Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Subsystems (15)
v7 cover Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Currently access to perf_events, i915_perf and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel is open only for a privileged process [1] with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability enabled in the process effective set [2].
This patch set introduces CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access to performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure. Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
CAP_PERFMON intends to meet the demand to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted, multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to mass users of a system, and securely unblock accessibility of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.
CAP_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [2] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
Possible alternative solution to this system security hardening, capabilities balancing task of making performance monitoring and observability operations more secure and accessible could be to use the existing CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to govern system performance monitoring and observability subsystems. However CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability still provides users with more credentials than are required for secure performance monitoring and observability operations and this excess is avoided by the designed CAP_PERFMON.
Although software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate those issues following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [3]. The bugs in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development process [4] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring and observability operations. Finally, the patch set is shaped in the way that simplifies backtracking procedure of possible induced issues [5] as much as possible.
The patch set is for tip perf/core repository:git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip perf/core
sha1: fdb64822443ec9fb8c3a74b598a74790ae8d2e22
---
Changes in v7:
- updated and extended kernel.rst and perf-security.rst documentation files with the information about CAP_PERFMON capability and its use cases
- documented the case of double audit logging of CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities on a SELinux enabled system
Changes in v6:
- avoided noaudit checks in perfmon_capable() to explicitly advertise CAP_PERFMON usage thru audit logs to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Changes in v5:
- renamed CAP_SYS_PERFMON to CAP_PERFMON
- extended perfmon_capable() with noaudit checks
Changes in v4:
- converted perfmon_capable() into an inline function
- made perf_events kprobes, uprobes, hw breakpoints and namespaces data available to CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes
- applied perfmon_capable() to drivers/perf and drivers/oprofile
- extended __cmd_ftrace() with support of CAP_SYS_PERFMON
Changes in v3:
- implemented perfmon_capable() macros aggregating required capabilities checks
Changes in v2:
- made perf_events trace points available to CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes
- made perf_event_paranoid_check() treat CAP_SYS_PERFMON equally to CAP_SYS_ADMIN
- applied CAP_SYS_PERFMON to i915_perf, bpf_trace, powerpc and parisc system performance monitoring and observability related subsystems
---
Alexey Budankov (12):
capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst with CAP_PERFMON information
Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst | 65 +++++++++++++-------- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 16 +++-- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 +- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 ++--- drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c | 2 +- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 +- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++ include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 ++- kernel/events/core.c | 6 +- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 +- tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 +- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 ++-- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 18 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
---
Validation (Intel Skylake, 8 cores, Fedora 29, 5.5.0-rc3+, x86_64):
libcap library [6], [7], [8] and Perf tool can be used to apply CAP_PERFMON capability for secure system performance monitoring and observability beyond the scope permitted by the system wide perf_event_paranoid kernel setting [9] and below are the steps for evaluation:
- patch, build and boot the kernel
- patch, build Perf tool e.g. to /home/user/perf
...
# git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git libcap
# pushd libcap
# patch libcap/include/uapi/linux/capabilities.h with [PATCH 1]
# make
# pushd progs
# ./setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf
# ./setcap -v "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf
/home/user/perf: OK
# ./getcap /home/user/perf
/home/user/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep
# echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid
2
...
$ /home/user/perf top
... works as expected ...
$ cat /proc/`pidof perf`/status
Name: perf
Umask: 0002
State: S (sleeping)
Tgid: 2958
Ngid: 0
Pid: 2958
PPid: 9847
TracerPid: 0
Uid: 500 500 500 500
Gid: 500 500 500 500
FDSize: 256
...
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000004400080000
CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 00000000
cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog
CapBnd: 0000007fffffffff
CapAmb: 0000000000000000
NoNewPrivs: 0
Seccomp: 0
Speculation_Store_Bypass: thread vulnerable
Cpus_allowed: ff
Cpus_allowed_list: 0-7
...Usage of cap_perfmon effectively avoids unused credentials excess:
- with cap_sys_admin:
CapEff: 0000007fffffffff => 01111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111
- with cap_perfmon:
CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 00000000
38 34 19
perfmon syslog sys_ptrace---
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
[2] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[4] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
[5] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/management-style.html#decisions
[6] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/setcap.8.html
[7] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git
[8] https://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/, posix_1003.1e-990310.pdf
[9] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html
PATCH v7 1/12 capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Introduce CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems.
CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure. Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted, multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to mass users of a system, and securely unblocks accessibility of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond the root and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.
CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring and observability operations.
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
--- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +4 -0
@@ -251,6 +251,10 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const structextern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid (const struct inode *inode,int cap);extern bool file_ns_capable (const struct file *file,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool ptracer_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns); +static inline bool perfmon_capable (void ) +{ +return capable (CAP_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +}/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk (const struct dentry *dentry,struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
include/uapi/linux/capability.h +7 -1
@@ -367,8 +367,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 +/* +* Allow system performance and observability privileged operations +* using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems +*/ + +#define CAP_PERFMON 38 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_PERFMON#define cap_valid (x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +2 -2
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ "audit_control", "setfcap"#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read" + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon" -#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_AUDIT_READ +#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_PERFMON #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v7 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Quoted 46 lines · Alexey Budankov
Introduce
CAP_PERFMONcapability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so thatCAP_PERFMONwould assistCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems.
