System design question
Felix Rubio Dalmau
Hi everybody,
I am playing with a QEMU VM that uses swtpm. My goal is to make a stable, easily maintainable setup to have ZFS native full disk encription, and I am facing a problem:
* I was relying on GRUB2 signature-checking capabilities to make sure that, besides the kernel (that is checked by Secure Boot anyway), initramfs had not been tampered with. However, this introduces yet a new (GPG) private key that needs to be stored, initramfs needs to be signed when changed, etc.
* Recently I have learned that from kernel 5.10 on, the measurements of initramfs can be found on PCR9, so I modified my PCR-based policy to make use of registers 0,1,7 and 9 and I am planning to remove the GRUB2 checks. But the problem now is: After generating the policies, which I do by....
```bash # Recreate the PCR-based policy tpm2_startauthsession -S session.ctx tpm2_policypcr -S session.ctx -L regular.policy -l sha256:0,1,7,9 tpm2_policypassword -S session.ctx -L regular.policy tpm2_flushcontext session.ctx # session for auth based on rescue password tpm2_startauthsession -S session.ctx tpm2_policysecret -S session.ctx -L rescue.policy -c o '<tpm_ownerpass>' tpm2_flushcontext session.ctx # compound both policies using OR tpm2_startauthsession -S session.ctx tpm2_policyor -S session.ctx -L compound.policy sha256:rescue.policy,regular.policy tpm2_flushcontext session.ctx # create the seal object (the FS password is requested to the user) tpm2_create -C prim.ctx -c key.ctx -u key.pub -r key.priv -L compound.policy -i- -p '<disk_unlock_password>' -a 'fixedtpm|fixedparent' # persist the object to the TPM tpm2_evictcontrol -c key.ctx 0x81010001 -P '<tpm_ownerpass>' ```
... then I need to store regular.policy and rescue.policy in initramfs, which will produce a different hash next time.
Therefore, the question is: is there any way I can store the policies in the TPM itself, so that I do not have to rebuild initramfs? Do you guys think this is not the way to go, and there is a better approach?
Thank you very much!
Felix
Felix Rubio Dalmau
My apologies, I have not played with TPM for long time: I had forgotten I could tpm2_nvdefine, and then tpm2_nvwrite/nvread.
Regards!
Felix
Roberts
Quoted 4 lines · Felix Rubio Dalmau
My apologies, I have not played with TPM for long time: I had forgotten I
couldtpm2_nvdefine, and then tpm2_nvwrite/nvread.
The best rule of thumb is to do everything you can to not use NV Indices. This is a very small and finite amount of space. I don't think you need to use these if you just "hardcode" the hash values.
Quoted 7 lines
Regards!
Felix_______________________________________________
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David Challener
Generally you use NV when you either have a problem with hash loops (which is solvable, by the way), or you don't have access to other storage that can be read when you need the value.
Quoted 22 lines · William C
Quoted 4 lines · Felix Rubio Dalmau
My apologies, I have not played with TPM for long time: I had forgotten I
couldtpm2_nvdefine, and then tpm2_nvwrite/nvread.The best rule of thumb is to do everything you can to not use NV Indices. This is a very small and finite amount of space. I don't think you need to use these if you just "hardcode" the hash values.
Quoted 7 lines
Regards!
Felix_______________________________________________
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Roberts
Quoted 45 lines · Felix Rubio Dalmau
Hi everybody,
I am playing with a QEMU VM that uses swtpm. My goal is to make a stable, easily maintainable setup to have ZFS native full disk encription, and I am facing a problem:
* I was relying on GRUB2 signature-checking capabilities to make sure that, besides the kernel (that is checked by Secure Boot anyway), initramfs had not been tampered with. However, this introduces yet a new (GPG) private key that needs to be stored, initramfs needs to be signed when changed, etc.
* Recently I have learned that from kernel 5.10 on, the measurements of initramfs can be found on PCR9, so I modified my PCR-based policy to make use of registers 0,1,7 and 9 and I am planning to remove the GRUB2 checks. But the problem now is: After generating the policies, which I do by....```bash # Recreate the PCR-based policy tpm2_startauthsession -S session.ctx tpm2_policypcr -S session.ctx -L regular.policy -l sha256:0,1,7,9 tpm2_policypassword -S session.ctx -L regular.policy tpm2_flushcontext session.ctx # session for auth based on rescue password tpm2_startauthsession -S session.ctx tpm2_policysecret -S session.ctx -L rescue.policy -c o '<tpm_ownerpass>' tpm2_flushcontext session.ctx # compound both policies using OR tpm2_startauthsession -S session.ctx tpm2_policyor -S session.ctx -L compound.policy sha256:rescue.policy,regular.policy tpm2_flushcontext session.ctx # create the seal object (the FS password is requested to the user) tpm2_create -C prim.ctx -c key.ctx -u key.pub -r key.priv -L compound.policy -i- -p '<disk_unlock_password>' -a 'fixedtpm|fixedparent' # persist the object to the TPM tpm2_evictcontrol -c key.ctx 0x81010001 -P '<tpm_ownerpass>' ```
Quoted 7 lines
... then I need to store regular.policy and rescue.policy in initramfs, which will produce a different hash next time.
