x86/speculation: Allow IBPB to be conditionally enabled on CPUs with always-on STIBP
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v2 1/1 x86/speculation: Allow IBPB to be conditionally enabled on CPUs with always-on STIBP
On AMD CPUs which have the feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON, STIBP is set to on and 'spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED'. At the same time, IBPB can be set to conditional. However, this leads to the case where it's impossible to turn on IBPB for a process because in the PR_SPEC_DISABLE case in ib_prctl_set, the (spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) condition leads to a return before the task flag is set. Similarly, ib_prctl_get will return PR_SPEC_DISABLE even though IBPB is set to conditional.
More generally, the following cases are possible:
1. STIBP = conditional && IBPB = on for spectre_v2_user=seccomp,ibpb
2. STIBP = on && IBPB = conditional for AMD CPUs with X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON
The first case functions correctly today, but only because spectre_v2_user_ibpb isn't updated to reflect the IBPB mode.
At a high level, this change does one thing. If either STIBP or IBPB is set to conditional, allow the prctl to change the task flag. Also, reflect that capability when querying the state. This isn't perfect since it doesn't take into account if only STIBP or IBPB is unconditionally on. But it allows the conditional feature to work as expected, without affecting the unconditional one.
---
Changes in v2:
- Fix typo in commit message
- s/is_spec_ib_user/is_spec_ib_user_controlled
- Update comment in ib_prctl_set() to reference X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON
- Have is_spec_ib_user_controlled() check both IBPB and STIBP modes
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +28 -18
@@ -1254,6 +1254,14 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)return 0 ; } +static bool is_spec_ib_user_controlled (void ) +{ +return spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || + spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP || + spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || + spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ; +} +static int ib_prctl_set (struct task_struct *task,unsigned long ctrl) {switch (ctrl) {
@@ -1262,13 +1270,20 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)return 0 ;/* -* Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict -* mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled -* by a previous prctl call. +* With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction +* code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead, +* unconditionally run the instruction. However, STIBP and IBPB +* are independent and either can be set to conditionally +* enabled regardless of the mode of the other. If either is set +* to conditional, allow the task flag to be updated, unless it +* was force-disabled by a previous prctl call. +* Currently, this is possible on an AMD CPU which has the +* feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON. In this case, if the +* kernel is booted with 'spectre_v2_user=seccomp', then +* spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP and +* spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED. */ -if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED || +if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled () ||task_spec_ib_force_disable (task))return -EPERM ;task_clear_spec_ib_disable (task);
@@ -1283,9 +1298,7 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE )return -EPERM ; -if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ) +if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled ())return 0 ;task_set_spec_ib_disable (task);if (ctrl ==PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE )
@@ -1351,20 +1364,17 @@ static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE )return PR_SPEC_ENABLE ; -else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ) -return PR_SPEC_DISABLE ; -else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || - spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ) { +else if (is_spec_ib_user_controlled ()) {if (task_spec_ib_force_disable (task))return PR_SPEC_PRCTL |PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE ;if (task_spec_ib_disable (task))return PR_SPEC_PRCTL |PR_SPEC_DISABLE ;return PR_SPEC_PRCTL |PR_SPEC_ENABLE ; - }else + }else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ) +return PR_SPEC_DISABLE ; +else return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog
Quoted 18 lines · Anand K Mistry
On AMD CPUs which have the feature
X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON, STIBP is set to on and 'spectre_v2_user_stibp==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED'. At the same time, IBPB can be set to conditional. However, this leads to the case where it's impossible to turn on IBPB for a process because in thePR_SPEC_DISABLEcase inib_prctl_set, the (spectre_v2_user_stibp==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) condition leads to a return before the task flag is set. Similarly,ib_prctl_getwill returnPR_SPEC_DISABLEeven though IBPB is set to conditional.More generally, the following cases are possible:
1. STIBP = conditional && IBPB = on for spectre_v2_user=seccomp,ibpb
2. STIBP = on && IBPB = conditional for AMD CPUs withX86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ONThe first case functions correctly today, but only because
spectre_v2_user_ibpbisn't updated to reflect the IBPB mode.
Quoted 8 lines
At a high level, this change does one thing. If either STIBP or IBPB is set to conditional, allow the prctl to change the task flag. Also, reflect that capability when querying the state. This isn't perfect since it doesn't take into account if only STIBP or IBPB is unconditionally on. But it allows the conditional feature to work as expected, without affecting the unconditional one.
Signed-off-by Anand K Mistry <[email protected]>
Does it need a Fixes: tag?