CAP_PERFMONhardens system security and integrity during performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to aCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged process [2]. Providing the access to system performance monitoring and observability operations underCAP_PERFMONcapability singly, without the rest ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure. Thus,CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
CAP_PERFMONmeets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted, multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute environments), where root orCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials are not available to mass users of a system, and securely unblocks accessibility of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond the root andCAP_SYS_ADMINuse cases.
CAP_PERFMONtakes overCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balances amount ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1] forCAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged with respect to the designedCAP_PERFMONcapability.Although the software running under
CAP_PERFMONcan not ensure avoidance of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring and observability operations.
Quoted 5 lines
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.htmlSigned-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
[...]
Re: [PATCH v7 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space
In reply to Alexey BudankovQuoted 5 lines · Alexey Budankov
Introduce
CAP_PERFMONcapability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so thatCAP_PERFMONwould assistCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems.
Signature · 8 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v7 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Quoted 10 lines · James Morris
Quoted 5 lines · Alexey Budankov
Introduce
CAP_PERFMONcapability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so thatCAP_PERFMONwould assistCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems.Acked-by James Morris <[email protected]>
Thanks James!
I appreciate your involvement and collaboration
w.r.t to the whole patch set.
Gratefully,
Alexey
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
PATCH v7 2/12 perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring of kernel code, cpus, tracepoints and namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/perf_event.h +3 -3
@@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)static inline int perf_allow_kernel (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL );
@@ -1305,7 +1305,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_cpu (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_CPU );
@@ -1313,7 +1313,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT );
kernel/events/core.c +1 -1
@@ -11205,7 +11205,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, }if (attr.namespaces) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v7 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 14 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to monitoring of kernel code, cpus, tracepoints and namespaces data for a
CAP_PERFMONprivileged process. Providing the access underCAP_PERFMONcapability singly, without the rest ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
Quoted 6 lines
For backward compatibility reasons access to
perf_eventssubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secureperf_eventsmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Signature · 8 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v7 3/12 perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +2 -2
@@ -9107,7 +9107,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/*
@@ -9167,7 +9167,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/*
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v7 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 19 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for
CAP_PERFMONprivileged process. Providing the access underCAP_PERFMONcapability singly, without the rest ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via
perf_event_openinterface and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.
CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
Quoted 6 lines
For backward compatibility reasons access to
perf_eventssubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secureperf_eventsmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Signature · 8 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v7 4/12 perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support
In reply to Alexey BudankovExtend error messages to mention CAP_PERFMON capability as an option to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance monitoring and observability. Make perf_event_paranoid_check() and __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of CAP_PERFMON capability.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +++-- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 ++- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++----- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c +3 -2
@@ -284,10 +284,11 @@ static int __cmd_ftrace(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace, int argc, const char **argv) .events = POLLIN, }; - if (!perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (!(perf_cap__capable(CAP_PERFMON) || + perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) { pr_err("ftrace only works for %s!\n", #ifdef HAVE_LIBCAP_SUPPORT - "users with the SYS_ADMIN capability" + "users with the CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability" #else "root" #endif
tools/perf/design.txt +2 -1
@@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for their own tasks. A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts -all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. +all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN +privilege. The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero.
tools/perf/util/cap.h +4 -0
@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused)#define CAP_SYSLOG 34#endif +#ifndef CAP_PERFMON +#define CAP_PERFMON 38 +#endif +#endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */
tools/perf/util/evsel.c +5 -5
@@ -2493,14 +2493,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,"You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" -"unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" +"unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" "The current value is %d:\n\n" " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" -">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -" Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" +">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +" Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
tools/perf/util/util.c +1 -0
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void)bool perf_event_paranoid_check (int max_level) {return perf_cap__capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || +perf_cap__capable (CAP_PERFMON ) ||perf_event_paranoid () <= max_level; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v7 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support
Quoted 13 lines · Alexey Budankov
Extend error messages to mention
CAP_PERFMONcapability as an option to substituteCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability for secure system performance monitoring and observability. Makeperf_event_paranoid_check()and__cmd_ftrace()to be aware ofCAP_PERFMONcapability.
CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
Quoted 6 lines
For backward compatibility reasons access to
perf_eventssubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secureperf_eventsmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Signature · 8 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v7 5/12 drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to i915_perf monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to i915_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure i915_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c +6 -7
@@ -3378,10 +3378,10 @@ i915_perf_open_ioctl_locked(struct i915_perf *perf,/* Similar to perf's kernel.perf_paranoid_cpu sysctl option * we check a dev.i915.perf_stream_paranoid sysctl option * to determine if it's ok to access system wide OA counters -* without CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. +* without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. */ if (privileged_op && - i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { + i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable ()) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to open i915 perf stream\n" ); ret = -EACCES ; goto err_ctx;
@@ -3574,9 +3574,8 @@ static int read_properties_unlocked(struct i915_perf *perf, }else oa_freq_hz =0 ; -if (oa_freq_hz > i915_oa_max_sample_rate && - !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { -DRM_DEBUG ("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without root privileges\n" , +if (oa_freq_hz > i915_oa_max_sample_rate && !perfmon_capable ()) { +DRM_DEBUG ("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges\n" , i915_oa_max_sample_rate);return -EACCES ; }
@@ -3997,7 +3996,7 @@ int i915_perf_add_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,return -EINVAL ; } -if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { +if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable ()) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to add i915 OA config\n" );return -EACCES ; }
@@ -4144,7 +4143,7 @@ int i915_perf_remove_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,return -ENOTSUPP ; } -if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { +if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable ()) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to remove i915 OA config\n" );return -EACCES ; }
Signature · 7 lines
2.20.1 _______________________________________________ Intel-gfx mailing list [email protected] https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
Re: [PATCH v7 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 13 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to
i915_perfmonitoring forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process. Providing the access underCAP_PERFMONcapability singly, without the rest ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
Quoted 6 lines
For backward compatibility reasons access to
i915_eventssubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for securei915_eventsmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Signature · 8 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v7 6/12 trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +1 -1
@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info)u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len;int ret; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;if (event->attr.type !=PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT )return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v7 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 13 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to
bpf_tracemonitoring forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process. Providing the access underCAP_PERFMONcapability singly, without the rest ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
Quoted 6 lines
For backward compatibility reasons access to
bpf_tracemonitoring remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for securebpf_tracemonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Signature · 8 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v7 7/12 powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c +2 -2
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static int thread_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* Sampling not supported */
@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ static int trace_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* Return if this is a couting event */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v7 07/12] powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 6 lines · Alexey Budankov
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for
CAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Signature · 8 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v7 8/12 parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c +1 -1
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,else return -EFAULT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;if (count !=sizeof (uint32_t ))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v7 08/12] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 6 lines · Alexey Budankov
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for
CAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Signature · 8 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v7 9/12 drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c +2 -2
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event)if (!attr->exclude_kernel) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT ); -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&perfmon_capable ()) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT );return reg;
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; reg =arm_spe_event_to_pmscr (event); -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && +if (!perfmon_capable () && (reg & (BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT ))))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v7 09/12] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 6 lines · Alexey Budankov
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for
CAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Signature · 8 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v7 10/12 drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c +1 -1
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int event_buffer_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) {int err = -EPERM ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;if (test_and_set_bit_lock (0 , &buffer_opened))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v7 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 6 lines · Alexey Budankov
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for
CAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Signature · 8 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v7 11/12 doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information
In reply to Alexey BudankovUpdate perf-security.rst documentation file with the information related to usage of CAP_PERFMON capability to secure performance monitoring and observability operations in system.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst | 65 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst +40 -25
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ .. _perf_security: -Perf Events and tool security +Perf events and tool security ============================= Overview
@@ -42,11 +42,11 @@ categories: Data that belong to the fourth category can potentially contain sensitive process data. If PMUs in some monitoring modes capture values of execution context registers or data from process memory then access -to such monitoring capabilities requires to be ordered and secured -properly. So, perf_events/Perf performance monitoring is the subject for -security access control management [5]_ . +to such monitoring modes requires to be ordered and secured properly. +So, perf_events performance monitoring and observability operations is +the subject for security access control management [5]_ . -perf_events/Perf access control +perf_events access control ------------------------------- To perform security checks, the Linux implementation splits processes
