch set is for tip perf/core repository:git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip perf/core
sha1: ceb9e77324fa661b1001a0ae66f061b5fcb4e4e6
---
Changes in v2:
- made perf_events trace points available to CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes
- made perf_event_paranoid_check() treat CAP_SYS_PERFMON equally to CAP_SYS_ADMIN
- applied CAP_SYS_PERFMON to i915_perf, bpf_trace, powerpc and parisc system performance monitoring and observability related subsystems
---
Alexey Budankov (7):
capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process parisc/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 ++-- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 +++++++------ include/linux/perf_event.h | 9 ++++++--- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 ++- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++----- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 11 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
---
Testing and validation (Intel Skylake, 8 cores, Fedora 29, 5.4.0-rc8+, x86_64):
libcap library [3], [4] and Perf tool can be used to apply CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability for secure system performance monitoring and observability beyond the scope permitted by the system wide perf_event_paranoid kernel setting [5] and below are the steps for evaluation:
- patch, build and boot the kernel
- patch, build Perf tool e.g. to /home/user/perf
...
# git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git libcap
# pushd libcap
# patch libcap/include/uapi/linux/capabilities.h with [PATCH 1]
# make
# pushd progs
# ./setcap "cap_sys_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf
# ./setcap -v "cap_sys_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf
/home/user/perf: OK
# ./getcap /home/user/perf
/home/user/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_sys_perfmon+ep
# echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid
2
...
$ /home/user/perf top
... works as expected ...
$ cat /proc/`pidof perf`/status
Name: perf
Umask: 0002
State: S (sleeping)
Tgid: 2958
Ngid: 0
Pid: 2958
PPid: 9847
TracerPid: 0
Uid: 500 500 500 500
Gid: 500 500 500 500
FDSize: 256
...
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000004400080000
CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 00000000
cap_sys_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog
CapBnd: 0000007fffffffff
CapAmb: 0000000000000000
NoNewPrivs: 0
Seccomp: 0
Speculation_Store_Bypass: thread vulnerable
Cpus_allowed: ff
Cpus_allowed_list: 0-7
...Usage of cap_sys_perfmon effectively avoids unused credentials excess:
- with cap_sys_admin:
CapEff: 0000007fffffffff => 01111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111
- with cap_sys_perfmon:
CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 00000000
38 34 19
sys_perfmon syslog sys_ptrace---
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
[2] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[3] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/setcap.8.html
[4] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git
[5] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html
[6] https://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/, posix_1003.1e-990310.pdf
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v2 1/7 capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following with the recommendations provided in the capabilities man page [1] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
--- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/uapi/linux/capability.h +7 -1
@@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 +/* +* Allow system performance and observability privileged operations +* using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems +*/ + +#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON#define cap_valid (x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +2 -2
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ "audit_control", "setfcap"#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read" + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon" -#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_AUDIT_READ +#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_SYS_PERFMON #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v2 1/7] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Quoted 16 lines · Alexey Budankov
Introduce
CAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability devoted to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so thatCAP_SYS_PERFMONwould assistCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability in its governing role forperf_events,i915_perfand other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_SYS_PERFMONintends to harden system security and integrity during system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available toCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes.
CAP_SYS_PERFMONintends to take overCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials following with the recommendations provided in the capabilities man page [1] forCAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
Quoted 3 lines
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Quoted 42 lines
--- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)include/uapi/linux/capability.h +7
-1@@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 +/* +* Allow system performance and observability privileged operations +* using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems +*/ + +#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON#define cap_valid (x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)security/selinux/include/classmap.h +2
-2@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ "audit_control", "setfcap"#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read" + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon" -#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_AUDIT_READ +#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_SYS_PERFMON #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.#endif
PATCH v2 2/7 perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to perf_events monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/perf_event.h +6 -3
@@ -1285,7 +1285,8 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)static inline int perf_allow_kernel (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL );
@@ -1293,7 +1294,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_cpu (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_CPU );
@@ -1301,7 +1303,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EPERM ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT );
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
RE: [PATCH v2 2/7] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 47 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to
perf_eventsmonitoring forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes.
For backward compatibility reasons access toperf_eventssubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secureperf_eventsmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)include/linux/perf_event.h index renamed from include/linux/perf_event.h +0
-0
34c7c6910026..52313d2cc343100644include/linux/perf_event.h +2
-2@@ -1285,7 +1285,8 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)static inline int perf_allow_kernel (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EACCES ; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL); @@ -1293,7 +1294,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct
perf_event_attr*attr)static inline int
perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr){include/linux/perf_event.h +2
-1-if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EACCES ; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU); @@ -1301,7 +1303,8 @@ static inline int
perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int
perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr){include/linux/perf_event.h +2
-2-if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EPERM ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT ); --
Quoted 1 line
2.20.1
Thanks. I like the idea of CAP_SYS_PERFMON that does not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. It makes granting users ability to run perf a bit safer.
I see a lot of "(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)" constructs now. Maybe wrapping it in an " inline bool perfmon_capable()" defined somewhere (like in /include/linux/capability.h)?
- Igor
Re: [PATCH v2 2/7] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 46 lines · Igor
Quoted 45 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to
perf_eventsmonitoring forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes.