Quoted 97 lines
---
Changes in v2:
- Fix typo in commit message
- s/is_spec_ib_user/is_spec_ib_user_controlled
- Update comment inib_prctl_set()to referenceX86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON
- Haveis_spec_ib_user_controlled()check both IBPB and STIBP modesarch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +28
-18@@ -1254,6 +1254,14 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)return 0 ; } +static bool is_spec_ib_user_controlled (void ) +{ +return spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || + spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP || + spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || + spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ; +} +static int ib_prctl_set (struct task_struct *task,unsigned long ctrl) {switch (ctrl) {@@ -1262,13 +1270,20 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)return 0 ;/* -* Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict -* mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled -* by a previous prctl call. +* With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction +* code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead, +* unconditionally run the instruction. However, STIBP and IBPB +* are independent and either can be set to conditionally +* enabled regardless of the mode of the other. If either is set +* to conditional, allow the task flag to be updated, unless it +* was force-disabled by a previous prctl call. +* Currently, this is possible on an AMD CPU which has the +* feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON. In this case, if the +* kernel is booted with 'spectre_v2_user=seccomp', then +* spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP and +* spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED. */ -if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED || +if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled () ||task_spec_ib_force_disable (task))return -EPERM ;task_clear_spec_ib_disable (task);@@ -1283,9 +1298,7 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE )return -EPERM ; -if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ) +if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled ())return 0 ;task_set_spec_ib_disable (task);if (ctrl ==PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE )@@ -1351,20 +1364,17 @@ static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE )return PR_SPEC_ENABLE ; -else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ) -return PR_SPEC_DISABLE ; -else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || - spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ) { +else if (is_spec_ib_user_controlled ()) {if (task_spec_ib_force_disable (task))return PR_SPEC_PRCTL |PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE ;if (task_spec_ib_disable (task))return PR_SPEC_PRCTL |PR_SPEC_DISABLE ;return PR_SPEC_PRCTL |PR_SPEC_ENABLE ; - }else + }else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ) +return PR_SPEC_DISABLE ; +else return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED ; }
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 1 line · Tom Lendacky
Does it need a Fixes: tag?
Yah, this one:
because it set mode to SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED, leading to the inability to set the TIF_SPEC_IB bit later.
Quoted 2 lines
Acked-by Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Added, thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteThe following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 1978b3a53a74e3230cd46932b149c6e62e832e9a Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/1978b3a53a74e3230cd46932b149c6e62e832e9a Author: Anand K Mistry <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Thu, 05 Nov 2020 16:33:04 +11:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 05 Nov 2020 21:43:34 +01:00
x86/speculation: Allow IBPB to be conditionally enabled on CPUs with always-on STIBP
On AMD CPUs which have the feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON, STIBP is set to on and
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED
At the same time, IBPB can be set to conditional.
However, this leads to the case where it's impossible to turn on IBPB for a process because in the PR_SPEC_DISABLE case in ib_prctl_set() the
spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED
condition leads to a return before the task flag is set. Similarly, ib_prctl_get() will return PR_SPEC_DISABLE even though IBPB is set to conditional.
More generally, the following cases are possible:
1. STIBP = conditional && IBPB = on for spectre_v2_user=seccomp,ibpb
2. STIBP = on && IBPB = conditional for AMD CPUs with X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON
The first case functions correctly today, but only because spectre_v2_user_ibpb isn't updated to reflect the IBPB mode.
At a high level, this change does one thing. If either STIBP or IBPB is set to conditional, allow the prctl to change the task flag. Also, reflect that capability when querying the state. This isn't perfect since it doesn't take into account if only STIBP or IBPB is unconditionally on. But it allows the conditional feature to work as expected, without affecting the unconditional one.
[ bp: Massage commit message and comment; space out statements for
better readability. ]
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +33 -18
@@ -1254,6 +1254,14 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)return 0 ; } +static bool is_spec_ib_user_controlled (void ) +{ +return spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || + spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP || + spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || + spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ; +} +static int ib_prctl_set (struct task_struct *task,unsigned long ctrl) {switch (ctrl) {
@@ -1261,16 +1269,26 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE )return 0 ; +/* -* Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict -* mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled -* by a previous prctl call. +* With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction +* code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead, +* unconditionally run the instruction. However, STIBP and IBPB +* are independent and either can be set to conditionally +* enabled regardless of the mode of the other. +* +* If either is set to conditional, allow the task flag to be +* updated, unless it was force-disabled by a previous prctl +* call. Currently, this is possible on an AMD CPU which has the +* feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON. In this case, if the +* kernel is booted with 'spectre_v2_user=seccomp', then +* spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP and +* spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED. */ -if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED || +if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled () ||task_spec_ib_force_disable (task))return -EPERM ; +task_clear_spec_ib_disable (task);task_update_spec_tif (task);break ;
@@ -1283,10 +1301,10 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE )return -EPERM ; -if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ) + +if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled ())return 0 ; +task_set_spec_ib_disable (task);if (ctrl ==PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE )task_set_spec_ib_force_disable (task);
@@ -1351,20 +1369,17 @@ static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE )return PR_SPEC_ENABLE ; -else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ) -return PR_SPEC_DISABLE ; -else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || - spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || - spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ) { +else if (is_spec_ib_user_controlled ()) {if (task_spec_ib_force_disable (task))return PR_SPEC_PRCTL |PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE ;if (task_spec_ib_disable (task))return PR_SPEC_PRCTL |PR_SPEC_DISABLE ;return PR_SPEC_PRCTL |PR_SPEC_ENABLE ; - }else + }else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ) +return PR_SPEC_DISABLE ; +else return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED ; }