@@ -66,11 +66,25 @@ into distinct units, known as capabilities [6]_ , which can be independently enabled and disabled on per-thread basis for processes and files of unprivileged users. -Unprivileged processes with enabled CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability are treated +Unprivileged processes with enabled CAP_PERFMON capability are treated as privileged processes with respect to perf_events performance -monitoring and bypass *scope* permissions checks in the kernel. - -Unprivileged processes using perf_events system call API is also subject +monitoring and observability operations, thus, bypass *scope* permissions +checks in the kernel. CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least +privilege [13]_ (POSIX 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39) for performance monitoring and +observability operations in the kernel and provides secure approach to +perfomance monitoring and observability in the system. + +For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events monitoring and +observability operations is also open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged +processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring and observability +use cases is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. +If system audit records [14]_ for a process using perf_events system call +API contain denial records of acquiring both CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN +capabilities then providing the process with CAP_PERFMON capability singly +is recommended as the preferred secure approach to resolve double access +denial logging related to usage of performance monitoring and observability. + +Unprivileged processes using perf_events system call are also subject for PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS ptrace access mode check [7]_ , whose outcome determines whether monitoring is permitted. So unprivileged processes provided with CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability are effectively
@@ -82,14 +96,14 @@ performance analysis of monitored processes or a system. For example, CAP_SYSLOG capability permits reading kernel space memory addresses from /proc/kallsyms file. -perf_events/Perf privileged users +Privileged Perf users groups --------------------------------- Mechanisms of capabilities, privileged capability-dumb files [6]_ and -file system ACLs [10]_ can be used to create a dedicated group of -perf_events/Perf privileged users who are permitted to execute -performance monitoring without scope limits. The following steps can be -taken to create such a group of privileged Perf users. +file system ACLs [10]_ can be used to create dedicated groups of +privileged Perf users who are permitted to execute performance monitoring +and observability without scope limits. The following steps can be +taken to create such groups of privileged Perf users. 1. Create perf_users group of privileged Perf users, assign perf_users group to Perf tool executable and limit access to the executable for
@@ -108,30 +122,30 @@ taken to create such a group of privileged Perf users. -rwxr-x--- 2 root perf_users 11M Oct 19 15:12 perf 2. Assign the required capabilities to the Perf tool executable file and - enable members of perf_users group with performance monitoring + enable members of perf_users group with monitoring and observability privileges [6]_ : :: - # setcap "cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf - # setcap -v "cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf + # setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf + # setcap -v "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf perf: OK # getcap perf - perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_sys_admin,cap_syslog+ep + perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep As a result, members of perf_users group are capable of conducting -performance monitoring by using functionality of the configured Perf -tool executable that, when executes, passes perf_events subsystem scope -checks. +performance monitoring and observability by using functionality of the +configured Perf tool executable that, when executes, passes perf_events +subsystem scope checks. This specific access control management is only available to superuser or root running processes with CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_SETFCAP [6]_ capabilities. -perf_events/Perf unprivileged users +Unprivileged users ----------------------------------- -perf_events/Perf *scope* and *access* control for unprivileged processes +perf_events *scope* and *access* control for unprivileged processes is governed by perf_event_paranoid [2]_ setting: -1:
@@ -166,7 +180,7 @@ is governed by perf_event_paranoid [2]_ setting: perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. -perf_events/Perf resource control +Resource control --------------------------------- Open file descriptors
@@ -227,4 +241,5 @@ Bibliography .. [10] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/acl.5.html>`_ .. [11] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/getrlimit.2.html>`_ .. [12] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/limits.conf.5.html>`_ - +.. [13] `<https://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable>`_ +.. [14] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditd.8.html>`_
Signature · 7 lines
2.20.1 _______________________________________________ Intel-gfx mailing list [email protected] https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
PATCH v7 12/12 doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst with CAP_PERFMON information
In reply to Alexey BudankovUpdate kernel.rst documentation file with the information related to usage of CAP_PERFMON capability to secure performance monitoring and observability operations in system.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +11 -5
@@ -720,20 +720,26 @@ perf_event_paranoid: ==================== Controls use of the performance events system by unprivileged -users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN). The default value is 2. +users (without CAP_PERFMON). The default value is 2. + +For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance +monitoring and observability remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN +privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure system +performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged +with respect to CAP_PERFMON use cases. === ================================================================== -1 Allow use of (almost) all events by all users Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK ->=0 Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN +>=0 Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON - Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN + Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_PERFMON ->=1 Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN +>=1 Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON ->=2 Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN +>=2 Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON === ==================================================================
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Patchwork
CI[Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev4)
In reply to Alexey Budankov== Series Details ==
== Series Details ==
Series: Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev4)
URL : https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/72273/
State : warning
== Summary ==
$ dim checkpatch origin/drm-tip 393a5cfde640 capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space -:52: WARNING:COMMIT_LOG_LONG_LINE: Possible unwrapped commit description (prefer a maximum 75 chars per line) #52: [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 0 checks, 36 lines checked6d4fdebe6edc perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process aa3ff32423c0 perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 86671f318860 perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support d1ef8a64f911 drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 5949431a2c37 trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process d54a2312705b powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 00477c2280be parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process ec85f7b8d940 drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 4efe076e5291 drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process f4e5dbd23f6c doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information 1accf5c7199d doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst with CAP_PERFMON information
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
Patchwork
CI[Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev4)
In reply to Alexey Budankov== Series Details ==
== Series Details ==
Series: Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev4)
URL : https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/72273/
State : success
== Summary ==
CI Bug Log - changes from CI_DRM_7954 -> Patchwork_16592
====================================================
Summary
-------
**SUCCESS**
No regressions found.