For backward compatibility reasons access toperf_eventssubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secureperf_eventsmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)include/linux/perf_event.h index renamed from include/linux/perf_event.h +0
-0
34c7c6910026..52313d2cc343100644include/linux/perf_event.h +2
-2@@ -1285,7 +1285,8 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)static inline int perf_allow_kernel (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EACCES ; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL); @@ -1293,7 +1294,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct
perf_event_attr*attr)static inline int
perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr){include/linux/perf_event.h +2
-1-if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EACCES ; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU); @@ -1301,7 +1303,8 @@ static inline int
perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int
perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr){include/linux/perf_event.h +2
-1-if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EPERM ;
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
return
security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
--
2.20.1Thanks. I like the idea of
CAP_SYS_PERFMONthat does not requireCAP_SYS_ADMIN. It makes granting users ability to run perf a bit safer.I see a lot of "(
capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON)||capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)" constructs now. Maybe wrapping it in an " inline boolperfmon_capable()" defined somewhere (like in /include/linux/capability.h)?
Yes, it makes sense.
Thanks,
Alexey
Quoted 3 lines
- Igor
Re: [PATCH v2 2/7] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Lubashev, IgorQuoted 46 lines · Igor
Quoted 45 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to
perf_eventsmonitoring forCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes.
For backward compatibility reasons access toperf_eventssubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secureperf_eventsmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_SYS_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)include/linux/perf_event.h index renamed from include/linux/perf_event.h +0
-0
34c7c6910026..52313d2cc343100644include/linux/perf_event.h +2
-2@@ -1285,7 +1285,8 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)static inline int perf_allow_kernel (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EACCES ; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL); @@ -1293,7 +1294,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct
perf_event_attr*attr)static inline int
perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr){include/linux/perf_event.h +2
-1-if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EACCES ; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU); @@ -1301,7 +1303,8 @@ static inline int
perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int
perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr){include/linux/perf_event.h +2
-1-if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EPERM ;
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
return
security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
--
2.20.1Thanks. I like the idea of
CAP_SYS_PERFMONthat does not requireCAP_SYS_ADMIN. It makes granting users ability to run perf a bit safer.I see a lot of "(
capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON)||capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)" constructs now. Maybe wrapping it in an " inline boolperfmon_capable()" defined somewhere (like in /include/linux/capability.h)?
Sounds reasonable, thanks!
~Alexey
Quoted 3 lines
- Igor
PATCH v2 3/7 perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support
In reply to Alexey BudankovExtend error messages to mention CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability as an option to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations [1]. Make perf_event_paranoid_check() to be aware of CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
--- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 ++- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++----- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
tools/perf/design.txt +2 -1
@@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for their own tasks. A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts -all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. +all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_PERFMON or +CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero.
tools/perf/util/cap.h +4 -0
@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused)#define CAP_SYSLOG 34#endif +#ifndef CAP_SYS_PERFMON +#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38 +#endif +#endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */
tools/perf/util/evsel.c +5 -5
@@ -2468,14 +2468,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,"You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" -"unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" +"unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" "The current value is %d:\n\n" " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" -">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -" Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" +">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +" Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
tools/perf/util/util.c +1 -0
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void)bool perf_event_paranoid_check (int max_level) {return perf_cap__capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || +perf_cap__capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||perf_event_paranoid () <= max_level; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v2 4/7 drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to i915_perf monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to i915_perf subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure i915_perf monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c +7 -6
@@ -2748,10 +2748,11 @@ i915_perf_open_ioctl_locked(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv,/* Similar to perf's kernel.perf_paranoid_cpu sysctl option * we check a dev.i915.perf_stream_paranoid sysctl option * to determine if it's ok to access system wide OA counters -* without CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. +* without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. */ if (privileged_op && - i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { + i915_perf_stream_paranoid && + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to open system-wide i915 perf stream\n" ); ret = -EACCES ; goto err_ctx;
@@ -2940,8 +2941,8 @@ static int read_properties_unlocked(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv, oa_freq_hz =0 ;if (oa_freq_hz > i915_oa_max_sample_rate && - !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { -DRM_DEBUG ("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without root privileges\n" , + !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))) { +DRM_DEBUG ("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges\n" , i915_oa_max_sample_rate);return -EACCES ; }
@@ -3328,7 +3329,7 @@ int i915_perf_add_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,return -EINVAL ; } -if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { +if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to add i915 OA config\n" );return -EACCES ; }
@@ -3474,7 +3475,7 @@ int i915_perf_remove_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,return -ENOTSUPP ; } -if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { +if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to remove i915 OA config\n" );return -EACCES ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v2 5/7 trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
--- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +1 -1
@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info)u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len;int ret; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EPERM ;if (event->attr.type !=PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT )return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v2 6/7 powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
--- arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c +2 -2
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static int thread_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EACCES ;/* Sampling not supported */
@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ static int trace_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EACCES ;/* Return if this is a couting event */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v2 7/7 parisc/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
--- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c +1 -1
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,else return -EFAULT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!(capable (CAP_SYS_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )))return -EACCES ;if (count !=sizeof (uint32_t ))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Patchwork
CI[Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
In reply to Alexey Budankov== Series Details ==
== Series Details ==
Series: Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
URL : https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/70961/
State : failure
== Summary ==
Applying: capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Applying: perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Applying: perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support
Applying: drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Using index info to reconstruct a base tree...
M drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c
Falling back to patching base and 3-way merge...
Auto-merging drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c
CONFLICT (content): Merge conflict in drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c
error: Failed to merge in the changes.
hint: Use 'git am --show-current-patch' to see the failed patch
Patch failed at 0004 drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".
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