Therefore, the question is: is there any way I can store the policies in the TPM itself, so that I do not have to rebuild initramfs? Do you guys think this is not the way to go, and there is a better approach?
Policy Hashes are stable and can be computed without the use of the tpm.
You don't really need to save those policy files as they are just the hash. Polcies are enforced by ensuring the hash generated on the sessoion via policy commands matches the policy field in the public portion of the object and that additional state, dependent on the policy commands, is also verified (like policy secret password).
tpm2 policysecret -S s.ctx -co -L policy.dat 0d84f55daf6e43ac97966e62c9bb989d3397777d25c5f749868055d65394f952
xxd -p -c256 policy.dat 0d84f55daf6e43ac97966e62c9bb989d3397777d25c5f749868055d65394f952
The policy files are just a way to move the digest between tools.
So really all that needs to occur is the code/script needs to be in place that does the normal PCR flow or rescue flow. The create call can be hardcoded to the known hash, that isn't changing and can be included in the filesystem when generated. If that doesn;t work we could support embedding the raw hex hash into the create command as an argument rather than a file argument.
Quoted 7 lines
Thank you very much!
Felix_______________________________________________
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Roberts
Quoted 80 lines · William C
Quoted 55 lines · Felix Rubio Dalmau
Hi everybody,
I am playing with a QEMU VM that uses swtpm. My goal is to make a stable, easily maintainable setup to have ZFS native full disk encription, and I am facing a problem:
* I was relying on GRUB2 signature-checking capabilities to make sure
that, besides the kernel (that is checked by Secure Boot anyway), initramfs had not been tampered with. However, this introduces yet a
new (GPG) private key that needs to be stored, initramfs needs to be
signed when changed, etc.
* Recently I have learned that from kernel 5.10 on, the measurements
of initramfs can be found on PCR9, so I modified my PCR-based policy
to make use of registers 0,1,7 and 9 and I am planning to remove the
GRUB2 checks. But the problem now is: After generating the policies,
which I do by....```bash # Recreate the PCR-based policy tpm2_startauthsession -S session.ctx tpm2_policypcr -S session.ctx -L regular.policy -l sha256:0,1,7,9 tpm2_policypassword -S session.ctx -L regular.policy tpm2_flushcontext session.ctx # session for auth based on rescue password tpm2_startauthsession -S session.ctx tpm2_policysecret -S session.ctx -L rescue.policy -c o '<tpm_ownerpass>' tpm2_flushcontext session.ctx # compound both policies using OR tpm2_startauthsession -S session.ctx tpm2_policyor -S session.ctx -L compound.policy sha256:rescue.policy,regular.policy tpm2_flushcontext session.ctx # create the seal object (the FS password is requested to the user) tpm2_create -C prim.ctx -c key.ctx -u key.pub -r key.priv -L compound.policy -i- -p '<disk_unlock_password>' -a 'fixedtpm|fixedparent' # persist the object to the TPM tpm2_evictcontrol -c key.ctx 0x81010001 -P '<tpm_ownerpass>' ```... then I need to store regular.policy and rescue.policy in initramfs, which will produce a different hash next time.
Quoted 7 lines
Therefore, the question is: is there any way I can store the policies
in the TPM itself, so that I do not have to rebuild initramfs? Do you
guys think this is not the way to go, and there is a better approach?Policy Hashes are stable and can be computed without the use of the tpm.
You don't really need to save those policy files as they are just the hash. Polcies are enforced by ensuring the hash generated on the sessoion via policy commands matches the policy field in the public portion of the object and that additional state, dependent on the policy commands, is also verified (like policy secret password).tpm2 policysecret -S s.ctx -co -L policy.dat
0d84f55daf6e43ac97966e62c9bb989d3397777d25c5f749868055d65394f952xxd -p -c256 policy.dat
0d84f55daf6e43ac97966e62c9bb989d3397777d25c5f749868055d65394f952The policy files are just a way to move the digest between tools.
Quoted 9 lines
So really all that needs to occur is the code/script needs to be in place that does the normal PCR flow or rescue flow. The create call can
be hardcoded to the known hash, that isn't changing and can be included
in the filesystem when generated. If that doesn;t work we could support
embedding the raw hex hash into the create command as an argument rather than a file argument.
FYI I have support for embedding the digest as a hex string value to the -L policy argument on the various tools here:
- https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools/pull/3117
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Thank you very much!