External URL: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16592/index.html
Known issues
------------
Here are the changes found in Patchwork_16592 that come from known issues:
### IGT changes ###
#### Possible fixes ####
* igt@gem_close_race@basic-threads:
- fi-hsw-peppy: [TIMEOUT][1] ([fdo#112271] / [i915#1084]) -> [PASS][2]
[1]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7954/fi-hsw-peppy/igt@[email protected]
[2]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16592/fi-hsw-peppy/igt@[email protected]
- fi-byt-n2820: [INCOMPLETE][3] ([i915#45]) -> [PASS][4]
[3]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7954/fi-byt-n2820/igt@[email protected]
[4]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16592/fi-byt-n2820/igt@[email protected]
[fdo#112271]: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112271
[i915#1084]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/1084
[i915#45]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/45
Participating hosts (50 -> 46)
------------------------------
Additional (1): fi-ehl-1
Missing (5): fi-hsw-4200u fi-byt-squawks fi-bsw-cyan fi-ctg-p8600 fi-byt-clapper
Build changes
-------------
* CI: CI-20190529 -> None
* Linux: CI_DRM_7954 -> Patchwork_16592
CI-20190529: 20190529
CI_DRM_7954: d7c1791394faaa869d3442705413dac8c0ecd677 @ git://anongit.freedesktop.org/gfx-ci/linux
IGT_5444: c46bae259d427f53fcfcd5f05de0181a9e82d6fe @ git://anongit.freedesktop.org/xorg/app/intel-gpu-tools
Patchwork_16592: 1accf5c7199df9a722b0754bc9f5abd58f926c5f @ git://anongit.freedesktop.org/gfx-ci/linux
== Linux commits ==
1accf5c7199d doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst with CAP_PERFMON information f4e5dbd23f6c doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information 4efe076e5291 drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process ec85f7b8d940 drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 00477c2280be parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process d54a2312705b powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 5949431a2c37 trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process d1ef8a64f911 drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 86671f318860 perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support aa3ff32423c0 perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 6d4fdebe6edc perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 393a5cfde640 capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space
== Logs ==
For more details see: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16592/index.html
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Hi,
Is there anything else I could do in order to move the changes forward or is something still missing from this patch set?
Could you please share you mind?
Thanks,
Alexey
Quoted 195 lines · Alexey Budankov
Currently access to
perf_events,i915_perfand other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel is open only for a privileged process [1] withCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability enabled in the process effective set [2].This patch set introduces
CAP_PERFMONcapability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so thatCAP_PERFMONwould assistCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_PERFMONintends to harden system security and integrity during performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to aCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged process [2]. Providing the access to performance monitoring and observability operations underCAP_PERFMONcapability singly, without the rest ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure. Thus,CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
CAP_PERFMONintends to meet the demand to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted, multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute environments), where root orCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials are not available to mass users of a system, and securely unblock accessibility of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root andCAP_SYS_ADMINuse cases.
CAP_PERFMONintends to take overCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [2] forCAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged with respect to the designedCAP_PERFMONcapability.Possible alternative solution to this system security hardening, capabilities balancing task of making performance monitoring and observability operations more secure and accessible could be to use the existing
CAP_SYS_PTRACEcapability to govern system performance monitoring and observability subsystems. HoweverCAP_SYS_PTRACEcapability still provides users with more credentials than are required for secure performance monitoring and observability operations and this excess is avoided by the designedCAP_PERFMON.Although software running under
CAP_PERFMONcan not ensure avoidance of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate those issues following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [3]. The bugs in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development process [4] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring and observability operations. Finally, the patch set is shaped in the way that simplifies backtracking procedure of possible induced issues [5] as much as possible.The patch set is for tip perf/core repository:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipperf/core
sha1:fdb64822443ec9fb8c3a74b598a74790ae8d2e22---
Changes in v7:
- updated and extendedkernel.rstandperf-security.rstdocumentation files with the information aboutCAP_PERFMONcapability and its use cases
- documented the case of double audit logging ofCAP_PERFMONandCAP_SYS_ADMINcapabilities on a SELinux enabled system
Changes in v6:
- avoided noaudit checks inperfmon_capable()to explicitly advertiseCAP_PERFMONusage thru audit logs to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Changes in v5:
- renamedCAP_SYS_PERFMONtoCAP_PERFMON
- extendedperfmon_capable()with noaudit checks
Changes in v4:
- convertedperfmon_capable()into an inline function
- madeperf_eventskprobes, uprobes, hw breakpoints and namespaces data available toCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes
- appliedperfmon_capable()todrivers/perfanddrivers/oprofile
- extended__cmd_ftrace()with support ofCAP_SYS_PERFMON
Changes in v3:
- implementedperfmon_capable()macros aggregating required capabilities checks
Changes in v2:
- madeperf_eventstrace points available toCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes
- madeperf_event_paranoid_check()treatCAP_SYS_PERFMONequally toCAP_SYS_ADMIN
- appliedCAP_SYS_PERFMONtoi915_perf,bpf_trace, powerpc and parisc system performance monitoring and observability related subsystems---
Alexey Budankov (12):
capabilities: introduceCAP_PERFMONto kernel and user space perf/core: open access to the core forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process perf/core: open access to probes forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process perf tool: extend Perf tool withCAP_PERFMONcapability support drm/i915/perf: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process trace/bpf_trace: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process powerpc/perf: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process parisc/perf: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged processdrivers/perf: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged processdrivers/oprofile: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process doc/admin-guide: updateperf-security.rstwithCAP_PERFMONinformation doc/admin-guide: updatekernel.rstwithCAP_PERFMONinformationDocumentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst | 65 +++++++++++++-------- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 16 +++-- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 +- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 ++--- drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c | 2 +- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 +- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++ include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 ++- kernel/events/core.c | 6 +- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 +- tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 +- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 ++-- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 18 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)---
Validation (Intel Skylake, 8 cores, Fedora 29, 5.5.0-rc3+,x86_64):libcap library [6], [7], [8] and Perf tool can be used to apply
CAP_PERFMONcapability for secure system performance monitoring and observability beyond the scope permitted by the system wideperf_event_paranoidkernel setting [9] and below are the steps for evaluation:- patch, build and boot the kernel
- patch, build Perf tool e.g. to/home/user/perf
...# git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git libcap # pushd libcap # patch libcap/include/uapi/linux/capabilities.h with [PATCH 1] # make # pushd progs # ./setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf # ./setcap -v "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf /home/user/perf: OK # ./getcap /home/user/perf /home/user/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep # echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid 2 ... $ /home/user/perf top ... works as expected ... $ cat /proc/`pidof perf`/status Name: perf Umask: 0002 State: S (sleeping) Tgid: 2958 Ngid: 0 Pid: 2958 PPid: 9847 TracerPid: 0 Uid: 500 500 500 500 Gid: 500 500 500 500 FDSize: 256 ... CapInh: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: 0000004400080000 CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 00000000 cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog CapBnd: 0000007fffffffff CapAmb: 0000000000000000 NoNewPrivs: 0 Seccomp: 0 Speculation_Store_Bypass: thread vulnerable Cpus_allowed: ff Cpus_allowed_list: 0-7 ...Usage of
cap_perfmoneffectively avoids unused credentials excess:- with
cap_sys_admin:
CapEff:0000007fffffffff=> 01111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111- with
cap_perfmon:
CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 0000000038 34 19 perfmon syslog sys_ptrace
Quoted 11 lines
---
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
[2] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[4] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
[5] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/management-style.html#decisions
[6] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/setcap.8.html
[7] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git
[8] https://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/, posix_1003.1e-990310.pdf
[9] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html
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Thanks, this looks good to me, in keeping with the CAP_SYSLOG break.
for the set.
James/Ingo/Peter, if noone has remaining objections, whose branch should these go in through?
thanks,
-serge
Quoted 221 lines · Alexey Budankov
Hi,
Is there anything else I could do in order to move the changes forward or is something still missing from this patch set?
Could you please share you mind?Thanks,
AlexeyQuoted 195 lines · Alexey Budankov
Currently access to
perf_events,i915_perfand other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel is open only for a privileged process [1] withCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability enabled in the process effective set [2].This patch set introduces
CAP_PERFMONcapability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so thatCAP_PERFMONwould assistCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_PERFMONintends to harden system security and integrity during performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to aCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged process [2]. Providing the access to performance monitoring and observability operations underCAP_PERFMONcapability singly, without the rest ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure. Thus,CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
CAP_PERFMONintends to meet the demand to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted, multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute environments), where root orCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials are not available to mass users of a system, and securely unblock accessibility of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root andCAP_SYS_ADMINuse cases.
CAP_PERFMONintends to take overCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [2] forCAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged with respect to the designedCAP_PERFMONcapability.Possible alternative solution to this system security hardening, capabilities balancing task of making performance monitoring and observability operations more secure and accessible could be to use the existing
CAP_SYS_PTRACEcapability to govern system performance monitoring and observability subsystems. HoweverCAP_SYS_PTRACEcapability still provides users with more credentials than are required for secure performance monitoring and observability operations and this excess is avoided by the designedCAP_PERFMON.Although software running under
CAP_PERFMONcan not ensure avoidance of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate those issues following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [3]. The bugs in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development process [4] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring and observability operations. Finally, the patch set is shaped in the way that simplifies backtracking procedure of possible induced issues [5] as much as possible.The patch set is for tip perf/core repository:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipperf/core
sha1:fdb64822443ec9fb8c3a74b598a74790ae8d2e22---
Changes in v7:
- updated and extendedkernel.rstandperf-security.rstdocumentation files with the information aboutCAP_PERFMONcapability and its use cases
- documented the case of double audit logging ofCAP_PERFMONandCAP_SYS_ADMINcapabilities on a SELinux enabled system