Felix_______________________________________________
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Felix Rubio Dalmau
Hey William,
Thank you for your answer, I have just been playing with the tpm2_tools in latest Debian 11.4, trying to follow your reasoning, but there is something I am missing:
As secureboot does not check the initramfs, my approach is to make the full disk encryption key depend on PCR registers 0,1,7 and 9 (for what I have read, from kernel 5.13 on, the measurements of initramfs go to PCR 9), or a rescue password. This approach implies having a script in place so that the first time a new kernel + initramfs boot I will get those measurements somewhere and then I can rebuild the policies with the correct contents (that is, until I find a way to precalculate the value of PCR 9 out of the initramfs file itself... assuming is possible).
In your email you say "[...]
Quoted 4 lines
So really all that needs to occur is the code/script needs to be in place that does the normal PCR flow or rescue flow. The create call can be hardcoded to the known hash, that isn't changing and can be included in the filesystem when generated.
[...]" but I do not see how would that be achieved: my current normal PCR flow goes like this:
tpm2_startauthsession -Q -S session.ctx --policy-session tpm2_policypcr -Q -S session.ctx -l sha256:0,1,7,9 tpm2_policypassword -Q -S session.ctxtpm2_policyor -Q -S session.ctx sha256:rescue.policy,regular.policy SECRET=tpm2_unseal -Q -c 0x81010001 -p "session:session.ctx+$REGULAR_PASS" tpm2_flushcontext -Q session.ctxtpm2_pcrextend -Q 0:sha256=00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000...
I think I understand, from user answer, that I should be able to replace
tpm2_policyor -Q -S session.ctx sha256:rescue.policy,regular.policy
by
tpm2_policyor -Q -S session.ctx <output of precalculated digest>
But still, this does not fix the issue: the moment I hardcode this value in my initramfs, its measurement on PCR 9 will change. The only way out I see is to avoid storing this information on the initramfs itself, and this is when the nvram came into the picture. Given that nvram is scarce, maybe I can get away by storing on it the digest of the policyor, and adding it somehow to the session after reading it?
Regards, and thank you very much for giving this issue a thought!
Felix
Roberts
Quoted 33 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Felix Rubio Dalmau <felix(a)kngnt.org>
Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2022 4:39 AM
To: tpm2(a)lists.01.org
Cc: Roberts, William C <william.c.roberts(a)intel.com>
Subject: Re: [tpm2] Re: System design questionHey William,
Thank you for your answer, I have just been playing with the
tpm2_toolsin latest Debian 11.4, trying to follow your reasoning, but there is something I am missing:As secureboot does not check the initramfs, my approach is to make the full disk encryption key depend on PCR registers 0,1,7 and 9 (for what I have read, from kernel 5.13 on, the measurements of initramfs go to PCR 9), or a rescue password. This approach implies having a script in place so that the first time a new kernel + initramfs boot I will get those measurements somewhere and then I can rebuild the policies with the correct contents (that is, until I find a way to precalculate the value of PCR 9 out of the initramfs file itself...
assuming is possible).In your email you say "[...]
Quoted 4 lines
So really all that needs to occur is the code/script needs to be in place that does the normal PCR flow or rescue flow. The create call can be hardcoded to the known hash, that isn't changing and can be included in the filesystem when generated.
[...]" but I do not see how would that be achieved: my current normal PCR flow goes like this:
Quoted 8 lines
tpm2_startauthsession-Q -S session.ctx --policy-sessiontpm2_policypcr-Q - S session.ctx -l sha256:0,1,7,9tpm2_policypassword-Q -S session.ctxtpm2_policyor-Q -S session.ctx sha256:rescue.policy,regular.policy SECRET=tpm2_unseal -Q -c 0x81010001 -p "session:session.ctx+$REGULAR_PASS"tpm2_flushcontext-Q session.ctxtpm2_pcrextend-Q 0:sha256=00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000...
So you do this to prevent unseal later right?
Theirs discussion on systemd to standardize this, amongst a lot of other things you may find interesting
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/22637
Quoted 8 lines
I think I understand, from user answer, that I should be able to replace
tpm2_policyor-Q -S session.ctx sha256:rescue.policy,regular.policy
by
tpm2_policyor-Q -S session.ctx <output of precalculated digest>But still, this does not fix the issue: the moment I hardcode this value in my initramfs, its measurement on PCR 9 will change.
Ahh yeah, including PCR 9 causes a chicken and egg problem where the egg Is initramfs. I don't see a way to break this dependency except by just need to calculate the value by running all those commands. :-(
Sorry my suggestion didn't work, it didn't occur to me at the time (facepalm).
Quoted 6 lines
The only way out I see is to
avoid storing this information on the initramfs itself, and this is when the nvram came into the picture. Given that nvram is scarce, maybe I can get away by storing on it the digest of the policyor, and adding it somehow to the session after reading it?
Policyor depends on the hashes of policy A and B... I don't see that breaking The dependency offhand. I have other ideas, but they have issues as well. I think the simplest thing is just run the commands.
Quoted 4 lines
Regards, and thank you very much for giving this issue a thought!
Felix