Changes in v6:
- avoided noaudit checks inperfmon_capable()to explicitly advertiseCAP_PERFMONusage thru audit logs to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Changes in v5:
- renamedCAP_SYS_PERFMONtoCAP_PERFMON
- extendedperfmon_capable()with noaudit checks
Changes in v4:
- convertedperfmon_capable()into an inline function
- madeperf_eventskprobes, uprobes, hw breakpoints and namespaces data available toCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes
- appliedperfmon_capable()todrivers/perfanddrivers/oprofile
- extended__cmd_ftrace()with support ofCAP_SYS_PERFMON
Changes in v3:
- implementedperfmon_capable()macros aggregating required capabilities checks
Changes in v2:
- madeperf_eventstrace points available toCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes
- madeperf_event_paranoid_check()treatCAP_SYS_PERFMONequally toCAP_SYS_ADMIN
- appliedCAP_SYS_PERFMONtoi915_perf,bpf_trace, powerpc and parisc system performance monitoring and observability related subsystems---
Alexey Budankov (12):
capabilities: introduceCAP_PERFMONto kernel and user space perf/core: open access to the core forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process perf/core: open access to probes forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process perf tool: extend Perf tool withCAP_PERFMONcapability support drm/i915/perf: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process trace/bpf_trace: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process powerpc/perf: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process parisc/perf: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged processdrivers/perf: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged processdrivers/oprofile: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process doc/admin-guide: updateperf-security.rstwithCAP_PERFMONinformation doc/admin-guide: updatekernel.rstwithCAP_PERFMONinformationDocumentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst | 65 +++++++++++++-------- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 16 +++-- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 +- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 ++--- drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c | 2 +- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 +- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++ include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 ++- kernel/events/core.c | 6 +- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 +- tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 +- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 ++-- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 18 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)---
Validation (Intel Skylake, 8 cores, Fedora 29, 5.5.0-rc3+,x86_64):libcap library [6], [7], [8] and Perf tool can be used to apply
CAP_PERFMONcapability for secure system performance monitoring and observability beyond the scope permitted by the system wideperf_event_paranoidkernel setting [9] and below are the steps for evaluation:- patch, build and boot the kernel
- patch, build Perf tool e.g. to/home/user/perf
...# git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git libcap # pushd libcap # patch libcap/include/uapi/linux/capabilities.h with [PATCH 1] # make # pushd progs # ./setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf # ./setcap -v "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf /home/user/perf: OK # ./getcap /home/user/perf /home/user/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep # echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid 2 ... $ /home/user/perf top ... works as expected ... $ cat /proc/`pidof perf`/status Name: perf Umask: 0002 State: S (sleeping) Tgid: 2958 Ngid: 0 Pid: 2958 PPid: 9847 TracerPid: 0 Uid: 500 500 500 500 Gid: 500 500 500 500 FDSize: 256 ... CapInh: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: 0000004400080000 CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 00000000 cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog CapBnd: 0000007fffffffff CapAmb: 0000000000000000 NoNewPrivs: 0 Seccomp: 0 Speculation_Store_Bypass: thread vulnerable Cpus_allowed: ff Cpus_allowed_list: 0-7 ...Usage of
cap_perfmoneffectively avoids unused credentials excess:- with
cap_sys_admin:
CapEff:0000007fffffffff=> 01111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111- with
cap_perfmon:
CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 0000000038 34 19 perfmon syslog sys_ptraceQuoted 11 lines
---
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
[2] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[4] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
[5] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/management-style.html#decisions
[6] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/setcap.8.html
[7] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git
[8] https://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/, posix_1003.1e-990310.pdf
[9] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html_______________________________________________
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James Morris
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Serge Hallyn
Thanks, this looks good to me, in keeping with the
CAP_SYSLOGbreak.Acked-by Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>for the set.
James/Ingo/Peter, if noone has remaining objections, whose branch should these go in through?
thanks,
I was assuming via the perf tree, but I am happy to take them.
Quoted 225 lines
-serge
Quoted 221 lines · Alexey Budankov
Hi,
Is there anything else I could do in order to move the changes forward or is something still missing from this patch set?
Could you please share you mind?Thanks,
AlexeyQuoted 195 lines · Alexey Budankov
Currently access to
perf_events,i915_perfand other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel is open only for a privileged process [1] withCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability enabled in the process effective set [2].This patch set introduces
CAP_PERFMONcapability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so thatCAP_PERFMONwould assistCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_PERFMONintends to harden system security and integrity during performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to aCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged process [2]. Providing the access to performance monitoring and observability operations underCAP_PERFMONcapability singly, without the rest ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure. Thus,CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
CAP_PERFMONintends to meet the demand to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted, multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute environments), where root orCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials are not available to mass users of a system, and securely unblock accessibility of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root andCAP_SYS_ADMINuse cases.
CAP_PERFMONintends to take overCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [2] forCAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged with respect to the designedCAP_PERFMONcapability.Possible alternative solution to this system security hardening, capabilities balancing task of making performance monitoring and observability operations more secure and accessible could be to use the existing
CAP_SYS_PTRACEcapability to govern system performance monitoring and observability subsystems. HoweverCAP_SYS_PTRACEcapability still provides users with more credentials than are required for secure performance monitoring and observability operations and this excess is avoided by the designedCAP_PERFMON.Although software running under
CAP_PERFMONcan not ensure avoidance of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate those issues following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [3]. The bugs in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development process [4] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring and observability operations. Finally, the patch set is shaped in the way that simplifies backtracking procedure of possible induced issues [5] as much as possible.The patch set is for tip perf/core repository:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipperf/core
sha1:fdb64822443ec9fb8c3a74b598a74790ae8d2e22---
Changes in v7:
- updated and extendedkernel.rstandperf-security.rstdocumentation files with the information aboutCAP_PERFMONcapability and its use cases
- documented the case of double audit logging ofCAP_PERFMONandCAP_SYS_ADMINcapabilities on a SELinux enabled system
Changes in v6:
- avoided noaudit checks inperfmon_capable()to explicitly advertiseCAP_PERFMONusage thru audit logs to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Changes in v5:
- renamedCAP_SYS_PERFMONtoCAP_PERFMON
- extendedperfmon_capable()with noaudit checks
Changes in v4:
- convertedperfmon_capable()into an inline function
- madeperf_eventskprobes, uprobes, hw breakpoints and namespaces data available toCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes
- appliedperfmon_capable()todrivers/perfanddrivers/oprofile
- extended__cmd_ftrace()with support ofCAP_SYS_PERFMON
Changes in v3:
- implementedperfmon_capable()macros aggregating required capabilities checks
Changes in v2:
- madeperf_eventstrace points available toCAP_SYS_PERFMONprivileged processes
- madeperf_event_paranoid_check()treatCAP_SYS_PERFMONequally toCAP_SYS_ADMIN
- appliedCAP_SYS_PERFMONtoi915_perf,bpf_trace, powerpc and parisc system performance monitoring and observability related subsystems---
Alexey Budankov (12):
capabilities: introduceCAP_PERFMONto kernel and user space perf/core: open access to the core forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process perf/core: open access to probes forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process perf tool: extend Perf tool withCAP_PERFMONcapability support drm/i915/perf: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process trace/bpf_trace: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process powerpc/perf: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process parisc/perf: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged processdrivers/perf: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged processdrivers/oprofile: open access forCAP_PERFMONprivileged process doc/admin-guide: updateperf-security.rstwithCAP_PERFMONinformation doc/admin-guide: updatekernel.rstwithCAP_PERFMONinformationDocumentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst | 65 +++++++++++++-------- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 16 +++-- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 +- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 ++--- drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c | 2 +- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 +- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++ include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 ++- kernel/events/core.c | 6 +- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 +- tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 +- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 ++-- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 18 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)---
Validation (Intel Skylake, 8 cores, Fedora 29, 5.5.0-rc3+,x86_64):libcap library [6], [7], [8] and Perf tool can be used to apply
CAP_PERFMONcapability for secure system performance monitoring and observability beyond the scope permitted by the system wideperf_event_paranoidkernel setting [9] and below are the steps for evaluation:- patch, build and boot the kernel
- patch, build Perf tool e.g. to/home/user/perf
...# git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git libcap # pushd libcap # patch libcap/include/uapi/linux/capabilities.h with [PATCH 1] # make # pushd progs # ./setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf # ./setcap -v "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf /home/user/perf: OK # ./getcap /home/user/perf /home/user/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep # echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid 2 ... $ /home/user/perf top ... works as expected ... $ cat /proc/`pidof perf`/status Name: perf Umask: 0002 State: S (sleeping) Tgid: 2958 Ngid: 0 Pid: 2958 PPid: 9847 TracerPid: 0 Uid: 500 500 500 500 Gid: 500 500 500 500 FDSize: 256 ... CapInh: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: 0000004400080000 CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 00000000 cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog CapBnd: 0000007fffffffff CapAmb: 0000000000000000 NoNewPrivs: 0 Seccomp: 0 Speculation_Store_Bypass: thread vulnerable Cpus_allowed: ff Cpus_allowed_list: 0-7 ...Usage of
cap_perfmoneffectively avoids unused credentials excess:- with
cap_sys_admin:
CapEff:0000007fffffffff=> 01111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111- with
cap_perfmon:
CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 0000000038 34 19 perfmon syslog sys_ptraceQuoted 11 lines
---
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
[2] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[4] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
[5] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/management-style.html#decisions
[6] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/setcap.8.html
[7] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git
[8] https://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/, posix_1003.1e-990310.pdf
[9] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html_______________________________________________
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James Morris <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
James Morris
maintainerQuoted 6 lines · Serge Hallyn
Thanks, this looks good to me, in keeping with the
CAP_SYSLOGbreak.Acked-by Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>for the set.
Quoted 13 lines
James/Ingo/Peter, if noone has remaining objections, whose branch should these go in through?
thanks,
-sergeQuoted 6 lines · Alexey Budankov
Hi,
Is there anything else I could do in order to move the changes forward or is something still missing from this patch set?
Could you please share you mind?
Alexey,
It seems some of the previous Acks are not included in this patchset, e.g.
https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/1/22/655
Every patch needs a Reviewed-by or Acked-by from maintainers of the code being changed.
You have enough from the security folk, but I can't see any included from the perf folk.
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James Morris <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel